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52-508: In 1917, Brigadier General Benedict Crowell was called to active duty and served on the General Munitions Board. As a board member, he established a relationship with the steel industry and was almost immediately appointed Assistant Secretary of War and Director of Munitions. As Director of Munitions, Crowell was a significant catalyst in improving the country's capability to produce arms and ammunition. However, he recognized

104-452: A dealer distribution model by effectively eliminating dealer margins ... [impacting] ... small and medium-sized businesses", amongst other issues. NDIA currently publishes National Defense , Weekly Policy Digest , Weekly Defense Insider , and Monthly Defense Watch . National Defense has been published under a series of different titles since 1940: Additional variations during the above periods: NDIA has 29 chapters located throughout

156-564: A key source of advocacy for creating a single unified military department after the war. Following studies by the JCS Joint Strategic Survey Committee on ways to resolve joint roles and missions problems, George Marshall published a memo in support of postwar unification on November 2, 1942. Marshall's memo called for the following: During both World Wars, but particularly World War 2, aviation had become increasingly important. The aircraft carrier had overtaken

208-493: A lack of attention to " logistics in war ," and a "lack of coordination among the services." In the years following the war, President Truman had been pushing for the unification of the armed services until the passing of the National Security Act of 1947, having research conducted on the topic since 1944 and having expressed his desire for Congress to act on the issue as early as April 6, 1946. He stated in

260-620: A letter to Congress on June 15, 1946, that he "consider[s] it vital that we have a unified force for our national defense ." President Truman had worked closely with the Army and the Navy to establish a consensus, but the departments struggled to come to an agreement until 1947. However, even if everyone could admit that a military reorganization was necessary, they could not agree on how it should be done. The process of obtaining even tentative consensus would take nearly four years. On March 28, 1944,

312-690: A letter to members of both the House Committee on Armed Services and the Senate Committee on Armed Services opposing Section 828 of S. 4628, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 , entitled "Requirement for Contractors to Provide Reasonable Access to Repair Materials". The proposed Section 828 raised concerns for NDIA that include "no carve-outs or limitations to protect sensitive trade secret information" and impacts on "the economics of

364-458: A promising way to save money by reducing duplication, and this would become a theme to which its proponents would repeatedly return. It also created a sense of urgency to quickly institutionalize lessons learned from World War 2. However, the shrinking budgets also created a zero-sum game environment which encouraged interservice bickering by pitting Army and Navy advocates against each other. Before World War II , congressional committees oversaw

416-440: A related House resolution (80 H.Con.Res. 70) on July 16, 1947. The bill received bipartisan support and was passed in both chambers by voice vote . The National Security Act of 1947 was signed into law by President Truman on July 26, 1947, while aboard his VC-54C presidential aircraft Sacred Cow . From 1921 to 1945, Congress considered approximately 50 bills to reorganize the armed forces. Mostly due to opposition by both

468-734: A single uniformed "Commander of all Forces." On June 19, 1945, the Department of the Navy began its own investigation. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal requested an objective investigation of the postwar reorganization by his friend Ferdinand Eberstadt , the former chairman of the Army-Navy Munitions Board and former vice chair of the War Production Board. By late September, Eberstadt had finished his report, and Forrestal forwarded it to

520-466: A way forward. On May 13th, Truman held the meeting, and demanded that Patterson and Forrestal find a way to break the impasse by the end of the month due to the urgency of passing unification legislation. He also said that he had accepted the Navy's arguments against the chief of staff. Finally, he told his chief of staff, Admiral William Leahy, to silence criticism of unification by naval officers. May 31st Patterson and Forrestal reported to him that of

572-488: Is "only in matters relating to the conduct of the present war" and that these authorities will expire "six months after the termination of the war." During World War II, then- chief of staff of the Army George Marshall brought the idea of unification of the armed services to President Franklin D. Roosevelt , but "he was routinely rebuffed on the grounds that a substantive discussion of this option while

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624-643: The Cabinet -level War Department and Navy Department , and while each department was separate from the other, both were able to obtain aircraft . During this time, the President had a level of authority over the departments. After the attack on Pearl Harbor , Congress passed the First War Powers Act , which authorized the sitting president "to make such redistribution of functions among executive agencies as he may deem necessary" provided that it

676-800: The Congress of the Confederation under the Articles of Confederation between 1781 and 1789. Benjamin Lincoln and later Henry Knox held the position. When Washington was inaugurated as the first President under the Constitution , he appointed Knox to continue serving as Secretary of War. The secretary of war was the head of the War Department . At first, he was responsible for all military affairs, including naval affairs . In 1798,

