45-541: The Iran Experts Initiative ( IEI ) was a project Iranian Foreign Ministry officials initiated in 2014. According to reports based on leaked emails, the initiative was used to "promote Tehran's arguments in the west". Members of the Iran Experts Initiative worked as academics and researchers for think tanks in the West, and gave advice to Europe and the U.S. According to a report by Iran International ,
90-426: A fissile material to cause a nuclear chain reaction . The most commonly used materials are uranium 235 ( U ) and plutonium 239 ( Pu ). Both uranium 233 ( U ) and reactor-grade plutonium have also been used. The amount of uranium or plutonium needed depends on the sophistication of the design, with a simple design requiring approximately 15 kg of uranium or 6 kg of plutonium and
135-627: A "major decline" in Iran's nuclear activity. Iran had produced stockpiles near 20% (medium-enriched uranium). Stocks in excess of 300 kg enriched up to 3.67% would be diluted to 0.7% or sold in return for uranium ore, while uranium enriched to between 5% and 20% was to be fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or sold or diluted to 3.67%. P5+1 agreed to facilitate commercial contracts. After 15 years, all limits on enrichment would be removed, including limits on
180-542: A past covert nuclear weapons program to the IAEA, as required. On 8 May 2018, Trump announced U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA . On 7 August 2018, the E.U. enacted a blocking statute to defeat U.S. sanctions on countries trading with Iran. In November 2018, U.S. sanctions came back into effect, intended to force Iran to alter its policies, including its support for militant groups in the region and its development of ballistic missiles . In May 2019, IAEA certified that Iran
225-444: A resolution and for Congress to vote on whether to override the veto. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) covered 109 pages, including five annexes. The major provisions are: Over 15 years, Iran would reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 97%, from 10,000 kg to 300 kg, and limit enrichment to 3.67%, sufficient for civilian nuclear power and research, but not for weaponry. This represented
270-428: A short-term program freeze in exchange for decreased economic sanctions. The IAEA began inspections under this interim agreement. The agreement was formally activated on 20 January 2014. That day, an IAEA report stated that Iran was adhering to the terms of the interim agreement, including stopping enrichment of uranium to 20%, beginning to dilute half of the stockpile of 20% enriched uranium to 3.5%, and halting work on
315-590: A single facility using first-generation centrifuges. Other facilities would be converted to avoid proliferation risks. IAEA would have regular access to all Iranian nuclear facilities to monitor compliance. In return for verifiably abiding by those provisions, Iran would receive relief from U.S., European Union , and United Nations S.C. nuclear-related sanctions . The JCPOA formed part of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 . The Security Council (S.C.) enacted it on 20 July 2015 and adopted it on 18 October. It took effect on 16 January 2016 (Adoption Day). JCPOA
360-432: A sophisticated design requiring as little as 9 kg of uranium or 2 kg of plutonium. Plutonium is almost nonexistent in nature, and natural uranium is about 99.3% uranium 238 ( U ) and only 0.7% U . To make a weapon, either uranium must be enriched or plutonium must be produced. Uranium enrichment is required for nuclear power , although not to the same purity. For this reason, uranium enrichment
405-421: A time out" as a confidence-building measure, under which sanctions and enrichment would be suspended. A November 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003; that estimate and U.S. Intelligence Community statements assessed that Iran was maintaining its option to develop nuclear weapons". In September 2009 U.S. President Barack Obama revealed
450-427: Is a dual-use technology required for both civilian and military purposes. Key strategies to prevent proliferation of nuclear arms include limiting the number of operating uranium enrichment plants and controlling the export of nuclear technology and fissile material . Iranian development of nuclear technology began in the 1970s, when the U.S. Atoms for Peace program began providing assistance. Iran ratified
495-713: Is an Iranian government ministry headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs , who is a member of cabinet. The office is currently held by Abbas Araghchi after the death of Hossein Amir-Abdollahian . Foreign policy decisions are made in the Supreme National Security Council and according to Ali Khamenei 's high courts. 35°41′15.22″N 51°25′2.26″E / 35.6875611°N 51.4172944°E / 35.6875611; 51.4172944 The first minister of foreign affairs of Iran
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#1732775808885540-622: The Natanz enrichment facility. In February 2003 Iranian President Mohammad Khatami acknowledged the existence of the facilities and acknowledged that Iran had undertaken "small-scale enrichment experiments" to produce low-enriched uranium for power plants. IAEA inspectors visited Natanz. In May 2003 Iran allowed IAEA inspectors to visit the Kalaye Electric Company, but not to take samples. In June 2003, an IAEA report concluded that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under
