77-589: [REDACTED] Look up atman in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. Atman or Ātman may refer to: Religion [ edit ] Ātman (Hinduism) , meaning "Self", a philosophical concept common to all schools of Hindu philosophy Ātman (Buddhism) , attā or attan , a reference to the essential self Anattā or anātman — "not-self", central concept in Buddhism Ātman (Jainism) , or Jīva ,
154-599: A "dis-/ bad- + stand-", that is, "standing badly, unsteady," "unstable." Duḥkha (Sanskrit: दुःख; Pali: dukkha ) is a term found in the Upanishads and Buddhist texts, meaning anything that is "uneasy, uncomfortable, unpleasant, difficult, causing pain or sadness". It is also a concept in Indian religions about the nature of transient phenomena which are innately "unpleasant", "suffering", "pain", "sorrow", "distress", "grief" or "misery." The term duḥkha does not have
231-404: A "self-like" concept. In particular are the tathāgatagarbha sūtras , where the title itself means a garbha (womb, matrix, seed) containing Tathāgata (Buddha). These Sutras suggest, states Paul Williams, that "all sentient beings contain a Tathagata" as their "essence, core or essential inner nature". The tathāgatagarbha doctrine, at its earliest probably appeared about the later part of
308-448: A belief in rebirth, and emphasize moral responsibility in a way different from pre-Buddhist materialistic schools of Indian philosophies. The materialistic schools of Indian philosophies, such as Charvaka , are called annihilationist schools because they posited that death is the end, there is no afterlife, no soul, no rebirth, no karma, and death is that state where a living being is completely annihilated, dissolved. Buddha criticized
385-457: A development of self towards a Selfless state not only with respect to oneself, but recognizing the lack of relational essence and Self in others, wherein states Martijn van Zomeren, "self is an illusion". The Buddha emphasized both karma and anattā doctrines. The Buddha criticized the doctrine that posited an unchanging essence as a subject as the basis of rebirth and karmic moral responsibility, which he called "atthikavāda". He also criticized
462-784: A noun in Samyutta Nikaya III.141, IV.49, V.345, in Sutta II.37 of Anguttara Nikaya , II.37–45 and II.80 of Patisambhidamagga , III.406 of Dhammapada . It also appears as an adjective, for example, in Samyutta Nikaya III.114, III.133, IV.28 and IV.130–166, in Sutta III.66 and V.86 of Vinaya . It is also found in the Dhammapada . The ancient Buddhist texts discuss Attā or Attan (self), sometimes with alternate terms such as Atuman , Tuma , Puggala , Jiva , Satta , Pana and Nama-rupa , thereby providing
539-464: A one-word English translation, and embodies diverse aspects of unpleasant human experiences. It is often understood as the opposite of sukha , meaning lasting "happiness," "comfort" or "ease." The word has been explained in recent times as a derivation from Aryan terminology for an axle hole, referring to an axle hole which is not in the center and leads to a bumpy, uncomfortable ride. According to Winthrop Sargeant , The ancient Aryans who brought
616-560: A philosophical term used within Jainism to identify the soul Atman jnana — "knowledge" in the context of Indian philosophy and religions Film [ edit ] Ātman (1975 film) , a Japanese experimental short film directed by Toshio Matsumoto Atman (1997 film) , a documentary film directed by Pirjo Honkasalo People [ edit ] Cynthia Atman , American engineer Pavel Atman (born 1987), Russian handball player See also [ edit ] Ataman ,
693-403: A poor axle hole," leading to discomfort. Joseph Goldstein , American vipassana teacher and writer, explains the etymology as follows: The word dukkha is made up of the prefix du- and the root kha . Du- means "bad" or "difficult". Kha means "empty". "Empty", here, refers to several things—some specific, others more general. One of the specific meanings refers to the empty axle hole of
770-588: A purified, enlightened deity as part of the Vajrayāna path to liberation from rebirths . One such deity is goddess Nairatmya (literally, non-soul, non-self). She symbolizes, states Miranda Shaw, that "self is an illusion" and "all beings and phenomenal appearances lack an abiding self or essence" in Vajrayāna Buddhism. The Buddhist concept of anattā or anātman is one of the fundamental differences between mainstream Buddhism and mainstream Hinduism , with
