Misplaced Pages

#189810

94-665: IPsec includes protocols for establishing mutual authentication between agents at the beginning of a session and negotiation of cryptographic keys to use during the session. IPsec can protect data flows between a pair of hosts ( host-to-host ), between a pair of security gateways ( network-to-network ), or between a security gateway and a host ( network-to-host ). IPsec uses cryptographic security services to protect communications over Internet Protocol (IP) networks. It supports network-level peer authentication, data origin authentication , data integrity , data confidentiality ( encryption ), and protection from replay attacks . Starting in

188-881: A certificate authority , this can be used for IPsec authentication. The security associations of IPsec are established using the Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP). ISAKMP is implemented by manual configuration with pre-shared secrets, Internet Key Exchange (IKE and IKEv2), Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys (KINK), and the use of IPSECKEY DNS records . RFC 5386 defines Better-Than-Nothing Security (BTNS) as an unauthenticated mode of IPsec using an extended IKE protocol. C. Meadows, C. Cremers, and others have used formal methods to identify various anomalies which exist in IKEv1 and also in IKEv2. In order to decide what protection

282-402: A checksum . The paradigm is similar to a window sliding sideways to allow entry of fresh packets and reject the ones that have already been acknowledged. When the receiver verifies the data, it sends an acknowledgment signal , or ACK, back to the sender to indicate it can send the next packet. In a simple automatic repeat request protocol (ARQ), the sender stops after every packet and waits for

376-592: A few incompatible engineering details, although they were conceptually identical. In addition, a mutual authentication and key exchange protocol Internet Key Exchange (IKE) was defined to create and manage security associations. In December 2005, new standards were defined in RFC 4301 and RFC 4309 which are largely a superset of the previous editions with a second version of the Internet Key Exchange standard IKEv2 . These third-generation documents standardized

470-474: A fixed N . Although commonly distinguished from the sliding-window protocol, the stop-and-wait ARQ protocol is actually the simplest possible implementation of it. The transmit window is 1 packet, and the receive window is 1 packet. Thus, N = 2 possible sequence numbers (conveniently represented by a single bit ) are required. The transmitter alternately sends packets marked odd and even . The acknowledgments likewise say odd and even . Suppose that

564-475: A fixed w r =1. The receiver refuses to accept any packet but the next one in sequence. If a packet is lost in transit, following packets are ignored until the missing packet is retransmitted, a minimum loss of one round-trip time . For this reason, it is inefficient on links that suffer frequent packet loss. Suppose that we are using a 3-bit sequence number, such as is typical for HDLC . This gives N =2 =8. Since w r =1, we must limit w t ≤7. This

658-832: A hash, so they cannot be modified in any way, for example by translating the port numbers. A means to encapsulate IPsec messages for NAT traversal {NAT-T} has been defined by RFC documents describing the NAT-T mechanism. In tunnel mode, the entire IP packet is encrypted and authenticated. It is then encapsulated into a new IP packet with a new IP header. Tunnel mode is used to create virtual private networks for network-to-network communications (e.g. between routers to link sites), host-to-network communications (e.g. remote user access) and host-to-host communications (e.g. private chat). Tunnel mode supports NAT traversal. Cryptographic algorithms defined for use with IPsec include: Refer to RFC 8221 for details. The IPsec can be implemented in

752-521: A host-to-host transport mode, as well as in a network tunneling mode. In transport mode, only the payload of the IP packet is usually encrypted or authenticated. The routing is intact, since the IP header is neither modified nor encrypted; however, when the authentication header is used, the IP addresses cannot be modified by network address translation , as this always invalidates the hash value . The transport and application layers are always secured by

846-412: A lack of mutual authentication had been considered a weakness in data transmission schemes. Schemes that have a mutual authentication step may use different methods of encryption, communication, and verification, but they all share one thing in common: each entity involved in the communication is verified. If Alice wants to communicate with Bob , they will both authenticate the other and verify that it

940-517: A low memory footprint ) in order to accommodate the system that is storing a lot of data. Many systems implement cloud computing , which allows quick access to large amounts of data, but sometimes large amounts of data can slow down communication. Even with edge-based cloud computing, which is faster than general cloud computing due to a closer proximity between the server and user, lightweight schemes allow for more speed when managing larger amounts of data. One solution to keep schemes lightweight during

