The Madhyamakālaṃkāra is an 8th-century Buddhist text , believed to have been originally composed in Sanskrit by Śāntarakṣita (725–788), which is extant in Tibetan . The Tibetan text was translated from the Sanskrit by Surendrabodhi ( Wylie : lha dbang byang chub ) and Jñānasūtra .
105-517: In the short-verse text of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra , Śāntarakṣita details his philosophical synthesis of the conventional truth of Yogacara with the ultimate truth of the Madhyamaka , assisted by Buddhist logic with a lengthy discussion of the " neither one nor many " argument. Though somewhat lyrical, it is a summary and a key to his encyclopedic Tattvasamgraha . It has the fullness of
210-506: A Sutta of direct meaning as a Sutta of indirect meaning. Saṃmuti or samuti (Pāli; Sanskrit: saṃvṛti ), meaning "common consent, general opinion, convention", and paramattha (Pāli; Sanskrit: paramārtha ), meaning "ultimate", are used to distinguish conventional or common-sense language, as used in metaphors or for the sake of convenience, from language used to express higher truths directly. The term vohāra (Pāli; Sanskrit: vyavahāra , "common practice, convention, custom"
315-450: A higher or ultimate reality. Nagarjuna's view is that "the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth". According to Siderits, Nagarjuna is a "semantic anti-dualist" who posits that there are only conventional truths. Jay L. Garfield explains: Suppose that we take a conventional entity, such as a table. We analyze it to demonstrate its emptiness, finding that there is no table apart from its parts [...] So we conclude that it
420-492: A logical approach when commenting upon Nāgārjuna . He also started with a Sautrāntika approach when discussing the way appearances appear, to debate with realists, but then took a Middle Way view of the ultimate nature of phenomenon. But he used logical assertions and arguments about the nature of that ultimate nature. His incorporation of logic into the Middle Way system was later critiqued by Candrakīrti , who felt that
525-460: A logical argument about the external world as discussed by the Hindu schools was possible. Otherwise their views would be so different as to be impossible to begin a debate. Then a logical discussion could follow. This approach attempts to solve how the material world connects with the mental world, but not completely explaining it. When pushed on this point, Dharmakīrti then drops a presupposition of
630-588: A new commentary and approach to Madhyamaka, which became the normative form in Tibet. In this variant, the Madhyamaka approach of Candrakīrti was elevated instead of Bhāvaviveka's yet Tsongkhapa rejected Candrakirti's disdain of logic and instead incorporated logic further. The exact role of logic in Tibetan Buddhist practice and study may still be a topic of debate, but it is definitely established in
735-507: A nondual relationship between the two concepts. A metaphor for essence-function is "A lamp and its light", a phrase from the Platform Sutra , where Essence is lamp and Function is light. The Nyingma tradition is the oldest of the four major schools of Tibetan Buddhism . It is founded on the first translations of Buddhist scriptures from Sanskrit into Tibetan , in the eighth century. Ju Mipham (1846–1912) in his commentary to
840-407: A pedagogical discourse on the development of the yana ; the philosophical challenges posed by the non-Buddhist religions and non-Dharmic traditions of India, and crystallizes a dialectical sophistication of Indian logic and the clarity of debate expected of a Khenpo of Nalanda Vihara . The text was seminal in the tradition of Samye which became known as a Nyingma institution in contrast to
945-699: A proposal contested by other Indian scholars. The internal perception concepts included pratibha (intuition), samanyalaksanapratyaksa (a form of induction from perceived specifics to a universal), and jnanalaksanapratyaksa (a form of perception of prior processes and previous states of a 'topic of study' by observing its current state). Further, some schools of Hinduism considered and refined rules of accepting uncertain knowledge from Pratyakṣa-pranama , so as to contrast nirnaya (definite judgment, conclusion) from anadhyavasaya (indefinite judgment). Anumāna (अनुमान) means ‘ inference ’ in Sanskrit, though it often
1050-495: A sense that can only be guessed". These terms were used to identify texts or statements that either did or did not require additional interpretation. A nītattha text required no explanation, while a neyyattha one might mislead some people unless properly explained: There are these two who misrepresent the Tathagata . Which two? He who represents a Sutta of indirect meaning as a Sutta of direct meaning and he who represents
1155-492: A series may be considered a unit: When a continuum of a lifetime is sought in the individual moments of the continuum, it cannot be found. The continuum is not the individual moments nor their composite; if a continuum were a composite of the moments, either each moment would be a continuum or there would be no separate moments. In the ninth shloka of the Madhyamālaṃkāra , Śāntarakṣita refutes personal singularity; "person"
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#17327972145571260-513: A set of polarities: Buddha-nature - sunyata, absolute-relative, sudden and gradual enlightenment. The Prajnaparamita Sutras and Madhyamaka emphasized the non-duality of form and emptiness: form is emptiness, emptiness is form, as the Heart Sutra says. The idea that the ultimate reality is present in the daily world of relative reality fitted into the Chinese culture which emphasized
1365-462: A trio of concepts, which describe the ancient Indian view on how knowledge is gained. The other two concepts are knower and knowable, each discussed in how they influence the knowledge, by their own characteristic and the process of knowing. The two are called Pramātŗ (प्रमातृ, the subject, the knower) and Prameya (प्रमेय, the object, the knowable). The term Pramana is commonly found in various schools of Hinduism. In Buddhist literature, Pramana
