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83-647: The Lushan Conference saw the political purge of the Defense Minister , Marshal Peng Dehuai , whose criticism of some aspects of the Great Leap Forward was seen as an attack on the political line of CCP Chairman Mao Zedong . The Conference also marked the first time since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 that disagreement over the direction of policy spilled into open conflict between party leaders. The conference's name

166-549: A Hawker Siddeley Trident he was aboard crashed in Öndörkhaan in Mongolia . The exact events of this " Lin Biao incident " have been a source of speculation ever since. The Chinese government's official explanation is that Lin and his family attempted to flee following a botched coup against Mao. Others have argued that they fled out of fear they would be purged, as Lin's relationship with other Communist Party leaders had soured in

249-484: A Japanese uniform and katana , which they had captured in battle. Lin then put the uniform and katana on, jumped onto a horse, and rode away from the army. While riding, Lin was spotted alone by a sharpshooter in Yan's army. The soldier was surprised to see a Japanese officer riding a horse in the desolate hills alone. He took aim at Lin and severely injured him. The bullet grazed Lin's head, penetrating deep enough to leave

332-606: A communist revolutionary, Ong did not accompany Lin, and their marriage effectively ended. After the Kuomintang-Communist split , Lin's commander, Ye Ting, joined forces with He Long and participated in the Nanchang Uprising on 1 August 1927. During the campaign Lin worked as a company commander under a regiment led by Chen Yi . Following the failure of the revolt, Lin escaped to the remote Communist base areas, and joined Mao Zedong and Zhu De in

415-585: A general refusal to either bathe or eat fruit. Because of his fear of wind and light, his office was gloomy and lacked any ventilation. Some accounts have suggested that Lin became a drug addict, either to opium or morphine. As early as 1953, Soviet doctors diagnosed Lin as suffering from manic depression . Lin's wife, Ye Qun , rejected this diagnosis, but it was later confirmed by Chinese doctors. Lin's fragile health made him vulnerable, passive, and easily manipulated by other political figures, notably Ye Qun herself. Lin's complaints got worse with time and age. In

498-590: A large garrison at Huaide while a second force positioned itself to ambush the force that would predictably be sent to relieve it. On 17 May, they won a major victory and forced the survivors to retreat to Changchun and Siping. By the end of May 1947, Lin's forces had taken control of most of the countryside (everything except for the rail lines and several major cities), infiltrated and destroyed most KMT forces in Manchuria, and re-established contact with isolated Communist forces in southern Liaoning province. After

581-641: A mediator between the left and right sides of the party, was extremely critical of Peng. Additionally, Peng's position would mean de facto realignment with Soviet approaches at a time when Mao had been trying to find an independent path in terms of both foreign and domestic policy approaches. By the time of the Plenum, which immediately followed the Lushan Conference, Peng had become politically isolated and stripped from his position as Defence Minister, replaced by Marshal Lin Biao . The Lushan Plenum adopted

664-731: A permanent impression on his skull. After being shot in the head, Lin fell from his horse and injured his back. Recovering from his wounds and ill with tuberculosis , Lin left for Moscow at the end of 1938, where he served as the representative of the Chinese Communist Party to the Executive Committee of the Communist International . He remained in Moscow until February 1942, working on Comintern affairs and writing for its publication. Lin

747-557: A resolution denouncing "the anti-Party clique headed by Peng Duhai." In contrast to Peng, Mao's position was that peasant enthusiasm was positive because political development required mass momentum. Mao continued to believe that the experiment of giving the peasantry a political role should be continued. His view was that initiatives like self-organizing agricultural tasks, self-managed schools, and cooperative medical services should continue wherever possible. Mao nonetheless agreed that specific objectives had to be made more realistic and that

830-637: A satellite organization of the Communist Youth League before he graduated high school in 1925. Later in 1925 he participated in the May Thirtieth Movement and enrolled in the newly established Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy in Guangzhou . As a young cadet, Lin admired the personality of Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), who was then the principal of the academy. At Whampoa, Lin also studied under Zhou Enlai , who