847-494: A self, making Buddhist schools that admit an existence of a "self" not heretical, but conservative, adhering to ancient beliefs. While there may be ambivalence on the existence or non-existence of self in early Buddhist literature, Bronkhorst suggests that these texts clearly indicate that the Buddhist path of liberation consists not in seeking Atman-like self-knowledge, but in turning away from what might erroneously be regarded as
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#1732764662383924-584: A shift from dus-sthā to duḥkha to dukkha . Analayo concurs, stating that dukkha as derived from duḥ-sthā , "standing badly," "conveys nuances of "uneasiness" or of being "uncomfortable." Silk Road philologist Christopher I. Beckwith elaborates on this derivation. According to Beckwith: ...although the sense of duḥkha in Normative Buddhism is traditionally given as 'suffering', that and similar interpretations are highly unlikely for Early Buddhism. Significantly, Monier-Williams himself doubts
1001-403: A title of Cossack and haidamak leaders of various kinds Atma (disambiguation) Atta (disambiguation) Divine soul (disambiguation) World Soul (disambiguation) Topics referred to by the same term [REDACTED] This disambiguation page lists articles associated with the title Atman . If an internal link led you here, you may wish to change the link to point directly to
1078-489: A well known meditation master, described the citta (mind) as being an indestructible reality that does not fall under anattā. He has stated that not-self is merely a perception that is used to pry one away from infatuation with the concept of a self, and that once this infatuation is gone the idea of not-self must be dropped as well. American monk Thanissaro Bhikkhu of the Thai Forest Tradition describes
1155-457: A wheel. If the axle fits badly into the center hole, we get a very bumpy ride. This is a good analogy for our ride through saṃsāra . However, according to Monier Monier-Williams , the actual roots of the Pali term dukkha appear to be Sanskrit दुस्- ( dus- , "bad") + स्था ( sthā , "to stand"). Regular phonological changes in the development of Sanskrit into the various Prakrits led to
1232-489: Is atta , or true self, was criticized as heretical in Buddhism in 1994 by Ven. Payutto , a well-known scholar monk, who stated that 'Buddha taught Nibbana as being no-self". The abbot of one major temple in the Dhammakaya tradition, Luang Por Sermchai of Wat Luang Por Sodh Dhammakayaram , argues that it tends to be scholars who hold the view of absolute no-self, rather than Buddhist meditation practitioners. He points to
1309-535: Is a 'self' or not, as a major cause of the dispute. Anātman is one of the main bedrock doctrines of Buddhism, and its discussion is found in the later texts of all Buddhist traditions. There are many different views of anātman ( Chinese : 無我 ; pinyin : wúwǒ ; Japanese : 無我 muga ; Korean : 무아 mu-a ) within various Mahayana schools. The early Mahayana Buddhist texts link their discussion of "emptiness" ( śūnyatā ) to anātman and nirvana. They do so, states Mun-Keat Choong, in three ways: first, in
1386-518: Is a positive language and expression of śūnyatā "emptiness" and represents the potentiality to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices. Other scholars do in fact detect leanings towards monism in these tathagatagarbha references. Michael Zimmermann sees the notion of an unperishing and eternal self in the Tathagatagarbha Sutra . Zimmermann also avers that "the existence of an eternal, imperishable self, that is, buddhahood,
1463-488: Is an essence or eternal soul, and this soul is part of the nature of a living being, existence and metaphysical reality . Theravada Buddhism scholars, states Oliver Leaman , consider the Anattā doctrine as one of the main theses of Buddhism. The Buddhist denial of an unchanging, permanent self is what distinguishes Buddhism from major religions of the world such as Christianity and Hinduism, giving it uniqueness, asserts
1540-593: Is applied even more rigorously than in the Upanishads: While the Upanishads recognized many things as being not-Self, they felt that a real, true Self could be found. They held that when it was found, and known to be identical to Brahman, the basis of everything, this would bring liberation. In the Buddhist Suttas , though, literally everything is seen as non-Self, even Nirvana . When this
