108-629: Eighth Amendment may refer to: Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution , part of the United States Bill of Rights Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of India , extended the period of reserved seats in the parliament Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of Ireland , which recognized the equal right to life of an unborn child Eighth Amendment to
216-642: A capital . . . crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, . . . nor be deprived of life . . . without due process of law." This clearly permits the death penalty to be imposed, and establishes beyond doubt that the death penalty is not one of the "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment." A similar observation was made by the Supreme Court in 2019. The Supreme Court held in Bucklew v. Precythe (2019) that
324-467: A conviction. This limitation applies equally to the price for obtaining pretrial release and the punishment for crime after conviction. The phrases in this amendment originated in the English Bill of Rights of 1689 . The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments has led courts to hold that the Constitution totally prohibits certain kinds of punishment, such as drawing and quartering . Under
432-408: A court can determine whether [the] challenged punishment comports with human dignity. They are, therefore, interrelated, and, in most cases, it will be their convergence that will justify the conclusion that a punishment is 'cruel and unusual'. The test, then, will ordinarily be a cumulative one: if a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily, if it
540-414: A deprivation of property without due process of law ". The Court wrote in its syllabus: The fixing of punishment for crime and penalties for unlawful acts is within the police power of the state , and this Court cannot interfere with state legislation in fixing fines, or judicial action in imposing them, unless so grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Where
648-488: A disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman." The dissent countered that the majority "takes too little account of the profound suffering the crime imposes upon the victims and their loved ones". The dissent also characterized the majority as " myopic " for considering legal history of only "the past five years". Incorporation of the Bill of Rights In United States constitutional law , incorporation
756-627: A federal law that required that he report an amount in excess of $ 10,000. In describing what constituted "gross disproportionality", the Court could not find any guidance from the history of the Excessive Fines Clause, and so relied on Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause case law: We must therefore rely on other considerations in deriving a constitutional excessiveness standard, and there are two that we find particularly relevant. The first, which we have emphasized in our cases interpreting
864-629: A fine as excessive for the first time in United States v. Bajakajian (1998). Under the Excessive Bail Clause, the Supreme Court has held that the federal government cannot set bail at "a figure higher than is reasonably calculated" to ensure the defendant's appearance at trial. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Excessive Fines Clause and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause apply to the states , but has not done this regarding
972-495: A law obviously violating any one of these principles, so court decisions regarding the Eighth Amendment would involve a "cumulative" analysis of the implication of each of the four principles. In this way, the United States Supreme Court "set the standard that a punishment would be cruel and unusual [if] it was too severe for the crime, [if] it was arbitrary, if it offended society's sense of justice, or if it
1080-422: A limitation on Congress. Mason warned that, otherwise, Congress may "inflict unusual and severe punishments". Henry emphasized that Congress should not be allowed to depart from precedent: What has distinguished our ancestors?—That they would not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment. But Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the common law. They may introduce
1188-721: A person" to do business and engage in his trade or vocation. Thus, in Black's view, the Slaughterhouse Cases should not impede incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states, via the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Some scholars go even further, and argue that the Slaughterhouse Cases affirmatively supported incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states. In dicta , Justice Miller's opinion in Slaughterhouse went so far as to acknowledge that
SECTION 10
#17327720094461296-418: A punishment can be measured by two different aspects, which are independent of each other. The first aspect is whether the punishment involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. The second aspect is that the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. In Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the Court explained that the Eighth Amendment "guarantees individuals
1404-462: A punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold. However, in Powell v. Texas , 392 U.S. 514 (1968), the Court upheld a statute barring public intoxication by distinguishing Robinson on the basis that Powell dealt with a person who
1512-463: A selective incorporation approach followed that of Justice Moody , who wrote in Twining v. New Jersey (1908) that "It is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law. If this is so, it is not because those rights are enumerated in