728-596: The Roberts Commission , and would continue to be investigated through almost the end of the century. One of the findings that emerged was the probable role of intelligence failures linked to interservice bickering between Pearl Harbor's Army and Navy commanders, General Walter Short and Admiral Husband Kimmel. Though not a court martial, the Roberts Commission explicitly accused the two of dereliction of duty for not conferring to coordinate in light of

780-777: The secretary of the Navy was created by statute, and the scope of responsibility for this office was reduced to the affairs of the United States Army . From 1886 onward, the secretary of war was in the line of succession to the presidency , after the vice president of the United States , the Speaker of the House of Representatives , the President pro tempore of the Senate and the secretary of state . In 1947, with

832-572: The Commandant of the Marine Corps, Alexander Vandegrift, addressed the committee. The hearings ended on May 19, 1944. Due to the increasingly apparent disagreements between the two departments, committee members and military leaders agreed that a fight between them would be bad for the war effort. In June, the committee reported the time was not right for legislation, but encouraged the two departments to continue to study unification. While

884-529: The Department of the Navy and the War Department, all but one failed to reach the floor of the House, and even this one was defeated by a vote of 153 to 135 in 1932. However, by the end of World War 2, several factors forced leaders to more seriously consider restructuring the military to improve unity. By 1945, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor had already been investigated several times, for example by

936-640: The Department of the Navy. Aside from the unification of the three military departments, the act established the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency , the latter of which is headed by the Director of Central Intelligence . The legislation was a result of efforts by Harry S. Truman beginning in 1944. President Truman proposed the legislation to Congress on February 26, 1947. The bill

988-525: The House and Senate, and would go into effect for the 80th United States Congress. Additionally, in August, Thomas suggested to Truman that he use an executive order to execute some unification changes, for example by creating a Council of Common Defense led by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. Thomas believed that forcing the military to operate under unification for several months might convince all involved, particularly Congress, that unification legislation

1040-584: The House passed a resolution introduced by Rep. James W. Wadsworth (R-NY) to create a Select Committee On Postwar Military Policy, and this began the debate. The committee chair was Rep. Clifton A. Woodrum (D-VA), and the committee itself was made up of seven members of the Naval Affairs Committee, seven members of the Military Affairs Committee, and nine other members. Though the War Department considered asking for

1092-626: The Marine Corps, all of which had been ended by congressional oversight. He noted Marine Corps successes such as the prediction of the course of the Pacific War by Pete Ellis, and a history of extreme frugality that did not characterize other services. Finally, he denounced the War Department plan as a transparent attempt to quietly marginalize and disband the Marine Corps by removing its congressional protection. On May 7th, Clark Clifford, Truman's lead for unification legislation, told General Norstad and Assistant Secretary of War Stuart Symington that

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1144-494: The Marine Corps. In January 1946, Senator Elbert D. Thomas formed a subcommittee within the Senate Military Affairs Committee to draft unification legislation. The subcommittee included Vice Admiral Arthur Radford and Major General Lauris Norstad as advisors from the Department of the Navy and the War Department. On April 9th, the subcommittee introduced the bill, S. 2044. Its key points were

1196-610: The National Training & Simulation Association (NTSA), the Precision Strike Association (PSA), and Women in Defense (WID). United States Secretary of War The secretary of war was a member of the U.S. president 's Cabinet , beginning with George Washington 's administration . A similar position, called either "Secretary at War" or "Secretary of War", had been appointed to serve

1248-849: The Navy , and the newly established Department of the Air Force (DAF) into the National Military Establishment (NME). The act also created the position of the secretary of defense as the head of the NME. It established the United States Air Force under the DAF, which worked to separate the Army Air Forces into its own service. It also protected the Marine Corps as an independent service under

1300-477: The Navy's response. The same month, Forrestal asked Sen. David Walsh, the chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, to hold hearings of his own so that the Navy would have a chance to properly present their counterargument to the War Department Proposal. At the same time, the Commandant directed the head of Marine Corps Schools, Merrill Twining, to create a Marine Corps Board to do the same for

1352-483: The Richardson Committee presented their findings and recommendations. They found that most Army officers and about half the Navy officers favored unification to a single service, but disagreed on the details. The committee's recommendations went even farther than McNarney's, calling not only for one civilian secretary overseeing the military and none overseeing the individual services, but also calling for

1404-564: The Senate. From October 7th to December 17, 1945, the Senate Military Affairs Committee conducted hearings to consider unification bills. These included not only S. 84, but also S. 1482, introduced in the middle of the hearings by Sens. Edwin C. Johnson (D-CO) and Harley M. Kilgore (D-WV). However, the hearings mostly became a venue for the two departments, increasingly at odds, to give their official positions on different unification plans. On October 30th, General J. Lawton Collins presented

