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85-611: Armoured cavalry, or simply armoured units, may be primarily equipped with heavy tanks or lighter and faster light tanks , armoured cars , or even scout cars in the case of what is often known as cavalry scout. Motorised or mechanised infantry may make up a portion of the unit in some countries, supported by either motorised or self-propelled artillery , with possibly airmobile troops on helicopters included. Horse-mounted troops used various forms of armour for their own protection, and often added protective elements to their mount's tack . Horse armour included hardened leather in

170-495: A battalion of forty-eight Vickers Medium Mark I tanks, a motorised machine-gun battalion, a mechanised artillery regiment, which had one battery of fully tracked self-propelled Birch guns capable of acting as conventional or anti-aircraft artillery, and a motorised company of field engineers. The unit carried out operations on Salisbury Plain and was observed by the other major nations, the United States , Germany , and

255-431: A better range than their WW I predecessors. To save weight, such designs had thin armour plating and this inspired fitting small-calibre high-velocity guns in turrets, giving tanks a good antitank capacity. Both France and Britain eventually built specialised infantry tanks, more heavily armoured to provide infantry support, and cavalry tanks that were faster and could exploit a breakthrough, seeking to bring about defeat of

340-468: A dangerous practice. The turboshaft -powered M1 Abrams , for example, has such hot exhaust gas that nearby infantry have to be careful where they stand. Tanks can also be very vulnerable to well aimed artillery ; well-coordinated air support and counter-battery artillery units can help overcome this. While attempts to defeat the tank were made before and during the Second World War, through

425-463: A deliberate military doctrine, in 1941, it ultimately failed on the eastern front, though initially attaining spectacular successes. Before the war, Heinz Guderian had in his Achtung–Panzer! propounded a thorough mechanisation of the German forces. By 1942, increased AFV-production allowed a fuller implementation of this ideal. Now extensive armoured combined arms team could be formed, distinct from

510-581: A group of three German A7V tanks engaged a group of three British Mark IV tanks which they met accidentally. After the final German spring offensives of 21 March to 18 July 1918, the Entente deployed tanks en masse at the Battle of Soissons (18 to 22 July 1918) and Battle of Amiens (August 1918), which ended the stalemate imposed by trench warfare on the Western Front, and thus effectively ended

595-840: A horsed cavalry role to a mechanized one, re-equipping with armoured cars previously used by the Royal Tank Corps . Other regiments followed suit; in April 1939, the Royal Armoured Corps was formed to encompass the eighteen mechanized cavalry regiments of the line alongside the eight battalions of the Royal Tank Regiment , but did not include the Household Cavalry . The remaining two regular cavalry regiments were based in Palestine, and following

680-679: A lack of effective armoured tactics. Strategic use of tanks developed only slowly during and immediately after World War I, partly due to these technical limits but also due to the prestige role traditionally accorded to horse-mounted cavalry. An exception, on paper, was the Plan 1919 of the British Army's Colonel J. F. C. Fuller , who envisaged using the expected vast increase in armour production during 1919 to execute deep strategic penetrations by mechanised forces consisting of tanks and infantry carried by trucks, supported by aeroplanes, to paralyse

765-495: A mixture of M48 Patton or M551 Sheridan tanks and M113 ACAVs (Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicles). The aviation troop of the squadron was equipped with helicopters, consisting of UH-1 transports, OH-6 Cayuse scouts, OH-58 Kiowa scout/gunships, and AH-1 Cobra gunships . Armoured cavalry regiments operated in country for the Corps/Theater Commander, while the squadrons operated as the "eyes and ears" for

850-570: A narrow cooperation between large armoured units – of the Panzerwaffe and the Cavalry – and "active" infantry divisions to break the Polish defensive lines and pursue the defeated enemy forces. The more limited and dispersed Polish armoured units were quickly destroyed. The Red Army, invading the east of Poland , also deployed armoured divisions. At the time, the swift collapse of the Polish army