1620-411: A separate opinion concurring in the judgment, he once again declared that he would reach the same incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Justice Gorsuch took an in-between position. He joined the opinion of the Court, but wrote a short concurrence acknowledging that the Privileges or Immunities Clause might be the better vehicle for incorporation—but ultimately deciding that nothing in
1728-564: A state antitrust law fixed penalties at $ 5,000 a day, and, after the verdict is guilty for over 300 days, a defendant corporation was fined over $ 1,600,000, this Court will not hold that the fine is so excessive as to amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law where it appears that the business was extensive and profitable during the period of violation and that the corporation has over $ 40,000,000 of assets and has declared dividends amounting to several hundred percent The Court further stated in its opinion: [I]t has contended that
1836-581: A statute in 1275 whereby bailable and non-bailable offenses were defined. The King's judges often subverted the provisions of the law. It was held that an individual may be held without bail upon the Sovereign's command. Eventually, the Petition of Right of 1628 argued that the King did not have such authority. Later, technicalities in the law were exploited to keep the accused imprisoned without bail even where
1944-571: A topic of the U.S. Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence . The punishment of Oates involved ordinary penalties collectively imposed in a barbaric, excessive and bizarre manner. The reason why the judges in Oates' perjury case were not allowed to impose the death penalty (unlike in the cases of those whom Oates had falsely accused) may be because such a punishment would have deterred even honest witnesses from testifying in later cases. England's declaration against "cruel and unusual punishments"
2052-608: Is basic to our system of law, and the Eighth Amendment's proscription of excessive bail has been assumed to have application to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment." In McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010), the right against excessive bail was included in a footnote listing incorporated rights. In Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas , 212 U.S. 86 (1909), the Supreme Court held that excessive fines are those that are "so grossly excessive as to amount to
2160-468: Is hard to view Weems as announcing a constitutional requirement of proportionality." In Trop v. Dulles , 356 U.S. 86 (1958), the Supreme Court held that punishing a natural-born citizen for a crime by revoking his citizenship is unconstitutional, being "more primitive than torture " because it involved the "total destruction of the individual's status in organized society". In Robinson v. California , 370 U.S. 660 (1962),
2268-555: Is not binding precedent in lower courts; it is merely an indication that SCOTUS may be inclined, given the proper question, to reconsider and ultimately reverse the Slaughterhouse Cases . In the 2019 case Timbs v. Indiana , the Supreme Court, citing McDonald, ruled that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated through the Due Process Clause. Justice Thomas did not join this opinion; in
SECTION 20
#17327720094462376-547: Is possible that a switch to Privileges or Immunities incorporation would limit protections of the rights of non-citizens against state governments. Many of the provisions of the First Amendment were applied to the States in the 1930s and 1940s, but most of the procedural protections provided to criminal defendants were not enforced against the States until the Warren Court of the 1960s, famous for its concern for
2484-526: Is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than some less severe punishment, then the continued infliction of that punishment violates the command of the Clause that the State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon those convicted of crimes." Justice Brennan also wrote that he expected no state would pass
2592-504: Is that any judicial determination regarding the gravity of a particular criminal offense will be inherently imprecise. Both of these principles counsel against requiring strict proportionality between the amount of a punitive forfeiture and the gravity of a criminal offense, and we therefore adopt the standard of gross disproportionality articulated in our Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause precedents. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm , supra, at 288; Rummel v. Estelle , 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980). Thus
2700-452: Is the doctrine by which portions of the Bill of Rights have been made applicable to the states . When the Bill of Rights was ratified, the courts held that its protections extended only to the actions of the federal government and that the Bill of Rights did not place limitations on the authority of the state and local governments . However, the post– Civil War era, beginning in 1865 with
2808-595: Is the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution . Proposed following the oftentimes bitter 1787–88 battle over ratification of the United States Constitution, and crafted to address the objections raised by Anti-Federalists , the Bill of Rights amendments add to the Constitution specific guarantees of personal freedoms and rights , clear limitations on the government's power in judicial and other proceedings, and explicit declarations that all powers not specifically delegated to Congress by
2916-570: The West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943) case that the founders intended the Bill of Rights to put some rights out of reach from majorities, ensuring that some liberties would endure beyond political majorities. As the Court noted, the idea of the Bill of Rights "was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by