1617-586: Is associated to the theory of seven emotions of endogenous disease through the formation of the spirit of the po a term that relates to the Western psychological notion of ego or the theological reference to the human soul . This theory is expounded in the application of traditional Chinese medicine for the treatment and prevention of pain and suffering from illness, disease and ignorance. Awakening, that is, awakening to one's true mind of emptiness and compassion, does not necessarily end physical suffering. In
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#17327646623831694-460: Is converting the "sense of I which is gained from introspection and the fact of physical individuality" into a theoretical belief in a self. "A belief in a (really) existing body" is considered a false belief and a part of the Ten Fetters that must be gradually lost. The second loci is the psychological realization of anattā , or loss of "pride or conceit". This, states Collins, is explained as
1771-533: Is definitely the basic point of the Tathāgatagarbha Sutra". He further indicates that there is no evident interest found in this sutra in the idea of Emptiness ( sunyata ). Williams states that the "self" in tathāgatagarbha sutras is actually "non-self", and neither identical nor comparable to the Hindu concepts of brahman and self. The anātman doctrine is extensively discussed in and partly inspires
1848-652: Is known, then liberation – Nirvana – is attained by total non-attachment. Thus both the Upanishads and the Buddhist Suttas see many things as not-Self, but the Suttas apply it, indeed non-Self, to everything . Both Buddhism and Hinduism distinguish ego-related "I am, this is mine", from their respective abstract doctrines of " Anattā " and " Atman ". This, states Peter Harvey, may have been an influence of Buddhism on Hinduism. The term niratman appears in
1925-434: Is no such substantial entity and that "Buddha taught the doctrine of no-self". Nāgārjuna asserted that the notion of a self is associated with the notion of one's own identity and corollary ideas of pride, selfishness and a sense of psychophysical personality. This is all false, and leads to bondage in his Madhyamaka thought. There can be no pride nor possessiveness, in someone who accepts anātman and denies "self" which
2002-471: Is not yet an Arahat , because he still does small evil action which leads to karmic fruition, but he has enough virtue that he does not experience this fruition in hell. An Arahat , states Harvey, has a fully enlightened state of empirical self, one that lacks the "sense of both 'I am' and 'this I am'", which are illusions that the Arahat has transcended. The Buddhist thought and salvation theory emphasizes
2079-522: Is often mistranslated as meaning "not having a self or essence", but actually means " is not ātman " instead of "does not have ātman ." It is also incorrect to translate Anattā simply as "ego-less", according to Peter Harvey, because the Indian concept of ātman and attā is different from the Freudian concept of ego. The concept of Anattā appears in numerous Sutras of the ancient Buddhist Nikāya texts (Pali canon). It appears, for example, as
2156-548: Is part of the first of the Four Noble Truths and one of the three marks of existence . The term also appears in scriptures of Hinduism , such as the Upanishads , in discussions of moksha (spiritual liberation). While the term dukkha has often been derived from the prefix du- ("bad" or "difficult") and the root kha ("empty," "hole"), meaning a badly fitting axle-hole of a cart or chariot giving "a very bumpy ride," it may actually be derived from duḥ-stha ,
2233-515: Is possible that "original Buddhism did not deny the existence of the soul", even though a firm Buddhist tradition has maintained that the Buddha avoided talking about the soul or even denied its existence. Tibetologist André Migot states that original Buddhism may not have taught a complete absence of self, pointing to evidence presented by Buddhist and Pali scholars Jean Przyluski and Caroline Rhys Davids that early Buddhism generally believed in