935-496: A purely infantry or cavalry formation. The panzer divisions integrated tanks with mechanised infantry (riding in halftracks to be protected from small-arms fire while being transported) and self-propelled artillery (howitzers fitted on a tank chassis). This allowed the panzer division to become an independent combat force, in principle able to overcome the problems of attaining a breakthrough against entrenched enemy infantry, equipped with large numbers of antitank-guns, with

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1020-481: A sharp increase in the number of available tanks for 1918. The German Empire , on the contrary, produced only a few tanks, late in the war. Twenty German A7V tanks were produced during the entire conflict, compared to over 4,400 French and over 2,500 British tanks of various kinds. Nonetheless, World War I saw the first tank-versus-tank battle, during the Second Battle of Villers-Bretonneux in April 1918, when

1105-525: A sudden change in the global geostrategic situation, gaining Germany a position of hegemony on the European continent, but also seemed to vindicate the theories of Fuller and Liddell-Hart. Confronted with the undeniable potential of armoured manoeuvre warfare, from the summer of 1940 onwards the armed forces of all surviving major powers adapted their tactical doctrine, unit organisation, strategic planning and tank production plans. According to Frieser, this

1190-456: A tank component supplemented by tank destroyers formed into independent tank destroyer battalions . The latter is most closely identified with the Chief of Army Ground Forces, Lesley J. McNair . Having studied the early German successes McNair came under the belief that U.S. forces would be faced with fast moving enemy forces who would seek to bypass, isolate and reduce U.S. forces in a replay of

1275-527: A war of attrition and embarked on a high-risk strategy. They approved the Manstein Plan , envisaging an advance through the Ardennes by the main mass of German infantry divisions, spearheaded by seven armoured divisions, while the main mobile French reserve consisting of three Cavalry armoured divisions ( Divisions Légères Mécaniques or Mechanised Light Divisions) – the only armoured units organised on

1360-483: Is an extreme example but exemplifies what has been fairly thoroughly documented since the Second World War: tanks and infantry work best by taking advantage of each other's strengths and combining to minimise the weaknesses. In many conflicts, it was usual to see infantry riding on the back of tanks, ready to jump off and provide support when necessary. Unfortunately, the design of many modern tanks makes this

1445-595: Is organized into squadrons and troops , which are equivalent to battalions and companies respectively. A regiment of armoured cavalry, such as the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (the Black Horse Regiment) in Vietnam, consisted of three full squadrons of armoured cavalry. The squadron normally consisted of a headquarters troop, three cavalry troops, a tank company, a 155-mm self-propelled howitzer battery, and an aviation troop. The three ground troops were

1530-513: The Panzerwaffe . The precise interpretation of this phenomenon has proven controversial among military historians. Traditionally, it has been seen as part of a " Blitzkrieg strategy" of swift world conquest by means of armoured forces. Later it has been argued, among others by Karl-Heinz Frieser , that the German army in the 1930s did not even possess an explicit Blitzkrieg tactical doctrine, let alone strategy. This would have been reflected by

1615-707: The 1937 repression of the officer corps . The Red Army ignored the lessons from Nomonhan , which had been successfully conducted by General Zhukov , and relied instead on lessons from politically selected officers who were veterans of the Spanish Civil War . The result was a poor showing during the Winter War . The Red Army tank fleet was extremely large, consisting of some 24,000 vehicles, but many were obsolete or unfit for service due to difficulties with supplying spare parts and lack of qualified support staff. One important development took place shortly before

1700-522: The First World War cavalry units were mostly converted from horses to either armoured cars or tanks which became known as either mechanized cavalry fulfilling a reconnaissance role, or armoured cavalry serving in the offensive role that seeks to break through the enemy defences. In October 1928, a new era began for the cavalry of the British Army when the 11th Hussars became the first regular cavalry regiment to "mechanize", to change from

1785-654: The French Army as the best army in Europe, and consequently the U.S. Army frequently copied French uniforms (the American Civil War) and aeroplanes. Only when France was rapidly overrun in 1940 did the U.S. Army become "shocked" into re-thinking the influences by the perceived actions of German tanks in the 1939 Polish Campaign. Its Armored Combat Arm was not created until 1940 when the Armored Force