1034-549: A member of the IPsec protocol suite. It provides origin authenticity through source authentication , data integrity through hash functions and confidentiality through encryption protection for IP packets . ESP also supports encryption -only and authentication -only configurations, but using encryption without authentication is strongly discouraged because it is insecure. Unlike Authentication Header (AH) , ESP in transport mode does not provide integrity and authentication for

SECTION 10

#1732771943190

1128-449: A mutual authentication step to data transmissions protocols can often increase performance runtime and computational costs. This can become an issue for network systems that cannot handle large amounts of data or those that constantly have to update for new real-time data (e.g. location tracking, real-time health data). Thus, it becomes a desired characteristic of many mutual authentication schemes to have lightweight properties (e.g. have

1222-678: A network encryption device in 1988. The work was openly published from about 1988 by NIST and, of these, Security Protocol at Layer 3 (SP3) would eventually morph into the ISO standard Network Layer Security Protocol (NLSP). In 1992, the US Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) was funded by DARPA CSTO to implement IPv6 and to research and implement IP encryption in 4.4 BSD , supporting both SPARC and x86 CPU architectures. DARPA made its implementation freely available via MIT. Under NRL's DARPA -funded research effort, NRL developed

1316-445: A packet that will never be transmitted; the useful range is 1 ≤ w r ≤ w t . So far, the protocol has been described as if sequence numbers are of unlimited size, ever-increasing. However, rather than transmitting the full sequence number x in messages, it is possible to transmit only x  mod  N , for some finite N . ( N is usually a power of 2 .) For example, the transmitter will only receive acknowledgments in

1410-402: A reader is breached, it will not affect the whole system. Individual readers will communicate with specific tags during mutual authentication, which runs in constant time as readers use the same private key for the authentication process. Many e-Healthcare systems that remotely monitor patient health data use wireless body area networks (WBAN) that transmit data through radio frequencies. This

1504-404: A security association is provided for the group, and is duplicated across all authorized receivers of the group. There may be more than one security association for a group, using different SPIs, thereby allowing multiple levels and sets of security within a group. Indeed, each sender can have multiple security associations, allowing authentication, since a receiver can only know that someone knowing

1598-697: A security extension for SIPP. This ESP was originally derived from the US Department of Defense SP3D protocol, rather than being derived from the ISO Network-Layer Security Protocol (NLSP). The SP3D protocol specification was published by NIST in the late 1980s, but designed by the Secure Data Network System project of the US Department of Defense . Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) is

1692-408: A so-called bump-in-the-wire (BITW) implementation of IPsec is possible. When IPsec is implemented in the kernel , the key management and ISAKMP / IKE negotiation is carried out from user space. The NRL-developed and openly specified "PF_KEY Key Management API, Version 2" is often used to enable the application-space key management application to update the IPsec security associations stored within

1786-445: Is n s − w t The receiver also knows that the transmitter's n a cannot be higher than the highest acknowledgment ever sent, which is n r . So the highest sequence number we could possibly see is n r + w t  ≤  n s + w t . Thus, there are 2 w t different sequence numbers that the receiver can receive at any one time. It might therefore seem that we must have N  ≥ 2 w t . However,

1880-407: Is a method of detecting a dead Internet Key Exchange (IKE) peer. The method uses IPsec traffic patterns to minimize the number of messages required to confirm the availability of a peer. DPD is used to reclaim the lost resources in case a peer is found dead and it is also used to perform IKE peer failover. UDP keepalive is an alternative to DPD. The IPsec protocols AH and ESP can be implemented in

1974-403: Is also used for both hosts and gateways. However, when retrofitting IPsec the encapsulation of IP packets may cause problems for the automatic path MTU discovery , where the maximum transmission unit (MTU) size on the network path between two IP hosts is established. If a host or gateway has a separate cryptoprocessor , which is common in the military and can also be found in commercial systems,

SECTION 20

#1732771943190

2068-404: Is because, after transmitting 7 packets, there are 8 possible results: Anywhere from 0 to 7 packets could have been received successfully. This is 8 possibilities, and the transmitter needs enough information in the acknowledgment to distinguish them all. If the transmitter sent 8 packets without waiting for acknowledgment, it could find itself in a quandary similar to the stop-and-wait case: does

