Ru Rendang is a state constituency in Terengganu , Malaysia , that has been represented in the Terengganu State Legislative Assembly .
91-619: The state constituency was first contested in 1986 and is mandated to return a single Assemblyman to the Terengganu State Legislative Assembly under the first-past-the-post voting system . Ethnic breakdown of Ru Rendang's electorate as of 2018 According to the Gazette issued on 30 March 2018, the Ru Rendang constituency has a total of 11 polling districts. This Malaysian location article
182-424: A single-winner voting rule. Voters typically mark one candidate as their favorite, and the candidate with the largest number of first-preference marks (a plurality ) is elected, regardless of whether they have over half of all votes (a majority ). It is sometimes called first-past-the-post (FPTP) in reference to gambling on horse races (where bettors would guess which horse they thought would be first past
273-625: A "Parliament full of second-choices who no one really wanted but didn't really object to either." However, FPP often results in strategic voting , which has prevented extreme left- and right-wing parties from gaining parliamentary seats , as opposed to proportional representation . This also implies that strategic voting is necessary to keep extremists from gaining seats, which often fails to materialize in practice for multiple reasons. In comparison, many other systems encourage voters to rank other candidates and thereby not (or at least less often to) have to strategically compromise on their first choice at
364-501: A 'cycle'. This situation emerges when, once all votes have been tallied, the preferences of voters with respect to some candidates form a circle in which every candidate is beaten by at least one other candidate ( Intransitivity ). For example, if there are three candidates, Candidate Rock, Candidate Scissors, and Candidate Paper , there will be no Condorcet winner if voters prefer Candidate Rock over Candidate Scissors and Scissors over Paper, but also Candidate Paper over Rock. Depending on
455-400: A 68% majority of 1st choices among the remaining candidates and won as the majority's 1st choice. As noted above, sometimes an election has no Condorcet winner because there is no candidate who is preferred by voters to all other candidates. When this occurs the situation is known as a 'Condorcet cycle', 'majority rule cycle', 'circular ambiguity', 'circular tie', 'Condorcet paradox', or simply
546-547: A contest between candidates A, B and C using the preferential-vote form of Condorcet method, a head-to-head race is conducted between each pair of candidates. A and B, B and C, and C and A. If one candidate is preferred over all others, they are the Condorcet Winner and winner of the election. Because of the possibility of the Condorcet paradox , it is possible, but unlikely, that a Condorcet winner may not exist in
637-427: A contributory factor in the country adopting the apartheid system after the 1948 general election in that country. Leblang and Chan found that a country's electoral system is the most important predictor of a country's involvement in war, according to three different measures: (1) when a country was the first to enter a war; (2) when it joined a multinational coalition in an ongoing war; and (3) how long it stayed in
728-521: A geographical base, parties that are small UK-wide can still do very well". On the other hand, minor parties that do not concentrate their vote usually end up getting a much lower proportion of seats than votes, as they lose most of the seats they contest and 'waste' most of their votes. The ERS also says that in FPP elections using many separate districts "small parties without a geographical base find it hard to win seats". Make Votes Matter said that in
819-542: A government without being the largest party. The use of proportional representation (PR) may enable smaller parties to become decisive in the country's legislature and gain leverage they would not otherwise enjoy, although this can be somewhat mitigated by a large enough electoral threshold . They argue that FPP generally reduces this possibility, except where parties have a strong regional basis. A journalist at Haaretz noted that Israel's highly proportional Knesset "affords great power to relatively small parties, forcing
910-431: A majority of seats just requires receiving more than half the vote in more than half the districts—even if the other party receives all the votes cast in the other districts—so just over a quarter of the vote is theoretically enough to win a majority in the legislature. With enough candidates splitting the vote in a district, the total number of votes needed to win can be made arbitrarily small . Under first-past-the-post,
1001-615: A majority of the votes cast in Canada only three times since 1921: in 1940 , 1958 and 1984 . In the United Kingdom, 19 of the 24 general elections since 1922 have produced a single-party majority government. In all but two of them ( 1931 and 1935 ), the leading party did not take a majority of the votes across the UK. In some cases, this can lead to a party receiving the plurality or even majority of total votes yet still failing to gain