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1870-623: The IJN favoured all-around protective armour) IJA tanks were lightly armoured. As with most armour during the 1930s, the main guns were small in calibre: 37 mm for their Type 95 light tanks and 47 mm for the Type 97 medium tank, but this was sometimes compensated by a high muzzle velocity. The IJA's use of tanks in China exemplifies its doctrine: light tanks were used for scouting or acted as mobile infantry support, while medium tanks supported

1955-534: The Schneider CA , also failed to live up to expectations. In the Battle of Cambrai (November to December 1917) British tanks were more successful, and broke a German trenchline system , the Hindenburg Line . Despite the generally unpromising beginnings, the military and political leadership in both Britain and France during 1917 backed large investment into armoured-vehicle production. This led to

2040-612: The Second Battle of El Alamein . In 2022, Kendrick Kuo, assistant professor at the U.S. Naval War College, wrote that due to factors emanating from the interwar period , the British army in North Africa initially operated their armoured units with little infantry or artillery support. Meanwhile, the Germans had integrated their armour with mechanised infantry and artillery. Only after undoing their misplaced emphasis on armour were

2125-576: The Soviet Union . Although its performance was recognised, it was disbanded in 1928. In 2022, Kendrick Kuo, assistant professor at the U.S. Naval War College , argued that the British army, under budget and over-stretched during the interwar period, pursued innovation recklessly by betting on the combat effectiveness of armoured units operating with little infantry or artillery support. Doing so led to its initial setbacks in North Africa during

2210-474: The Western Front by the effectiveness of entrenched defensive infantry armed with machine guns – known as trench warfare . Under these conditions, attacks usually advanced very slowly and incurred massive casualties. The developers of tanks aimed to return manoeuvre to warfare, and found a practical way to do so: providing caterpillar traction to machine guns allowing them to overcome trenches, while at

2295-639: The 11th ACR's tank companies) were equipped with the M551 Sheridan armored airborne reconnaissance assault vehicle (today, known to historians as a light tank ). Armoured cavalry units can use hunter-killer teams. Scout vehicles and tanks can operate in concert, suited respectively as "hunters" and "killers". For instance, in U.S. land forces, the cavalry scouts of a team (often mounted in M3 Bradley Cavalry Fighting Vehicles) go in search of enemy positions, and flush

2380-478: The 1920s the armoured vehicles, as early road transport in general, were extremely unreliable, and could not be used in sustained operations. Mainstream thought on the subject was more conservative and tried to integrate armoured vehicles into the existing infantry and cavalry organisation and tactics. Technical development initially focussed on the improvement of the suspension system, transmission and engine, to create vehicles that were faster, more reliable and had

2465-494: The 1930s, political tensions between the world powers quickly increased. The Soviet Union and France began to rearm in the early thirties. In the Soviet Union, the mechanisation of the armed forces was part of a massive general industrialisation programme, the successive Five Years Plans , and the country soon had more tanks than the rest of the world combined, thousands of them being produced per year. In this period, before

2550-523: The 4th Cavalry Division was transformed into the 1e Division Légère Mécanique , the first French armoured division of the Cavalry. In Germany, after the Nazi Regime started open rearmament in March 1935, on 15 October 1935 three Panzerdivisionen were formed. Though some tank brigades were part of the Cavalry or Infantry arm, most German tanks were concentrated into a special branch, from 1936 called

2635-548: The Allies on the tactical and operational level. German tanks operated while directed by radio communication, which allowed tank commanders to take greater advantage of the manoeuvrability of their vehicles. Even after the conquest of Poland , "Blitzkrieg" was not defined on the strategic level. Guderian and von Manstein devised a strategy that entailed what later would be seen as the essence of Blitzkrieg: concentrated panzer divisions performing swift deep penetrations. This strategy