3024-691: The Adamson Court declined to adopt Black's interpretation, the Court during the following twenty-five years employed a doctrine of selective incorporation that succeeded in extending against the States almost all of the protections in the Bill of Rights, as well as other, unenumerated rights. The Bill of Rights thus imposes legal limits on the powers of governments and acts as an anti-majoritarian/minoritarian safeguard by providing deeply entrenched legal protection for various civil liberties and fundamental rights. The Supreme Court for example concluded in
3132-667: The Due Process Clause expressly allows the death penalty in the United States because "the Fifth Amendment, added to the Constitution at the same time as the Eighth, expressly contemplates that a defendant may be tried for a 'capital' crime and 'deprived of life' as a penalty, so long as proper procedures are followed". The Court also explicitly said: "The Constitution allows capital punishment. [...] Nor did
3240-634: The Fifth Amendment right to an indictment by a grand jury , and the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil lawsuits. Incorporation applies both procedurally and substantively to the guarantees of the states. Thus, procedurally, only a jury can convict a defendant of a serious crime, since the Sixth Amendment jury-trial right has been incorporated against the states; substantively, for example, states must recognize
3348-732: The Second Circuit applied the Third Amendment to the states in Engblom v. Carey . This is a binding authority over the federal courts in Connecticut , New York , and Vermont , but is only a persuasive authority over the other courts in the United States. The Tenth Circuit has suggested that the right is incorporated because the Bill of Rights explicitly codifies the "fee ownership system developed in English law" through
Eighth Amendment - Misplaced Pages Continue
3456-550: The Thirteenth Amendment , which declared the abolition of slavery , gave rise to the incorporation of other amendments, applying more rights to the states and people over time. Gradually, various portions of the Bill of Rights have been held to be applicable to state and local governments by incorporation via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868. Prior to the ratification of
3564-569: The "right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances ... are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution," although in context Miller may have only been referring to assemblies for petitioning the federal government. In the 2010 landmark case McDonald v. Chicago , the Supreme Court declared the Second Amendment is incorporated through the Due Process Clause. However, Justice Thomas ,
3672-414: The 1920s, a series of Supreme Court decisions interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to "incorporate" most portions of the Bill of Rights, making these portions, for the first time, enforceable against the state governments. No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... — Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (1791) The United States Bill of Rights
3780-619: The 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination was not inherent in a conception of due process and so did not apply to states, but was overruled in Malloy v. Hogan (1964). Similarly, Justice Cardozo stated in Palko v. Connecticut (1937) that the right against double jeopardy was not inherent to due process and so does not apply to the states, but that was overruled in Benton v. Maryland (1969). Frankfurter's incrementalist approach did carry
3888-550: The Bill of Rights did not apply to state governments; such protections were instead provided by the constitutions of each state . After the Civil War , Congress and the states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment , which included the Due Process Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause . While the Fifth Amendment had included a due process clause, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment crucially differed from
3996-463: The Bill of Rights to the states, the amendments that were finally submitted for ratification applied only to the federal government. [N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... — Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) In the 1833 case of Barron v. Baltimore , the Supreme Court of the United States held that
4104-460: The Bill of Rights were aware of such provisions [outlawing disproportional punishments], yet chose not to replicate them." In Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48 (2010), the Supreme Court declared that a life sentence without any chance of parole, for a crime other than murder, is cruel and unusual punishment for a minor . Two years later, in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460 (2012),
4212-417: The Bill of Rights, so as to be binding upon the States. A dissenting school of thought championed by Justices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas supported that incorporation of specific rights, but urged incorporation of all specific rights instead of just some of them. Black was for so-called mechanical incorporation, or total incorporation, of Amendments 1 through 8 of the Bill of Rights. Black felt that
4320-543: The Constitution are reserved for the states or the people . The concepts enumerated in these amendments are built upon those found in several earlier documents, including the Virginia Declaration of Rights and the English Bill of Rights 1689 , along with earlier documents such as Magna Carta (1215). Although James Madison 's proposed amendments included a provision to extend the protection of some of
4428-423: The Constitution of Pakistan , which changed Pakistan's government from a parliamentary system to a semi-presidential system Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of South Africa , which allowed members of municipal councils to cross the floor from one political party to another without losing their seats Topics referred to by the same term [REDACTED] This disambiguation page lists articles associated with
