Misplaced Pages

#312687

122-561: The United States backed coup in 1954 brought Carlos Castillo Armas to power. Along with other people with fascist leanings, he started the National Liberation Movement ( Movimiento de Liberación Nacional , or MLN). The founders of the party described it as the "party of organized violence." The new government promptly reversed the democratic reforms initiated during the Guatemalan Revolution and

244-632: A New York Times article about the visit to Guatemala by Chilean poet Pablo Neruda highlighted his communist beliefs, but neglected to mention his reputation as the greatest living poet in Latin America. Several figures in Eisenhower's administration, including Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother CIA Director Allen Dulles , had close ties to the United Fruit Company. The Dulles brothers had been partners of

366-476: A " state within a state ". The U.S. government was closely involved with the Guatemalan state under Cabrera, frequently dictating financial policies and ensuring that American companies were granted several exclusive rights. When Cabrera was overthrown in 1920, the U.S. sent an armed force to make certain that the new president remained friendly to it. Fearing a popular revolt following the unrest created by

488-432: A bridge on 19 June. When the rebels did reach their targets, they met with further setbacks. The force of 122 men targeting Zacapa were intercepted and decisively beaten by a garrison of 30 Guatemalan soldiers, with only 30 men escaping death or capture. The force that attacked Puerto Barrios was dispatched by policemen and armed dockworkers, with many of the rebels fleeing back to Honduras. In an effort to regain momentum,

610-553: A campaign of psychological warfare , which would present Castillo Armas' victory as a fait accompli to the Guatemalan people, and would force Árbenz to resign. The propaganda campaign had begun well before the invasion, with the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) writing hundreds of articles on Guatemala based on CIA reports, and distributing tens of thousands of leaflets throughout Latin America. The CIA persuaded friendly governments to screen video footage of Guatemala that supported

732-522: A failed coup on November 13, 1960, by progressive army officers who wished to set up a democratic government. In response to this threat, the Guatemalan government acted on the advice of the military attaché at the United States embassy and helped set up several vigilante groups throughout the country. The establishment of several new government death squads also coincided with a rise in US involvement with

854-480: A force led by Arévalo's defense minister Jacobo Árbenz . Arana was among those killed, but details of the coup attempt were never made public. Other sources of opposition to Arévalo's government were the right-wing politicians and conservatives within the military who had grown powerful during Ubico's dictatorship, as well as the clergy of the Catholic Church . The largely free 1950 elections were won by

976-455: A lower payload. The planes targeted ammunition depots, parade grounds, and other visible targets. On 22 June, another plane bombed the Honduran town of San Pedro de Copán ; John Dulles claimed the attack had been conducted by the Guatemalan air force, thus avoiding diplomatic consequences. However, by 22 June 1954, Armas' forces were down to one P-47 which made an ineffective air strike on

1098-448: A military reason to do so, this could have cost him the support of the army. Carlos Enrique Díaz , the chief of the Guatemalan armed forces, told Árbenz that arming civilians would be unpopular with his soldiers, and that "the army [would] do its duty". Árbenz instead told Díaz to select officers to lead a counter-attack. Díaz chose a corps of officers who were all regarded to be men of personal integrity, and who were loyal to Árbenz. On

1220-754: A million dollars to convince lawmakers and the American public that the Guatemalan government needed to be overthrown. As the Cold War developed and the Guatemalan government clashed with U.S. corporations on an increasing number of issues, the U.S. government grew increasingly suspicious of the Guatemalan Revolution. In addition, the Cold War predisposed the Truman administration to see the Guatemalan government as communist. Arévalo's support for

1342-407: A moderate capitalist approach. The PGT too committed itself to working within the existing legal framework to achieve its immediate objectives of emancipating peasants from feudalism and improving workers' rights. The most prominent component of Árbenz's policy was his agrarian reform bill. Árbenz drafted the bill himself, having sought advice from economists across Latin America. The focus of

SECTION 10

#1732780977313

1464-478: A number of church leaders throughout the Guatemalan countryside, and persuaded them to incorporate anti-government messages into their sermons. While preparations for Operation PBSuccess were underway, Washington issued a series of statements denouncing the Guatemalan government, alleging that it had been infiltrated by communists. The State Department also asked the Organization of American States to modify

1586-571: A premature coup on 29 March 1953, with a futile raid against the army garrison at Salamá , in the central Guatemalan department of Baja Verapaz . The rebellion was swiftly crushed, and a number of participants were arrested. Several CIA agents and allies were imprisoned, weakening the coup effort. Thus the CIA came to rely more heavily on the Guatemalan exile groups and their anti-democratic allies in Guatemala. The CIA considered several candidates to lead

1708-400: A research study from a firm known to be hostile to social reform, which produced a 235-page report that was highly critical of the Guatemalan government. Historians have stated that the report was full of "exaggerations, scurrilous descriptions and bizarre historical theories" but it nonetheless had a significant impact on the members of Congress who read it. Overall, the company spent over half

1830-538: A series of dictators were willing to accommodate the economic interests of the U.S. in return for its support for their regimes. Guatemala was among the Central American countries of the period known as a banana republic . From 1890 to 1920, control of Guatemala's resources and its economy shifted away from Britain and Germany to the U.S., which became Guatemala's dominant trade partner. The Monroe Doctrine continued to be seen as relevant to Guatemala, and

1952-525: A team of diplomats who would support PBSuccess. It was led by John Peurifoy , who took over as Ambassador to Guatemala in October 1953. Another member of the team was William D. Pawley , a wealthy businessman and diplomat with extensive knowledge of the aviation industry. Peurifoy was a militant anti-communist, and had proven his willingness to work with the CIA during his time as United States Ambassador to Greece . Under Peurifoy's tenure, relations with

