The AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon ( JSOW ) is a glide bomb that resulted from a joint venture between the United States Navy and Air Force to deploy a standardized medium-range precision-guided weapon, especially for engagement of defended targets from outside the range of standard anti-aircraft defenses, thereby increasing aircraft survivability and minimizing friendly losses. It is intended to be used against soft targets such as parked aircraft , trucks , armored personnel carriers (APCs), and surface-to-air missile sites (SAMs). Prior to launch, it is given a destination through either a predesignated waypoint or a point marked through a targeting pod . It glides, using two wings that pop out for added lift, to the marked destination and dispenses submunitions in a short, roughly linear pattern. The designation of the Joint Standoff Weapon as an "air-to-ground missile" is a misnomer , as it is an unpowered bomb with guidance avionics , similar to the older GBU-15 .
51-512: The JSOW is a fire-and-forget weapon that employs a tightly coupled GPS/INS for navigation, and is capable of day/night and adverse weather operations. The JSOW-C adds an infra-red seeker for terminal guidance . Originally the JSOW was developed by Defense Systems & Electronics division of Texas Instruments . After a first flight, funded by the company in April 1991, a joint program between
102-467: A JASSM-ER derivative. The AGM-154A was the first variant to be used in combat. The AGM-154A is usually used for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses missions. Initial deployment testing occurred aboard USS Nimitz and later aboard the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower . The first combat deployment of the JSOW occurred over southern Iraq on December 17, 1998, when launched by a single F/A-18C from
153-470: A case study for development programs, and for Integrated Product Teams, and is sometimes cited in academic research on program management. The warhead of the AGM-154A consists of 145 BLU-97/B Combined Effects Bomb (CEB) submunitions. These bomblets have a shaped charge for armor defeating capability, a fragmenting case for material destruction, and a zirconium ring for incendiary effects. The warhead for
204-457: A different time. Spoofing attacks are generally harder to detect as adversaries generate counterfeit signals. These spoofed signals are challenging to recognize from legitimate signals, thus confusing ships' calculation of positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT). This means that spoofed signals may be modified in such a way as to cause the receiver to estimate its position to be somewhere other than where it actually is, or to be located where it
255-533: A geopolitical conflict. Several shipping companies with vessels navigating around Iranian waters are instructing vessels to transit dangerous areas with high speed and during daylight. On October 15, 2023, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that GPS had been “restricted in active combat zones in accordance with various operational needs,” but has not publicly commented on more advanced interference. In April 2024, however, researchers at University of Texas at Austin detected false signals and traced their origin to
306-442: A mail server with telnet . Geolocation spoofing occurs when a user applies technologies to make their device appear to be located somewhere other than where it is actually located. The most common geolocation spoofing is through the use of a Virtual Private Network (VPN) or DNS Proxy in order for the user to appear to be located in a different country, state or territory other than where they are actually located. According to
357-458: A massive attack on Iraqi air-defense sites, nearly every weapon missed the target. The cause of the miss was reported as a software problem. This problem was solved soon afterward. Since 1998, at least 400 of the JSOW weapons have been used in the following conflicts: Operation Desert Fox , Operation Southern Watch , NATO Operation Allied Force , Operation Enduring Freedom , and Operation Iraqi Freedom . Fire-and-forget Fire-and-forget
408-729: A particular air base in Israel run by the IDF. In June 2017, approximately twenty ships in the Black Sea complained of GPS anomalies, showing vessels to be transpositioned miles from their actual location, in what Professor Todd Humphreys believed was most likely a spoofing attack. GPS anomalies around Putin's Palace and the Moscow Kremlin , demonstrated in 2017 by a Norwegian journalist on air, have led researchers to believe that Russian authorities use GPS spoofing wherever Vladimir Putin
459-530: A possible criminal using a preset "blacklist". Technologies related to the synthesis and modeling of speech are developing very quickly, allowing one to create voice recordings almost indistinguishable from real ones. Such services are called Text-to-Speech (TTS) or Style transfer services. The first one aimed at creating a new person. The second one aimed at identifies as another in voice identification systems. A large number of scientists are busy developing algorithms that would be able to distinguish