913-508: Is additionally responsible for publishing news about military affairs. The Ministry is headed by a Minister of National Defense ; unlike in other countries, the minister does not have command authority over the army, generally exercising diplomatic functions. However, until December 2023, the office has always been held by a member of the CMC. With the removal of Li Shangfu in December, 2023,

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996-475: Is derived from the meeting place, a resort on Mount Lu in Jiujiang , China. The original objective of the conference was to review the events of the Great Leap Forward and solve practical issues brought forth by those events. When the Lushan Conference began, the leadership was divided on questions of how the crisis had developed and what the response going forward should be. Mao was critical of his own role in

1079-549: Is the longest serving Minister of National Defense of the People's Republic of China. Lin became instrumental in creating the foundations for Mao Zedong's cult of personality in the early 1960s, and was rewarded for his service in the Cultural Revolution by being named Mao 's designated successor as the sole Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, from 1966 until his death. Lin died on 13 September 1971, when

1162-661: The Jiangxi–Fujian Soviet in 1928. After joining forces with Mao, Lin became one of Mao's closest supporters. Lin became one of the most senior military field commanders within the Jiangxi Soviet. He commanded the First Army Group, and achieved a degree of power comparable to that of Peng Dehuai , who commanded the Third Army Group. According to Comintern representative Otto Braun , Lin

1245-593: The Northern Expedition , where he rose from deputy platoon leader to battalion commander within a few months. During this time Lin joined the Communist Party . By 1927 Lin was a colonel. When he was twenty, Lin married a girl from the countryside with the family name "Ong". This marriage was arranged by Lin's parents, and the couple never became close. When Lin left the Kuomintang to become

1328-601: The Pingjin Campaign , taking Beijing and Tianjin within a period of two months. Tianjin was taken by force, and on 22 January 1949 General Fu Zuoyi and his army of 400,000 men agreed to surrender Beijing without a battle, and the PLA occupied the city on 31 January. The Pingjin Campaign saw Lin remove a total of approximately 520,000 enemy troops from the enemy's battle lines. Many of those who surrendered later joined

1411-685: The Red Army . Lin's First Army became known for its mobility, and for its ability to execute successful flanking maneuvers. Between 1930 and 1933, Lin's forces captured twice the number of prisoners of war and military equipment as the Third and Fifth Army Groups combined. The successes of Lin's forces are due partially to the division of labour within the Red Army: Lin's forces were more offensive and unorthodox than other groups, allowing Lin to capitalize on other Red Army commanders' successes. During

1494-557: The Yangtze River Crossing Campaign . Lin's armies continued to defeat KMT armies farther south, finally occupying all KMT positions on mainland China by the end of 1949. The last position occupied by Lin's forces was the tropical island of Hainan . Lin Biao was considered one of the Communists' most brilliant generals after the founding of the People's Republic of China, in 1949. Lin was the youngest of

1577-828: The Zunyi Conference in January 1935. Lin may have become privately dissatisfied with Mao's strategy of constant evasion by the end of the Long March, but continued to support Mao publicly. The American journalist Edgar Snow met Lin Biao in the Communist base of Shaanxi in 1936, and wrote about Lin in his book, Red Star Over China . Snow's account focused more on the role of Peng than Lin, evidently having had long conversations with, and devoting two whole chapters to, Peng (more than any other individual apart from Mao). Though he said of Lin: Lin Biao did not present

1660-441: The " Ten Marshals " named in 1955, a title that recognized Lin's substantial military contributions. Lin Biao continued to suffer from poor health after 1949, and chose to avoid high-profile military and political positions. His status led him to be appointed to a number of high-profile positions throughout most of the 1950s, but these were largely honorary and carried few responsibilities. He generally delegated or neglected many of

1743-435: The "winds of exaggeration" (i.e., over-reporting of grain production), the communal dining, and also the establishment of commune militia , which he felt would undermine the strength of the People's Liberation Army . He expressed his "confusion" towards "rather large losses" and the "epidemic of bragging" in the Great Leap Forward. Peng attributed the problems to " petty bourgeois fanaticism." For this reason, Mao extended