2074-476: The Alfhem to be used to bolster peasant militias, in the event of army disloyalty, but the U.S. informed army chiefs of the shipment, forcing Árbenz to hand them over to the military, and deepening the rift between him and his top generals. Castillo Armas' army of 480 men was not large enough to defeat the Guatemalan military, even with U.S.-supplied aircraft. Therefore, the plans for Operation PBSuccess called for

2196-567: The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to follow up on it. The CIA contacted Carlos Castillo Armas , a Guatemalan army officer who had been exiled from the country in 1949 following a failed coup attempt against President Arévalo. Believing that Castillo Armas would lead a coup with or without their assistance, the CIA decided to supply him with weapons and 225,000 U.S. dollars. The CIA considered Castillo Armas sufficiently corrupt and authoritarian to be well suited to lead

2318-539: The European powers against further colonization in Latin America . The stated aim of the Monroe Doctrine was to maintain order and stability, and to ensure that U.S. access to resources and markets was not limited. Historian Mark Gilderhus states that the doctrine also contained racially condescending language, which likened Latin American countries to squabbling children. While the U.S. did not initially have

2440-565: The Great Depression , wealthy Guatemalan landowners lent their support to Jorge Ubico , who won an uncontested election in 1931 . Ubico's regime became one of the most repressive in the region. He abolished debt peonage , replacing it with a vagrancy law which stipulated that all landless men of working age needed to perform a minimum of 100 days of forced labor annually. He authorized landowners to take any actions they wished against their workers, including executions . Ubico

2562-561: The Third World . Some assert that Washington didn't believe Guatemala to be an immediate communist threat, citing declassified documents from the U.S. Policy Planning Staff, which state the real risk was the example of independence of the U.S. that Guatemala might offer to nationalists wanting social reform throughout Latin America. Both the role of the UFC and that of the perception of communist influence continue to be cited as motivations for

SECTION 20

#1732780977313

2684-521: The United Fruit Company (UFC). Formed in 1899 by the merger of two large U.S. corporations, the new entity owned large tracts of land across Central America, and in Guatemala controlled the railroads , the docks, and the communication systems. By 1900 it had become the largest exporter of bananas in the world, and had a monopoly over the Guatemalan banana trade . Journalist and writer William Blum describes UFC's role in Guatemala as

2806-455: The agrarian reform program that was the main project of president Jacobo Arbenz Guzman and which directly impacted the interests of both the United Fruit Company and the Guatemalan landowners. After the 1954 coup d'état, the MLN became in effect the party of the Guatemalan landowners and military. However, the leftist guerrillas in the country were very active during the 1960s, especially after

2928-441: The 60-man force was intercepted and jailed by Salvadoran policemen before it got to the border. At 8:20 am on 18 June 1954, Castillo Armas led his invading troops over the border. Ten trained saboteurs preceded the invasion, with the aim of blowing up railways and cutting telegraph lines. At about the same time, Castillo Armas' planes flew over a pro-government rally in the capital. The U.S. Psychological Strategy Board ordered

3050-752: The Americas. The weapons were delivered to Guatemala at the Atlantic port of Puerto Barrios by the Swedish freight ship MS  Alfhem , which sailed from Szczecin in Poland . The U.S. failed to intercept the shipment despite imposing an illegal naval quarantine on Guatemala. However "Guatemalan army officers" quoted in The New York Times said that "some of the arms ... were duds, worn out, or entirely wrong for use there". The CIA portrayed

3172-517: The CIA station in South Korea. Haney reported directly to Wisner, thereby separating PBSuccess from the CIA's Latin American division, a decision which created some tension within the agency. Haney decided to establish headquarters in a concealed office complex in Opa-locka, Florida . Codenamed "Lincoln", it became the nerve center of operation PBSuccess. The CIA operation was complicated by

3294-556: The CIA to carry out Operation PBSuccess in August 1953. The CIA armed, funded, and trained a force of 480 men led by Carlos Castillo Armas. After U.S. efforts to criticize and isolate Guatemala internationally, Armas' force invaded Guatemala on 18 June 1954, backed by a heavy campaign of psychological warfare , as well as air bombings of Guatemala City and a naval blockade. The invasion force fared poorly militarily, and most of its offensives were defeated. However, psychological warfare and

3416-589: The Caribbean Legion also worried the Truman administration, which saw it as a vehicle for communism, rather than as the anti-dictatorial force it was conceived as. Until the end of its term, the Truman administration had relied on purely diplomatic and economic means to try to reduce the perceived communist influence. The U.S. had refused to sell arms to the Guatemalan government after 1944; in 1951 it began to block all weapons purchases by Guatemala. The U.S.'s worries over communist influence increased after

3538-424: The Eisenhower administration to the UFC. Others have argued that the overthrow was motivated primarily by U.S. strategic interest; the knowledge of the presence of a small number of communists close to Árbenz led the U.S. to reach incorrect conclusions about the extent of communist influence. Yet others have argued that the overthrow was part of a larger tendency within the U.S. to oppose nationalist movements in

3660-406: The Guatemalan border. The largest force was supposed to attack the Atlantic harbor town of Puerto Barrios, while the others attacked the smaller towns of Esquipulas , Jutiapa , and Zacapa , the Guatemalan army's largest frontier post. Zapaca was of great significance to controlling Guatemala as it handled the majority of commerce along key rail routes. The invasion plan quickly faced difficulties;