510-467: A range of interference, jamming, and spoofing attacks. A system and receiver agnostic detection software offers applicability as cross-industry solution. Software implementation can be performed in different places within the system, depending on where the GNSS data is being used, for example as part of the device's firmware, operating system, or on the application level. A method proposed by researchers from
561-404: A similar goal. In this method, the communication abilities of both cars and radar measurements are used to compare against the supplied GNSS position of both cars to determine the distance between the two cars which is then compared to the radar measurements and checked to make sure they match. If the two lengths match within a threshold value, then no spoofing has occurred, but above this threshold,
SECTION 10
#1732780057994612-687: A study by GlobalWebIndex , 49% of global VPN users utilize VPNs primarily to access territorially restricted entertainment content. This type of geolocation spoofing is also referred to as geo-piracy, since the user is illicitly accessing copyrighted materials via geolocation spoofing technology. Another example of geolocation spoofing occurred when an online poker player in California used geolocation spoofing techniques to play online poker in New Jersey , in contravention of both California and New Jersey state law. Forensic geolocation evidence proved
663-422: A web site other than that intended, or opening an email that is not in reality from the address shown (or apparently shown). Although website and email spoofing attacks are more widely known, any service that relies on domain name resolution may be compromised. Some websites, especially pornographic paysites , allow access to their materials only from certain approved (login-) pages. This is enforced by checking
714-414: Is a type of missile guidance which does not require further external intervention after launch such as illumination of the target or wire guidance , and can hit its target without the launcher being in line-of-sight of the target. This is an important property for a guided weapon to have, since a person or vehicle that lingers near the target to guide the missile (using, for instance, a laser designator )
765-553: Is but at a different time, as determined by the attacker. One common form of a GNSS spoofing attack, commonly termed a carry-off attack, begins by broadcasting signals synchronized with the genuine signals observed by the target receiver. The power of the counterfeit signals is then gradually increased and drawn away from the genuine signals. Even though GNSS is one of the most relied upon navigational systems, it has demonstrated critical vulnerabilities towards spoofing attacks. GNSS satellite signals have been shown to be vulnerable due to
816-504: Is commonly used by spammers to hide the origin of their e-mails and leads to problems such as misdirected bounces (i.e. e-mail spam backscatter ). E-mail address spoofing is done in quite the same way as writing a forged return address using snail mail . As long as the letter fits the protocol, (i.e. stamp, postal code ) the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) will send the message. It can be done using
867-479: Is just over 410 centimetres (160 in) in length and weighs about 450 kilograms (1,000 lb). The JSOW was originally to be delivered in three variants, each of which uses a common air vehicle, or truck, while substituting various payloads. The AGM-154A (JSOW-A) entered service in 1999. US Navy and Air Force developed the AGM-154B (JSOW B) up until Multi-Service Operational Test & Evaluation (MOT&E) but
918-860: Is likely that additional variants will emerge. The basic airframe is advertised as a "truck" and the JSOW-as-a-truck capability is widely advertised. Raytheon has placed a tremendous investment in the JSOW program and will certainly try to extend the Department of Defense contracts for as long as possible with system upgrades and repackagings for new missions and targets. The AGM-154C-1 was scheduled to begin production in 2009. The first three launches were conducted in August 2011 from an F/A-18F. The JSOW-C1 completed integrated test and evaluations in January 2015, moving on to operational tests. The C1 version
969-636: Is located. The mobile systems named Borisoglebsk-2 , Krasukha and Zhitel are reported to be able to spoof GPS. Incidents involving Russian GPS spoofing include during a November 2018 NATO exercise in Finland that led to ship collision (unconfirmed by authorities). and a 2019 incident of spoofing from Syria by the Russian military that affected the civil airport in Tel Aviv . In December of 2022 significant GPS interference in several Russian cities