Eighth Amendment - Misplaced Pages Continue
4536-559: The Constitution." The Tenth Amendment is also not listed; by its wording, it is a reservation of powers to the states and to the people.) Guarantee against establishment of religion Guarantee of free exercise of religion Guarantee of freedom of speech Guarantee of freedom of the press Guarantee of freedom of assembly Guarantee of the right to petition for redress of grievances Guarantee of freedom of expressive association Right to keep and bear arms Freedom from quartering of soldiers In 1982,
4644-536: The Constitution: [T]he state law under consideration in the Slaughter-House cases was only challenged as one which authorized a monopoly, and the brief for the challenger properly conceded that there was "no direct constitutional provision against a monopoly." The argument did not invoke any specific provision of the Bill of Rights, but urged that the state monopoly statute violated "the natural right of
4752-404: The Court decided a California law authorizing a 90-day jail sentence for "be[ing] addicted to the use of narcotics " violated the Eighth Amendment, as narcotics addiction "is apparently an illness", and California was attempting to punish people based on the state of this illness, rather than for any specific act. The Court wrote: To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract,
4860-442: The Court declared that, within the context of judicial deference to the legislature's power to set punishments, a fine would not offend the Eighth Amendment unless it were "grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense". In Timbs v. Indiana the Supreme Court ruled that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to state and local governments under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case involves
4968-478: The Court sustained a mandatory sentence of life without parole imposed for possession of 672 grams (1.5 pounds) or more of cocaine. The Court acknowledged that a punishment could be cruel but not unusual, and therefore not prohibited by the Constitution. Additionally, in Harmelin , Justice Scalia , joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist , said "the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee," and that "what
5076-407: The Court to exclude rights from incorporation which had erroneously been deemed fundamental in previous decisions. Another difference between incorporation through Due Process versus Privileges or Immunities is that the text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause refers only to the privileges or immunities of "citizens," while the Due Process Clause protects the due process rights of "any person." It
5184-451: The Court went further, holding that mandatory life sentences without parole cannot be imposed on minors, even for homicide. In Coker v. Georgia , 433 U.S. 584 (1977), the Court declared that the death penalty was unconstitutionally excessive for rape of a woman and, by implication, for any crime where a death does not occur. The majority in Coker stated that "death is indeed
5292-438: The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the Supreme Court has struck down the application of capital punishment in some instances, but capital punishment is still permitted in some cases where the defendant is convicted of murder . The Supreme Court has held that the Excessive Fines Clause prohibits fines that are "so grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law". The Court struck down
5400-585: The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause limits the criminal process in three ways: "[F]irst, it limits the kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those convicted of crimes, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble , supra; Trop v. Dulles , supra; second, it proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, e.g., Weems v. United States , supra ; and third, it imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such, e.g., Robinson v. California , supra ." In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber , 329 U.S. 459 (1947),
5508-606: The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, is that judgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to the legislature. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm , 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) ("Reviewing courts ... should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes"); see also Gore v. United States , 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) ("Whatever views may be entertained regarding severity of punishment ... these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy"). The second
SECTION 50
#17327720094465616-444: The Eighth Amendment has been interpreted to mean that bail may be denied if the charges are sufficiently serious. The Supreme Court has also permitted "preventive" detention without bail. In United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the only limitation imposed by the Excessive Bail Clause is that "the government's proposed conditions of release or detention not be 'excessive' in light of
5724-410: The Eighth Amendment was adopted. James Madison changed "ought" to "shall", when he proposed the amendment to Congress in 1789. In Coker v. Georgia (1977) it was decided that "Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent." In Timbs v. Indiana (2019)
5832-559: The English Bill of Rights into law in December 1689. Members of parliament characterized the punishment in the Oates case as not just "barbarous" and "inhuman" but also "extravagant" and "exorbitant". There is some scholarly dispute about whom the clause intended to limit. In England, the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause may have been a limitation on the discretion of judges, requiring them to adhere to precedent. According to