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1826-588: The 54th division, and severing an important railroad that linked Wei's forces from their ports on the Bohai Sea . Lin continued his advance, defeating all garrisons in western Manchuria or inducing them to defect by late February. On 26 February Lin reorganized his forces as the Northeastern Field Army and began preparations to return and take Siping, whose garrison had been transferred elsewhere by Chen Cheng and never re-strengthened. Lin began

1909-630: The Chinese Reds' military magazines   ... have been republished, studied and criticised in Nanking (Nanjing) military journals, and also in Japan and Soviet Russia. Within a year of Snow's reporting, Lin was seriously wounded. A Red Army soldier shot him by mistake. Lin and Mao generally had a close personal relationship, but some accounts claim that Lin sometimes made disparaging comments about Mao in private, and that Lin's support of Mao

1992-733: The Chinese military including the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which is instead commanded by the Central Military Commission (CMC). The work of the Ministry and the Minister are primarily diplomatic in nature, generally functioning as the a liaison representing the CMC and PLA when dealing with foreign militaries. The MND was set up according to a decision adopted by the 1st Session of the 1st National People's Congress in 1954. In contrast to practice in other nations,

2075-472: The Communist ambush failed, Lin ordered his forces to withdraw and join in the siege of Zhangwu. When Chen did not intervene and the town fell on 28 December, Lin assumed the main part of the campaign was over and he dispersed his forces to rest and attack secondary targets. Chen saw Lin's withdrawal as an opportunity to seize the offensive. He ordered his forces to attack targets in northern Liaoning on 1 January 1948, and on 3 January, Lin successfully encircled

2158-442: The Communists' defense against Chiang's 1933–34 Fifth Encirclement Campaign , Lin advocated a strategy of protracted guerilla warfare, and opposed the positional warfare advocated by Braun and his supporters. Lin believed that the best way to destroy enemy soldiers was not to pursue them or defend strategic points, but to weaken the enemy through feints, ambushes, encirclements, and surprise attacks. Lin's views generally conformed with

2241-736: The Cultural Revolution; indeed, all of these were symptoms very similar to those seen in individuals who suffer from schizoid personality disorder. The challenge of Lin's personality problems in conjunction with the turbulent political climate of the Cultural Revolution impacted his overall ability to govern his position. Lin suffered from excessive headaches, and spent much of his free time consulting Chinese medical texts and preparing traditional Chinese medicines for himself. He suffered from insomnia, and often took sleeping pills. He ate simple meals, did not smoke, and did not drink alcohol. As his condition progressed, his fear of water led to

2324-755: The Japanese invasion of Shanxi . In this capacity, Lin orchestrated the ambush at Pingxingguan in September 1937, which was one of the few battlefield successes for the Chinese in the early period of the Second Sino-Japanese War (known in China as the "War of Resistance Against Japan"). In 1938, while he was still leading Chinese forces in Shanxi, Japanese soldiers who had joined the Communists and were serving under Lin's command presented Lin with

2407-468: The Long March they worked well together, Lin specializing in feints, masked strategy, surprises, ambushes, flank attacks, pounces from the rear, and stratagems. Peng met the enemy head-on in frontal assaults and fought with such fury that again and again he wiped them out. Peng did not believe a battle well fought unless he managed to replenish—and more than replenish—any losses by seizure of enemy guns and converting prisoners of war to new and loyal recruits to

2490-487: The Lushan Conference was the distortion created by false production reports. During the Great Leap Forward , lower bureaucratic levels were asked to fulfill unrealistic production quotas. Ignoring the actual conditions at even lower levels, officials frequently claimed that the production goals had been achieved. These behaviors were prompted by higher-level officials who overly emphasized production and addressed

2573-517: The MND does not exercise command authority over the army including the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which is instead subordinate to the Central Military Commission (CMC). The MND serves as a liaison representing the CMC and PLA when dealing with foreign militaries in military exchange and cooperation. It has the primary responsibility for China's defense attachés and is the institutional point of contact for foreign defense attachés assigned to China. It

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2656-803: The MND has not had a seat on the CMC. While this may change, Dong Jun was not added to the CMC during the Third Plenum meeting in July 2024. Lin Biao Lin Biao ( Chinese : 林彪 ; 5 December 1907 – 13 September 1971) was a Chinese politician and Marshal of the People's Republic of China who was pivotal in the Communist victory during the Chinese Civil War , especially in Northeast China from 1946 to 1949. Lin