2162-444: Is beneficial for patients that should not be disturbed while being monitored, and can reduced the workload for medical worker and allow them to focus on the more hands-on jobs. However, a large concern for healthcare providers and patients about using remote health data tracking is that sensitive patient data is being transmitted through unsecured channels, so authentication occurs between the medical body area network user (the patient),

2256-458: Is constructed and interpreted: The IPsec protocols use a security association , where the communicating parties establish shared security attributes such as algorithms and keys. As such, IPsec provides a range of options once it has been determined whether AH or ESP is used. Before exchanging data, the two hosts agree on which symmetric encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the IP packet, for example AES or ChaCha20 , and which hash function

2350-415: Is important because user identities and passwords are still protected, as the messages are only readable to the two parties involved. However, a negative aspect about password-based authentication is that password tables can take up a lot of memory space. One way around using a lot of memory during a password-based authentication scheme is to implement one-time passwords (OTP), which is a password sent to

2444-463: Is more difficult to copy or guess session keys when using biometrics, but it can be difficult to encrypt noisy data. Due to these security risks and limitations, schemes can still employ mutual authentication regardless of how many authentication factors are added. Mutual authentication is often found in schemes employed in the Internet of Things (IoT), where physical objects are incorporated into

2538-495: Is more often used in business-to-business (B2B) applications, where a limited number of programmatic and homogeneous clients are connecting to specific web services, the operational burden is limited, and security requirements are usually much higher as compared to consumer environments. mTLS is also used in microservices -based applications based on runtimes such as Dapr , via systems like SPIFFE. While lightweight schemes and secure schemes are not mutually exclusive , adding

2632-459: Is not to be trusted, and then will verify its legality. Mutual authentication supports zero trust networking because it can protect communications against adversarial attacks, notably: Mutual authentication also ensures information integrity because if the parties are verified to be the correct source, then the information received is reliable as well. By default the TLS protocol only proves

2726-496: Is often employed in the Internet of Things (IoT). Writing effective security schemes in IoT systems is challenging, especially when schemes are desired to be lightweight and have low computational costs. Mutual authentication is a crucial security step that can defend against many adversarial attacks, which otherwise can have large consequences if IoT systems (such as e-Healthcare servers) are hacked. In scheme analyses done of past works,

2820-531: Is one way that has been proposed to mutually authenticate the user to the database, by authenticating with the main mediBchain node and keeping patient anonymity. Fog-cloud computing is a networking system that can handle large amounts of data, but still has limitations regarding computational and memory cost. Mobile edge computing (MEC) is considered to be an improved, more lightweight fog-cloud computing networking system, and can be used for medical technology that also revolves around location-based data. Due to

2914-489: Is required, such as in the data link layer ( OSI layer 2 ) as well as in the Transmission Control Protocol (i.e., TCP windowing ). They are also used to improve efficiency when the channel may include high latency . Packet-based systems are based on the idea of sending a batch of data, the packet , along with additional data that allows the receiver to ensure it was received correctly, perhaps

IPsec - Misplaced Pages Continue

3008-403: Is still important to ensure mutual authentication occurs in order to keep a secure scheme. Schemes may sacrifice a better runtime or storage cost when ensuring mutual authentication in order to prioritize protecting the sensitive data. In mutual authentication schemes that require a user's input password as part of the verification process, there is a higher vulnerability to hackers because

3102-499: Is the next packet to be transmitted, i.e. the sequence number of the first packet not yet transmitted. Likewise, n r is the first packet not yet received. Both numbers are monotonically increasing with time; they only ever increase. The receiver may also keep track of the highest sequence number yet received; the variable n s is one more than the sequence number of the highest sequence number received. For simple receivers that only accept packets in order ( w r = 1), this

3196-412: Is the same as n r , but can be greater if w r > 1. Note the distinction: all packets below n r have been received, no packets above n s have been received, and between n r and n s , some packets have been received. When the receiver receives a packet, it updates its variables appropriately and transmits an acknowledgment with the new n r . The transmitter keeps track of