3782-400: The Guatemalan capital. The radio broadcasts have been given a lot of credit by historians for the success of the coup, owing to the unrest they created throughout the country. They were unexpectedly assisted by the outage of the government-run radio station, which stopped transmitting for three weeks while a new antenna was being fitted. The Voice of Liberation transmissions continued throughout

Mano Blanca - Misplaced Pages Continue

3904-444: The Guatemalan government soured further, although those with the Guatemalan military improved. In a report to John Dulles, Peurifoy stated that he was "definitely convinced that if [Árbenz] is not a communist, then he will certainly do until one comes along". Within the CIA, the operation was headed by Deputy Director of Plans Frank Wisner . The field commander selected by Wisner was former U.S. Army Colonel Albert Haney, then chief of

4026-575: The Middle East. The intimidation was not solely naval; on 26 May one of Castillo Armas' planes flew over the capital, dropping leaflets that exhorted people to struggle against communism and support Castillo Armas. The most wide-reaching psychological weapon was the radio station Voice of Liberation, La Voz de la Liberación . E. Howard Hunt's deputy, David Atlee Phillips , directed the radio station. It began broadcasting on 1 May 1954, carrying anti-communist propaganda, telling its listeners to resist

4148-711: The New Anticommunist Organization and the Anticommunist Council of Guatemala. These three groups operated within the United States supported government arm known as the Regional Telecommunications Center – La Regional – which linked them to various government, military and police agencies. This network was built on the Committees against Communism created by the Central Intelligence Agency after

4270-549: The PR from taking power. During the 1960s, Mano Blanca's front man was Raúl Lorenzana. Lorenzana was close to the Guatemalan military and operated out of the headquarters of the Guatemalan Army's Cuartel de Matamoros and a government safehouse at La Aurora airbase. Human rights activist Blase Bonpane described the activities of Mano Blanca as being an integral part of the policy of the Guatemalan government, and by extension

4392-490: The President of Guatemala. Arévalo's administration drafted a more liberal labor code, built health centers, and increased funding to education. Arévalo enacted a minimum wage, and created state-run farms to employ landless laborers. He cracked down on the communist Guatemalan Party of Labour ( Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo , PGT) and in 1945 criminalized labor unions in workplaces with fewer than 500 workers. By 1947,

4514-476: The State Department aggravated the U.S. arms embargo by thwarting the Árbenz government's arms purchases from Canada, Germany, and Rhodesia . By 1954 Árbenz had become desperate for weapons, and decided to acquire them secretly from Czechoslovakia , which would have been the first time that a Soviet bloc country shipped weapons to the Americas, an action seen as establishing a communist beachhead in

4636-418: The U.S. launched Operation Hardrock Baker, a naval blockade of Guatemala. Ships and submarines patrolled the Guatemalan coasts, and all approaching ships were stopped and searched; these included ships from Britain and France, violating international law. However Britain and France did not protest very strongly, hoping that in return the U.S. would not interfere with their efforts to subdue rebellious colonies in

4758-587: The U.S. stating that Eisenhower's role as a general in World War II demonstrated that he was against imperialism. The Soviet Union was the only country to support Guatemala. When the U.S. and its allies proposed referring the matter to the Organization of American States, the Soviet Union vetoed the proposal. Guatemala continued to press for a Security Council investigation; the proposal received

4880-466: The U.S. version of events. As part of the psychological warfare, the U.S. Psychological Strategy Board authorized a "Nerve War Against Individuals" to instill fear and paranoia in potential loyalists and other potential opponents of the coup. This campaign included death threats against political leaders deemed loyal or deemed to be communist, and the sending of small wooden coffins, non-functioning bombs, and hangman's nooses to such people. The US bombing

5002-406: The U.S.'s actions today. Eisenhower authorized the CIA operation to overthrow Jacobo Árbenz, code-named Operation PBSuccess, in August 1953. The operation was granted a budget of 2.7 million U.S. dollars for "psychological warfare and political action". The total budget has been estimated at between 5 and 7 million dollars, and the planning employed over 100 CIA agents. In addition,

Mano Blanca - Misplaced Pages Continue

5124-477: The UFC was specially refitted in New Orleans and loaded with weapons under the guise of agricultural machinery, and set sail for Nicaragua. However, the plan was terminated soon after: accounts of its termination vary. Some sources state that the State Department discovered the plan when a senior official was asked to sign a certain document, while others suggest that Somoza was indiscreet. The eventual outcome

5246-563: The Ubico government resulted in a popular uprising led by university students and middle-class citizens in 1944. Ubico fled, handing over power to a three-person junta which continued Ubico's policies until it was toppled by the October Revolution that aimed to transform Guatemala into a liberal democracy . The largely free election that followed installed a philosophically conservative university professor, Juan José Arévalo , as

5368-727: The agenda of the Inter-American Conference , which was scheduled to be held in Caracas in March 1954, requesting the addition of an item titled "Intervention of International Communism in the American Republics", which was widely seen as a move targeting Guatemala. On 29 and 30 January 1954, the Guatemalan government published documents containing information leaked to it by a member of Castillo Armas' team who had turned against him. Lacking in original documents,

5490-586: The allegations from the Guatemalan government as proof that it had become communist. At the conference in Caracas, the various Latin American governments sought economic aid from the U.S., as well as its continuing non-intervention in their internal affairs. The U.S. government's aim was to pass a resolution condemning the supposed spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere. The Guatemalan foreign minister Guillermo Toriello argued strongly against