2310-428: Is rendered as "not-Self", but this translation expresses an incomplete meaning, states Peter Harvey; a more complete rendering is "no-Self" because from its earliest days, Anattā doctrine denied that there is anything called a "Self" in any person or anything else, and that a belief in "Self" is a source of Dukkha (suffering, pain, unsatisfactoriness). Buddhist scholar Richard Gombrich , however, argues that anattā
2387-406: Is suffering" ( duḥkham eva sarvaṁ vivekinaḥ ). Some of the Hindu scripture verses referring to duhkha are: Those who have known it – they become immortal. As for the rest – only suffering awaits them. When a man rightly sees, he sees all, he wins all, completely. vīta-rāga-bhaya-krodhaḥ sthita-dhīr munir uchyate nāpnuvanti mahātmānaḥ saṁsiddhiṁ paramāṁ gatāḥ Duḥkha is explained in
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2464-585: Is synonymous with Anātman (an + ātman) in Sanskrit Buddhist texts. In some Pali texts, ātman of Vedic texts is also referred to with the term Attan , with the sense of "soul". An alternate use of Attan or Atta is "self, oneself, essence of a person", driven by the Vedic-era Brahmanical belief that atman is the permanent, unchangeable essence of a living being, or the true self. In Buddhism-related English literature, Anattā
2541-435: Is the citta (mind/heart, mindset, emotional nature), and the development of self in the Suttas is the development of this citta . One with "great self", state the early Buddhist Suttas , has a mind which is neither at the mercy of outside stimuli nor its own moods, neither scattered nor diffused, but imbued with self-control, and self-contained towards the single goal of nibbana and a 'Self-like' state. This "great self"
2618-425: Is the doctrine of "no-self" – that no unchanging, permanent self or essence can be found in any phenomenon. While often interpreted as a doctrine denying the existence of a self, anatman is more accurately described as a strategy to attain non-attachment by recognizing everything as impermanent, while staying silent on the ultimate existence of an unchanging essence. In contrast, dominant schools of Hinduism assert
2695-407: Is the sense of personal identity of oneself, others or anything, states Nāgārjuna. Further, all obsessions are avoided when a person accepts emptiness ( śūnyatā ). Nāgārjuna denied there is anything called a self-nature as well as other-nature, emphasizing true knowledge to be comprehending emptiness. Anyone who has not dissociated from their belief in personality in themselves or others, through
2772-617: The Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya — in all likelihood predate the advent of Buddhism. In these scriptures of Hinduism, the Sanskrit word du ḥ kha (दुःख) appears in the sense of "suffering, sorrow, distress", and in the context of a spiritual pursuit and liberation through the knowledge of Atman ('essence'). The concept of sorrow and suffering, and self-knowledge as a means to overcome it, appears extensively with other terms in
2849-672: The Maitrayaniya Upanishad of Hinduism, such as in verses 6.20, 6.21 and 7.4. Niratman literally means "selfless". The niratman concept has been interpreted to be analogous to anatman of Buddhism. The ontological teachings, however, are different. In the Upanishad, states Thomas Wood, numerous positive and negative descriptions of various states – such as niratman and sarvasyatman (the self of all) – are used in Maitrayaniya Upanishad to explain
2926-528: The 3rd century CE, and is verifiable in Chinese translations of 1st millennium CE. Most scholars consider the tathāgatagarbha doctrine of an "essential nature" in every living being is equivalent to "self", and it contradicts the anātman doctrines in a vast majority of Buddhist texts, leading scholars to posit that the tathāgatagarbha sutras were written to promote Buddhism to non-Buddhists. The Mahayana Mahaparinirvana Sutra explicitly asserts that
3003-478: The Buddha intentionally set aside the question of whether or not there is a self as a useless question, and goes on to call the phrase "there is no self" the "granddaddy of fake Buddhist quotes". He adds that clinging to the idea that there is no self at all would actually prevent enlightenment. Thanissaro Bhikkhu points to the Ananda Sutta ( SN 44.10 ), where the Buddha stays silent when asked whether there