5940-534: The Excessive Bail Clause. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. The Eighth Amendment was adopted, as part of the Bill of Rights , in 1791. It is almost identical to a provision in the English Bill of Rights of 1689 , in which Parliament declared, "as their ancestors in like cases have usually done ... that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The provision
6048-515: The Fifth Amendment in that it explicitly applied to the states. The Privileges or Immunities Clause also explicitly applied to the states, unlike the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution. In the Slaughter-House Cases (1873), the Supreme Court ruled that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was not designed to protect individuals from the actions of state governments. In Twining v. New Jersey (1908),
6156-467: The First Amendment prohibition against a state-established religion, regardless of whether state laws and constitutions offer such a prohibition. The Supreme Court declined to apply new procedural constitutional rights retroactively against the states in criminal cases in Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Rep. John Bingham , the principal framer of the Fourteenth Amendment, advocated that
6264-554: The Fourteenth Amendment and the development of the incorporation doctrine, the Supreme Court in 1833 held in Barron v. Baltimore that the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal, but not any state, governments. Even years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court in United States v. Cruikshank (1876) still held that the First and Second Amendment did not apply to state governments. However, beginning in
6372-468: The Fourteenth Amendment required the States to respect all of the enumerated rights set forth in the first eight amendments, but he did not wish to see the doctrine expanded to include other, unenumerated " fundamental rights " that might be based on the Ninth Amendment . The Tenth Amendment was excluded from total incorporation as well, due to it already being patently concerned with the power of
6480-546: The Fourteenth Amendment was designed to apply the first eight amendments from the Bill of Rights to the states, as he expressed in his dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California . This view was again expressed by Black in his concurrence in Duncan v. Louisiana citing the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause: "'No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
6588-537: The Fourteenth applied the first eight Amendments of the Bill of Rights to the States. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently declined to interpret it that way, despite the dissenting argument in the 1947 case of Adamson v. California by Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black that the framers' intent should control the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment (he included a lengthy appendix that quoted extensively from Bingham's congressional testimony). Although
SECTION 60
#17327720094466696-459: The Government of the United States had provided no remedy and could provide none. In Furman v. Georgia , 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Justice Brennan wrote, "There are, then, four principles by which we may determine whether a particular punishment is 'cruel and unusual'." Justice Brennan added: "The function of these principles, after all, is simply to provide [the] means by which
6804-536: The Massachusetts Ratifying Convention for the federal constitution, for example noted in a letter from January 30, 1788, that the new Constitution would give the U.S. Congress the power "to ascertain, point out, and determine, what kind of punishments shall be inflicted on persons convicted of crimes." He added with respect those who would belong to the new government under the new Constitution: "They are nowhere restrained from inventing
6912-451: The State legislation of this Union, of flagrant violations of the guarantied privileges of citizens of the United States, for which the national Government furnished and could furnish by law no remedy whatever. Contrary to the express letter of your Constitution, "cruel and unusual punishments" have been inflicted under State laws within this Union upon citizens, not only for crimes committed, but for sacred duty done, for which and against which
7020-475: The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Due Process Clause might incorporate some of the Bill of Rights, but continued to reject any incorporation under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The doctrine of incorporation has been traced back to either Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad v. City of Chicago (1897) in which the Supreme Court appeared to require some form of just compensation for property appropriated by state or local authorities (although there
7128-412: The Supreme Court assumed arguendo that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . In Robinson v. California , 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Court ruled that it did apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson was the first case in which the Supreme Court applied the Eighth Amendment against
7236-415: The Supreme Court ruled that the Excessive Fines Clause does apply to civil asset forfeiture actions taken by the federal government, in the specific case, the government's seizure of the petitioner's auto body shop on the basis of one charge of drug possession for which he had served seven years in prison. In United States v. Bajakajian , 524 U.S. 321 (1998), the Supreme Court ruled that it