5612-525: The army would not fight. Afraid of a U.S. intervention in Castillo Armas' favor, he did not tell Árbenz of his suspicions. PGT leaders also began to have their suspicions; acting secretary general Alvarado Monzón sent a member of the central committee to Zacapa to investigate. He returned on 25 June, reporting that the army was highly demoralized, and would not fight. Monzón reported this to Árbenz, who quickly sent another investigator. He too returned

5734-450: The assistance of other senior army officers. They informed Peurifoy of this plan, asking him to stop the hostilities in return for Árbenz's resignation. Peurifoy promised to arrange a truce, and the plotters went to Árbenz and informed him of their decision. Árbenz, utterly exhausted and seeking to preserve at least a measure of the democratic reforms that he had brought, agreed without demur. After informing his cabinet of his decision, he left

5856-553: The bombing of the Matamoros Fortress in downtown Guatemala City, and a U.S. P-47 warplane flown by a mercenary pilot bombed the city of Chiquimula . Castillo Armas demanded Árbenz's immediate surrender. The invasion provoked a brief panic in the capital, which quickly decreased as the rebels failed to make any striking moves. Bogged down by supplies and a lack of transportation, Castillo Armas' forces took several days to reach their targets, although their planes blew up

5978-573: The broadcasts were concocted in Miami by Guatemalan exiles, flown to Central America, and broadcast through a mobile transmitter. The Voice of Liberation made an initial broadcast that was repeated four times, after which it took to transmitting two-hour bulletins twice a day. The transmissions were initially only heard intermittently in Guatemala City; a week later, the CIA significantly increased their transmitting power, allowing clear reception in

6100-413: The capital had fought alongside the Guatemalan Revolution twice before—during the popular uprising of 1944 , and during the attempted coup of 1949 —but on this occasion the army, intimidated by the U.S., refused to fight. The union members were reluctant to fight both the invasion and their own military. Seeing this, Díaz reneged on his support of the President, and began plotting to overthrow Árbenz with

6222-635: The capital. The CIA sponsors of Armas began to worry Operation PBSuccess may fail. Col. Al Haney, heading the CIA's operation, informed Allen Dulles that more aircraft was needed or else the Armas invasion would surely fail. Dulles made arrangements for the sale of three additional P-47s from the military to the Nicaraguan government, to be paid for by William Pawley , a successful businessman, Eisenhower supporter, and CIA consultant.  In an Oval Office meeting, Dulles and others briefed President Eisenhower on

SECTION 50

#1732780977313

6344-406: The command of Colonel Víctor M. León, who was believed to be loyal to Árbenz. León told Árbenz that the counter-attack would be delayed for logistical reasons, but assured him not to worry, as Castillo Armas would be defeated very soon. Other members of the government were not so certain. Army Chief of Staff Parinello inspected the troops at Zacapa on 23 June, and returned to the capital believing that

6466-519: The communist Guatemalan Party of Labour . The U.S. government feared that Guatemala's example could inspire nationalists wanting social reform throughout Latin America. The United Fruit Company (UFC), whose highly profitable business had been affected by the softening of exploitative labor practices in Guatemala, engaged in an influential lobbying campaign to persuade the U.S. to overthrow the Guatemalan government. U.S. President Harry Truman authorized Operation PBFortune to topple Árbenz in 1952, which

6588-505: The company had paid when it bought the property. More expropriation occurred soon after, bringing the total to over 400,000 acres (160,000 ha), at the rate which UFC had valued its property for tax purposes. The company was unhappy with losing the land, and the level of profit resulting from the sale, resulting in further lobbying in Washington, particularly through U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles , who had close ties to

6710-525: The company was the main obstacle to progress in the country. American historians observed that "[to] the Guatemalans it appeared that their country was being mercilessly exploited by foreign interests which took huge profits without making any contributions to the nation's welfare". In 1953, 200,000 acres (81,000 ha) of uncultivated land was expropriated by the government, which paid 2.99 U.S. dollars per acre (7.39 U.S. dollars per hectare), twice what

6832-402: The company. The UFC also began a public relations campaign to discredit the Guatemalan government, hiring Edward Bernays , who mounted a concerted misinformation campaign for several years which portrayed the company as the victim of a "communist" Guatemalan government. The company stepped up its efforts after Dwight Eisenhower was elected U.S. president in 1952. These included commissioning

6954-460: The conflict, broadcasting exaggerated news of rebel troops converging on the capital, and contributing to massive demoralization among both the army and the civilian population. Castillo Armas' force of 480 men had been split into four teams, ranging in size from 60 to 198. On 15 June 1954 these four forces left their bases in Honduras and El Salvador , and assembled in various towns just outside

7076-431: The council to "take measures necessary ... to put a stop to the aggression", which he said Nicaragua and Honduras were responsible for, along with "certain foreign monopolies which have been affected by the progressive policy of my government". The Security Council looked at Guatemala's complaint at an emergency session on 20 June. The debate was lengthy and heated, with Nicaragua and Honduras denying any wrongdoing, and

7198-583: The counter-insurgency, with the transfer of weapons and techniques that had been used in the Vietnam War . A thousand Green Berets were also sent by the United States, along with military consultants, some of whom were implicated in the setting up of the death squads. Mano Blanca, or the Movement of Organized Nationalist Action, was set up in 1966 as a front for the MLN to carry out its more violent activities, along with many other similar groups, including

7320-535: The country, and flew to exile in Mexico. Some 120 Árbenz loyalists or communists were also allowed to leave, and the CIA stated that none of the assassination plans contemplated by the CIA were actually implemented. On June 30, 1954 the CIA began a comprehensive destruction process of documents related to Operation PBSuccess. When an oversight committee of the United States Senate in 1975 investigated