3290-520: Is to be provided for an outgoing packet, IPsec uses the Security Parameter Index (SPI), an index to the security association database (SADB), along with the destination address in a packet header, which together uniquely identifies a security association for that packet. A similar procedure is performed for an incoming packet, where IPsec gathers decryption and verification keys from the security association database. For IP multicast

3384-405: Is to be used, the requirement that n t + n r  ≤ 8 must be maintained; if w r is increased to 2, w t must be decreased to 6. Suppose that w r  =2, but an unmodified transmitter is used with w t  =7, as is typically used with the go-back-N variant of HDLC. Further suppose that the receiver begins with n r  = n s  =0. Now suppose that

3478-404: Is used to ensure the integrity of the data, such as BLAKE2 or SHA256 . These parameters are agreed for the particular session, for which a lifetime must be agreed and a session key . The algorithm for authentication is also agreed before the data transfer takes place and IPsec supports a range of methods. Authentication is possible through pre-shared key , where a symmetric key is already in

3572-441: Is who they are expecting to communicate with before any data or messages are transmitted. A mutual authentication process that exchanges user IDs may be implemented as follows: To verify that mutual authentication has occurred successfully, Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic (BAN logic) is a well regarded and widely accepted method to use, because it verifies that a message came from a trustworthy entity. BAN logic first assumes an entity

3666-511: The Bullrun program. There are allegations that IPsec was a targeted encryption system. The OpenBSD IPsec stack came later on and also was widely copied. In a letter which OpenBSD lead developer Theo de Raadt received on 11 Dec 2010 from Gregory Perry, it is alleged that Jason Wright and others, working for the FBI, inserted "a number of backdoors and side channel key leaking mechanisms" into

3760-665: The IETF standards-track specifications (RFC 1825 through RFC 1827) for IPsec. NRL's IPsec implementation was described in their paper in the 1996 USENIX Conference Proceedings. NRL's open-source IPsec implementation was made available online by MIT and became the basis for most initial commercial implementations. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) formed the IP Security Working Group in 1992 to standardize openly specified security extensions to IP, called IPsec . The NRL developed standards were published by

3854-544: The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) version 2. Authentication Header (AH) is a member of the IPsec protocol suite. AH ensures connectionless integrity by using a hash function and a secret shared key in the AH algorithm. AH also guarantees the data origin by authenticating IP packets . Optionally a sequence number can protect the IPsec packet's contents against replay attacks , using

IPsec - Misplaced Pages Continue

3948-542: The application layer , IPsec can automatically secure applications at the internet layer . IPsec is an open standard as a part of the IPv4 suite and uses the following protocols to perform various functions: The Security Authentication Header (AH) was developed at the US Naval Research Laboratory in the early 1990s and is derived in part from previous IETF standards' work for authentication of

4042-416: The error detection mechanism reveals corruption, the packet will be ignored by the receiver and a negative or duplicate acknowledgement will be sent by the receiver. The receiver may also be configured to not send any acknowledgement at all. Similarly, the receiver is usually uncertain about whether its acknowledgements are being received. It may be that an acknowledgment was sent, but was lost or corrupted in

4136-595: The sliding window technique and discarding old packets. AH operates directly on top of IP, using IP protocol number 51 . The following AH packet diagram shows how an AH packet is constructed and interpreted: The IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) was developed at the Naval Research Laboratory starting in 1992 as part of a DARPA -sponsored research project, and was openly published by IETF SIPP Working Group drafted in December 1993 as

4230-450: The window , to be sent without having to wait for an ACK. Each packet receives a sequence number, and the ACKs send back that number. The protocol keeps track of which packets have been ACKed, and when they are received, sends more packets. In this way, the window slides along the stream of packets making up the transfer. Sliding windows are a key part of many protocols. It is a key part of

4324-571: The Healthcare Service Provider (HSP) and the trusted third party. e-Healthcare clouds are another way to store patient data collected remotely. Clouds are useful for storing large amounts of data, such as medical information, that can be accessed by many devices whenever needed. Telecare Medical Information Systems (TMIS), an important way for medical patients to receive healthcare remotely, can ensure secured data with mutual authentication verification schemes. Blockchain

4418-510: The IETF as RFC 1825 through RFC 1827. The initial IPv4 suite was developed with few security provisions. As a part of the IPv4 enhancement, IPsec is a layer 3 OSI model or internet layer end-to-end security scheme. In contrast, while some other Internet security systems in widespread use operate above the network layer , such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) that operates above the transport layer and Secure Shell (SSH) that operates at