7344-637: The Supreme Court ruled that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply "when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded". While punitive damages in civil cases are not covered by the Excessive Fines Clause, such damages were held to be covered by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, notably in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell , 538 U.S. 408 (2003). In Austin v. United States 509 U.S. 602 (1993),
7452-400: The Supreme Court stated that the Excessive Bail Clause, the Excessive Fines Clause and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause together form a shield against abuses stemming from the government's punitive or criminal-law-enforcement authority . In England, sheriffs originally determined whether to grant bail to criminal suspects. Since they tended to abuse their power, Parliament passed
7560-625: The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, and the Fourteenth Amendment likewise forbids the states from depriving citizens of their property without due process of law. See United States v. Nichols , 841 F.2d 1485, 1510 n.1 (10th Cir. 1988). Unreasonable search and seizure Warrant requirements Right to indictment by a grand jury Protection against double jeopardy Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination Right to Due Process of Law Protection against taking of private property without just compensation Right to
7668-639: The United States Constitution The Eighth Amendment ( Amendment VIII ) to the United States Constitution protects against imposing excessive bail , excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishments . This amendment was adopted on December 15, 1791, along with the rest of the United States Bill of Rights . The amendment serves as a limitation upon the state or federal government to impose unduly harsh penalties on criminal defendants before and after
7776-480: The United States' seem to me an eminently reasonable way of expressing the idea that henceforth the Bill of Rights shall apply to the States." Justice Felix Frankfurter , however, felt that the incorporation process ought to be incremental, and that the federal courts should only apply those sections of the Bill of Rights whose abridgment would "shock the conscience," as he put it in Rochin v. California (1952). Such
7884-499: The case itself turned on the question of which clause is the source of the incorporation. In the Timbs decision, one of Justice Thomas's stated reasons for preferring incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities Clause was what he perceived as the Court's failure to consistently or correctly define which rights are "fundamental" under the Due Process Clause. In Thomas' view, incorporation through Privileges or Immunities would allow
7992-501: The court of king's bench, in the reign of king James the second) ... Virginia adopted this provision of the English Bill of Rights in the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, and the Virginia convention that ratified the U.S. Constitution recommended in 1788 that this language also be included in the Constitution. Virginians such as George Mason and Patrick Henry wanted to ensure this restriction would also be applied as
8100-407: The courts." This is why "fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." The 14th Amendment has vastly expanded civil rights protections and is cited in more litigation than any other amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In the 1940s and 1960s the Supreme Court gradually issued a series of decisions incorporating several of the specific rights from
8208-571: The crime, or compared to the competence of the perpetrator. This will be discussed in the sections below. In Wilkerson v. Utah , 99 U.S. 130 (1878), the Supreme Court commented that drawing and quartering , public dissection , burning alive , or disembowelment constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Relying on Eighth Amendment case law Justice William O. Douglas stated in his Robinson v. California , 370 U.S. 660 (1962) concurrence opinion that "historic punishments that were cruel and unusual included " burning at
8316-492: The day, but the end result is very nearly what Justice Black advocated, with the exceptions noted below. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. ... — Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Some have suggested that the Privileges or Immunities Clause would be a more appropriate textual basis than
8424-597: The death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment if the defendant is under age 16 when the crime was committed. Furthermore, in Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the Court barred the executing of people who were under age 18 when the crime was committed. In Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Court declared that executing people who are mentally handicapped constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The case of Weems v. United States , 217 U.S. 349 (1910), marked
8532-482: The due process clause for incorporation of the Bill of Rights. It is often said that the Slaughter-House Cases "gutted the privileges or immunities clause" and thus prevented its use for applying the Bill of Rights against the states. In his dissent to Adamson v. California , however, Justice Hugo Black pointed out that the Slaughter-House Cases did not directly involve any right enumerated in
8640-464: The establishment of the Inquisition in the United States, Henry was concerned with the application of torture as a way of extracting confessions. They also feared that the federal government would misuse its powers to create federal crimes as well as to punish those who committed them under the new Constitution and thus use these powers as a way to oppress the people. Abraham Holmes, a member of
8748-541: The factors to consider, a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for cashing a $ 100 check on a closed account was cruel and unusual. However, in Harmelin v. Michigan , 501 U.S. 957 (1991), a fractured Court retreated from the Solem test and held that for non-capital sentences, the Eighth Amendment constrains only the length of prison terms by a "gross disproportionality principle". Under this principle,