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2720-566: The Anglo-French coalition proved unable to match the Germans in the number of armoured divisions, as it was impossible to quickly raise such large units. Though the French possessed a superior number of tanks, often better armoured and armed, half of these were allotted at army-level to independent Bataillons de Chars de Combat ("battle tank battalions") for infantry support. In early 1940, the German command had concluded that it could not win

2805-575: The Ardennes forced the crossings over the river Meuse , assisted by massive carpet bombing of the crossing points. In the original plan, the armoured divisions were again supposed to closely cooperate with the infantry divisions. In reality, armour commanders like Erwin Rommel and Heinz Guderian immediately broke out of the bridgeheads, initiating a drive towards the English Channel , which

2890-460: The Battle of Cambrai a large concentration of British heavy tanks effected a breakthrough, it was not exploited by armour. The manoeuvrability of the tank should at least in theory regain armies the ability to flank enemy lines. In practice, tank warfare during most of World War I was hampered by the technical immaturity of the new weapon system, limiting speed, operational range, and reliability, and

2975-609: The British able to restore their combat effectiveness. Much of the Red Army development in tank use was based on the theoretical work carried out by such officers as Tukhachevsky and Triandafillov in the mid to late 1930s. This was as part of the two-directioned concepts, one being infantry-centred "broad front" and the other being a "shock army". While the infantry based part of the doctrine demanded "powerful tanks" (heavy tanks armed with infantry guns and machineguns) and "tankettes" (light, often amphibious tanks with machineguns),

3060-643: The Commonwealth troops of the British Western Desert Force . The arrival of the German Afrika Korps under command of General der Panzertruppe Erwin Rommel highlighted the weaknesses of the British approach: the small number of infantry and artillery in each armoured division was sufficient when attacking the immobile and uncoordinated Italian troops, but against the highly mobile, well-coordinated German units,

3145-638: The East Mediterranean region and Israel in particular would serve to become a testing ground for development in armoured warfare during the decades of the Cold War. Both sides in the Arab–Israeli series of conflicts made heavy use of tanks and other armoured vehicles due to the practicality of tanks in the desert environment these conflicts largely took place in. During the 1956 Suez War and Six-Day War (1967), Israeli armoured units typically had

3230-451: The Fall of France. To stem the flood of marauding panzers, fast moving powerfully armed tank destroyer battalions were created to be held back and used in the counter-attack. It was also calculated that U.S. interests would be better served by large numbers of reliable ( battle-worthiness ) medium tanks rather than a smaller number of unreliable heavy tanks. It was decided therefore to slow

3315-493: The French, and ultimately were the deciding factors in the battle. It overcame their inferiority in armour and armament relative to the main French materiel such as the Char B1 bis . The superior tactical and operational praxis, combined with an appropriate strategic implementation, enabled the Germans to defeat forces superior in armour (both quantitatively and qualitatively) in the battles of 1940, but just as Blitzkrieg became

3400-608: The Red Army in World War II , initiated under strict secrecy and using the Principle of Surprise. Furthermore, to improve the fighting capabilities of armoured units, all heavy and medium tanks are to be commanded by officers and crewed by NCOs. In Germany, in-depth research through theoretical approaches, wargaming and exercises developed a confidence within the Panzertruppe itself (and political support by Hitler) in

3485-522: The Second World War. All major European states (with the exception of Germany that was forbidden to possess armoured vehicles under the Treaty of Versailles ), the US, and Japan, would create their own experimental mechanised forces during the late 1920s, many using either French or British vehicle designs or even directly purchased vehicles, but largely borrowing from both to develop their own doctrines. During

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3570-757: The T-34 was also able to negotiate terrain in difficult weather conditions, something that persistently dogged the German designs. Assessing the success of the German Blitzkrieg strategy, operational methods and tactics, the Red Army concluded that it should return to the use of operational methods developed before the war, so the Tank Armies were eventually created. To complement the T-34, heavy tanks, self-propelled artillery, and tank destroyers were also designed. The Red Army's armoured forces were used in concentrations during all strategic operations of