7442-437: The countryside that a fifth column attack was imminent; large numbers of peasants went to the government and asked for weapons to defend their country. They were repeatedly told that the army was "successfully defending our country". Nonetheless, peasant volunteers assisted the government war effort, manning roadblocks and donating supplies to the army. Weapons shipments dropped by rebel planes were intercepted and turned over to

SECTION 60

#1732780977313

7564-533: The coup in 1954. The members of Mano Blanca were largely army officers, and the outfit received a lot of its funding from planters. It also received information from military intelligence. The MANO was distinct from other "death squads" operating at the same time, as it was initially formed as an independent paramilitary organization, unlike the CADEG or the NOA which were primarily front organizations operated exclusively by

7686-489: The coup. The coup was planned in detail over the next few weeks by the CIA, the UFC, and Somoza. The CIA also contacted Marcos Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic; the two U.S.-backed dictators were supportive of the plan, and agreed to contribute some funding. Although PBFortune was officially approved on 9 September 1952, various planning steps had been taken earlier in

7808-499: The coup. Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes , the conservative candidate who had lost the 1950 election to Árbenz, held favor with the Guatemalan opposition but was rejected for his role in the Ubico regime, as well as his European appearance, which was unlikely to appeal to the majority mixed-race mestizo population. Another popular candidate was the coffee planter Juan Córdova Cerna, who had briefly served in Arévalo's cabinet before becoming

7930-560: The election of Árbenz in 1951 and his enactment of Decree 900 in 1952. In April 1952 Anastasio Somoza García , the dictator of Nicaragua , made his first state visit to the U.S. He made several public speeches praising the U.S., and was awarded a medal by the New York City government. During a meeting with Truman and his senior staff, Somoza said that if the U.S. gave him the arms, he would "clean up Guatemala". The proposal did not receive much immediate support, but Truman instructed

8052-466: The end of the Guatemalan Revolution . The coup installed the military dictatorship of Carlos Castillo Armas , the first in a series of U.S.-backed authoritarian rulers in Guatemala . The coup was largely the result of a CIA covert operation code-named PBSuccess. The Guatemalan Revolution began in 1944, after a popular uprising toppled the military dictatorship of Jorge Ubico . Juan José Arévalo

8174-515: The extra planes that Eisenhower had approved. They had limited material success; many of their bombs were surplus material from World War II, and failed to explode. Nonetheless, they had a significant psychological impact. On 25 June, the same day that he received the army's ultimatum, Árbenz learned that Castillo Armas had scored what later proved to be his only military victory, defeating the Guatemalan garrison at Chiquimula . Historian Piero Gleijeses has stated that if it were not for U.S. support for

8296-614: The failed 1949 coup and on the CIA's payroll since the aborted PBFortune in 1951, who was to lead the coming coup. Castillo Armas was given enough money to recruit a small force of mercenaries from among Guatemalan exiles and the populations of nearby countries. This band was called the Army of Liberation. The CIA established training camps in Nicaragua and Honduras and supplied them with weapons as well as several bombers . The U.S. signed military agreements with both those countries prior to

8418-543: The fear of a U.S. invasion intimidated the Guatemalan Army , which eventually refused to fight. Árbenz unsuccessfully attempted to arm civilians to resist the invasion, before resigning on 27 June. Castillo Armas became president ten days later, following negotiations in San Salvador . Described as the definitive deathblow to democracy in Guatemala, the coup was widely criticized internationally, and strengthened

8540-695: The government had engaged in poor forgery to enhance the information it possessed, undermining the credibility of its charges. A spate of arrests followed of allies of Castillo Armas within Guatemala, and the government issued statements implicating a "Government of the North" in a plot to overthrow Árbenz. Washington denied these allegations, and the U.S. media uniformly took the side of their government; even publications which had until then provided relatively balanced coverage of Guatemala, such as The Christian Science Monitor , suggested that Árbenz had succumbed to communist propaganda. Several Congressmen also pointed to

8662-420: The government, the political parties, and the labor unions. Colonel Díaz was also present. The President told them that the army at Zacapa had abandoned the government, and that the civilian population needed to be armed to defend the country. Díaz raised no objections, and the unions pledged several thousand troops. When the troops were mustered the next day, only a few hundred showed up. The civilian population of

8784-563: The government. The Árbenz government also pursued diplomatic means to try to end the invasion. It sought support from El Salvador and Mexico; Mexico declined to get involved, and the Salvadoran government merely reported the Guatemalan effort to Peurifoy. Árbenz's largest diplomatic initiative was in taking the issue to the United Nations Security Council . On 18 June the Guatemalan foreign minister petitioned

8906-500: The history of the CIA's assassinations program and requested information about the CIA's assassination program as part of Operation PBSuccess, the CIA stated it had lost all such records. Journalist Annie Jacobsen states that the CIA claim of no assassinations having taken place is doubtful. In May 1997, the CIA stated it had rediscovered some of its documents that it had said were lost. The names of assassination targets had all been redacted, which made it impossible to verify whether any of

9028-403: The interests of the UFC with that of U.S. national security interests, and made it more willing to overthrow the Guatemalan government. The success of the 1953 CIA operation to overthrow the democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran also strengthened Eisenhower's belief in using the agency to effect political change overseas. Historians and authors writing about the 1954 coup have debated

9150-426: The invasion of Guatemala, allowing it to move heavier arms freely. The CIA trained at least 1,725 foreign guerillas plus thousands of additional militants as reserves. These preparations were only superficially covert: the CIA intended Árbenz to find out about them, as a part of its plan to convince the Guatemalan people that the overthrow of Árbenz was a fait accompli . Additionally, the CIA made covert contact with