1020-696: Is slated for delivery in 2016. It achieved Initial Operating Capability (IOC) on 22 June 2016. On 11 October 2017 the Department of the Navy declared the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) C-1 ready for full operational capability. In addition, the AGM-154A-1 configuration is under development by Raytheon for FMS sales. This version replaces the submunition payload of the AGM-154A with a BLU-111 warhead to enhance blast-fragmentation effects without
1071-450: Is vulnerable to attack and unable to carry out other tasks. Generally, information about the target is programmed into the missile just prior to launch. This can include coordinates, radar measurements (including velocity), or an infrared image of the target. After it is fired, the missile guides itself by some combination of gyroscopes and accelerometers , GPS , onboard active radar homing , and infrared homing optics. Some systems offer
SECTION 20
#17327800579941122-542: The referrer header of the HTTP request. This referrer header, however, can be changed (known as " referrer spoofing " or "Ref-tar spoofing"), allowing users to gain unauthorized access to the materials. " Spoofing " can also refer to copyright holders placing distorted or unlistenable versions of works on file-sharing networks. The sender information shown in e-mails (the From: field) can be spoofed easily. This technique
1173-529: The "Checkerboards" of VMFA-312 , Carrier Air Wing Three embarked aboard USS Enterprise during Operation Desert Fox . The glide range of the JSOW allowed the weapon to strike a target located in the southern suburbs of Baghdad. This weapon has enjoyed success since its early use. One adverse event occurred in February 2001, when a strike of F/A-18s from the USS Harry S. Truman battle group launched
1224-556: The AGM-154B is the BLU-108/B from the Air Force's Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW) program. The JSOW B was to carry six BLU-108/B submunitions. Each submunition releases four projectiles (total of 24 per weapon) that use infrared sensors to detect targets. When a submunition detects that it is aligned with a target, it fires, creating an explosively formed penetrator capable of defeating vehicle armor. This program concluded development but
1275-537: The Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of Maryland, College Park and the School of Optical and Electronic Information at Huazhong University of Science and Technology that aims to help mitigate the effects of GNSS spoofing attacks by using data from a vehicles controller area network (CAN) bus. The information would be compared to that of received GNSS data and compared in order to detect
1326-524: The FMS procedure and made the purchase for JSOW as well as JASSM and JDAM in 2017.) The JSOW family is a 450-kilogram (1,000 lb) class weapon intended to provide a low cost, highly lethal air-to-surface glide bomb with standoff capabilities from 28 km (15 nmi) low altitude launch and up to 110 km (60 nmi) high altitude launch. The JSOW can be used against a variety of land targets and operates from ranges outside enemy point defenses. The JSOW
1377-603: The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center ( NCCIC ) and the National Coordinating Center for Communications ( NCC ), released a paper which lists methods to prevent this type of spoofing. Some of the most important and most recommended to use are: These installation and operation strategies and development opportunities can significantly enhance the ability of GPS receivers and associated equipment to defend against
1428-472: The Navy decided not to procure the weapon when the Air Force left the program. The AGM-154C (JSOW BROACH) entered service in February 2005. During the 1990s, the JSOW was considered to be one of the most successful development programs in DOD history. The system was introduced to operational use a year ahead of schedule. Unlike most guided weapons and aircraft, the system never had a weight management problem, and
1479-598: The Navy decided not to procure the weapon. The AGM-154C uses an Imaging Infrared (IIR) terminal seeker with autonomous guidance. The AGM-154C carries the BROACH warhead . This two stage 225 kg (500 lb) warhead is made up from a WDU-44 shaped augmenting warhead and a WDU-45 follow through bomb. The weapon is designed to attack hardened targets. It entered service with the US Navy in February 2005. Full rate production started on December 29, 1999. In June 2000, Raytheon
1530-538: The US GPS, Russia's GLONASS , China's BeiDou , and Europe's Galileo constellation, are vulnerable to this technique. It has been suggested that in order to mitigate some of the vulnerabilities the GNSS systems face concerning spoofing attacks, the use of more than one navigational system at once is recommended. It was suggested that the December 2011 capture of a Lockheed RQ-170 drone aircraft in northeastern Iran