8856-400: The fifth justice in the majority, criticized substantive due process and declared instead that he reached the same incorporation only through the Privileges or Immunities Clause. No other justice attempted to question his rationale. This is considered by some as a "revival" of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, however as it is a concurring opinion and not the majority opinion in the case, it
8964-416: The fines imposed are so excessive as to constitute a taking of the defendant's property without due process of law. It is not contended in this connection that the prohibition of the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution against excessive fines operates to control the legislation of the states. The fixing of punishment for crime or penalties for unlawful acts against its laws is within the police power of
9072-453: The first eight Amendments, but because they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of law." The due process approach thus considers a right to be incorporated not because it was listed in the Bill of Rights, but only because it is required by the definition of due process , which may change over time. For example, Moody's decision in Twining stated that
9180-435: The first time the Supreme Court exercised judicial review to overturn a criminal sentence as cruel and unusual. The Court overturned a punishment called cadena temporal , which mandated "hard and painful labor", shackling for the duration of incarceration, and permanent civil disabilities. This case is often viewed as establishing a principle of proportionality under the Eighth Amendment. However, others have written that "it
9288-492: The great treatise of the 1760s by William Blackstone entitled Commentaries on the Laws of England : [H]owever unlimited the power of the court may seem, it is far from being wholly arbitrary; but its discretion is regulated by law. For the bill of rights has particularly declared, that excessive fines ought not to be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted: (which had a retrospect to some unprecedented proceedings in
9396-463: The later addition of the Eighth Amendment outlaw the practice. [...] The same Constitution that permits States to authorize capital punishment also allows them to outlaw it. [...] While the Eighth Amendment doesn't forbid capital punishment, it does speak to how States may carry out that punishment, prohibiting methods that are 'cruel and unusual'." The Court also explained in Bucklew that “what unites
9504-607: The most cruel and unheard-of punishments, and annexing them to crimes; and there is no constitutional check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild instruments of their discipline." Relying on the history of the Eighth Amendment and its own caselaw the Supreme Court stated in Ingraham v. Wright (1977) that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was designed to protect those convicted of crimes. The Supreme Court consequently determined in Ingraham that
9612-410: The offense. The Court outlined three factors that were to be considered in determining if a sentence is excessive: "(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." The Court held that in the circumstances of the case before it and
9720-484: The offenses were bailable; such loopholes were for the most part closed by the Habeas Corpus Act 1679 . Thereafter, judges were compelled to set bail, but they often required impracticable amounts. Finally, the English Bill of Rights (1689) held that "excessive bail ought not to be required." However, the English Bill of Rights did not determine the distinction between bailable and non-bailable offenses. Thus,
9828-434: The perceived evil". In Stack v. Boyle , 342 U.S. 1 (1951), the Supreme Court declared that a bail amount is "excessive" under the Eighth Amendment if it were "a figure higher than is reasonably calculated" to ensure the defendant's appearance at trial. The incorporation status of the Excessive Bail Clause is unclear. In Schilb v. Kuebel , 404 U.S. 357 (1971), the Court stated in dicta : "Bail, of course,
9936-487: The practice of France, Spain, and Germany--of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime. They will say that they might as well draw examples from those countries as from Great Britain, and they will tell you that there is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of government, that they must have a criminal equity, and extort confession by torture, in order to punish with still more relentless severity. We are then lost and undone. Ultimately, Henry and Mason prevailed, and
10044-456: The punishments the Eighth Amendment was understood to forbid, and distinguishes them from those it was understood to allow, is that the former were long disused (unusual) forms of punishment that intensified the sentence of death with a (cruel) superadd[ition] of terror, pain, or disgrace." According to the Supreme Court , the Eighth Amendment forbids some punishments entirely, and forbids some other punishments that are excessive when compared to
10152-623: The right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions", and that "punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to both the offender and the offense." The Supreme Court has also looked to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" when addressing the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Justice Antonin Scalia noted in a concurring opinion in Callins v. Collins (1994): "The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for