4512-490: The IP stack of an operating system . This method of implementation is done for hosts and security gateways. Various IPsec capable IP stacks are available from companies, such as HP or IBM. An alternative is so called bump-in-the-stack (BITS) implementation, where the operating system source code does not have to be modified. Here IPsec is installed between the IP stack and the network drivers . This way operating systems can be retrofitted with IPsec. This method of implementation

4606-709: The Internet and can communicate via IP address. Authentication schemes can be applied to many types of systems that involve data transmission. As the Internet's presence in mechanical systems increases, writing effective security schemes for large numbers of users, objects, and servers can become challenging, especially when needing schemes to be lightweight and have low computational costs. Instead of password-based authentication, devices will use certificates to verify each other's identities. Mutual authentication can be satisfied in radio network schemes, where data transmissions through radio frequencies are secure after verifying

4700-585: The NSA compromised IPsec VPNs by undermining the Diffie-Hellman algorithm used in the key exchange. In their paper, they allege the NSA specially built a computing cluster to precompute multiplicative subgroups for specific primes and generators, such as for the second Oakley group defined in RFC 2409. As of May 2015, 90% of addressable IPsec VPNs supported the second Oakley group as part of IKE. If an organization were to precompute this group, they could derive

4794-504: The OpenBSD crypto code. In the forwarded email from 2010, Theo de Raadt did not at first express an official position on the validity of the claims, apart from the implicit endorsement from forwarding the email. Jason Wright's response to the allegations: "Every urban legend is made more real by the inclusion of real names, dates, and times. Gregory Perry's email falls into this category. ... I will state clearly that I did not add backdoors to

SECTION 50

#1732771943190

4888-599: The OpenBSD operating system or the OpenBSD Cryptographic Framework (OCF)." Some days later, de Raadt commented that "I believe that NETSEC was probably contracted to write backdoors as alleged. ... If those were written, I don't believe they made it into our tree." This was published before the Snowden leaks. An alternative explanation put forward by the authors of the Logjam attack suggests that

4982-510: The TCP protocol, which inherently allows packets to arrive out of order, and is also found in many file transfer protocols like UUCP-g and ZMODEM as a way of improving efficiency compared to non-windowed protocols like XMODEM . See also SEAlink . Conceptually, each portion of the transmission (packets in most data link layers, but bytes in TCP) is assigned a unique consecutive sequence number, and

5076-608: The abbreviation of IPsec to uppercase "IP" and lowercase "sec". "ESP" generally refers to RFC 4303, which is the most recent version of the specification. Since mid-2008, an IPsec Maintenance and Extensions (ipsecme) working group is active at the IETF. In 2013, as part of Snowden leaks , it was revealed that the US National Security Agency had been actively working to "Insert vulnerabilities into commercial encryption systems, IT systems, networks, and endpoint communications devices used by targets" as part of

5170-456: The acknowledgment mean that all 8 packets were received successfully, or none of them? The most general case of the sliding window protocol is Selective Repeat ARQ . This requires a much more capable receiver, which can accept packets with sequence numbers higher than the current n r and store them until the gap is filled in. The advantage, however, is that it is not necessary to discard following correct data for one round-trip time before

5264-503: The actual limit is lower. The additional insight is that the receiver does not need to distinguish between sequence numbers that are too low (less than n r ) or that are too high (greater than or equal to n s + w r ). In either case, the receiver ignores the packet except to retransmit an acknowledgment. Thus, it is only necessary that N  ≥  w t + w r . As it is common to have w r < w t (e.g. see Go-Back-N below), this can permit larger w t within

5358-401: The basic reliability of the sliding window protocol does not depend on the details. Every time a packet numbered x is received, the receiver checks to see if it falls in the receive window, n r ≤ x < n r + w r . (The simplest receivers only have to keep track of one value n r = n s .) If it falls within the window, the receiver accepts it. If it is numbered n r ,