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#17327909599991092-509: A minor party in protest at its policies, since to do so would likely only help the major party's main rival. Rather than curtailing extreme voices, FPP today empowers the (relatively) extreme voices of the Labour and Conservative party memberships." For example, the electoral system of Hungary , a mixed system dominated by FPP have seen Fidesz (right-wing, populist party) win 135 seats in the 2022 Hungarian parliamentary election and has remained
1183-474: A plurality of legislative seats. This results in a situation called a majority reversal or electoral inversion . Famous examples of the second-place party (in votes nationally) winning a majority of seats include the elections in Ghana in 2012 , New Zealand in 1978 and 1981 , and the United Kingdom in 1951 . Famous examples of the second placed party (in votes nationally) winning a plurality of seats include
1274-622: A powerful electoral incentive for large parties to target similar segments of voters with similar policies. The effect of this reduces political diversity in a country because the larger parties are incentivized to coalesce around similar policies. The ACE Electoral Knowledge Network describes India's use of FPTP as a "legacy of British colonialism". Duverger's law is an idea in political science which says that constituencies that use first-past-the-post methods will lead to two-party systems , given enough time. Economist Jeffrey Sachs explains: The main reason for America's majoritarian character
1365-499: A principle known in political science as Duverger's Law . Smaller parties are trampled in first-past-the-post elections. However, most countries with first-past-the-post elections have multiparty legislatures (albeit with two parties larger than the others), the United States being the major exception. There is a counter-argument to Duverger's Law, that while on the national level a plurality system may encourage two parties, in
1456-842: A public election in 1840 by his son Rowland for the Adelaide City Council in Australia. STV saw its first national use in Denmark in 1855, and was reinvented several times in the 19th century. Condorcet method Condorcet methods Positional voting Cardinal voting Quota-remainder methods Approval-based committees Fractional social choice Semi-proportional representation By ballot type Pathological response Strategic voting Paradoxes of majority rule Positive results A Condorcet method ( English: / k ɒ n d ɔːr ˈ s eɪ / ; French: [kɔ̃dɔʁsɛ] )
1547-532: A result of a kind of tie known as a majority rule cycle , described by Condorcet's paradox . The manner in which a winner is then chosen varies from one Condorcet method to another. Some Condorcet methods involve the basic procedure described below, coupled with a Condorcet completion method, which is used to find a winner when there is no Condorcet winner. Other Condorcet methods involve an entirely different system of counting, but are classified as Condorcet methods, or Condorcet consistent, because they will still elect
1638-493: A significant number of safe seats , where a representative is sheltered from any but the most dramatic change in voting behavior. In the UK, the Electoral Reform Society estimates that more than half the seats can be considered as safe. It has been claimed that members involved in the 2009 expenses scandal were significantly more likely to hold a safe seat. The House of Commons of England originated in
1729-548: A small party may draw votes and seats away from a larger party that it is more similar to, and therefore give an advantage to one it is less similar to. For example, in the 2000 United States presidential election , the left-leaning Ralph Nader drew more votes from the left-leaning Al Gore , resulting in Nader spoiling the election for the Democrats. According to the political pressure group Make Votes Matter , FPTP creates
1820-523: A specific election. This is sometimes called a Condorcet cycle or just cycle and can be thought of as Rock beating Scissors, Scissors beating Paper, and Paper beating Rock . Various Condorcet methods differ in how they resolve such a cycle. (Most elections do not have cycles. See Condorcet paradox#Likelihood of the paradox for estimates.) If there is no cycle, all Condorcet methods elect the same candidate and are operationally equivalent. For most Condorcet methods, those counts usually suffice to determine
1911-453: A system based on plurality voting spread over many separate districts is that the larger parties, and parties with more geographically concentrated support, gain a disproportionately large share of seats, while smaller parties with more evenly distributed support gain a disproportionately small share. This is because in doing this they win many seats and do not 'waste' many votes in other areas. As voting patterns are similar in about two-thirds of
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#17327909599992002-582: A tendency for Independentista voters to support Populares candidates. This phenomenon is responsible for some Popular victories, even though the Estadistas have the most voters on the island, and is so widely recognised that Puerto Ricans sometimes call the Independentistas who vote for the Populares "melons", because that fruit is green on the outside but red on the inside (in reference to