1456-483: The Thomas Bill could not pass in its current form, and that the Naval Affairs Committee hearings were causing it to lose more support every day. He also admitted he had been swayed by some of the Navy's objections, especially regarding the role of the chief of staff. Clifford recommended that Truman meet with the secretaries of War and the Navy and their advisors to clarify points of agreement and disagreement and find

1508-645: The US military two case studies of joint operations between Europe and the Pacific. In the Pacific, the Army and Navy had experienced constant friction from command and logistics problems. In Europe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) , created based on the British Chiefs of Staff Committee , had smoothed over these coordination problems and became President Roosevelt's principal military advisors. The JCS became

1560-554: The United States. NDIA consists of subject-specific divisions that aim to promote defense and national security through access, influence, and education. NDIA has 5 industrial committees and working groups that bring government and industry personnel together on important topics. NDIA affiliates include the Association for Enterprise Information (AFEI), the Emerging Technologies Institute (ETI),

1612-687: The War Department and Department of the Navy "get in line" behind the official White House policy. When questioned about Army lobbying tactics, Truman claimed ignorance, but stated he was opposed to all congressional lobbying by the two departments. On April 30th, the Senate Naval Affairs Committee began hearings to consider S. 2044. On May 6th, Commandant of the Marine Corps Alexander Vandegrift testified. His testimony noted that on multiple occasions there had been efforts to marginalize and disband

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1664-538: The War Department plan in all respects. The hearings concluded as Congress went into its Christmas recess with the two departments and their congressional allies at an impasse. Over the course of the 1945 hearings, Navy and Marine Corps resistance to the War Department plan began to coalesce. In October, on the advice of Admiral Radford, Forrestal created the Secretary's Committee on Research on Reorganization (SCOROR) to track unification developments and help manage

1716-534: The War Department's plan. It combined features of recommendations made by the Richardson committee (other than Richardson's dissent) and Marshall's original plan from November 1942. Its key recommendations included the following: On November 29th, Assistant Secretary of the Navy H. Struve Hensel presented the Department of the Navy's plan. It was the recommendations of the Eberstadt Report, but left

1768-576: The Woodrum Committee met, the JCS continued to study the problem by convening their own committee of two Army officers and two Navy officers. It was led by former Pacific Fleet commander Admiral James O. Richardson . The Richardson committee interviewed eighty commanders both at war and in Washington, almost all of flag rank, to get their thoughts on postwar reorganization. On April 18, 1945,

1820-535: The battleship as the Navy's premier surface combatant. Army airmen had called for an independent air service since 1919, and the Army's Air Corps had already been expanded into what bordered on a separate service. Finally, the advent of nuclear weapons delivered by bombers led some leaders, such as Curtis LeMay , to believe air power would inevitably become more decisive than ground warfare or sea power. The time seemed right to create an independent air force, but it would require congressional action. Immediately following

1872-536: The chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, David Walsh. The 200 page report's key recommendations included the following: On January 3, 1945, the first day of the 79th Congress, Rep. Jennings Randolph (D-WV) submitted unification bill H.R. 550 to the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department. Two days later, Sen. Lister Hill (D-AL) introduced a similar bill, S. 84, in

1924-422: The country was at war might undermine the war effort ." On August 26, 1944, future president Harry S. Truman , who was a senator at the time, wrote that "under such a set-up [of unification] another Pearl Harbor will not have to be feared" in his article "Our Armed Forces Must Be United". Military problems apparent during World War II that turned attention to the need for unification were a lack of preparedness ,

1976-414: The following: On March 15th and 16th, Army Air Corps Commanding General Carl Spaatz and Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower wrote two papers regarding unification JCS 1478/10 and 1478/11, that dealt with Army objectives for postwar unification. Marked "TOP SECRET", the two papers were blunt in their statement of their intent to marginalize the Marine Corps. The Eisenhower-Spaatz proposal's key points were

2028-474: The following: The papers were forwarded to the chief of naval operations, Admiral Chester Nimitz, for his thoughts. There the papers came to the attention of Merritt Edson, the Marine Corps liaison to the chief of naval operations. Edson alerted the commandant of the Marine Corps and the members of the Marine Corps Board, most of whom, particularly Merrill Twining, believed that the only purpose of

2080-515: The hearings to be postponed to prevent an interservice fight that could hurt wartime unity, they decided not to when Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox told Secretary of War Henry Stimson that he also favored unification. The hearings began on April 24, 1944. On the second day, Lieutenant General Joseph McNarney presented the War Department's plan for unification, which was essentially Marshall's plan as laid out in his memo. On May 11th,