2739-612: The Northeast, except for Changchun, Shenyang , and an area connecting the rail line from Beiping to those cities. Following Lin's Winter campaign, Mao wanted him to attack targets farther south, but Lin disagreed because he did not want to leave a strong enemy at his back, and he believed the defeat of a strong city would force Chiang to abandon the Northeast. By 25 May 1948, the Northeastern Field Army had completely encircled Changchun, including its airfield, and for

2822-565: The PLA. After taking Beijing, the Communists attempted to negotiate for the surrender of the remaining KMT forces. When these negotiations failed, Lin resumed his attacks on the KMT in the southeast. After taking Beijing, Lin's army numbered 1.5 million soldiers. He crossed the Yangtze River in the Spring of 1949 and decisively defeated the defending KMT army stationed in central China during

2905-671: The Politburo, initially held serious reservations about China's entry into the Korean War , citing the devastation that would result if the "imperialists" (Americans) detonated an atomic bomb in Korea or China. Lin later declined to lead forces in Korea, citing his ill health. In early October 1950, Peng Dehuai was named commander of the Chinese forces bound for Korea, and Lin went to the Soviet Union for medical treatment. Lin flew to

2988-527: The Red Army. With Mao Zedong, Lin Biao shared the distinction of being one of the few Red commanders never wounded. Engaged on the front in more than a hundred battles, in field command for more than 10 years, exposed to every hardship that his men have known, with a reward of $ 100,000 on his head, he miraculously remained unhurt and in good health. In 1932, Lin Biao was given command of the 1st Red Army Corps, which then numbered about 20,000 rifles. It became

3071-599: The Red Army. Lin disagreed with this position, but was ordered by Mao to draw the KMT into a decisive battle and "not give an inch of land" around Siping, Jilin . On 15 April, Lin orchestrated an ambush and forced KMT forces there to withdraw with heavy casualties. When the local KMT commander, Du Yuming , launched a counterattack on 18 April, Mao ordered the troops there to hold the city indefinitely. The fighting continued until Mao finally allowed Lin to withdraw on 19 May, which Lin did immediately, barely saving his army from encirclement and destruction. Du pursued Lin's forces to

3154-661: The Songhua River, where they staged guerrilla raids, ambushed relief forces, attacked isolated garrisons, and avoided decisive confrontations with strong units Du sent to defeat them. While they did so, they looted large quantities of supplies and destroyed the infrastructure of the KMT-held territories that they passed through, including bridges, railroads, fortifications, electrical lines, and boats. When Du sent his forces back south, they were ambushed and defeated. When Du requested reinforcements from Chiang Kai-shek, his request

3237-457: The absurd bureaucratic boasting regarding production quotas had to be stopped. Mao bitterly criticised Peng for being part of a group that wavered in the face of difficulties and who were "only 30 kilometres away from the rightists". Mao also announced in August that the conflict at the conference is a class struggle and that the conflict "is the continuation of the life-or-death struggle between

3320-662: The army's setbacks he reorganized the army, combining surviving regiments and raising local militia forces to the status of regular units. By the fall of 1947, he had 510,000 soldiers under his command, approximately equal to Nationalist forces in the region. Before Du's replacement, Chen Cheng , could cross north and begin an offensive, Lin moved his army south and began the Autumn Offensive, in which his forces destroyed rail lines and other infrastructure, attacked isolated Nationalist units, and attempted to provoke and ambush strong Nationalist forces. Chen's forces responded to

3403-445: The bluff, lusty face of Peng Dehuai. He was ten years younger, rather slight, oval-faced, dark, handsome. Peng talked with his men. Lin kept his distance. To many he seemed shy and reserved. There are no stories reflecting warmth and affection for his men. His fellow Red Army commanders respected Lin, but when he spoke, it was all business   ... The contrast between Mao's top field commanders could hardly have been more sharp, but on