1470-576: Is a form of perception and inference in Buddhist thought. Valid scriptures, valid minds and valid persons are considered in Buddhism as Avisamvadin ( mi slu ba , incontrovertible, indisputable). Means of cognition and knowledge, other than perception and inference, are considered invalid in Buddhism. In Buddhism, the two most important scholars of pramāṇa are Dignāga and Dharmakīrti . Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are usually categorized as expounding
1575-654: Is a theory of knowledge, and encompasses one or more reliable and valid means by which human beings gain accurate, true knowledge. The focus of pramana is how correct knowledge can be acquired, how one knows, how one does not know, and to what extent knowledge pertinent about someone or something can be acquired. While the number of pramanas varies widely from system to system, many ancient and medieval Indian texts identify six pramanas as correct means of accurate knowledge and to truths: Three central pramanas which are almost universally accepted are perception ( Sanskrit : pratyakṣa), inference ( anumāna ), and "word", meaning
1680-607: Is accepted, and the two truths doctrine is understood as referring to two ontological truths. Reality exists of two levels, a relative level and an absolute level. Based on their understanding of the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra , the Chinese Buddhist monks and philosophers supposed that the teaching of the Buddha-nature was, as stated by that sutra, the final Buddhist teaching, and that there
1785-461: Is accorded a provisional existence. The character of the phenomenal world is declared to be neither real nor unreal, but logically indeterminable. Ultimately, all phenomena are empty ( śūnyatā ) of an inherent self or essence due to the non-existence of the self ( anattā ), but temporarily exist depending on other phenomena ( pratītyasamutpāda ). In Chinese Buddhism , the Mādhyamaka thought
1890-415: Is also used in more or less the same sense as samuti . The Theravādin commentators expanded on these categories and began applying them not only to expressions but to the truth then expressed: The Awakened One, the best of teachers, spoke of two truths, conventional and higher; no third is ascertained; a conventional statement is true because of convention and a higher statement is true as disclosing
1995-504: Is an essential truth above emptiness ( śūnyatā ) and the two truths. The doctrine of emptiness ( śūnyatā ) is an attempt to show that it is neither proper nor strictly justifiable to regard any metaphysical system as absolutely valid. It doesn't lead to nihilism but strikes a middle course ( madhyamāpratipada ) between excessive naïveté and excessive skepticism . Satya is usually taken to mean "truth", but also refers to "a reality", "a genuinely real existent". Satya ( Sat-yá )
2100-420: Is conveyed a continuum understood as "neither one nor many". The Padmakara Translation Group qualifies the word "person" (Wylie: gang zag), extending it to all sentient beings . The shloka is translated by the group and Doctor. Ju Mipham's commentary on the verse is likewise translated by both sources. Ju Mipham made five assertions not unique to Śāntarakṣita's view: In the first assertion, Śāntarakṣita makes
2205-657: Is derived from Sat and ya . Sat means being, reality, and is the present participle of the root as , "to be" ( PIE *h₁es- ; cognate to English is ). Ya and yam means "advancing, supporting, hold up, sustain, one that moves". As a composite word, Satya and Satyam imply that "which supports, sustains and advances reality, being"; it literally means, "that which is true, actual, real, genuine, trustworthy, valid". The two truths doctrine states that there is: Chandrakīrti suggests three possible meanings of saṁvṛti : The conventional truth may be interpreted as "obscurative truth" or "that which obscures
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#17327972145572310-420: Is derived from the Sanskrit roots, pra (प्र), a preposition meaning "outward" or "forth", and mā (मा) which means "measurement". Pramā means "correct notion, true knowledge, basis, foundation, understand", with pramāṇa being a further nominalization of the word. Thus, the concept Pramāṇa implies that which is a "means of acquiring prama or certain, correct, true knowledge". Pramāṇa forms one part of
2415-490: Is either derivable from other pramanas or flawed means to correct knowledge, instead one must rely on direct perception or proper inference. Anupalabdhi (अनुपलब्धि) means non-perception, negative/cognitive proof. Anupalabdhi pramana suggests that knowing a negative, such as "there is no jug in this room" is a form of valid knowledge. If something can be observed or inferred or proven as non-existent or impossible, then one knows more than what one did without such means. In
2520-787: Is either spoken or written, but through Sabda (words). The reliability of the source is important, and legitimate knowledge can only come from the Sabda of reliable sources. The disagreement between the schools of Hinduism has been on how to establish reliability. Some schools, such as Carvaka , state that this is never possible, and therefore Sabda is not a proper pramana. Other schools debate means to establish reliability. Different schools of Hindu philosophy accept one or more of these pramanas as valid epistemology. Carvaka school accepted only one valid source of knowledge—perception. It held all remaining methods as outright invalid or prone to error and therefore invalid. Epistemologically,
2625-427: Is empty. But now let us analyze that emptiness […]. What do we find? Nothing at all but the table’s lack of inherent existence [...] To see the table as empty [...] is to see the table as conventional, as dependent. In Nāgārjuna 's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā the two truths doctrine is used to defend the identification of dependent origination ( pratītyasamutpāda ) with emptiness ( śūnyatā ): The Buddha's teaching of
2730-616: Is fat" and "Devadatta does not eat in day", then the following must be true: "Devadatta eats in the night". This form of postulation and deriving from circumstances is, claim the Indian scholars, a means to discovery, proper insight and knowledge. The Hindu schools that accept this means of knowledge state that this method is a valid means to conditional knowledge and truths about a subject and object in original premises or different premises. The schools that do not accept this method, state that postulation, extrapolation and circumstantial implication