9272-499: The largest landowner and employer in Guatemala for several years. Ubico granted it a new contract, which was immensely favorable to the company. This included 200,000 hectares (490,000 acres) of public land, an exemption from taxes, and a guarantee that no other company would receive any competing contract. Ubico requested the UFC cap the daily salary of its workers at 50 U.S. cents, so that workers in other companies would be less able to demand higher wages. The repressive policies of

9394-402: The law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell , and in that capacity had arranged several deals for the UFC. Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith would later become a director of the company, while Eisenhower's personal assistant Ann C. Whitman was the wife of UFC public relations director Edmund S. Whitman. These personal connections meant that the Eisenhower administration tended to conflate

9516-440: The law resulted in a significant improvement in living standards for thousands of peasant families, the majority of whom were Indigenous. Historian Greg Grandin sees the law as representing a fundamental power shift in favor of the hitherto marginalized. By 1950, the United Fruit Company's (now Chiquita ) annual profits were 65 million U.S. dollars, twice as large as the revenue of the government of Guatemala. The company

9638-413: The law was on transferring uncultivated land from large landowners to poor laborers, who would then be able to begin viable farms of their own. The official title of the agrarian reform bill was Decree 900 . It expropriated all uncultivated land from landholdings that were larger than 673 acres (272 ha). If the estates were between 224 acres (91 ha) and 672 acres (272 ha), uncultivated land

9760-446: The leader of Mano Blanca had told him the death threats had been made because he was a communist, and would "give his life for the poor." Overall, Mano Blanca was responsible for thousands of murders and kidnappings, leading travel writer Paul Theroux to refer to them as "Guatemala's version of a volunteer Gestapo unit." Mano Blanca was active during the governments of colonel Carlos Arana Osorio and general Kjell Laugerud García and

9882-427: The legal adviser to the UFC. The death of his son in an anti-government uprising in 1950 turned him against the government, and he had planned the unsuccessful Salamá coup in 1953 before fleeing to join Castillo Armas in exile. Although his status as a civilian gave him an advantage over Castillo Armas, he was diagnosed with throat cancer in 1954, taking him out of the reckoning. Thus it was Castillo Armas, in exile since

10004-411: The long-lasting anti-U.S. sentiment in Latin America . Attempting to justify the coup, the CIA launched Operation PBHistory , which sought evidence of Soviet influence in Guatemala among documents from the Árbenz era, but found none. Castillo Armas quickly assumed dictatorial powers, banning opposition parties, executing, imprisoning and torturing political opponents, and reversing the social reforms of

10126-649: The military and security services. Armed with the support and coordination of the Guatemalan Armed Forces, Mano Blanca began a campaign described by the United States Department of State as one of "kidnappings, torture, and summary execution ." One of the main targets of Mano Blanca was the Partido Revolucionario (PR), an anti-communist group that was the only major reform oriented party allowed to operate under

10248-464: The military-dominated regime. Other targets included the banned leftist parties. The PR drew a lot of its members from the activist base that had been created during the agrarian reform program begun by former president Jacobo Arbenz in 1952, and these individuals were targeted by the Mano Blanca. When it was founded, the group had the specific aim of preventing Julio César Méndez Montenegro of

10370-494: The need for additional aircraft in the Armas invasion. Upon Eisenhower's approval, the planes were purchased by Pawley on behalf of the Nicaraguan government. The P-47s flew from Puerto Rico to Panama and went into action on 23 June, hitting Guatemalan army forces and other targets in the capital. Early in the morning on 27 June 1954, a plane attacked Puerto San José and bombed the British cargo ship, SS  Springfjord , which

10492-490: The night of 19 June, most of the Guatemalan troops in the capital region left for Zacapa, joined by smaller detachments from other garrisons. Árbenz stated that "the invasion was a farce", but worried that if it was defeated on the Honduran border, Honduras would use it as an excuse to declare war on Guatemala, which would lead to a U.S. invasion. Because of the rumours spread by the Voice of Liberation, there were worries throughout

10614-504: The operation recruited scores of individuals from among Guatemalan exiles and the populations of the surrounding countries. The plans included drawing up lists of people within Árbenz's government to be assassinated if the coup were to be carried out. Manuals of assassination techniques were compiled, and lists were also made of people whom the junta would dispose of. These were the CIA's first known assassination manuals, and were reused in subsequent CIA actions. The State Department created

10736-427: The passage of Decree 900 in 1952. Of the 550,000 acres (220,000 ha) that the company owned, only 15 percent was being cultivated; the rest was idle, and thus came under the scope of the agrarian reform law. The UFC responded by intensively lobbying the U.S. government. Several Congressmen criticized the Guatemalan government for not protecting the interests of the company. The Guatemalan government replied that

10858-410: The policy of the United States government and the Central Intelligence Agency . One of the deaths Mano Blanca was responsible for was that César Montenegro Paniagua , a communist politician who was killed in retribution for the killing of West German ambassador Karl von Spreti by FAR guerrillas . Mano Blanca also sent death threats to one of the leaders of a student organization. Bonpane reported that

10980-400: The popular Árbenz, and represented the first transfer of power between democratically elected leaders in Guatemala. Árbenz had personal ties to some members of the communist PGT, which was legalized during his government, and a couple of members played a role in drafting the new president's policies. Nonetheless, Árbenz did not try to turn Guatemala into a communist state , instead choosing

11102-463: The power to enforce the doctrine, during the 19th century many European powers withdrew from Latin America, allowing the U.S. to expand its sphere of influence . In 1895, President Grover Cleveland laid out a more militant version of the doctrine, stating that the U.S. was "practically sovereign" on the continent. Following the Spanish–American War in 1898, this aggressive interpretation