3080-405: The Buddha used the term "self" in order to win over non-Buddhist ascetics. The Ratnagotravibhāga (also known as Uttaratantra ), another text composed in the first half of 1st millennium CE and translated into Chinese in 511 CE, points out that the teaching of the tathāgatagarbha doctrine is intended to win sentient beings over to abandoning "self-love" ( atma-sneha ) – considered to be one of
3157-502: The Buddha's statements on anattā were originally a "not-self" teaching that developed into a "no-self" teaching in later Buddhist thought. According to Wynne, early Buddhist texts such as the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta do not deny that there is a self, stating that the five aggregates that are described as not-self are not descriptions of a human being but descriptions of the human experience. According to Johannes Bronkhorst , it
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3234-434: The Buddha's statements on non-self as a path to awakening rather than a universal truth. Bhikkhu Bodhi authored a rejoinder to Thanissaro, agreeing that anattā is a strategy for awakening but stating that "The reason the teaching of anattā can serve as a strategy of liberation is precisely because it serves to rectify a misconception about the nature of being, hence an ontological error ." Thanissaro Bhikkhu states that
3311-415: The Buddhist tradition, suffering after awakening is often explained as the working-out or untangling of karma of one's previous present life. In Hinduism, duḥkha encompasses many meanings such as the phenomenological senses of pain and grief, a deep-seated dissatisfaction with the limitations of worldly existence, and the devastation of impermanence. In Hindu scriptures, the earliest Upani ṣ ads —
3388-488: The Sanskrit language to India were a nomadic, horse- and cattle-breeding people who travelled in horse- or ox-drawn vehicles. Su- and dus- are prefixes indicating good or bad. The word kha , in later Sanskrit meaning "sky," "ether," or "space," was originally the word for "hole," particularly an axle hole of one of the Aryan's vehicles. Thus sukha ... meant, originally, "having a good axle hole," while duḥkha meant "having
3465-491: The Sutta considers the materialistic concept in the pre-Buddhist Vedic period of "no afterlife, complete annihilation" at death to be a denial of Self, but still "tied up with belief in a Self". "Self exists" is a false premise, assert the early Buddhist texts. However, adds Peter Harvey, these texts do not admit the premise "Self does not exist" either because the wording presumes the concept of "Self" before denying it; instead,
3542-526: The Theravada tradition. With the doctrine of Anattā , stands or falls the entire Buddhist structure, asserts Nyanatiloka Mahathera . According to Collins, "insight into the teaching of anattā is held to have two major loci in the intellectual and spiritual education of an individual" as s/he progresses along the Path . The first part of this insight is to avoid sakkayaditthi (Personality Belief), that
3619-484: The Upanishadic inquiry fails to find an empirical correlate of the assumed Atman , but nevertheless assumes its existence, and Advaitins "reify consciousness as an eternal self." In contrast, the Buddhist inquiry "is satisfied with the empirical investigation which shows that no such Atman exists because there is no evidence" states Jayatilleke. According to Harvey, in Buddhism the negation of temporal existents
3696-523: The Wrong view and the Right view; this third case of nominative usage is properly translated as "self" (as an identity) and is unrelated to "soul", states Collins. The first two usages incorporate the idea of soul. Buddhist scholars Richard Gombrich and Alexander Wynne argue that the Buddha's descriptions of no-self in early Buddhist texts do not deny that there is a self. Wynne and Gombrich both argue that
3773-456: The common sense of a monk's meditative state of emptiness; second, with the main sense of anātman or 'everything in the world is empty of self'; third, with the ultimate sense of Nirvana or realization of emptiness and thus an end to rebirth cycles of suffering. The anātman doctrine is another aspect of śūnyatā , its realization is the nature of the nirvana state and to an end to rebirths. The Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna (~200 CE),