2835-561: Is held by the Gelug school leaning to a moderate realism with some accommodation of universals and the other held by the other schools who held that Dharmakīrti was distinctly antirealist. A key feature of Dignāga's logic is in how he treats generalities versus specific objects of knowledge. The Nyāya Hindu school made assertions about the existence of general principles, and in refutation Dignāga asserted that generalities were mere mental features and not truly existent. To do this he introduced
2940-400: Is more useful and reliable, and when it is not. In various ancient and medieval texts of Hinduism, 32 types of Upamāna and their value in epistemology are debated. Arthāpatti (अर्थापत्ति) means postulation, derivation from circumstances. In contemporary logic, this pramana is similar to circumstantial implication . As example, if a person left in a boat on river earlier, and the time
3045-546: Is not a non-cow. Dignaga formulated three conditions (Sanskrit: trairūpya ; Wylie: tshul-gsum) which a logical sign or mark ( linga ) must fulfill: When a linga is identified, there are three possibilities; the sign may be present in all, some or none of the sapakṣas or vipakṣas . Identifying a sign assumes that it is present in the pakṣa , and the first condition is met. Dignaga combined these in his Hetucakra . The Commentary on Difficult Points (Sanskrit: Madhyamālaṃkāra-panjika, Wylie: dbu ma rgyan gyi dka' 'grel)
3150-471: Is now past the expected time of arrival, then the circumstances support the truth postulate that the person has arrived. Many Indian scholars considered this pramana as invalid or at best weak, because the boat may have gotten delayed or diverted. However, in cases such as deriving the time of a future sunrise or sunset, this method was asserted by the proponents to be reliable. Another common example for arthapatti in ancient Hindu texts is, that if "Devadatta
3255-568: Is of two types in Hindu texts: external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind. According to Matt Stefan, the distinction is between direct perception ( anubhava ) and remembered perception ( smriti ). The ancient and medieval Indian texts identify four requirements for correct perception: Some ancient scholars proposed "unusual perception" as pramana and called it internal perception,
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3360-675: Is often considered the most important philosophical text of the Nyingma lineage in Tibet, particularly for those who follow Mipham Rinpoche's understanding of the Shentong Madhyamaka view. The mindstream of sentient beings is one application of the argument, neither one nor many . 'Neither one nor many' is an application of the third function of the catuṣkoṭi of Indian logic. Hopkins and Napper (1983, 1996: p. 160), in Meditation on Emptiness , discussed whether or not
3465-863: Is referred to as Pramāṇavāda . Pramana is also related to the Indian concept of Yukti (युक्ति) which means active application of epistemology or what one already knows, innovation, clever expedients or connections, methodological or reasoning trick, joining together, application of contrivance, means, method, novelty or device to more efficiently achieve a purpose. Yukti and Pramana are discussed together in some Indian texts, with Yukti described as active process of gaining knowledge in contrast to passive process of gaining knowledge through observation/perception. The texts on Pramana , particularly by Samkhya , Yoga , Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta schools of Hinduism, include in their meaning and scope "Theories of Errors". These texts explore why human beings make error and reach incorrect knowledge, how can one know if one
3570-457: Is required to engage the text: In general, it is important to be familiar with the teachings on probative signs and reasoning and, within that context, the notions of other-elimination, the three conditions of the correct sign, and all the methods of proof or refutation. According to the doctrine of apoha ( gshan-sel-wa in Tibetan), an entity is defined as the negation of its opposite; a cow
3675-676: Is the Pramāṇa-samuccaya . Dignāga's Pramāṇa-samuccaya played a crucial role in shaping the discipline of epistemology ( pramāṇaśāstra ), blending it with logical discourse. Dharmakīrti, influenced by Dignāga, further developed these ideas in his Pramanavarttika . These two rejected the complex Abhidharma -based description of how in the Vaibhāṣika school and the Sautrāntika Following Scripture approach connected an external world with mental objects, and instead posited that
3780-417: Is the best way to progress. Still affirming the supremacy of the Madhyamaka school when students analyze for ultimacy, when relating to conventionalities the mind-only position is recommended. The fourth assertion distinguishes between the ultimate way of abiding established by the Madhyamaka method (the non-enumerated ultimate) and an approximate (enumerated) ultimate: a lesser, conventional understanding of
3885-463: Is then explained as "referents of negative expression" in contrast to " referents of positive expression" in Padartha . An absence, state the ancient scholars, is also "existent, knowable and nameable", giving the example of negative numbers, silence as a form of testimony, asatkaryavada theory of causation, and analysis of deficit as real and valuable. Abhava was further refined in four types, by
3990-402: Is told, by someone who has been there, that in those lands you see an animal that sort of looks like a cow, grazes like cow but is different from a cow in such and such way. Such use of analogy and comparison is, state the Indian epistemologists, a valid means of conditional knowledge, as it helps the traveller identify the new animal later. The subject of comparison is formally called upameyam ,