1581-590: The US Navy and the US Air Force was awarded. Two other teams had bid on the contract. Texas Instruments sold its defense division to Raytheon in January 1997. US Navy commenced Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL) in February 1997 and JSOW entered operational service in January 1999. The Joint Standoff Weapon is currently used by the US Navy. Foreign Military Sales have been signed with Poland and Turkey for use with their F-16 fighters. Finland, Greece and Singapore are pursuing FMS cases at this time. (Finland cleared
AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon - Misplaced Pages Continue
1632-449: The door for outside attackers to send malicious commands that could result in the loss of human lives, environmental contamination, navigation accidents, and financial costs. However, seeing as more than 80% of global trade is moved through shipping companies, relying upon GNSS systems for navigation is necessary even though maritime vessels will be vulnerable to spoofing attacks with limited countermeasures. All GNSS systems, such as
1683-591: The end of FY2023. The US Navy eventually scrapped plans to develop the JSOW-ER in its FY2022 budget, instead opting to procure a variant of Lockheed Martin's AGM-158B Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile Extended Range ( JASSM-ER ) cruise missile to meet both its strike and offensive anti-surface warfare (OASuW) requirements. It is also expected to leverage technology from the AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile ( LRASM ), itself
1734-609: The geolocation spoofing and the player forfeited more than $ 90,000 in winnings. Public telephone networks often provide caller ID information, which includes the caller's number and sometimes the caller's name, with each call. However, some technologies (especially in Voice over IP (VoIP) networks) allow callers to forge caller ID information and present false names and numbers. Gateways between networks that allow such spoofing and other public networks then forward that false information. Since spoofed calls can originate from other countries,
1785-559: The increased usage has rendered the system more susceptible to attacks, given the widespread integration of facial recognition systems in society. Some online sources and tutorials detail methods for tricking facial recognition systems through practices known as face spoofing or presentation attacks, which can pose risks in terms of unauthorized access. To mitigate these dangers, measures such as liveness checks (verifying blinking), deep learning , and specialized cameras like 3D cameras have been introduced to prevent facial recognition spoofing. It
1836-417: The laws in the receiver's country may not apply to the caller. This limits laws' effectiveness against the use of spoofed caller ID information to further a scam . A global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing attack attempts to deceive a GNSS receiver by broadcasting fake GNSS signals, structured to resemble a set of normal GNSS signals, or by rebroadcasting genuine signals captured elsewhere or at
1887-521: The occurrence of a spoofing attack and to reconstruct the driving path of the vehicle using that collected data. Properties such as the vehicles speed and steering angle would be amalgamated and regression modeled in order to achieve a minimum error in position of 6.25 meters. Similarly, a method outlined by researchers in a 2016 IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium conference paper discuss the idea of using cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC) and vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communications in order to achieve
1938-494: The option of either continued input from the launch platform or fire-and-forget. Fire-and-forget missiles can be vulnerable to soft-kill systems on modern main battle tanks, in addition to existing hard-kill systems. As opposed to unguided RPGs which require a hard-kill system (a counter projectile(s) used to destroy the incoming missile), fire-and-forget missiles can often be jammed by means such as electro-optical dazzlers . Many of these are infrared homing missiles; some of
1989-467: The prime contractor Texas Instruments , and subcontractors. In one case, the prime contractor determined that the best-in-class supplier for a design service was the government, and gave part of its funding back. JSOW was recognized in 1996 with a Laurels Award from Aviation Week & Space Technology . It is notable for a guided weapon to receive this award, which is normally reserved for much larger systems. Because of this history, JSOW has been used as
2040-458: The remainder (e.g. AIM-120) are active radar guided. Spoofing attack In the context of information security , and especially network security , a spoofing attack is a situation in which a person or program successfully identifies as another by falsifying data , to gain an illegitimate advantage. Many of the protocols in the TCP/IP suite do not provide mechanisms for authenticating