5452-616: The early 1970s, the Advanced Research Projects Agency sponsored a series of experimental ARPANET encryption devices , at first for native ARPANET packet encryption and subsequently for TCP/IP packet encryption; some of these were certified and fielded. From 1986 to 1991, the NSA sponsored the development of security protocols for the Internet under its Secure Data Network Systems (SDNS) program. This brought together various vendors including Motorola who produced

5546-452: The entire IP packet . However, in tunnel mode , where the entire original IP packet is encapsulated with a new packet header added, ESP protection is afforded to the whole inner IP packet (including the inner header) while the outer header (including any outer IPv4 options or IPv6 extension headers) remains unprotected. ESP operates directly on top of IP, using IP protocol number 50. The following ESP packet diagram shows how an ESP packet

5640-484: The fog nodes and the vehicle, vehicular handoff becomes a safe process and the car’s system is safe from hackers. Many systems that do not require a human user as part of the system also have protocols that mutually authenticate between parties. In unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems, a platform authentication occurs rather than user authentication. Mutual authentication during vehicle communication prevents one vehicle's system from being breached, which can then affect

5734-465: The highest acknowledgment it has received n a . The transmitter knows that all packets up to, but not including n a have been received, but is uncertain about packets between n a and n s ; i.e. n a ≤ n r ≤ n s . The sequence numbers always obey the rule that n a ≤ n r ≤ n s < n t ≤ n a + w t . That is: Whenever the transmitter has data to send, it may transmit up to w t packets ahead of

SECTION 60

#1732771943190

5828-424: The highest possible throughput , it is important that the transmitter is not forced to stop sending by the sliding window protocol earlier than one round-trip delay time (RTT). The limit on the amount of data that it can send before stopping to wait for an acknowledgment should be larger than the bandwidth-delay product of the communications link. If it is not, the protocol will limit the effective bandwidth of

5922-427: The identity of the server to the client using X.509 certificates , and the authentication of the client to the server is left to the application layer. TLS also offers client-to-server authentication using client-side X.509 authentication. As it requires provisioning of the certificates to the clients and involves less user-friendly experience, it's rarely used in end-user applications. Mutual TLS authentication (mTLS)

6016-406: The kernel-space IPsec implementation. Existing IPsec implementations usually include ESP, AH, and IKE version 2. Existing IPsec implementations on Unix-like operating systems , for example, Solaris or Linux , usually include PF_KEY version 2. Embedded IPsec can be used to ensure the secure communication among applications running over constrained resource systems with a small overhead. IPsec

6110-546: The keys being exchanged and decrypt traffic without inserting any software backdoors. A second alternative explanation that was put forward was that the Equation Group used zero-day exploits against several manufacturers' VPN equipment which were validated by Kaspersky Lab as being tied to the Equation Group and validated by those manufacturers as being real exploits, some of which were zero-day exploits at

6204-470: The keys sent the data. Note that the relevant standard does not describe how the association is chosen and duplicated across the group; it is assumed that a responsible party will have made the choice. To ensure that the connection between two endpoints has not been interrupted, endpoints exchange keepalive messages at regular intervals, which can also be used to automatically reestablish a tunnel lost due to connection interruption. Dead Peer Detection (DPD)

6298-424: The large physical range required of locational tracking, 5G networks can send data to the edge of the cloud to store data. An application like smart watches that track patient health data can be used to call the nearest hospital if the patient shows a negative change in vitals. Fog node networks can be implemented in car automation , keeping data about the car and its surrounding states secure. By authenticating

6392-521: The latest acknowledgment n a . That is, it may transmit packet number n t as long as n t < n a + w t . In the absence of a communication error, the transmitter soon receives an acknowledgment for all the packets it has sent, leaving n a equal to n t . If this does not happen after a reasonable delay, the transmitter must retransmit the packets between n a and n t . Techniques for defining reasonable delay can be extremely elaborate, but they only affect efficiency;

6486-417: The link. In any communication protocol based on automatic repeat request for error control , the receiver must acknowledge received packets. If the transmitter does not receive an acknowledgment within a reasonable time, it re-sends the data. A transmitter that does not get an acknowledgment cannot know if the receiver actually received the packet; it may be that it was lost or damaged in transmission. If

6580-412: The mutual authentication process is to limit the number of bits used during communication. Applications that solely rely on device-to-device (D2D) communication, where multiple devices can communicate locally in close proximities, removes the third party network. This in turn can speed up communication time. However, the authentication still occurs through insecure channels, so researchers believe it