4095-590: Is used to mean ‘ guess ’ in modern Indian languages. In the context of classical philosophy, it is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths by applying reason. Observing smoke and inferring fire is an example of Anumana . In all except one Hindu philosophies, this is a valid and useful means to knowledge. The method of inference is explained by Indian texts as consisting of three parts: pratijna (hypothesis), hetu (a reason), and drshtanta (examples). The hypothesis must further be broken down into two parts, state
4200-591: Is wrong, and, if so, how one can discover whether one's epistemic method was flawed or one's conclusion (truth) was flawed, in order to revise oneself and reach correct knowledge. Traditional Hinduism identifies six pramanas as correct means of accurate knowledge and to truths: Pratyakṣa (evidence/ perception), Anumāna (inference), Upamāna (comparison and analogy), Arthāpatti (postulation, derivation from circumstances), Anupalabdhi (non-perception, negative/cognitive proof) and Śabda (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts). In verse 1.2.1 of
4305-516: The Madhyamālaṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita (725–788) says: If one trains for a long time in the union of the two truths, the stage of acceptance (on the path of joining), which is attuned to primordial wisdom, will arise. By thus acquiring a certain conviction in that which surpasses intellectual knowledge, and by training in it, one will eventually actualize it. This is precisely how the Buddhas and
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4410-566: The shruti , Vedas . Hiriyanna explains Sabda-pramana as a concept which means reliable expert testimony. The schools of Hinduism which consider it epistemically valid suggest that a human being needs to know numerous facts, and with the limited time and energy available, he can learn only a fraction of those facts and truths directly. He must rely on others, his parent, family, friends, teachers, ancestors and kindred members of society to rapidly acquire and share knowledge and thereby enrich each other's lives. This means of gaining proper knowledge
4515-500: The Carvaka school of the Śramaṇa tradition holds that only one (perception) is a reliable source of knowledge, Buddhism holds two (perception, inference) are valid means, Jainism holds three (perception, inference and testimony), while Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta schools of Hinduism hold that all six pramanas are useful and can be reliable means to knowledge. The various schools of Indian philosophy have debated whether one of
4620-551: The Padmakara Translation Group (2005). James Blumenthal (2004) also provides a version of the Madhyamālaṃkāra with commentary by Gyaltsab Je (1364–1432). According to Doctor (2004: p.ix), the Madhyamakālaṃkāra ... is renowned as the principal scripture of the Yogācāramadhyamaka. Although masters such as Ārya Vimuktisena (6th century CE) are said to have set forth their presentations of
4725-478: The Pramana tradition of valid cognition. Mipham uses this demonstration in his commentary to point out a problem with Je Tsongkhapa's approach of negating the predicate of "true establishment" instead of the object of perception, which is avoided in Śāntarakṣita's approach. Mipham also notes that many Prasaṅgika writers (similar to their Svatantrika counterparts) made positive assertions to move students closer to
4830-675: The Sautrantika distinction that objects of cognition are of two kinds: abstract, theoretical mental objects (including generalities, like classes of objects and their names) and actual things, defined as things which function. Although the Sautantrika made that distinction for conventional and ultimate truth, Śāntarakṣita discards theoretical or general objects and discusses actual things as conventional truth. He incorporates Dharmakirti's cognition which analyzes conventionalities, connecting that with cognition which analyzes for ultimacy. In
4935-512: The Sutrayana and Mahayana traditions' development in its place of origin before the Buddhist tradition of India was transposed by the cultures of the Far East (such as China and Japan) and elsewhere (such as Ceylon and Kashmir ), where Buddhism was already flourishing in culturally specific forms. The text refutes challenges of Buddhist systems and tenets from within the tradition, and is
5040-475: The Svātantrika approach. Modern Buddhist schools employ the 'three spheres' (Sanskrit: trimaṇḍala; Tibetan: 'khor gsum): When Madhyamaka first migrated to Tibet, Śāntarakṣita established a view of Madhyamaka more consistent with Bhāvaviveka while further evolving logical assertions as a way of contemplating and developing one's viewpoint of the ultimate truth. In the 14th century Je Tsongkhapa presented
5145-544: The Taittirīya Āraṇyaka (c. 9th–6th centuries BCE), "four means of attaining correct knowledge" are listed: smṛti ("scripture, tradition"), pratyakṣa ("perception"), aitihya ("expert testimony, historical tradition"), and anumāna ("inference"). In some texts such as by Vedvyasa, ten pramanas are discussed, Krtakoti discusses eight epistemically reliable means to correct knowledge. The most widely discussed pramanas are: Pratyakṣa (प्रत्यक्ष) means perception. It
5250-525: The Three Natures and the Trikaya . The Three Natures are: The Lankavatara Sutra took an idealistic turn in apprehending reality. D. T. Suzuki writes the following: The Lanka is quite explicit in assuming two forms of knowledge: the one for grasping the absolute or entering into the realm of Mind-only, and the other for understanding existence in its dual aspect in which logic prevails and
5355-625: The Two Truths doctrine in light of the Svatantrika Madhyamaka ("those who assert the ultimate is the illusory nature") view and its Shentong Madhyamaka refinement as qualifying the Prasangika Madhyamaka ("those who make no assertions"): Then, for the ultimate truth, there are two schools of Madhyamaka: those who assert the ultimate is the illusory nature, and those who make no assertions. To explain further,