3850-476: The conceit of asmimana or "I am"; (...) what this "conceit" refers to is the fact that for the unenlightened, all experience and action must necessarily appear phenomenologically as happening to or originating from an "I". When a Buddhist gets more enlightened, this happening to or originating in an "I" or sakkdyaditthi is less. The final attainment of enlightenment is the disappearance of this automatic but illusory "I". The Theravada tradition has long considered
3927-606: The concept of self, is in a state of avidya (ignorance) and caught in the cycle of rebirths and redeaths. The texts attributed to the 5th-century Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu of the Yogācāra school similarly discuss anātman as a fundamental premise of the Buddha. The Vasubandhu interpretations of no-self thesis were challenged by the 7th-century Buddhist scholar Candrakīrti , who then offered his own theories on its importance. Some 1st-millennium CE Buddhist texts suggest concepts that have been controversial because they imply
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#17327646623834004-568: The context for the Buddhist Anattā doctrine. Examples of such Attā contextual discussions are found in Digha Nikaya I.186–187, Samyutta Nikaya III.179 and IV.54, Vinaya I.14, Majjhima Nikaya I.138, III.19, and III.265–271 and Anguttara Nikaya I.284. According to Steven Collins, the inquiry of anattā and "denial of self" in the canonical Buddhist texts is "insisted on only in certain theoretical contexts", while they use
4081-633: The context. Contemporary translators of Buddhist texts use a variety of English words to convey the aspects of dukh . Early Western translators of Buddhist texts (before the 1970s) typically translated the Pali term dukkha as "suffering." Later translators have emphasized that "suffering" is a too limited translation for the term duḥkha, and have preferred to either leave the term untranslated, or to clarify that translation with terms such as anxiety, distress, frustration, unease, unsatisfactoriness, not having what one wants, having what one doesn't want, etc. In
4158-530: The defects by Buddhism. The 6th-century Chinese tathāgatagarbha translation states that "Buddha has shiwo (true self) which is beyond being and nonbeing". However, the Ratnagotravibhāga asserts that the "self" implied in tathāgatagarbha doctrine is actually "not-self". According to some scholars, the Buddha-nature discussed in these sutras does not represent a substantial self; rather, it
4235-532: The early Buddhist texts use the concept of Anattā as the implicit premise. According to Peter Harvey, while the Suttas criticize notions of an eternal, unchanging Self as baseless, they see an enlightened being as one whose empirical self is highly developed. This is paradoxical, states Harvey, in that "the Self-like nibbana state" is a mature self that knows "everything as Selfless". The "empirical self"
4312-504: The existence of Ātman as pure awareness or witness-consciousness , "reify[ing] consciousness as an eternal self." Anattā is a composite Pali word consisting of an (not) and attā (self-existent essence). The term refers to the central Buddhist concept that there is no phenomenon that has a permanent, unchanging "self" or essence. It is one of the three characteristics of all existence, together with dukkha (suffering, dissatisfaction) and anicca (impermanence). Anattā
4389-626: The experiences of prominent forest hermit monks such as Luang Pu Sodh and Ajahn Mun to support the notion of a "true self". Similar interpretations on the "true self" were put forth earlier by the 12th Supreme Patriarch of Thailand in 1939. According to Williams, the Supreme Patriarch's interpretation echoes the tathāgatagarbha sutras. Several notable teachers of the Thai Forest Tradition have also described ideas in contrast to absolute no-self. Ajahn Maha Bua ,
4466-475: The founder of Madhyamaka (middle way) school of Mahayana Buddhism, analyzed dharma first as factors of experience. David Kalupahana states that Nāgārjuna analyzed how these experiences relate to "bondage and freedom, action and consequence", and thereafter analyzed the notion of personal self ( ātman ). Nāgārjuna extensively wrote about rejecting the metaphysical entity called ātman (self, soul), asserting in chapter 18 of his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā that there