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3486-794: The campaign by withdrawing into their city garrisons. The Communists were not able to provoke a decisive confrontation, and the Autumn Offensive ended in a stalemate. Chen's forces remained static and reactionary, at the end of 1947, Lin led his armies back south in his final Liaoshen Campaign, the Winter Offensive. His initial plan was to repeat the goal of his last offensive, to besiege Jilin City and ambush its relief force, but after reviewing Kuomintang troop dispositions he determined that southern Manchuria would be an easier target. On 15 December, Lin's forces attacked Fakui , Zhangwu , and Xinlitun . Chen sent reinforcements to relieve Fakui, and when

3569-472: The city twice and engaged in street-to-street fighting, but were driven back both times with heavy casualties. By 19 June, Lin's assault troops had become increasingly exhausted, and Lin began to rotate them to prevent them from becoming completely ineffective. On 24 June, Nationalist reinforcements arrived from the south to lift the siege. Lin recognized that he did not have enough manpower left to defeat them, and on 1 July, he ordered his forces to retreat back to

3652-541: The conference became a mess. Ministry of National Defense of the People%27s Republic of China#Minister The Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China is the second-ranked constituent department under the State Council . It is headed by the Minister of National Defense. Unlike in other countries, the Ministry of National Defense does not have operational command over

3735-436: The conference for more than ten days. On July 23, Mao showed Peng's letter to his comrades and asked them to express their views on the issue. Peng made no further substantive argument other than for the party to immediately withdraw from political initiatives in rural areas. Peng's position found no support among other conference attendees, as it amounted to "political suicide" for the party. For example, Zhou Enlai , normally

3818-400: The conference to contain the "leftist tendency" ( zuoqing ) elements in the Great Leap Forward . In Spring 1959, PRC Defense Minister Peng Dehuai led a Chinese military delegation on a visit to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Peng expressed his displeasure with the Great Leap Forward to various communist leaders, including Nikita Khruschev. In his view, the socioeconomic policies of

3901-494: The criticism of Peng Dehuai resulted in a victory for Mao Zedong, it also led the leadership to conclude that he had been treated unfairly and that the party's norms had been violated. Zhou Xiaozhou , along with Huang Kecheng and Zhang Wentian , who lent their support to Peng Dehuai in questioning the wisdom of the Great Leap Forward , were also branded as traitors, stripped of their positions, and sent to re-education through labour . Li Rui , one of Mao's private secretaries,

3984-439: The failures of the Great Leap Forward. He described the backyard steel campaign he had promoted as a "great catastrophe" and criticized himself for pushing communization so fast. In a July speech before the Lushan Conference, Mao states, "The chaos caused was on a grand level and I take responsibility for it." Mao also defended the policies of the Great Leap Forward in general and communes in particular. A major specific focus of

4067-584: The final few years of his life. Following Lin's death, he was officially condemned as a traitor by the Communist Party. Since the late 1970s, Lin and the wife of Mao, Jiang Qing , have been labeled the two major "counter-revolutionary forces" of the Cultural Revolution, receiving official blame from the Chinese government for the worst excesses of that period. Lin Biao was the son of a prosperous merchant family in Huanggang , Hubei . His name at birth

4150-629: The formal political responsibilities that he was assigned, usually citing his poor health. After Lin's injury in 1938, he suffered from ongoing physical and mental health problems. A theory holds that his lifelong health problems may have resulted from the injury. His exact medical condition is not well understood, partially because his medical records have never been publicly released. Dr. Li Zhisui , then one of Mao's personal physicians, believed that Lin suffered from neurasthenia and hypochondria . He became ill whenever he perspired, and suffered from phobias about water, wind, cold, light, and noise. He

4233-400: The general assault on the city on 13 March, and took the town one day later. The capture of Siping ended Lin's Winter Offensive. The KMT nearly lost all of Manchuria by the end of the campaign and suffered 156,000 casualties, most of which survived as prisoners of war that were indoctrinated and recruited into Lin's forces. By the end of winter 1948 the Kuomintang had lost all of its territory in

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4316-462: The isolated Nationalist 5th Corps. Its commander, Chen Linda , realized that he was being surrounded and requested reinforcements, but Chen Cheng only responded that he would "allow" Chen Linda to withdraw. The attempted breakout failed, and the 5th Corps was destroyed on 7 January. After this defeat, Chen Cheng was replaced with Wei Lihuang ten days later, but Wei was not able to prevent the Communists from capturing Liaoyang on 6 February, destroying