3655-605: The U.S. Army consisted of the M2A4 and M3 Stuart light tanks up until 1941, although these vehicles were five years newer than the 1935 built Type 95 's, the IJA and U.S. light tanks were comparable to each other, and seemingly performed well for their respective forces during jungle combat operations; during their phase of World War II. As with all armour, maintenance was a continuous challenge; especially in tropical environments. When IJA and SNLF (Imperial marines) tanks did clash with

3740-571: The US Army Division Commanders. An Army brigade would only be authorized a cavalry troop, and not a whole cavalry squadron. According to Army doctrine, the cavalry would find the enemy, and hold the enemy in place, until the heavy forces were brought up to deal with the located enemy. This process was known as the battle hand-off. At this point the cavalry is free to disengage and continue with other missions. Security missions could be rear guard, flank guard, or advance guard –

3825-430: The ability of troops to penetrate conventional defensive lines through use of manoeuvre by armoured units. Much of the application of armoured warfare depends on the use of tanks and related vehicles used by other supporting arms such as infantry fighting vehicles , self-propelled artillery , and other combat vehicles , as well as mounted combat engineers and other support units. The doctrine of armored warfare

3910-503: The advantage, mainly due to good tactics and unit cohesion . Conversely, the Yom Kippur War (1973) illustrated the problems that can arise if armoured and infantry units do not work closely together. Israeli tanks, operating independently in large numbers, were decimated by Egyptian anti-tank teams, well-distributed amongst regular infantry, and often equipped with new, first-generation portable anti-tank guided missiles . This

3995-514: The ancient world, expanding to barding and even plate armour by the Middle Ages . From antiquity, light cavalry was generally more agile and more lightly protected than heavy cavalry, which used larger horses needed to carry heavier, more reinforced equipment and riders. Between the late 17th and mid-19th centuries, armoured cavalry referred to those cavalry regiments that retained the cuirass , and were commonly known as cuirassiers . After

4080-529: The armoured divisions were structurally short of tanks. Though the U.S. had established the Tank Corps in World War I using French Renault FT light tanks and British Mark V and Mark V* heavy tanks, and some officers like Dwight D. Eisenhower and George S. Patton, Jr. emerged from that war initially as avid proponents of continuing and developing an American armoured force, the rapid reduction of

4165-449: The armoured formation as the key battlefield formation – although this view was before 1940 not shared by the other Arms of Service. A key part of this doctrine was improved communications by having radios in all tanks, although this ideal suffered from technical limits as most tanks had receiver sets only. At the outbreak of World War II, the German armoured forces benefited from a much more profound and more flexible training than that of

4250-414: The beginning of the war, but would only be built in small numbers towards the end, being placed in reserve, to be deployed for the defence of Japan itself. The Republic of China 's National Revolutionary Army 's 200th Division was the country's only mechanised division during the war. The 200th used pre-war tanks acquired from Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union. The conflict between Arab nations in

4335-540: The divisions still consisted of infantry that was not even motorised. As a result, tanks tended to be allotted to special armoured units, where the limited and expensive expert maintenance and training capacity could be concentrated. Only the Soviet Union had enough tanks to equip an organic tank battalion in each infantry division. Nevertheless, France was the first to create large armoured units: in 1934 two Mechanised Corps were formed of 430 tanks each. In July 1935, in France

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4420-604: The enemy before they could get a shot in. Although they usually had guns of either 75 mm or 76 mm calibre (the M36 used a 90mm calibre gun), the tank destroyer units were issued with the ancestor of the modern armour-piercing discarding sabot , rounds which made their guns much more powerful than a simple comparison of calibres would suggest. The Japanese doctrine was mainly French in concept but with some purely Japanese elements. Due to Japan's naval priorities in warship construction and inter-service feuds (the marine branch of

4505-618: The enemy by severing his lines of communication and supply, as cavalry had done during the previous century. The British were the first to create a larger fully mechanised unit when the War Office sanctioned the creation of the Experimental Mechanized Force , which was formed on 1 May 1927, under infantry Colonel R. J. Collins, after Fuller (was) refused the function. Its sub-units were entirely mobile and consisted of reconnaissance tankettes and armoured cars ,