4543-576: The history of Buddhism. In Thai Buddhism, for example, states Paul Williams , some modern era Buddhist scholars have claimed that "Nirvana is indeed the true self", while other Thai Buddhists disagree. For instance, the Dhammakaya tradition in Thailand teaches that it is erroneous to subsume nirvana under the rubric of anattā (no-self); instead, nirvana is taught to be the "true self" or dhammakaya . The Dhammakaya tradition teaching that nirvana
4620-417: The idea that "all things are not-self" ( sabbe dhamma anattā ). Second, states Collins, the Suttas apply the doctrine to deny self of any person, treating conceit to be evident in any assertion of "this is mine, this I am, this is myself" ( etam mamam eso 'ham asmi, eso me atta ti ). Third, the Theravada texts apply the doctrine as a nominal reference, to identify examples of "self" and "not-self", respectively
4697-428: The intended article. Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Atman&oldid=1247324828 " Category : Disambiguation pages Hidden categories: Short description is different from Wikidata All article disambiguation pages All disambiguation pages Anatt%C4%81 In Buddhism , the term anattā ( Pali : 𑀅𑀦𑀢𑁆𑀢𑀸 ) or anātman ( Sanskrit : अनात्मन् )
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#17327646623834774-500: The latter asserting that ātman ("self") exists. In Hinduism, Atman refers to the essence of human beings, the observing pure awareness or witness-consciousness . It is unaffected by ego, distinct from the individual being ( jivanatman ) embedded in material reality , and characterized by Ahamkara ('I-making'), mind ( citta , manas ), and all the defiling kleshas (impurities). Embodied personality changes over time, while Atman doesn't. According to Jayatilleke,
4851-559: The lay Theravada Buddhists in Southeast Asia, the doctrines of kamma , rebirth and punna (merit) inspire a wide range of ritual practices and ethical behavior. The Anattā doctrine is key to the concept of Nibbana in the Theravada tradition. The liberated nirvana state, states Collins, is the state of Anattā , a state that is neither universally applicable nor can be explained, but can be realized. The dispute about "self" and "not-self" doctrines has continued throughout
4928-528: The materialistic annihilationism view that denied rebirth and karma, states Damien Keown. Such beliefs are inappropriate and dangerous, stated Buddha, because they encourage moral irresponsibility and material hedonism. Anattā does not mean there is no afterlife, no rebirth or no fruition of karma, and Buddhism contrasts itself to annihilationist schools. Buddhism also contrasts itself to other Indian religions that champion moral responsibility but posit eternalism with their premise that within each human being there
5005-428: The materialistic doctrine that denied the existence of both soul and rebirth, and thereby denied karmic moral responsibility, which he calls "natthikavāda". Instead, the Buddha asserted that there is no essence, but there is rebirth for which karmic moral responsibility is a must. In the Buddha's framework of karma, right view and right actions are necessary for liberation. Hinduism , Jainism and Buddhism all assert
5082-506: The nondual concept of the "highest Self". According to Ramatirtha, states Paul Deussen, the niratman state discussion is referring to stopping the recognition of oneself as an individual soul, and reaching the awareness of universal soul or the metaphysical Brahman . The Greek philosopher Pyrrho traveled to India as part of Alexander the Great 's entourage where he was influenced by the Indian gymnosophists , which inspired him to create
5159-414: The ongoing process of death and rebirth itself: Early emphasis is on the importance of developing insight into the nature of duḥkha , the conditions that cause it, and how it can be overcome. This process is formulated in the teachings on the Four Noble Truths . Chinese Buddhist tradition has been influenced by Taoism and Confucian theory that advocates that duhkha (古:十Ten directions, 口 hole or opening)
5236-541: The original on 2016-09-01 . Retrieved 2016-09-27 . Dukkha Duḥkha ( / ˈ d uː k ə / )(Sanskrit: दुःख; Pali: dukkha ), "suffering", "pain," "unease," "unsatisfactory," is an important concept in Buddhism , Jainism and Hinduism . Its meaning depends on the context, and may refer more specifically to the "unsatisfactoriness" or "unease" of transient existence, which we crave or grasp for when we are ignorant of this transientness. In Buddhism, dukkha