585-611: The Natanz uranium enrichment plant; and the Parchin military research and development complex. In 2015, the U.S. enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015. Under the Act, once a nuclear agreement was negotiated with Iran, Congress had 60 days in which to pass a resolution of approval, a resolution of disapproval, or do nothing. The Act included time beyond the 60 days for the president to veto
630-521: The Parchin Military Research complex . The agreement took effect on 20 January 2014. It was criticized and opposed in the U.S. , Israel , Saudi Arabia , and by Iranian principlists . The U.S. withdrew from the pact in 2018 and imposed sanctions under the policy of "maximum pressure". The sanctions applied to all countries and companies doing business with Iran and cut it off from the international financial system, rendering
675-664: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970. After the 1979 Iranian Revolution , Iran's nuclear program fell into disarray as "much of Iran's nuclear talent fled the country in the wake of the Revolution". The new leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini , initially opposed nuclear technology. In the late 1980s Iran reinstated its nuclear program, with assistance from China (which entered into an agreement with Iran in 1990), Pakistan (which did
720-863: The Arak heavy-water reactor. A major focus of the negotiations was limitations on the Arak IR-40 heavy water reactor and production plant (which was under construction, but never became operational. Iran agreed in the Joint Plan of Action not to commission or fuel the reactor; the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant ; the Gachin uranium mine ; the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant ; the Isfahan uranium-conversion plant;
765-600: The Europeans, saying that during the negotiations, Iran had mastered the conversion of uranium yellowcake at Isfahan. In August 2013, three days after his inauguration, Rouhani called for negotiations with the P5+1. In September 2013 Obama and Rouhani spoke by telephone, the first high-level contact between U.S. and Iranian leaders since 1979, and Secretary of State John Kerry met with Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif . Former officials alleged that, in order to advance
810-630: The IAEA inspected several facilities. This was followed by the Paris Agreement in November 2004, in which Iran agreed to temporarily suspend enrichment and conversion activities, including those related to centrifuges, and committed to working with the EU-3 to find a diplomatic solution". In August 2005, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad accused the Iranian negotiators of treason. Over
855-476: The Iran Experts Initiative. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers expressed "deep concern with the Department [of Defense]'s hiring of Ariane Tabatabai". State Department spokesman Matt Miller said that the report "looked like an account of things that happened almost a decade ago", while Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee Chairman Jack Bergman said Tabatabai's "close ties" to
900-533: The Iranian government "should disqualify her for a position in such a sensitive area as special operations and low-intensity conflict." The Pentagon launched an investigation following the reports. In October 2023, after a review, Tabatabai retained her top-secret security clearance, as confirmed by Rheanne Wirkkala , the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs , in a letter dated 13 October 2023 to Senator Joni Ernst . Two weeks later,
945-626: The Ministry was completed in 1939. Comprehensive agreement on Iranian nuclear program Withdrawn The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA ; Persian : برنامه جامع اقدام مشترک , romanized : barnāmeye jāme'e eqdāme moshtarak ( برجام , BARJAM )), also known as the Iran nuclear deal or Iran deal , is an agreement to limit the Iranian nuclear program in return for sanctions relief and other provisions. The agreement
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#1732775808885990-592: The Natanz facility and had to respect specific limitations for eight years. The intent was to maintain a one-year breakout interval. With cooperation from the "Working Group" (the P5+1 and possibly other countries), Iran was permitted to modernize the Arak heavy water research reactor based on an agreed design. Arak was to be limited to 20 MW t to support allowed research and production, while minimizing plutonium production and avoiding weapons-grade plutonium. Spent fuel
1035-446: The Natanz plant. The centrifuges there were limited to IR-1 centrifuges, Iran's oldest and least efficient; Iran would warehouse its advanced IR-2M centrifuges during this period. Non-operating centrifuges would be stored in Natanz and monitored by IAEA, but could be used to replace failed centrifuges. Iran agreed to build no enrichment facilities for 15 years. Iran could continue research and development work on enrichment only at