6674-410: The packet was accepted or not, the receiver transmits an acknowledgment containing the current n r . (The acknowledgment may also include information about additional packets received between n r and n s , but that only helps efficiency.) Note that there is no point having the receive window w r larger than the transmit window w t , because there is no need to worry about receiving

6768-447: The password is human-made rather than a computer-generated certificate. While applications could simply require users to use a computer-generated password, it is inconvenient for people to remember. User-made passwords and the ability to change one's password are important for making an application user-friendly, so many schemes work to accommodate the characteristic. Researchers note that a password based protocol with mutual authentication

6862-412: The possession of both hosts, and the hosts send each other hashes of the shared key to prove that they are in possession of the same key. IPsec also supports public key encryption , where each host has a public and a private key, they exchange their public keys and each host sends the other a nonce encrypted with the other host's public key. Alternatively if both hosts hold a public key certificate from

6956-402: The range n a to n t , inclusive. Since it guarantees that n t − n a  ≤  w t , there are at most w t +1 possible sequence numbers that could arrive at any given time. Thus, the transmitter can unambiguously decode the sequence number as long as N  >  w t . A stronger constraint is imposed by the receiver. The operation of the protocol depends on

7050-420: The receive sequence number is increased by 1, and possibly more if further consecutive packets were previously received and stored. If x > n r , the packet is stored until all preceding packets have been received. If x ≥ n s , the latter is updated to n s = x +1. If the packet's number is not within the receive window, the receiver discards it and does not modify n r or n s . Whether

7144-551: The receiver being able to reliably distinguish new packets (which should be accepted and processed) from retransmissions of old packets (which should be discarded, and the last acknowledgment retransmitted). This can be done given knowledge of the transmitter's window size. After receiving a packet numbered x , the receiver knows that x  <  n a + w t , so n a  >  x − w t . Thus, packets numbered x − w t will never again be retransmitted. The lowest sequence number we will ever receive in future

7238-405: The receiver sees the following series of packets (all modulo 8): Because w r  =2, the receiver will accept and store the final packet 0 (thinking it is packet 8 in the series), while requesting a retransmission of packet 7. However, it is also possible that the transmitter failed to receive any acknowledgments and has retransmitted packet 0. In this latter case, the receiver would accept

7332-457: The receiver side also the window moves one packet for every packet received. The sliding window method ensures that traffic congestion on the network is avoided. The application layer will still be offering data for transmission to TCP without worrying about the network traffic congestion issues as the TCP on sender and receiver side implement sliding windows of packet buffer. The window size may vary dynamically depending on network traffic. For

7426-468: The receiver to ACK. This ensures packets arrive in the correct order, as only one may be sent at a time. The time that it takes for the ACK signal to be received may represent a significant amount of time compared to the time needed to send the packet. In this case, the overall throughput may be much lower than theoretically possible. To address this, sliding window protocols allow a selected number of packets,

7520-481: The receiver uses the numbers to place received packets in the correct order, discarding duplicate packets and identifying missing ones. The problem with this is that there is no limit on the size of the sequence number that can be required. By placing limits on the number of packets that can be transmitted or received at any given time, a sliding window protocol allows an unlimited number of packets to be communicated using fixed-size sequence numbers. The term window on

7614-449: The same time in an authentication protocol . It is a default mode of authentication in some protocols ( IKE , SSH ) and optional in others ( TLS ). Mutual authentication is a desired characteristic in verification schemes that transmit sensitive data, in order to ensure data security . Mutual authentication can be accomplished with two types of credentials: usernames and passwords , and public key certificates . Mutual authentication

7708-535: The sender and receiver. Radio frequency identification (RFID) tags are commonly used for object detection, which many manufacturers are implementing into their warehouse systems for automation. This allows for a faster way to keep up with inventory and track objects. However, keeping track of items in a system with RFID tags that transmit data to a cloud server increases the chances of security risks, as there are now more digital elements to keep track of. A three way mutual authentication can occur between RFID tags,

7802-401: The tag readers, and the cloud network that stores this data in order to keep RFID tag data secure and unable to be manipulated. Similarly, an alternate RFID tag and reader system that assigns designated readers to tags has been proposed for extra security and low memory cost. Instead of considering all tag readers as one entity, only certain readers can read specific tags. With this method, if