4399-429: The most dreaded section of the Red Army. Chiefly due to Lin's extraordinary talent as a tactician, it destroyed, defeated or outmanoeuvered every Government force sent against it and was never broken in battle   .... Like many able Red commanders, Lin has never been outside China, speaks and reads no language but Chinese. Before the age of 30, however, he has already won recognition beyond Red circles. His articles in

4482-471: The most successful commanders in the Red Army during the Long March . Under the direction of Mao and Zhou, the Red Army finally arrived at the remote Communist base of Yan'an , Shaanxi , in December 1936. Lin and Peng Dehuai were generally considered the Red Army's best battlefield commanders, and were not rivals during the Long March . Both of them had supported Mao's rise to de facto leadership at

4565-546: The most well-equipped Communist forces in China. By the time that units from the Kuomintang (Nationalists) were able to arrive in the major cities of Manchuria, Lin's forces were already in firm control of most of the countryside and surrounding areas. By the end of 1945, Lin had 280,000 troops in Manchuria under his command, but according to Kuomintang estimates only 100,000 of these were regular forces with access to adequate equipment. The KMT also estimated that Lin also had access to 100,000 irregular auxiliaries, whose membership

4648-485: The news about the defeat at Jinzhou, a KMT army from Yunnan and its commander, Zeng Zesheng , defected and abandoned its position on the outskirts of Changchun on 14 October. This doomed the remaining Nationalist forces in the city, and Zheng Dongguo was forced to surrender two days later. Chiang ordered the 9th army of 110,000 men under General Liao Yaoxiang to travel west and retake Jinzhou, but Lin directed nearly all of his forces to stop them, and they began to encircle

4731-529: The north of the Songhua River. The Communists suffered over 30,000 losses at Siping, and may have suffered a desertion rate of over 20% during the withdrawal, while the Nationalist garrison at Siping fell from 20,000 to slightly over 3,000 before the siege was broken. Lin volunteered to write a self-criticism after the defeat. He also criticized his commander at Siping, Li Tianyou , for demonstrating poor tactics and for lacking "revolutionary spirit". Despite

4814-407: The peasants as "rural Stakhanovites ." The ensuing false statistics impeded central coordination of the economy. At Mount Lu, addressing these issues implicated a broader political tension over centralization and decentralization. As academic Alessandro Russo writes, the party's former strength of coordinating peasant political power had now created a major obstacle. Mao Zedong also intended to use

4897-464: The period undermined the economic development necessary to modernize the army. On his return to China in mid-June, Peng criticized the Great Leap Forward. Peng's criticism culminated in his "Letter of Opinion." On July 14, Peng wrote a private letter to Mao criticizing some elements of the Great Leap Forward. In the letter, he cautiously framed his words and did not deny the "great achievement" of Mao, but meanwhile showed his disapproval for elements like

4980-508: The radical policies of the Great Leap Forward, had he been so inclined. Mao himself summarized the Lushan Conference in the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference after the disasters of the Great Leap Forward , as he self-criticized and argued the Lushan Conference should be focused on the works; however, "then up jumped Peng and said 'you fucked my mother for forty days, can I fuck your mother for twenty days?'", and

5063-410: The relief unit on 21 October. After a week of fighting, the Nationalist army was destroyed on 28 October. Remaining KMT garrisons in the Northeast attempted to break out of the region and flee south, but most were unsuccessful. After Changchun, the only major KMT garrison in the Northeast was Shenyang, where 140,000 KMT soldiers were eventually forced to surrender. By the end of 1948 all of Northeast China

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5146-518: The rest of the siege the Nationalist commander, Zheng Dongguo , depended entirely on supplies airdropped into the city. On 19 May, Lin submitted a report to Mao in which he expected heavy casualties. By 20 July the siege was at a stalemate, and Lin deferred to Mao, allowing some of his army to attack Jinzhou farther south, beginning the Liaoshen Campaign . When Chiang airlifted reinforcements to defend Jinzhou, Lin ordered his army to abandon