1080-560: The Pentagon released a statement confirming that "Dr. Tabatabai was thoroughly and properly vetted" as a condition of her employment with the Department of Defense. This Iran -related article is a stub . You can help Misplaced Pages by expanding it . This espionage -related article is a stub . You can help Misplaced Pages by expanding it . Iranian Foreign Ministry The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ( Persian : وزارت امور خارجه , romanized : Vezārat-e Omūr-e Khārejeh )
1125-471: The S.C. acknowledged Iran's rights under Article IV of the NPT, which provides the "inalienable right... to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes". In 2007, IAEA director-general Mohamed ElBaradei said that military action against Iran "would be catastrophic, counterproductive" and called for negotiations. ElBaradei specifically proposed a "double, simultaneous suspension,
1170-730: The S.C. resolutions derived from the IAEA Statute and the United Nations Charter . The resolutions demanded that Iran cease enrichment activities, and imposed sanctions, including bans on the transfer of nuclear and missile technology to the country and freezes on the assets of certain Iranian individuals and entities. In July 2006, Iran opened the Arak heavy water production plant, which led to another S.C. resolution. Four more S.C. resolutions followed: 1747 (March 2007), 1803 (March 2008), 1835 (September 2008), and 1929 (June 2010). In Resolution 1803 and elsewhere
1215-488: The S.C.. In April 2006 Ahmadinejad claimed that Iran had explored nuclear technology for power generation, not weapons. In June 2006 the E.U. 3 joined China, Russia, and the U.S., to form the P5+1. That July, the S.C. passed its first resolution (nr. 1696) , demanding Iran stop uranium enrichment and processing. S.C. resolution 1737 was adopted in December; followed by others. The legal authority for IAEA referral and
1260-633: The deal, the Obama administration shielded Hezbollah from the Central Intelligence Agency and from the Drug Enforcement Administration 's Project Cassandra investigation regarding drug smuggling. Attorney General Jeff Sessions ordered an investigation. On 24 November 2013, after several rounds of negotiations, the interim Joint Plan of Action was signed between Iran and the P5+1. It consisted of
1305-413: The deal. In 2018, IAEA inspectors spent an aggregate of 3,000 calendar days in Iran, installing seals and collecting surveillance camera photos, measurement data, and documents for further analysis. In March 2018, IAEA Director Yukiya Amano said that the organization had verified that Iran was implementing its nuclear-related commitments. On April 30, the U.S. and Israel said that Iran had not disclosed
1350-506: The existence of an underground enrichment facility in Fordow, near Qom . Israel threatened military action. In March 2013 the U.S. and Iran began talks in Oman, led by William Burns and Jake Sullivan (U.S.) and Ali Asghar Khaji (Iran). In June 2013 Hassan Rouhani was elected president of Iran. In a 2006 negotiation with Europe, Rouhani said that Iran had used the negotiations to dupe
1395-762: The following 20 months and, in April 2015, agreed on an Iran nuclear deal framework , which later led to JCPOA, along with a Roadmap Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Negotiations centered around sanctions relief and restrictions on Iran's nuclear facilities, including the Arak IR-40 reactor , Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant , Gachin Uranium Mine, Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant , Isfahan Uranium Conversion Plant , Natanz Uranium Enrichment Plant , and
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1440-623: The following two months, the E.U. 3 agreement fell apart as talks over the Long Term Agreement broke down; the Iranian government "felt that the proposal was heavy on demands, light on incentives, did not incorporate Iran's proposals, and violated the Paris Agreement". Iran notified IAEA that it would resume enrichment at Esfahan . In February 2006 Iran ended its implementation of the Additional Protocol and resumed enrichment at Natanz, prompting IAEA to refer Iran to
1485-542: The monitoring and verification provisions for as long as Iran remained a party to the NPT. A comprehensive inspections regime would monitor and confirm Iranian compliance. The IAEA was to have multilayered oversight "over Iran's entire nuclear supply chain, from uranium mills to its procurement of nuclear-related technologies ". For sites such as Fordow and Natanz, the IAEA was to have 24-hour access to nuclear facilities and to maintain continuous monitoring (including via surveillance equipment). The agreement authorized
1530-536: The nuclear deal's economic provisions null. The agreement included a series of provisions describing actions that Iran would undertake for specified periods of time. For 13 years, Iran agreed to eliminate its stockpile of medium- enriched uranium , cut its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98%, and reduce by about two-thirds the number of its gas centrifuges . For 15 years, Iran agreed to enrich uranium only up to 3.67% and not to build heavy-water facilities . For 10 years, uranium enrichment would be limited to