2093-466: A vote could be considered as wasted . FPP wastes fewer votes when it is used in two-party contests. But waste of votes and minority governments are more likely when large groups of voters vote for three, four or more parties as in Canadian elections. Canada uses FPP and only two of the last seven federal Canadian elections ( 2011 and 2015 ) produced single-party majority governments. In none of them did
2184-427: A voter's choice within any given pair can be determined from the ranking. Some elections may not yield a Condorcet winner because voter preferences may be cyclic—that is, it is possible that every candidate has an opponent that defeats them in a two-candidate contest. The possibility of such cyclic preferences is known as the Condorcet paradox . However, a smallest group of candidates that beat all candidates not in
2275-417: A war after becoming a party to it. When the people are fairly represented in parliament, more of those groups who may object to any potential war have access to the political power necessary to prevent it. In a proportional democracy, war and other major decisions generally requires the consent of the majority. The British human rights campaigner Peter Tatchell , and others, have argued that Britain entered
2366-552: Is a stub . You can help Misplaced Pages by expanding it . First-past-the-post voting Condorcet methods Positional voting Cardinal voting Quota-remainder methods Approval-based committees Fractional social choice Semi-proportional representation By ballot type Pathological response Strategic voting Paradoxes of majority rule Positive results First-preference plurality ( FPP ) also known as single-member district plurality ( SMDP )—often shortened simply to plurality —is
2457-406: Is a prospect of a change in representation, leaving safer areas excluded from participation in an active campaign. Political parties operate by targeting districts, directing their activists and policy proposals toward those areas considered to be marginal, where each additional vote has more value. This feature of FPTP has often been used by its supporters in contrast to proportional systems. In
2548-407: Is also a Condorcet method, even though the voters do not vote by expressing their orders of preference. There are multiple rounds of voting, and in each round the vote is between two of the alternatives. The loser (by majority rule) of a pairing is eliminated, and the winner of a pairing survives to be paired in a later round against another alternative. Eventually, only one alternative remains, and it
2639-499: Is also referred to collectively as Condorcet's method. A voting system that always elects the Condorcet winner when there is one is described by electoral scientists as a system that satisfies the Condorcet criterion. Additionally, a voting system can be considered to have Condorcet consistency, or be Condorcet consistent, if it elects any Condorcet winner. In certain circumstances, an election has no Condorcet winner. This occurs as
2730-411: Is an election method that elects the candidate who wins a majority of the vote in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates, whenever there is such a candidate. A candidate with this property, the pairwise champion or beats-all winner , is formally called the Condorcet winner or Pairwise Majority Rule Winner (PMRW). The head-to-head elections need not be done separately;
2821-412: Is an election between four candidates: A, B, C, and D. The first matrix below records the preferences expressed on a single ballot paper, in which the voter's preferences are (B, C, A, D); that is, the voter ranked B first, C second, A third, and D fourth. In the matrix a '1' indicates that the runner is preferred over the 'opponent', while a '0' indicates that the runner is defeated. Using a matrix like
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2912-401: Is holding an election on the location of its capital . The population is concentrated around four major cities. All voters want the capital to be as close to them as possible. The options are: The preferences of each region's voters are: To find the Condorcet winner every candidate must be matched against every other candidate in a series of imaginary one-on-one contests. In each pairing
3003-513: Is known as ambiguity resolution, cycle resolution method, or Condorcet completion method . Circular ambiguities arise as a result of the voting paradox —the result of an election can be intransitive (forming a cycle) even though all individual voters expressed a transitive preference. In a Condorcet election it is impossible for the preferences of a single voter to be cyclical, because a voter must rank all candidates in order, from top-choice to bottom-choice, and can only rank each candidate once, but
3094-440: Is no preference between candidates that were left unranked. Some Condorcet elections permit write-in candidates . The count is conducted by pitting every candidate against every other candidate in a series of hypothetical one-on-one contests. The winner of each pairing is the candidate preferred by a majority of voters. Unless they tie, there is always a majority when there are only two choices. The candidate preferred by each voter