11224-473: The presidential palace at 8 pm on 27 June 1954, having taped a resignation speech that was broadcast an hour later. In it, he stated that he was resigning to eliminate the "pretext for the invasion", and that he wished to preserve the gains of the October Revolution of 1944. He walked to the nearby Mexican Embassy , seeking political asylum. Two months later he was granted safe passage out of

11346-478: The rebel planes tried air attacks on the capital. These attacks caused little material damage, but they had a significant psychological impact, leading many citizens to believe that the invasion force was more powerful than it actually was. The rebel bombers needed to fly out of the Nicaraguan capital of Managua ; as a result, they had a limited payload . A large number of them substituted dynamite or Molotov cocktails for bombs, in an effort to create loud bangs with

11468-411: The rebellion, the officer corps of the Guatemalan army would have remained loyal to Árbenz because, although they were not uniformly his supporters, they were more wary of Castillo Armas, and also had strong nationalist views. As it was, they believed that the U.S. would intervene militarily, leading to a battle they could not win. On the night of 25 June, Árbenz called a meeting of the senior leaders of

11590-412: The reforms of Arévalo's government affected the UFC more than other companies. Among other things, the new labor code allowed UFC workers to strike when their demands for higher wages and job security were not met. The company saw itself as being targeted by the reforms, and refused to negotiate with strikers, despite frequently being in violation of the new laws. The company's troubles were compounded with

11712-408: The relative importance of the role of the United Fruit Company and the worries about communist influence (whether or not these were grounded in reality) in the U.S.'s decision to instigate the coup in 1954. Several historians have maintained that the lobbying of the UFC, and the expropriation of its lands, were the chief motivation for the U.S., strengthened by the financial ties of individuals within

11834-409: The remaining unions had grown strong enough to pressure him into drafting a new labor code, which made workplace discrimination illegal and created health and safety standards. However, Arévalo refused to advocate land reform of any kind, and stopped short of drastically changing labor relations in the countryside. Despite Arévalo's anti-communism, the U.S. was suspicious of him, and worried that he

11956-411: The resolution, stating that it represented the "internationalization of McCarthyism". Despite support among the delegates for Toriello's views, the anti-communist resolution passed with only Guatemala voting against, because of the votes of dictatorships dependent on the U.S. and the threat of economic pressure applied by John Dulles. Although support among the delegates for Dulles' strident anti-communism

12078-468: The revolution. In the first few months of his government, Castillo Armas rounded up and executed between three thousand and five thousand supporters of Árbenz. Nearly four decades of civil war followed, as leftist guerrillas fought the series of U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes whose brutalities include a genocide of the Maya peoples . U.S. President James Monroe 's foreign policy doctrine of 1823 warned

12200-455: The same report, carrying an additional message for Árbenz from the officers at Zacapa—asking the President to resign. The officers believed that given U.S. support for the rebels, defeat was inevitable, and Árbenz was to blame for it. He stated that if Árbenz did not resign, the army was likely to strike a deal with Castillo Armas, and march on the capital with him. During this period, Castillo Armas had begun to intensify his aerial attacks with

12322-414: The secret arms purchase, compelled the President to supply arms only to the Army. From the beginning of the invasion, Árbenz was confident that Castillo Armas could be defeated militarily and expressed this confidence in public. But he was worried that a defeat for Castillo Armas would provoke a direct invasion by the U.S. military. This also contributed to his decision not to arm civilians initially; lacking

12444-423: The shipment of these weapons as Soviet interference in the United States' backyard; it was the final spur for the CIA to launch its coup. U.S. rhetoric abroad also had an effect on the Guatemalan military. The military had always been anti-communist, and Ambassador Peurifoy had applied pressure on senior officers since his arrival in Guatemala in October 1953. Árbenz had intended the secret shipment of weapons from

12566-414: The support of Britain and France, but on 24 June it was vetoed by the U.S., the first time it did so against its allies. The U.S. accompanied this with threats to the foreign offices of both countries that the U.S. would stop supporting their other initiatives. UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld called the U.S. position "the most serious blow so far aimed at the [United Nations]". A fact-finding mission

12688-421: The year. In January 1952, officers in the CIA's Directorate of Plans compiled a list of "top flight Communists whom the new government would desire to eliminate immediately in the event of a successful anti-Communist coup". The CIA plan called for the assassination of over 58 Guatemalans, as well as the arrest of many others. The CIA put the plan into motion in late 1952. A freighter that had been borrowed from

12810-414: The Árbenz government and support the liberating forces of Castillo Armas. The station claimed to be broadcasting from deep within the jungles of the Guatemalan hinterland, a message which many listeners believed. This belief extended outside of Guatemala itself, with foreign correspondents from publications such as The New York Times believing it to be the most authentic source of information. In actuality,

12932-412: Was a group of progressive exiles and revolutionaries, whose members included Fidel Castro , that aimed to overthrow U.S.-backed dictatorships across Central America. The government also faced opposition from within the country; Arévalo survived at least 25 coup attempts. A notable example was an attempt in 1949 led by Francisco Arana , which was foiled in an armed shootout between Arana's supporters and

13054-404: Was a precursor to PBSuccess. Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected U.S. president in 1952, promising to take a harder line against communism , and his staff members John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles had significant links to the United Fruit Company. The U.S. federal government drew exaggerated conclusions about the extent of communist influence among Árbenz's advisers, and Eisenhower authorized