7896-548: The time of their exposure. The Cisco PIX and ASA firewalls had vulnerabilities that were used for wiretapping by the NSA. Furthermore, IPsec VPNs using "Aggressive Mode" settings send a hash of the PSK in the clear. This can be and apparently is targeted by the NSA using offline dictionary attacks . Mutual authentication Mutual authentication or two-way authentication (not to be confused with two-factor authentication ) refers to two parties authenticating each other at

7990-508: The transmission medium. In this case, the receiver must acknowledge the retransmission to prevent the data being continually resent, but must otherwise ignore it. The transmitter and receiver each have a current sequence number n t and n r , respectively. They each also have a window size w t and w r . The window sizes may vary, but in simpler implementations they are fixed. The window size must be greater than zero for any progress to be made. As typically implemented, n t

8084-485: The transmitter can be informed that a retransmission is required. This is therefore preferred for links with low reliability and/or a high bandwidth-delay product. The window size w r need only be larger than the number of consecutive lost packets that can be tolerated. Thus, small values are popular; w r =2 is common. The extremely popular HDLC protocol uses a 3-bit sequence number, and has optional provision for selective repeat. However, if selective repeat

8178-433: The transmitter may start transmitting one packet followed by two packets (before transmitting two packets, one packet ack has to be received), followed by three packets and so on until 10 packets. But after reaching 10 packets, further transmissions are restricted to one packet transmitted for one ack packet received. In a simulation this appears as if the window is moving by one packet distance for every ack packet received. On

8272-426: The transmitter side represents the logical boundary of the total number of packets yet to be acknowledged by the receiver. The receiver informs the transmitter in each acknowledgment packet the current maximum receiver buffer size (window boundary). The TCP header uses a 16 bit field to report the receiver window size to the sender. Therefore, the largest window that can be used is 2 = 64 kilobytes. In slow-start mode,

8366-420: The transmitter starts with low packet count and increases the number of packets in each transmission after receiving acknowledgment packets from receiver. For every ack packet received, the window slides by one packet (logically) to transmit one new packet. When the window threshold is reached, the transmitter sends one packet for one ack packet received. If the window limit is 10 packets then in slow start mode

8460-400: The transmitter, having sent an odd packet, did not wait for an odd acknowledgment, and instead immediately sent the following even packet. It might then receive an acknowledgment saying "expecting an odd packet next". This would leave the transmitter in a quandary: has the receiver received both of the packets, or neither? Go-Back-N ARQ is the sliding window protocol with w t >1, but

8554-643: The user via SMS or email. OTPs are time-sensitive, which means that they will expire after a certain amount of time and that memory does not need to be stored. Recently, more schemes have higher level authentication than password based schemes. While password-based authentication is considered as "single-factor authentication," schemes are beginning to implement smart card ( two-factor ) or biometric-based (three-factor) authentication schemes. Smart cards are simpler to implement and easy for authentication, but still have risks of being tampered with. Biometrics have grown more popular over password-based schemes because it

8648-405: The whole system negatively. For example, a system of drones can be employed for agriculture work and cargo delivery, but if one drone were to be breached, the whole system has the potential to collapse. Sliding window A sliding window protocol is a feature of packet-based data transmission protocols . Sliding window protocols are used where reliable in-order delivery of packets

8742-466: The wrong packet as packet 8. The solution is for the transmitter to limit w t  ≤6. With this restriction, the receiver knows that if all acknowledgments were lost, the transmitter would have stopped after packet 5. When it receives packet 6, the receiver can infer that the transmitter received the acknowledgment for packet 0 (the transmitter's n a  ≥1), and thus the following packet numbered 0 must be packet 8. There are many ways that

8836-460: Was developed in conjunction with IPv6 and was originally required to be supported by all standards-compliant implementations of IPv6 before RFC 6434 made it only a recommendation. IPsec is also optional for IPv4 implementations. IPsec is most commonly used to secure IPv4 traffic. IPsec protocols were originally defined in RFC 1825 through RFC 1829, which were published in 1995. In 1998, these documents were superseded by RFC 2401 and RFC 2412 with

#189810