10260-399: The rights of those accused of crimes, brought state standards in line with federal requirements. The following list enumerates, by amendment and individual clause, the Supreme Court cases that have incorporated the rights contained in the Bill of Rights. (The Ninth Amendment is not listed; its wording indicates that it "is not a source of rights as such; it is simply a rule about how to read
10368-409: The stake , crucifixion , breaking on the wheel " ( In re Kemmler , 136 U. S. 436, 136 U. S. 446), quartering , the rack and thumbscrew (see Chambers v. Florida , 309 U. S. 227, 309 U. S. 237), and, in some circumstances, even solitary confinement (see In re Medley, 134 U. S. 160, 134 U. S. 167-168)." In Thompson v. Oklahoma , 487 U.S. 815 (1988), the Supreme Court ruled that
10476-576: The state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. Before Robinson , the Eighth Amendment had been applied previously only in cases against the federal government. Justice Potter Stewart 's opinion for the Robinson Court held that "infliction of cruel and unusual punishment is in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as John Bingham , had discussed this subject: Many instances of State injustice and oppression have already occurred in
10584-496: The state. We can only interfere with such legislation and judicial action of the states enforcing it if the fines imposed are so grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. In essence, the government must not be able to confiscate such a large amount of property without following an established set of rules created by the legislature. In Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. , 492 U.S. 257 (1989),
10692-441: The states. Black felt that his formulation eliminated any arbitrariness or caprice in deciding what the Fourteenth Amendment ought to protect, by sticking to words already found in the Constitution. Although Black was willing to invalidate federal statutes on federalism grounds, he was not inclined to read any of the first eight amendments as states' rights provisions as opposed to individual rights provisions. Justice Black felt that
10800-468: The title Eighth Amendment . If an internal link led you here, you may wish to change the link to point directly to the intended article. Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Eighth_Amendment&oldid=1151169315 " Category : Disambiguation pages Hidden categories: Short description is different from Wikidata All article disambiguation pages All disambiguation pages Eighth Amendment to
10908-409: The use of civil asset forfeiture to seize a $ 42,000 vehicle under state law in addition to the imposition of a $ 1,200 fine for drug trafficking charges, house arrest, and probation. The Constitution was amended to prohibit cruel and unusual punishments as part of the United States Bill of Rights as a result of objections raised by people such as Abraham Holmes and Patrick Henry . While Holmes feared
11016-408: Was 'cruel and unusual' under the Eighth Amendment was to be determined without reference to the particular offense." Scalia wrote "If 'cruel and unusual punishments' included disproportionate punishments, the separate prohibition of disproportionate fines (which are certainly punishments) would have been entirely superfluous." Moreover, "There is little doubt that those who framed, proposed, and ratified
11124-456: Was a state statute on the books that provided the same guarantee) or, more commonly, to Gitlow v. New York (1925), in which the Court expressly held that States were bound to protect freedom of speech. Since that time, the Court has steadily incorporated most of the significant provisions of the Bill of Rights. Provisions that the Supreme Court either has refused to incorporate, or whose possible incorporation have not yet been addressed, include
11232-697: Was approved by Parliament in February 1689, and was read to King William III and his wife Queen Mary II as the Declaration of Right on the following day. Members of Parliament then explained in August 1689 that "the Commons had a particular regard ... when that Declaration was first made" to punishments like the one that had been inflicted by the King's Bench against Titus Oates. Parliament then enacted
11340-468: Was drunk in public , not merely for being addicted to alcohol. Traditionally, the length of a prison sentence was not subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, regardless of the crime for which the sentence was imposed. It was not until the case of Solem v. Helm , 463 U.S. 277 (1983), that the Supreme Court held that incarceration, standing alone, could constitute cruel and unusual punishment if it were "disproportionate" in duration to
11448-472: Was largely inspired by the case in England of Titus Oates who, after the accession of King James II in 1685, was tried for multiple acts of perjury that had led to executions of many people Oates had wrongly accused. Oates was sentenced to imprisonment, including an annual ordeal of being taken out for two days' pillory plus one day of whipping while tied to a moving cart. The Oates case eventually became
11556-561: Was not more effective than a less severe penalty." The plurality of the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia stated that the Eighth Amendment is not static, but that its meaning is interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner to accord with, in the words of Trop v. Dulles , 356 U.S. 86 (1958), at page 101, "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Punishments including capital punishment must therefore not be "excessive". The "excessiveness" of
11664-411: Was unconstitutional to confiscate $ 357,144 from Hosep Bajakajian, who had failed to report possession of over $ 10,000 while leaving the United States. In what was the first case in which the Supreme Court ruled that a fine violated the Excessive Fines Clause, the Court held that it was "grossly disproportional" to take all the money Bajakajian had attempted to take out of the United States in violation of
#445554