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#17327972145575460-817: The Vaiśeṣika school considered the following as the only proper means of knowledge: According to the Sankhya , Yoga , and two sub-schools of Vedanta, the proper means of knowledge must rely on these three pramanas: These are enumerated in sutra I.7 of the Yoga Sutras . The mode of Pramana itself in sutra I.6 is distinguished among 5 classes of vritti/mental modification, the others including indiscrimination, verbal delusion, sleep, and memory. The Nyāya school accepts four means of obtaining knowledge ( pramāṇa ), viz., Perception, Inference, Comparison and Word. In Mimamsa school of Hinduism linked to Prabhakara considered
5565-484: The hetu (reason) must necessarily and separately account for the inference in "all" cases, in both sapaksha and vipaksha . A conditionally proven hypothesis is called a nigamana (conclusion). Upamāna (उपमान) means comparison and analogy. Some Hindu schools consider it as a proper means of knowledge. Upamana , states Lochtefeld, may be explained with the example of a traveller who has never visited lands or islands with endemic population of wildlife. He or she
5670-578: The testimony of past or present reliable experts ( Śabda ); and more contentious ones, which are comparison and analogy ( upamāna ), postulation, derivation from circumstances ( arthāpatti ), and non-perception, negative/cognitive proof ( anupalabdhi ). Each of these are further categorized in terms of conditionality, completeness, confidence and possibility of error, by each school of Indian philosophies. The various schools of Indian philosophies vary on how many of these six pramanas are epistemically reliable and valid means to knowledge. For example,
5775-544: The Bodhisattvas have said that liberation is to be gained. The following sentence from Mipham 's exegesis of Śāntarakṣita 's Madhyamālaṃkāra highlights the relationship between the absence of the four extremes ( mtha'-bzhi ) and the nondual or indivisible two truths ( bden-pa dbyer-med ): The learned and accomplished [masters] of the Early Translations considered this simplicity beyond
5880-537: The Buddhas of the dharma has recourse to two truths: The world-ensconced truth and the truth which is the highest sense. 9. Those who do not know the distribution (vibhagam) of the two kinds of truth Do not know the profound "point" (tattva) in the teaching of the Buddha. 10. The highest sense of the truth is not taught apart from practical behavior, And without having understood the highest sense one cannot understand nirvana. Nāgārjuna based his statement of
5985-497: The Dharma is based on two truths: a truth of worldly convention and an ultimate truth. Those who do not understand the distinction drawn between these two truths do not understand the Buddha's profound truth. Without a foundation in the conventional truth the significance of the ultimate cannot be taught. Without understanding the significance of the ultimate, liberation is not achieved. In Nagarjuna's own words: 8. The teaching by
6090-617: The Huayan school were in the area of its metaphysics. It taught the doctrine of the mutual containment and interpenetration of all phenomena, as expressed in Indra's net . One thing contains all other existing things, and all existing things contain that one thing. Distinctive features of this approach to Buddhist philosophy include: Huayan teaches the Four Dharmadhatu , four ways to view reality: The teachings of Zen are expressed by
6195-470: The Madhyamaka in a way that employs the assertions specific to the Vijñānavāda , Śāntarakṣita was the one to found an actual system in which the ultimate freedom from constructs (Sanskrit niṣprapañca , Tibetan spros bral ) is realized through insight into the non-existence of any external matter ( bāhyārtha , phyi don ). This synthesis of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka, the two great currents of Mahāyāna philosophy,
6300-497: The Madhyamakalankara, Jamyang Khyentse Wangpo, our incomparable guide, unbounded in his kindness, whose very name I hardly dare to pronounce, who is the very personification of the compassion of the abbot Bodhisattva, of the master Padmasambhava, and of King Trisongdetsen, who is the sovereign among the learned and accomplished, who is supreme Manjushri appearing in the form of a monk in saffron robes, and whose renown fills
6405-492: The Middle Way (dBu-ma rgyan, Skt. Madhyamaka-alamkara) . Indian logic is primarily a study of inferences and their patterns. A pramana is a means of knowledge. Indian logic was influenced by grammar, and Greek (or classical) logic was influenced by mathematics. Vidyabhusana (1921), Randle (1930) and Fyodor Shcherbatskoy (1930) used the terms "Indian logic" and " Buddhist logic ". The Padmakara Translation Group (2005: p. 157) rendered Mipham's advice that Buddhist logic
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#17327972145576510-584: The Pali canon, the distinction is not made between a lower truth and a higher truth, but rather between two kinds of expressions of the same truth, which must be interpreted differently. Thus a phrase or passage, or a whole sutta, might be classed as neyyattha or samuti or vohāra , but it is not regarded at this stage as expressing or conveying a different level of truth. Nītattha (Pāli; Sanskrit: nītārtha ), "of plain or clear meaning" and neyyattha (Pāli; Sanskrit: neyartha ), "[a word or sentence] having
6615-501: The Sautrāntrika position and shifts to a kind of Yogācāra position that extramental objects never really occur but arise from the habitual tendencies of mind. So he begins a debate with Hindu schools positing external objects then later to migrate the discussion to how that is logically untenable. Note there are two differing interpretations of Dharmakīrti's approach later in Tibet, due to differing translations and interpretations. One
6720-599: The Vedic scriptures, which combine the ritualistic injunctions of the Brahmana and speculative philosophical questions of the Upanishads as one whole 'revealed' body of work thereby contrasting the jñāna kāņḍa with karmakāņḍa . [REDACTED] Religion portal While the concept of the two truths is associated with the Madhyamaka school, its history goes back to the earliest years of Buddhism . In