13176-499: Was also intended to have psychological consequences with E. Howard Hunt of the CIA saying "What we wanted to do was to have a terror campaign, to terrify Arbenz particularly, to terrify his troops, much as the German Stuka bombers terrified the population of Holland, Belgium and Poland". Alfhem ' s success in evading the quarantine led to Washington escalating its intimidation of Guatemala through its navy . On 24 May,

13298-431: Was an admirer of European fascist leaders such as Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler , but had to ally with the U.S. for geopolitical reasons, and received substantial support from this country throughout his reign. A staunch anti-communist , Ubico reacted to several peasant rebellions with incarcerations and massacres. By 1930 the UFC had built an operating capital of 215 million U.S. dollars, and had been

13420-461: Was dissolved by general Fernando Romeo Lucas García in 1978. 1954 Guatemalan coup d%27%C3%A9tat Rebel/U.S. government/military victory [REDACTED] Guatemalan government [REDACTED] Guatemalan rebel exiles Supported by : [REDACTED]   United States The 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état ( Golpe de Estado en Guatemala de 1954 ) deposed the democratically elected Guatemalan President Jacobo Árbenz and marked

13542-457: Was elected president in Guatemala's first democratic election . He introduced a minimum wage and near-universal suffrage. Arévalo was succeeded in 1951 by Árbenz, who instituted land reforms which granted property to landless peasants. The Guatemalan Revolution was disliked by the U.S. federal government, which was predisposed during the Cold War to see it as communist. This perception grew after Árbenz had been elected and formally legalized

13664-442: Was less strong than he and Eisenhower had hoped for, the conference marked a victory for the U.S., which was able to make concrete Latin American views on communism. The U.S. had stopped selling arms to Guatemala in 1951 while signing bilateral defense agreements and increasing arms shipments to neighboring Honduras and Nicaragua. The U.S. promised the Guatemalan military that it too could obtain arms—if Árbenz were deposed. In 1953,

13786-440: Was more willing than Truman to use the CIA to depose governments the U.S. disliked. Although PBFortune had been quickly aborted, tension between the U.S. and Guatemala continued to rise, especially with the legalization of the communist PGT, and its inclusion in the government coalition for the elections of January 1953. Articles published in the U.S. press often reflected this predisposition to see communist influence; for example,

13908-404: Was on charter to the U.S. company W.R. Grace and Company Line , and was being loaded with Guatemalan cotton and coffee. This incident cost the CIA one million U.S. dollars in compensation. The Árbenz government originally meant to repel the invasion by arming the military-age populace, workers' militias, and the Guatemalan Army . Resistance from the armed forces, as well as public knowledge of

14030-536: Was set up by the Inter-American Peace Committee ; Washington used its influence to delay the entry of the committee until the coup was complete and a military dictatorship installed. Árbenz was initially confident that his army would quickly dispatch the rebel force. The victory of a small garrison of 30 soldiers over the 180 strong rebel force outside Zacapa strengthened his belief. By 21 June, Guatemalan soldiers had gathered at Zacapa under

14152-508: Was that Secretary of State Dean Acheson called off the operation. The CIA continued to support Castillo Armas; it paid him a monthly retainer of 3000 U.S. dollars, and gave him the resources to maintain his rebel force. During his successful campaign for the U.S. presidency, Dwight Eisenhower pledged to pursue a more proactive anti-communist policy, promising to roll back communism, rather than contain it . Working in an atmosphere of increasing McCarthyism in government circles, Eisenhower

14274-494: Was the largest landowner in Guatemala, and virtually owned Puerto Barrios , Guatemala's only port to the Atlantic , allowing it to profit from the flow of goods through the port. Because of its long association with Ubico's government, Guatemalan revolutionaries saw the UFC as an impediment to progress after 1944. This image was reinforced by the company's discriminatory policies against the native population. Owing to its size,

14396-467: Was to be expropriated only if less than two-thirds of it was in use. The owners were compensated with government bonds, the value of which was equal to that of the land expropriated. The value of the land itself was what the owners had declared it to be in their tax returns in 1952. Of the nearly 350,000 private landholdings, only 1,710 were affected by expropriation. The law was implemented with great speed, which resulted in some arbitrary land seizures. There

14518-480: Was under Soviet influence. The communist movement did grow stronger during Arévalo's presidency, partly because he released its imprisoned leaders, and also through the strength of its teachers' union. However, the communists were still oppressed by the state, as they were harassed by Arévalo's police at any opportunity. Another cause for U.S. worry was Arévalo's support of the Caribbean Legion . The Legion

14640-628: Was used to create a U.S. economic empire across the Caribbean , such as with the 1903 treaty with Cuba that was heavily tilted in the U.S.' favor. U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt believed that the U.S. should be the main beneficiary of production in Central America . The U.S. enforced this hegemony with armed interventions in Nicaragua (1912–33), and Haiti (1915–34). The U.S. did not need to use its military might in Guatemala, where

14762-538: Was used to justify the coup in 1954. Following a surge in global coffee demand in the late 19th century, the Guatemalan government made several concessions to plantation owners. It passed legislation that dispossessed the communal landholdings of the Indigenous population and allowed coffee growers to purchase it. Manuel Estrada Cabrera , President of Guatemala from 1898 to 1920, was one of several rulers who made large concessions to foreign companies, including

14884-420: Was violence directed at landowners. By June 1954, 1,400,000 acres (570,000 ha) of land had been expropriated and distributed. Approximately 500,000 individuals, or one-sixth of the population, had received land by this point. Contrary to the predictions made by detractors, the law resulted in a slight increase in Guatemalan agricultural productivity, cultivated area, and purchases of farm machinery. Overall,

#312687