2132-647: The nation's need for an association that fostered cooperation between civilian industry and government in support of industrial preparedness. He founded the Army Ordnance Association (AOA) in 1919 and served as president for its first 25 years. Over the ensuing decades, AOA became the American Defense Preparedness Association (ADPA), which then merged with the 1944 National Security Industrial Association (NSIA) in 1997, creating NDIA. In July 2024, NDIA signed

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2184-508: The papers' high classification was to conceal the Army's goals from Congress. Nimitz replied on March 30th, and included responses by the Commandant and by the head of Naval Aviation, both of whom were strongly against the proposals. Following the bill's introduction, the Department of the Navy openly opposed it. In a press conference on April 11th, Truman said he had not authorized Navy officers to speak against unification, only to offer their honest opinions. He demanded that members of both

2236-473: The passing of the National Security Act of 1947 , the secretary of war was replaced by the secretary of the Army and the secretary of the Air Force , which, along with the secretary of the Navy, have since 1949 been non-Cabinet subordinates under the secretary of defense . The secretary of the Army's office is generally considered the direct successor to the secretary of war's office although

2288-585: The president of the board, the secretary wore no special insignia. The inspector general, quartermaster general , commissary general, and adjutant general served on the secretary's staff. However, the Army itself under Secretary Henry Knox only consisted of 700 men.     Federalist (4)     Democratic-Republican (8)     Democratic (14)     Whig (5)     Republican (25) National Security Act of 1947 The National Security Act of 1947 ( Pub.L. 80-253 , 61 Stat. 495 , enacted July 26, 1947)

2340-447: The question of an independent air force up to Congress. Proponents of the Department of the Navy's plan came across as obstructionists due to the previous Woodrum Committee hearings having framed the debate entirely in terms of the War Department plan. Proponents of the War Department's plan repeatedly emphasized the cost savings it would provide. On December 19th, Truman let Congress know his own thoughts on unification. They mirrored

2392-594: The secretary of defense took the secretary of war's position in the Cabinet, and the line of succession to the presidency. The office of Secretary at War was modeled upon Great Britain's secretary at war , who was William Barrington, 2nd Viscount Barrington , at the time of the American Revolution. The office of Secretary at War was meant to replace both the commander-in-chief and the Board of War , and like

2444-610: The twelve points in S. 2044 they agreed on eight and disagreed on four. The points of agreement were as follows: The remaining points of disagreement were the following: The period of rival Military Affairs Committee and Naval Affairs Committee hearings came to an end for good on August 2nd, when Truman signed the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 . It combined the Military Affairs and Naval Affairs Committees into Armed Services Committees in

2496-579: The war, confronting the Soviets was a lower priority than ending wartime austerity, balancing the federal budget, and returning to peace. This situation would not change until the Soviet Union developed nuclear weapons in 1949, followed by the Korean War in 1950. In this environment, forces were rapidly demobilized, and budgets were slashed. In Fiscal Year 1946, the military's total budget ceiling

2548-426: The warnings. During World War 2, interservice cooperation remained voluntary, requiring complex interchanges of liaisons for planning and operations. Additionally, the Army and Navy often competed for resources, for example industrial production and new recruits. Enabling operations under these conditions had required the creation of numerous joint agencies and interdepartmental committees. World War 2 had also given

2600-535: Was a law enacting major restructuring of the United States government 's military and intelligence agencies following World War II . The majority of the provisions of the act took effect on September 18, 1947, the day after the Senate confirmed James Forrestal as the first secretary of defense . The act merged the Department of the Army (renamed from the Department of War ), the Department of

2652-601: Was approximately $ 42 billion. In Fiscal Year 1947, it was $ 14 billion. On V-J Day, the US military consisted of the Army's 91 Army divisions, 9 Marine Corps divisions, 1,166 combat ships in the Navy, and 213 combat groups in the Army Air Forces. By the end of demobilization on June 30, 1947, the Army had 10 divisions, the Marine Corps had 2 divisions, the Navy had 343 combat ships, and the Army Air Forces had 63 groups of which only 11 were fully operational. As forces were reduced and budgets were cut, unification seemed like

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2704-410: Was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on February 28, 1947, and in the Senate on March 3, 1947. Senator Chan Gurney was the bill's sponsor . Senator Gurney, as chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services , led committee hearings for the bill from mid-March to early May. The bill passed in the Senate on July 9, 1947, and in the House on July 19, 1947. The Senate agreed to

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