2091-424: The signals’ being relatively weak on Earth’s surface, making GNSS signals ultimate targets for spoofing attacks. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the systems are continuously and recklessly deemed trustworthy even though there, at present, are no means of protecting the systems, signals, or safely guarding vessels against malicious spoofing attacks. Resultingly, the reliance upon systems such as GNSS has opened
AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon - Misplaced Pages Continue
2142-416: The source or destination of a message, leaving them vulnerable to spoofing attacks when extra precautions are not taken by applications to verify the identity of the sending or receiving host. IP spoofing and ARP spoofing in particular may be used to leverage man-in-the-middle attacks against hosts on a computer network . Spoofing attacks which take advantage of TCP/IP suite protocols may be mitigated with
2193-529: The synthesized voice of the machine from the real one. On the other hand, these algorithms need to be thoroughly tested to make sure that the system really works. However, an early study has shown that feature design and masking augmentation have a significant impact on the ability to detect spoofed voice. Facial recognition technology is widely employed in various areas, including immigration checks and phone security, as well as on popular platforms like Airbnb and Uber to verify individuals' identities. However,
2244-505: The unexploded ordnance (UXO) concerns with the BLU-97/B payload. A Pratt & Whitney TJ-150 turbojet engine for a powered JSOW is being tested. This variant is named JSOW-ER, where "ER" is for "extended range". JSOW-ER will increase range from 130 to 560 kilometres (70 to 300 nmi). In February, 2019, the US Navy announced that it would issue a sole-source contract to Raytheon to build an improved JSOW-ER to be placed in service by
2295-447: The use of firewalls capable of deep packet inspection or by taking measures to verify the identity of the sender or recipient of a message. The term 'Domain name spoofing' (or simply though less accurately, 'Domain spoofing') is used generically to describe one or more of a class of phishing attacks that depend on falsifying or misrepresenting an internet domain name . These are designed to persuade unsuspecting users into visiting
2346-427: The user is notified so that s/he can take action. Information technology plays an increasingly large role in today's world, and different authentication methods are used for restricting access to informational resources, including voice biometrics. Examples of using speaker recognition systems include internet banking systems, customer identification during a call to a call center, as well as passive identification of
2397-415: The yacht, allowing their spoofing equipment to gradually overpower the signal strengths of the actual GPS constellation satellites, altering the course of the yacht. In 2019, a British oil tanker called Stena Impero was the target of a spoofing attack that directed the ship into Iranian waters where it was seized by Iranian forces. Consequently, the vessel including its crew and cargo were used as pawns in
2448-721: Was contracted to develop an enhanced electronics package for the JSOW to prevent electronic spoofing of GPS signals. This ultimately resulted in the JSOW Block II weapon, incorporating multiple cost reduction initiatives in addition to the Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) capability. JSOW Block II was scheduled to begin production in March 2007. The JSOW contains a modular control and deployment interface that allows future enhancement and additional configurations since it
2499-402: Was deployed at its target weight. The system introduced a new type of fuze , but was able to obtain authority from an independent safety review in record time. Many observers credited these accomplishments to the management style chosen by the DOD and Texas Instruments. After a competitive selection, the program staff was organized into integrated product teams with members from the government,
2550-625: Was reported by the GPSJam service; the interference was attributed to defensive measures taken by Russian authorities in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine. Since the advent of Software Defined Radio (SDR), GPS simulator applications have been made available to the general public. This has made GPS spoofing much more accessible, meaning it can be performed at limited expense and with a modicum of technical knowledge. Whether this technology applies to other GNSS systems remains to be demonstrated. The Department of Homeland Security, in collaboration with
2601-608: Was the result of such an attack. GNSS spoofing attacks had been predicted and discussed in the GNSS community as early as 2003. A "proof-of-concept" attack was successfully performed in June 2013, when the luxury yacht White Rose of Drachs was misdirected with spoofed GPS signals by a group of aerospace engineering students from the Cockrell School of Engineering at the University of Texas in Austin . The students were aboard
SECTION 50
#1732780057994#993006