5229-531: The siege and return to Changchun, but Mao disagreed and overruled him, and Lin was ordered to engage the defenders in a decisive confrontation. On 14 October, the Northeast Field Army began its assault on Jinzhou with 250,000 men and the bulk of Lin's artillery and armor. After nearly 24 hours of fighting, Lin's forces were victorious, suffering 24,000 casualties but capturing the enemy commander, Fan Hanjie , and 90,000 enemy soldiers. After hearing

5312-469: The south bank of the Songhua River , where they halted due to Du's concerns about his army becoming overextended. According to Communist sources, Lin's army lost 15,000 soldiers in the fighting and withdrawal, but Nationalist sources claim that 25,000 soldiers also deserted or surrendered, and that Lin's force of 100,000 irregular auxiliaries suffered from mass desertion during the retreat. On 10 June,

5395-441: The tactics advocated by Mao. After Chiang's forces successfully occupied several strategic locations within the Jiangxi Soviet, in 1934, Lin was one of the first Red Army commanders to publicly advocate the abandonment of the Jiangxi Soviet, but he was opposed by most Red Army commanders, especially Braun and Peng Dehuai. After the Communists finally resolved to abandon their base, later in 1934, Lin continued his position as one of

5478-456: The two forces agreed to a ceasefire brokered by George Marshall , and fighting temporarily ceased. Mao ordered Lin to counterattack that winter, but Lin refused, replying that his forces were exhausted and not logistically prepared to do so. When Du led the majority of his forces to attack Communist forces on the Korean border in January 1947, Lin finally ordered 20,000 of his soldiers to cross

5561-401: The two great antagonists of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in the process of the socialist revolution during the past decade." Peng was subsequently dismissed and arrested. In September 1959, he was replaced by Lin Biao . As indicated by Mao in a September 1959 speech, Mao believed that Peng and others had gone "behind the back of our fatherland to collude with a foreign country." Although

5644-517: The victory of the Summer Offensive, Lin's forces gained the initiative and Kuomintang defensive strategy became static and reactionary. Lin ordered his forces to besiege Siping, but they suffered very high casualties and made little progress, partially due to the defenders' strong entrenched position and air support, and due to the attackers' poor artillery support (Lin only had seventy pieces of artillery around Siping). Lin's forces broke into

5727-548: The war ceased in 1949. He led a section of the government's civil bureaucracy as one of the co-serving Vice Premiers of the People's Republic of China from 1954 onwards, becoming First Vice Premier from 1964. Lin became more active in politics when named one of the co-serving Vice Chairmen of the Chinese Communist Party in 1958. He held the three responsibilities of Vice Premier, Vice Chairman and Minister of National Defense from 1959 onwards. To date, Lin

5810-464: The years before his death, the fiancée of Lin's son reported that Lin became extremely distant and socially and politically detached, even to the extent that he never read books or newspapers. His passivity made him difficult to connect with at any meaningful level: "usually he just sat there, blankly". In Lin's rare periods of activity, he used his time mostly to complain about, and seek treatment for his large variety of medical issues. Lin, like most of

5893-669: Was " Lin Yurong ". Lin's father opened a small handicrafts factory in the mid-late 1910s, but was forced to close the factory due to "heavy taxes imposed by local militarists". After closing the factory, Lin's father worked as a purser aboard a river steamship. Lin entered primary school in 1917, and moved to Shanghai in 1919 to continue his education. As a child, Lin was much more interested in participating in student movements than in pursuing his formal education. Lin transferred to Wuchang Gongjin High School ( 武昌共进中学 ) at 15. Lin joined

5976-452: Was "politically   ... a blank sheet on which Mao could write as he pleased" during this period. After Mao was removed from power in 1932 by his rivals (the 28 Bolsheviks ), Lin frequently attended strategic meetings in Mao's name and openly attacked the plans of Mao's enemies. Within the Jiangxi Soviet, Lin's First Army Group was the best-equipped and arguably most successful force within