6825-681: The Vijnanas are active. The latter is designated Discrimination ( vikalpa ) in the Lanka and the former transcendental wisdom or knowledge ( prajna ). To distinguish these two forms of knowledge is most essential in Buddhist philosophy. When Buddhism came to China from Gandhara (now Afghanistan) and India in the first/second century CE, the two truths teaching was initially understood and interpreted through various ideas in Chinese philosophy , including Confucian and Taoist ideas which influenced
6930-438: The ancient Indian scholars: sadhya (that idea which needs to proven or disproven) and paksha (the object on which the sadhya is predicated). The inference is conditionally true if sapaksha (positive examples as evidence) are present, and if vipaksha (negative examples as counter-evidence) are absent. For rigor, the Indian philosophies also state further epistemic steps. For example, they demand Vyapti —the requirement that
7035-790: The ascendancy of the Muslim empire in India during the 13th-century eclipse of Buddhism through its transplantation to the Tibetan Plateau by Śāntarakṣita at the request of Trisong Detsen . It was taught at the Samye Monastery, which was safeguarded by the Himalayas . Kennard Lipman (1979) published a study of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra in English. The text and Ju Mipham's commentary are available in studies by Thomas Doctor (2004) and
7140-424: The concept "non-perception" as a pramana . The schools that endorsed Anupalabdi affirmed that it as valid and useful when the other five pramanas fail in one's pursuit of knowledge and truth. Abhava (अभाव) means non-existence. Some scholars consider Anupalabdi to be same as Abhava , while others consider Anupalabdi and Abhava as different. Abhava-pramana has been discussed in ancient Hindu texts in
7245-421: The context of Padārtha (पदार्थ, referent of a term). A Padartha is defined as that which is simultaneously Astitva (existent), Jneyatva (knowable) and Abhidheyatva (nameable). Specific examples of padartha , states Bartley, include dravya (substance), guna (quality), karma (activity/motion), samanya/jati (universal/class property), samavaya (inherence) and vishesha (individuality). Abhava
7350-505: The dictate of his guru ( rtsa ba'i bla ma ), Jamyang Khyentse Wangpo (1820–1892), who charged him with the commentary. Manjushri is used as a term of respect for the scholarship and understanding beyond letters and words of his Rimé teacher. Suchness is the revelation of Mipham's vajrayana from the Padmakara Translation Group's colophon (2005: p. 382): Seeing that there are many reasons for expounding
7455-464: The emergent Sarma traditions of Atisha 's (980-1054) translation phase. It documents the Nyingma view of the Two Truths , making it a canonical work. Although the text was marginalized due to the rise of the Prasaṅgika subschool of Mādhyamaka , it was revived by Ju Mipham's (1846–1912) 1876 Commentary . The Madhyamakālaṃkāra and its tradition survived the destruction of Nalanda Vihara and
7560-399: The establishment of the ultimate way of abiding since it was beyond thought and concept was not the domain of logic. He used simple logical consequence arguments to refute the views of other tenet systems, but generally he thought a more developed use of logic and epistemology in describing the Middle Way was problematic. Bhāvaviveka's use of autonomous logical arguments was later described as
7665-486: The first says that the illusory nature is established when the perceiver of an object experiences a perception of that object as being unreal. This view was put forth by Kamalashila, Shantarakshita, and other proponents of the Svatantrika Madhyamaka school. Their view is clearly explained in Mipham Jamyang Gyatso's commentary on Shantarakshita's 'Ornament of the Middle Way.' This commentary by Mipham Rinpoche
7770-796: The following pramanas as proper: In Advaita Vedānta , and Mimamsa school linked to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa , the following pramanas are accepted: Padmākara Translation Group (2005: p. 390) annotates that: Strictly speaking, pramana ( tshad ma ) means "valid cognition." In (Buddhism) practice, it refers to the tradition, principally associated with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, of logic ( rtags rigs ) and epistemology ( blo rigs ). Buddhism accepts only two pramana ( tshad ma ) as valid means to knowledge: Pratyaksha ( mngon sum tshad ma , perception) and Anumāṇa ( rjes dpag tshad ma , inference). Rinbochay adds that Buddhism also considers scriptures as third valid pramana , such as from Buddha and other "valid minds" and "valid persons". This third source of valid knowledge
7875-549: The four extremes, this abiding way in which the two truths are indivisible, as their own immaculate way. Pramana Pramana ( Sanskrit : प्रमाण ; IAST: Pramāṇa) literally means " proof " and "means of knowledge". In Indian philosophies, pramana are the means which can lead to knowledge, and serve as one of the core concepts in Indian epistemology . It has been one of the key, much debated fields of study in Hinduism , Buddhism and Jainism since ancient times. It
7980-608: The idea of Apoha , that the way the mind recognizes is by comparing and negating known objects from the perception. In that way, the general idea or categories of objects has to do with differences from known objects, not from identification with universal truths. So one knows that a perceived chariot is a chariot not because it is in accord with a universal form of a chariot, but because it is perceived as different from things that are not chariots. This approach became an essential feature of Buddhist epistemology. The contemporary of Dignāga but before Dharmakīrti, Bhāvaviveka , incorporated
8085-629: The ideas of Chán (Zen) Buddhism , as can be seen in the Five Ranks and other Chan texts. Chinese thinking often took the two truths to refer to two ontological truths (two ways of being, or levels of existence ): a relative level and an absolute level. For example, Taoists at first misunderstood sunyata (emptiness) to be akin to the Taoist non-being. In Madhyamaka the two truths are two epistemological truths : two different ways to look at reality. Chinese Madhyamaka ( Sanlun ) thus rejected