5313-614: The philosophy of Pyrrhonism . Philologist Christopher Beckwith argues that Pyrrho based his philosophy on his translation of the three marks of existence into Greek, and that adiaphora (not logically differentiable, not clearly definable, negating Aristotle's use of "diaphora") reflects Pyrrho's understanding of the Buddhist concept of anattā . Harvey, Peter (2013b). The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvana in Early Buddhism . Routledge. pp. 34, 38. ISBN 978-1-136-78336-4 . Archived from
5390-679: The pre-Buddhist Upanishads. The term Duhkha also appears in many other middle and later post-Buddhist Upanishads such as the verse 6.20 of Shvetashvatara Upanishad , as well as in the Bhagavad Gita , all in the contexts of moksha and bhakti . The term also appears in the foundational Sutras of the six schools of Hindu philosophy , such as the opening lines of Samkhya karika of the Samkhya school. The Samkhya school identifies three types of suffering. The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali state that "for one who has discrimination, everything
5467-413: The ritual practices of the Vajrayāna tradition. The Tibetan terms such as bdag med refer to "without a self, insubstantial, anātman". These discussions, states Jeffrey Hopkins, assert the "non-existence of a permanent, unitary and independent self", and attribute these ideas to the Buddha. The ritual practices in Vajrayāna Buddhism employs the concept of deities, to end self-grasping, and to manifest as
5544-650: The self. This is a reverse position to the Vedic traditions which recognized the knowledge of the self as "the principal means to achieving liberation." According to Harvey, the contextual use of Attā in the Nikāyas is two-sided. In one, it directly denies that anything can be found called a self or soul in a human being that is a permanent essence of a human being, a theme found in Brahmanical traditions. In another, states Peter Harvey, such as at Samyutta Nikaya IV.286,
5621-418: The sequence "birth is painful," dukhka may be translated as "painful." When related to vedana , "feeling," dukkha ("unpleasant," "painful") is the opposite of sukkha ("pleasure," "pleasant"), yet all feelings are dukkha in that they are impermanent, conditioned phenomena, which are unsatisfactory, incapable of providing lasting satisfaction. The term "unsatisfactoriness" then is often used to emphasize
5698-440: The terms atta, purisa, puggala quite naturally and freely in various contexts. The elaboration of the anattā doctrine, along with identification of the words such as "puggala" as "permanent subject or soul" appears in later Buddhist literature. According to Collins, the Suttas present the doctrine in three forms. First, they apply the "no-self, no-identity" investigation to all phenomena as well as any and all objects, yielding
5775-529: The understanding and application of the Anattā doctrine to be a complex teaching, whose "personal, introjected application has always been thought to be possible only for the specialist, the practising monk". The tradition, states Collins, has "insisted fiercely on anattā as a doctrinal position", while in practice it may not play much of a role in the daily religious life of most Buddhists. The Theravada doctrine of Anattā , or not-self not-soul, inspire meditative practices for monks, states Donald Swearer, but for
5852-450: The unsatisfactoriness of "life under the influence of afflictions and polluted karma." Duḥkha is one of the three marks of existence , namely anitya ("impermanent"), duḥkha ("unsatisfactory"), anatman (without a lasting essence). Within the Buddhist sutras, duḥkha has a broad meaning, and is divided in three categories: Various sutras sum up how transient existence is regarded to be duḥkha , starting with saṃsāra ,
5929-502: The usual explanation of duḥkha and presents an alternative one immediately after it, namely: duḥ-stha "'standing badly,' unsteady, disquieted (lit. and fig.); uneasy", and so on. This form is also attested, and makes much better sense as the opposite of the Rig Veda sense of sukha, which Monier-Williams gives in full. The literal meaning of duḥkha , as used in a general sense is "suffering" or "painful." Its exact translation depends on
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