4590-477: The enemy command-structure. Following the First World War, the technical and doctrinal aspects of armoured warfare became more sophisticated and diverged into multiple schools of doctrinal thought. During the 1920s, a very limited number of tanks were produced. There were however, important theoretical and technical developments. Various British and French commanders who had contributed to the origin of

4675-471: The enemy into a designated kill zone where the armored units can inflict more damage on the enemy than the "hunters" alone could hope to. Current British cavalry regiments in armoured role Armoured warfare Armoured warfare or armored warfare ( American English ; see spelling differences ), is the use of armoured fighting vehicles in modern warfare . It is a major component of modern methods of war . The premise of armored warfare rests on

4760-400: The enemy they were quickly destroyed by concealed anti-tank guns or overwhelming numbers of hostile tanks. Japan was a naval power, and concentrated its production on warships, thus placing a low priority on armoured vehicle development, its tanks becoming quickly obsolete during the later years of the war. A number of designs that were equal to heavier foreign types were on the drawing board at

4845-616: The equation. The US Armored Cavalry's mission was to find the enemy and/or provide security for the Army, while having the means to destroy the enemy if becoming decisively engaged. In Vietnam, the US Army deployed 1 Armored Cavalry Regiment (containing 3 squadrons and an aviation squadron), 7 Armored Cavalry Squadrons, and 2 Armored Cavalry Troops: From about January 1969 until the last mounted unit re-deployed from Vietnam in 1972 (air units remained in country), most armoured cavalry units (except

4930-470: The forces and apathy and even antipathy towards funding and maintaining armed forces in the inter-war years led to relative stagnation of armoured doctrine in the United States. Adna R. Chaffee, Jr. , virtually alone, advocated for the future of armoured warfare and the development of appropriate training, equipment and doctrine during the late 1920s through the 1930s. The United States Army regarded

5015-619: The infantry and assaulted deeper objectives, but did not fight en masse. In 1939, the Japanese Army engaged Soviet armour at Nomonhan . During the three-month-long war, Japanese armour had shown their weakness against Soviet tanks; and the resulting Japanese defeat prompted a series of complaints by the Imperial Army to incorporate improvements in future Japanese armour. This is the primary reason IJA tanks were not as successful while being used with IJA tactics. The tank forces of

5100-471: The lines of the German armoured divisions – would be lured into the Low Countries by a feint attack with a lesser force, including three armoured divisions. In May 1940, during the Battle of France , the German feint resulted in a number of undecided armour engagements, among them the Battle of Hannut , the largest tank battle fought until that date. At the same time, German motorised infantry west of

5185-492: The mechanisation progressed, slowly the French armour doctrine began to reflect the increased capacity, evolving from direct infantry support, to independent breakthrough and eventually envelopment with the Infantry, and to deep strategic exploitation with the Cavalry. Despite the increase in tank numbers, in all countries financial constraints prohibited a full mechanisation of the entire armed ground forces. Necessarily, most of

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5270-565: The outbreak of war retained their horses until 1940 (the Royal Dragoon Guards ) and 1941 (the Royal Scots Greys ). Following mechanization, the few remaining distinctions of unit type became meaningless; cavalry regiments moved between the heavy and light armoured roles regardless of their names. U.S. Army armoured cavalry had the mission of reconnaissance and security. Unlike armoured and infantry units, U.S. Cavalry

5355-528: The potential to completely halt tank assaults inflicting devastating losses to armoured units without infantry support. However, much of the AFV production was increasingly diverted away from the Panzertruppe . The Artillery formed its own Sturmgeschütz units and infantry divisions were given their own Panzerjäger companies. Despite lowering their formal organic strength, from the summer of 1943 onwards,