8190-408: The mental domain never connects directly with the external world but instead only perceives an aspect based upon the sense organs and the sense consciousnesses. Further, the sense consciousnesses assume the form of the aspect (Sanskrit: Sākāravāda) of the external object and what is perceived is actually the sense consciousness which has taken on the form of the external object. By starting with aspects,
8295-655: The mundane world and society. But this does not tell how the absolute is present in the relative world. This question is answered in such schemata as the Five Ranks of Tozan and the Oxherding Pictures . The polarity of absolute and relative is also expressed as "essence-function". The absolute is essence, the relative is function. They can't be seen as separate realities, but interpenetrate each other. The distinction does not "exclude any other frameworks such as neng-so or "subject-object" constructions", though
8400-428: The object of comparison is called upamanam , while the attribute(s) are identified as samanya . Thus, explains Monier Williams , if a boy says "her face is like the moon in charmingness", "her face" is upameyam , the moon is upamanam , and charmingness is samanya . The 7th-century text Bhaṭṭikāvya in verses 10.28 through 10.63 discusses many types of comparisons and analogies, identifying when this epistemic method
8505-483: The ontological reading of the two truths. However, drawing on buddha-nature thought (such as that of the Mahayana Mahaparinirvana Sutra ) and on Yogacara sources, other Chinese Buddhist thinkers defended the view that the two truths did refer to two levels of reality (which were nevertheless non-dual and inferfused), one which was conventional, illusory and impermanent, and another which
8610-415: The other and by meditating properly, one reaches the path of seeing . This is called the view that sees the dharmadatu. To analyze the extremes of existence and non-existence, Ju Mipham advises students to contemplate and establish the lack of inherent existence and then contemplate the extreme of non-existence. In contemplating step by step and enumerating the conceptual extremes, a student progresses toward
8715-413: The principles of the vast and the profound as originally set forth by Asaṇga (fl. 4th century) and Nāgārjuna (possibly 150-250 CE) respectively, is also characterized by its use of the pramāṇa methods of Dignāga (5th-6th century) and Dharmakīrti (6th-7th century) as integral steps towards the realization of the ultimate. Alexander Berzin (2006) translates the title into English as A Filigree of
8820-400: The schools of Hinduism that accepted it as a useful method of epistemology: dhvamsa (termination of what existed), atyanta-abhava (impossibility, absolute non-existence, contradiction), anyonya-abhava (mutual negation, reciprocal absence) and pragavasa (prior, antecedent non-existence). Śabda (शब्द) means relying on word, testimony of past or present reliable experts, specifically
8925-443: The second assertion, a self-reflective awareness ( svasaṃvedana ) exists; consciousness can be aware of objects of cognition. This position was later critiqued by Je Tsongkhapa as implying that a self-reflective awareness is separate from objects of cognition. Ju Mipham later qualified its meaning; cognition is self-aware, not a separate material thing. In the third assertion, the consciousness-only view of conventional appearances
9030-438: The senses, while mithya-samvrti or "false samvrti" refers to false cognitions of "things" which do not exist as they are perceived. Nagarjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā provides a logical defense for the claim that all things are empty ( sunyata ) of an inherently-existing self-nature. Sunyata, however, is also shown to be "empty", and Nagarjuna's assertion of "the emptiness of emptiness" prevents sunyata from constituting
9135-446: The six forms of pramana can be derived from another and the relative uniqueness of each. For example, Buddhism considers Buddha and other "valid persons", "valid scriptures" and "valid minds" as indisputable, but that such testimony is a form of perception and inference pramanas . The science and study of pramanas is called Nyaya . Pramāṇa literally means "proof" and is also a concept and field of Indian philosophy. The concept
9240-528: The teaching of the Śākyamuni Buddha : the "conventional" or "provisional" ( saṁvṛti ) truth, and the "ultimate" ( paramārtha ) truth. The exact meaning varies between the various Buddhist schools and traditions . The best known interpretation is from the Mādhyamaka school of Mahāyāna Buddhism , whose founder was the Indian Buddhist monk and philosopher Nāgārjuna . For Nāgārjuna, the two truths are epistemological truths . The phenomenal world
9345-455: The tradition. Ju Mipham remarked in his 19th-century commentary on Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamakālaṅkāra : The Buddha's doctrine, from the exposition of the two truths onward, unerroneously sets forth the mode of being of things as they are. And the followers of the Buddha must establish this accordingly, through the use of reasoning. Such is the unerring tradition of Śakyamuni. On the other hand, to claim that analytical investigation in general and
9450-407: The true characteristics of events. The Prajñaptivāda school took up the distinction between the conventional ( saṃvṛti ) and ultimate ( paramārtha ) truths, and extended the concept to metaphysical-phenomenological constituents ( dharma ), distinguishing those that are real ( tattva ) from those that are purely conceptual, i.e., ultimately nonexistent ( prajñāpti ). The distinction between
9555-508: The true nature" as a result. It is constituted by the appearances of mistaken awareness. Conventional truth would be the appearance that includes a duality of apprehender and apprehended, and objects perceived within that. Ultimate truths are phenomena free from the duality of apprehender and apprehended. Buddha's teaching of Dharma may be viewed as a path ( mārga ) of release from suffering or Dukkha . The first Noble Truth equates life-experiences with pain and suffering. Buddha's language
9660-485: The two "are completely different from each other in terms of their way of thinking". In Korean Buddhism, essence-function is also expressed as "body" and "the body's functions": [A] more accurate definition (and the one the Korean populace is more familiar with) is "body" and "the body's functions". The implications of "essence/function" and "body/its functions" are similar, that is, both paradigms are used to point to