1575-493: The project consisted of "an influence network formed and guided by Tehran". In September 2023, the London-based Persian-language news television channel Iran International and the news website Semafor obtained leaked foreign ministry emails in which Iranian government officials claimed credit for assembling a network of Western scholars called the Iran Experts Initiative. According to the reports,
1620-543: The safeguards agreement. Iran, faced with the prospect of a U.N. S.C. referral, entered negotiations with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the E.U. 3). The U.S. took no part. In October 2003, Iran and the E.U. 3 agreed to the Tehran Declaration. Iran agreed to full IAEA cooperation, to sign the Additional Protocol, and to temporarily suspend uranium enrichment. In September and October 2003
1665-499: The same in 1992), and Russia (which did the same in 1992 and 1995), and from the A.Q. Khan network. Iran began pursuing nuclear capability, including uranium mining and experimenting with uranium enrichment. In August 2002 the Paris-based Iranian dissident group National Council of Resistance of Iran publicly revealed the existence of two undeclared nuclear facilities, the Arak heavy-water production facility and
1710-576: The thousands of emails describe an effort by Iran's Foreign Ministry "to improve Tehran's image abroad". The reports also said Iran sought to build international ties with influential academics and researchers. Iranian diplomat Saeed Khatibzadeh wrote a letter in 2014 to Mostafa Zahrani (head of Iran's Foreign Ministry think tank) saying that the core members of the IEI had been selected. IEI members reportedly communicated with Iranian officials. Pentagon official and academic Ariane Tabatabai has been linked to
1755-544: The type and number of centrifuges, Iran's stocks of enriched uranium, and enrichment sites. According to Belfer, at this point Iran could "expand its nuclear program to create more practical overt and covert nuclear weapons options". Iran initially possessed centrifuges sufficient for one nuclear weapon, but not for nuclear power. Over ten years, Iran would secure over two-thirds of its centrifuges in storage, reducing active units to 6,104 centrifuges, with only 5,060 allowed to enrich uranium. Enrichment would be restricted to
1800-519: Was Mirza Abdulvahab Khan , who served from 1821 to 1823. The current officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are: Since 5 September 2013, the Ministry has been responsible for the negotiation of the Comprehensive agreement on Iranian nuclear program , which had previously been carried out by the Supreme National Security Council . In 2023 ministry and president began an Africa tour of three states to boost relations. The building of
1845-491: Was abiding by the main terms, though questions were raised about how many advanced centrifuges Iran was allowed to have, which was only loosely specified in the deal. On 1 July 2019, Iran announced that it had breached the limit set on its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, which the IAEA confirmed. On 5 January 2020, Iran declared that it would no longer abide by the deal's limitations but would continue to coordinate with IAEA. A fission-based "atomic" nuclear weapon uses
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1890-728: Was finalized in Vienna on 14 July 2015, between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations S.C. —China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, U.S.—plus Germany) together with the European Union . Formal negotiations began with the adoption of the Joint Plan of Action , an interim agreement signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries in November 2013. Iran and the P5+1 countries engaged in negotiations for
1935-429: Was to be converted into a nuclear physics and technology center. For 15 years Fordow would maintain no more than 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades in one wing. Two of the six cascades would be transitioned for stable radioisotope production for medical, agricultural, industrial, and scientific use. The other four would remain idle. Iran agreed to keep no fissile material there. An Additional Protocol extended
1980-468: Was to be sent out of the country. All heavy water beyond Iran's reactor needs was to be exportable. In exchange, Iran imported 130 tonnes of uranium ore in 2015 and in late 2016 was approved to import 130 tonnes in 2017. For 15 years Iran agreed not to research or engage in spent fuel reprocessing , build additional heavy-water reactors, or accumulate heavy water. Fordow would stop researching and enriching uranium for at least 15 years. The facility
2025-503: Was to remain in effect for eight years or until receipt by the S.C. of an IAEA report stating that IAEA had reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remained in peaceful activities, and terminated ten years from Adoption Day. On 12 October 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would not make the certification provided for under U.S. domestic law , but stopped short of terminating
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