5440-645: The production of the U.S. heavy tank designs such as the M26 Pershing and concentrate resources on mass-producing the M4 Sherman and tank destroyers such as the M18 Hellcat . To be able get into position to counter-attack, the tank destroyers had to be fast. To achieve the desired mobility and agility from the engines available the armour protection was sacrificed, a measure of protection coming from being nimble and hopefully from being able to knock out

5525-409: The purchase of a T3 chassis, using the Christie suspension , from US designer John Walter Christie , which served as the basis of the Soviet BT series of fast tanks. The Red Army tactics were influenced by the theoretical works of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky who advocated "large scale tank warfare" as part of the deep battle doctrine. In France, the second largest tank producer, mechanisation

5610-462: The relatively unimpressive rate of tank production and development. During the 1930s the United Kingdom gave priority to the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy . The British Army began the conversion of its cavalry from horse to tanks and all but a few regiments were fully converted by 1939. The British 1st Armoured Division was formed, as the "Mobile Division", in November 1937. Before the Second World War actual use of armoured fighting vehicles

5695-426: The rise to power of the Nazi Party in Germany, German officers were sent to observe and participate in development of armoured doctrine in the USSR. Red Army and German experts collaborated in developing the use of tanks based on second generation vehicles with turreted main weapons, and experimenting to design different chassis configurations and drive trains. One important acquisition for the Red Army turned out to be

5780-413: The same functions as performed by infantrymen, only with tanks and ACAVs. With the infantry, the advance guard would be called the point man . During the Vietnam War, it was the mission of armour (tanks) to close with the enemy and defeat them using firepower, manoeuvre, and shock action. With the US Infantry, the mission was the same, minus the shock power. Artillery's mission was to add firepower to

5865-473: The same time offering them armour protection against small arms as they were moving. Britain and France first developed tanks in 1915 as a way of navigating the barbed wire and other obstacles of no-man's land while remaining protected from machine-gun fire. British Mark I tanks first went into action at the Somme on 15 September 1916, but did not manage to break the deadlock of trench warfare. The first French employment of tanks, on 16 April 1917, using

5950-435: The shock army demanded "manoeuvre tanks" (fast tanks with medium guns) used in conjunction with motorised forces and "mechanised cavalry" that would operate in depth as "strategic cavalry" combined with nascent airborne troops. These ideas culminated in the "PU-36" or the 1936 Field Service Regulations. At the start of the Second World War much of the Red Army, including its armoured forces, was in transition and recovering from

6035-438: The summer of 1939 combined mass tank manoeuvres with artillery and air attacks, to defeat the Japanese Imperial Army at the Battles of Khalkhin Gol at Nomonhan in Mongolia . Partly as a result of the experiences in Spain, the Soviet Union began the development of a new generation of medium and heavy tanks, sporting much stronger armour and armament. In their Invasion of Poland during September 1939, German forces applied

6120-400: The tank, such as Jean Baptiste Eugène Estienne , B. H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller , theorised about a possible future use of independent armoured forces, containing a large concentration of tanks, to execute deep strategic penetrations. Especially Liddell Hart wrote many books about the subject, partly propagating Fuller's theories. Such doctrines were faced with the reality that during

6205-476: The undermanned Commonwealth formations were proving inadequate. Between 1941 and 1942, the Allies struggled in armoured battles in the North African desert due to improper tactics; in particular, running armoured formations into opposing anti-tank positions; however, they achieved some notable successes at Crusader , 1st Alamein and under Montgomery finally achieved decisive victories, in particular at

6290-510: The war, which influenced Soviet armoured doctrine and tank design for a decade: the creation of the T-34 . Developed on the Christie suspension chassis and using sloped armour for the first time, the T-34 proved a shock to the German forces in the first German encounter of Soviet T-34 and KV tanks . The T-34 had an excellent combination of mobility, protection and firepower. Using wide tracks,

6375-425: The war. Tactically, deployment plans for armour during the war typically placed a strong emphasis on direct support for infantry. The tank's main tasks were seen as crushing barbed-wire and destroying machine-gun nests, facilitating the advance of foot soldiers. Theoretical debate largely focused on the question of whether to use a "swarm" of light tanks for this, or a limited number of potent heavy vehicles. Though in