9765-441: The two schools of Hinduism that consider Anupalabdhi as epistemically valuable, a valid conclusion is either sadrupa (positive) or asadrupa (negative) relation—both correct and valuable. Like other pramana , Indian scholars refined Anupalabdi to four types: non-perception of the cause, non-perception of the effect, non-perception of object, and non-perception of contradiction. Only two schools of Hinduism accepted and developed
9870-626: The two truths ( satyadvayavibhāga ) was fully developed by Nāgārjuna ( c. 150 – c. 250 CE ) of the Madhyamaka school. The Madhyamikas distinguish between loka-samvriti-satya , "world speech truth" c.q. "relative truth" c.q. "truth that keeps the ultimate truth concealed", and paramarthika satya , ultimate truth. Loka-samvriti-satya can be further divided in tathya-samvrti or loka-samvrti , and mithya-samvrti or aloka-samvrti , "true samvrti" and "false samvrti". Tathya-samvrti or "true samvrti" refers to "things" which concretely exist and can be perceived as such by
9975-553: The two truths on the Kaccāyanagotta Sutta. In the Kaccāyanagotta Sutta, the Buddha , speaking to the monk Kaccayana Gotta on the topic of right view, describes the middle Way between nihilism and eternalism: By and large, Kaccayana, this world is supported by a polarity, that of existence and non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "non-existence" with reference to
10080-582: The ultimate view, pointing out that the distinction between Prasangika and Svatantrika lies in how students are taught about conventionalities and not in the consideration of ultimate truth. He concludes that Je Tsongkhapa, in making a distinction based on true establishment, proposes a Svatantrika rather than a Prasangika approach. Two truths doctrine The Buddhist doctrine of the two truths ( Sanskrit : dvasatya , Wylie : bden pa gnyis ) differentiates between two levels of satya (Sanskrit; Pali: sacca ; word meaning " truth " or " reality ") in
10185-402: The ultimate which leads to the non-enumerated ultimate. As part of his explanation of why this is useful, Mipham quotes Gorampa (who references the four conceptual extremes ) (Wylie: mtha' bzhi; Sanskrit: caturanta): The intellect of ordinary people, which investigates ultimate reality, cannot refute in a single stroke all four conceptual extremes. But by refuting these four extremes one after
10290-442: The ultimate. When all extremes have been analyzed, they reach the non-enumerative (true) ultimate. In the fifth assertion, analysis of objects with respect to approximate (enumerated) ultimates does not create a problem of true establishment. A distinction can be made when analyzing for each case, including the two approaches to cognition (one for the conventional domain and the other to analyze for ultimacy) which are his additions to
10395-639: The view of the Sautrāntika tenets, though one can make a distinction between the Sautrāntikas Following Scripture ( Tibetan : ལུང་གི་རྗེས་འབྲང་གི་མདོ་སྡེ་པ , Wylie : lung gi rjes 'brang gi mdo sde pa ) and the Sautrāntikas Following Reason ( Tibetan : རིགས་པ་རྗེས་འབྲང་གི་མདོ་སྡེ་པ , Wylie : rigs pa rjes 'brang gi mdo sde pa ) and both these masters are described as establishing the latter. Dignāga's main text on this topic
10500-466: The vocabulary of Chinese Buddhism . As such, Chinese Buddhist translations and treatises made use of native Chinese terminology, such as "T’i -yung" (體用, "Essence and Function") and " Li-Shih " (理事, Noumenon and Phenomenon) to refer to the two truths. These concepts were later developed in the Chinese Buddhist traditions like the Wéishí and Huayan schools. The doctrines of these schools also influenced
10605-455: The world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. According to Chattopadhyaya, although Nagarjuna presents his understanding of the two truths as a clarification of the teachings of the Buddha, the two truths doctrine as such is not part of the earliest Buddhist tradition. The Yogacara school of Buddhism distinguishes
10710-512: The world, gave to me the Indian and Tibetan commentaries on the Madhyamakalankara, asking me to study them well and to compose a commentary. And as his diamondlike injunction came down upon my head, I earnestly gave myself to the task. Ringu Tulku et al. (2006: pp. 193–194), in their survey of the Rimé movement, convey the importance of Mipham's Commentary to the Nyingmapa and their view of
10815-722: Was eternal, unchanging and pure. The Huayan school or Flower Garland is a tradition of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy that flourished in China during the Tang period . It is based on the Sanskrit Flower Garland Sutra (S. Avataṃsaka Sūtra , C. Huayan Jing ) and on a lengthy Chinese interpretation of it, the Huayan Lun . The name Flower Garland is meant to suggest the crowning glory of profound understanding. The most important philosophical contributions of
10920-468: Was simple and colloquial. Naturally, various statements of Buddha at times appear contradictory to each other. Later Buddhist teachers were faced with the problem of resolving these contradictions. Nagarjuna and other teachers introduced an exegetical technique of distinguishing between two levels of truth, the conventional and the ultimate. A similar method is reflected in the Brahmanical exegesis of
11025-631: Was written by Kamalaśīla ( fl. 713–763) Another commentary, Remembering The Ornament of the Middle Way (Wylie: dbu ma rgyan gyi brjed byang), was written by Gyaltsab Je (1364–1432). Lobzang Dongak Chökyi Gyatso (Wylie: blo bzang mdo sngags chos kyi rgya mtsho, 1903–1957), also known as Tulku Sungrap, wrote the commentary translated into English as The Sword to Cut Through False Views (Wylie: dbu ma rgyan gyi mchan 'grel nyung ngu lta ngan gcod pa'i ral gri). The title of Ju Mipham's Commentary (Wylie: dbu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad 'jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa'i zhal lung) conveys Mipham's precepts in honouring
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