6059-406: Was accompanied by his wife, Liu Ximin, but their relationship deteriorated in Moscow, and Lin eventually returned to Yan'an without her. While in Moscow, Lin became infatuated with Zhou Enlai's adopted daughter, Sun Weishi , who was studying in Moscow from 1938 to 1946. Before returning to China, in 1942, Lin proposed to Sun and promised to divorce his wife, from whom Lin had become estranged. Sun

6142-536: Was also stripped of party membership and sent to a labor camp for refusing to denounce Peng. Not long after the Lushan Conference, Mao removed himself from the day-to-day workings of the party. Historian Maurice Meisner argues that Mao must have understood that Peng's criticisms were widely shared by the Party leadership and that Mao could not command sufficient support from the Central Committee to continue

6225-406: Was drawn mainly from unemployed factory workers. Lin avoided decisive confrontations throughout 1945, and he was able to preserve the strength of his army despite criticism from his peers in the Party and the PLA. For the sake of bargaining with the Kuomintang in peace negotiations in 1946, Mao ordered Lin to assemble his army to take and defend key cities, which was against the previous strategy of

6308-511: Was eight years older than Lin. Lin had no contact with Zhou after their time in Whampoa, until they met again in Yan'an in the late 1930s. Lin's relationship with Zhou was never especially close, but they rarely opposed each other directly. After graduating from Whampoa in 1926, Lin was assigned to a regiment commanded by Ye Ting . Less than a year after graduating from Whampoa, he was assigned to

6391-420: Was elected the sixth-ranking Central Committee member in 1945 based on his earlier battlefield reputation. After the Japanese surrender, the Communists moved large numbers of troops to Manchuria (Northeast China), and Lin Biao relocated to Manchuria to command the new "Communist Northeast Military District". The Soviets transferred captured Japanese military equipment to the Communists, making Lin's army one of

6474-462: Was largely for the pursuit of power. After arriving in Yan'an, Lin became the principal of the newly founded Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political University . In 1937, Lin married one of the students there, a girl named Liu Ximin, who had earned the nickname "University Flower". In August 1937, Lin was named commander-in-chief of the 115th Division of the Communist 8th Route Army and ordered to aid Yan Xishan 's forces in repelling

6557-416: Was not able to accept Lin's proposal, but promised to consider marrying Lin after completing her studies. Lin divorced Liu Ximin after returning to China, and married another woman, Ye Qun , in 1943. The relationship between Sun and Ye was notably bad. After returning to Yan'an, Lin was involved in troop training and indoctrination assignments. Lin was absent for most of the fighting during World War II, but

6640-426: Was rejected. On 8 April, Lin moved his headquarters from Harbin to Shuangcheng in order to be closer to the front. On 5 May, he held a conference with his subordinates and announced that his armies would change tactics, engage in a large-scale counterattack, and seek to defeat Du's forces in a decisive battle. On 8 May, Lin launched the first of his "three great campaigns", the Summer Offensive, intending to engage

6723-543: Was said to become nervous at the sight of rivers and oceans in traditional Chinese paintings, and suffered from diarrhea, which could be triggered by the sound of running water. Li's account of Lin's condition is notably different from the official Chinese version. In another study, Lin is described as having symptoms similar to those seen in patients of schizoid personality disorder . Lin's personality traits including his aloofness, lack of interest in social relationships, secretiveness, and emotional coldness he exhibited during

6806-806: Was the general who commanded the decisive Liaoshen and Pingjin campaigns , in which he co-led the Manchurian Field Army to victory and led the People's Liberation Army into Beijing. He crossed the Yangtze River in 1949, decisively defeated the Kuomintang and took control of the coastal provinces in Southeast China . He ranked third among the Ten Marshals . Zhu De and Peng Dehuai were considered senior to Lin, and Lin ranked directly ahead of He Long and Liu Bocheng . Lin abstained from taking an active role in politics after

6889-521: Was under Communist control. After taking control of the Manchurian provinces, Lin then swept into North China . Forces under Lin were responsible for winning two of the three major military victories responsible for the defeat of the Kuomintang. Lin suffered from ongoing periods of serious illness throughout the campaign. Following the victory in Manchuria, Lin commanded over a million soldiers, encircling Chiang's main forces in northern China during

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