6460-465: Was also established. Under this doctrine, U.S. tank crews of both armoured divisions and GHQ tank battalions were taught to fight tanks in tank on tank engagements. Armoured force personnel during and after the war criticised the infantry for using the GHQ tank battalions assigned to infantry divisions strictly as infantry support. The U.S. combined arms team included air support, artillery, engineers, and

6545-482: Was born on 10 July 1940, with the Headquarters, Armor Force and the Headquarters, I Armored Corps established at Fort Knox . On July 15, 1940, the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanised) became the 1st Armored Division ; the 7th Provisional Tank Brigade, an infantry tank unit at Fort Benning , became the 2nd Armored Division ". The Tank Battalion was established at Fort Meade , Md., and a small Armored Force School

6630-413: Was developed to break the static nature of World War I trench warfare on the Western Front , and return to the 19th century school of thought that advocated manoeuvre and decisive battle outcomes in military strategy . Modern armored warfare began during the First World War of 1914–1918. Strategists wanted to break the tactical , operational and strategic stalemates forced on commanders on

6715-410: Was even true for Germany itself, that only now officially adopted Blitzkrieg tactics. In the deserts of North Africa, the British developed the alternative approach of combining the armoured, infantry and artillery together to form a 'balanced, combined arms team'. The 10th Italian Army of Maresciallo (Marshal) Rodolfo Graziani , being ill-armed and inadequately led, soon gave way to this approach by

6800-618: Was limited. Both sides used Italian, German and Soviet tanks during the Spanish Civil War but these proved to be vulnerable to antitank guns due to their thin armour. Traditionalist elements within the Red Army used this to diminish the influence of proponents of mechanisation. Tukhachevsky himself was executed in 1937. Nevertheless, during the Soviet-Japanese Border Wars of 1938 and 1939, the Soviet forces tested modern armoured warfare tactics. General Georgy Zhukov in

6885-463: Was motivated by a need to compensate for severe manpower shortages due to a collapsed birth rate during World War I. This led to the development of a vast range of specialised armoured vehicles, not just tanks but also armoured cars , self-propelled guns , mechanised artillery , armoured tractors, armoured supply vehicles, armoured artillery observation vehicles, armoured command vehicles, half-tracks , and fully tracked armoured personnel carriers . As

6970-627: Was not initially accepted by German High Command. Nevertheless, the final plans for the invasion of France in 1940 hinged on the element of a Schwerpunkt at Sedan, and was assigned to such forces. The great success of this operation led to Blitzkrieg being integrated with strategic planning for the rest of the war. German tanks could carry with them enough fuel and supplies to go almost two hundred kilometers, and enough food to last three to nine days. This relative independence from supply lines proved effective, and allowed them to advance on critical targets much faster and without hesitation. Another factor

7055-684: Was reached within a week. The French reserve of four Infantry armoured divisions, the Divisions cuirassées , lacked sufficient strategic mobility to prevent this. The strategic envelopment surrounded the Belgian army, the British Expeditionary Force and the best French troops. It led to the Evacuation of Dunkirk and the ultimate fall of France in operation Fall Rot . The spectacular and unexpected success not only caused

7140-526: Was seen as the result of an armoured Blitzkrieg. However, later it has been argued that the campaign was largely an instance of the classical nineteenth century German concept of the "Annihilation Battle", in which the role of deep strategic armoured penetrations was limited. In the wake of the Polish campaign, during the Phoney War French, British and German tank production sharply increased, with both western allies out-producing Germany. However,

7225-582: Was the ability of commanders to make strategic decisions in the field and without much consultation with their headquarters, the orders of which were often simply ignored. A prime example is Erwin Rommel 's lead-from-the-front approach while commanding 7.Panzer-Division which allowed him a flexible response to the battlefield situation, an instance of the Auftragstaktik (reliance on subordinates to make their own decisions). The effect of German Panzer 's speed, mobility, and communication shocked

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