3185-407: Is related to kingmakers in that the lesser-known candidates may encourage their supporters to rank the other candidates a certain way. Supporters of electoral reform generally see this as a positive development, and claim that alternatives certain to FPP will encourage less negative and more positive campaigning, as candidates will have to appeal to a wider group of people. Opinions are split on whether
3276-510: Is taken to be the one in the pair that the voter ranks (or rates) higher on their ballot paper. For example, if Alice is paired against Bob it is necessary to count both the number of voters who have ranked Alice higher than Bob, and the number who have ranked Bob higher than Alice. If Alice is preferred by more voters then she is the winner of that pairing. When all possible pairings of candidates have been considered, if one candidate beats every other candidate in these contests then they are declared
3367-495: Is that a portion of the electorate (2.7%) voted for Ralph Nader of the Green Party , and exit polls indicated that more of them would have preferred Gore (45%) to Bush (27%). The election was ultimately determined by the results from Florida , where Bush prevailed over Gore by a margin of only 537 votes (0.009%), which was far exceeded by the 97488 (1.635%) votes cast for Nader in that state. In Puerto Rico , there has been
3458-408: Is the electoral system for Congress. Members of Congress are elected in single-member districts according to the "first-past-the-post" (FPTP) principle, meaning that the candidate with the plurality of votes is the winner of the congressional seat. The losing party or parties win no representation at all. The first-past-the-post election tends to produce a small number of major parties, perhaps just two,
3549-404: Is the winner. This is analogous to a single-winner or round-robin tournament; the total number of pairings is one less than the number of alternatives. Since a Condorcet winner will win by majority rule in each of its pairings, it will never be eliminated by Robert's Rules. But this method cannot reveal a voting paradox in which there is no Condorcet winner and a majority prefer an early loser over
3640-697: The 2017 general election , "the Green Party, Liberal Democrats and UKIP (minor, non-regional parties) received 11% of votes between them, yet they shared just 2% of seats", and in the 2015 general election , "[t]he same three parties received almost a quarter of all the votes cast, yet these parties shared just 1.5% of seats." According to Make Votes Matter, in the 2015 UK general election UKIP came in third in terms of number of votes (3.9 million/12.6%), but gained only one seat in Parliament, resulting in one seat per 3.9 million votes. The Conservatives on
3731-480: The Marquis de Condorcet , who championed such systems. However, Ramon Llull devised the earliest known Condorcet method in 1299. It was equivalent to Copeland's method in cases with no pairwise ties. Condorcet methods may use preferential ranked , rated vote ballots, or explicit votes between all pairs of candidates. Most Condorcet methods employ a single round of preferential voting, in which each voter ranks
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3822-434: The 1970s , where the first round selects two major contenders who go on to receive the overwhelming majority of votes. [REDACTED] Suppose that Tennessee is holding an election on the location of its capital . The population is concentrated around four major cities. All voters want the capital to be as close to them as possible. The options are: The preferences of each region's voters are: In FPTP, only
3913-414: The 20th century, many countries that previously used FPP have abandoned it in favor of other electoral systems, including the former British colonies of Australia and New Zealand . Most U.S. states still officially retain FPP for most elections. However, the combination of partisan primaries with the two-party system mean the country has effectively used a variation on the two-round system since
4004-453: The Condorcet and Borda count methods, which were respectively reinvented in the 18th century by the Marquis de Condorcet and Jean-Charles de Borda . More serious investigation into electoral systems came in the late 18th century, when several thinkers independently proposed systems of proportional representation to elect legislatures. The single transferable vote in particular was invented in 1819 by Thomas Wright Hill , and first used in
4095-544: The Condorcet winner if there is one. Not all single winner, ranked voting systems are Condorcet methods. For example, instant-runoff voting and the Borda count are not Condorcet methods. In a Condorcet election the voter ranks the list of candidates in order of preference. If a ranked ballot is used, the voter gives a "1" to their first preference, a "2" to their second preference, and so on. Some Condorcet methods allow voters to rank more than one candidate equally so that
4186-464: The Condorcet winner. As noted above, if there is no Condorcet winner a further method must be used to find the winner of the election, and this mechanism varies from one Condorcet consistent method to another. In any Condorcet method that passes Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives , it can sometimes help to identify the Smith set from the head-to-head matchups, and eliminate all candidates not in
4277-555: The Copeland winner has the highest possible Copeland score. They can also be found by conducting a series of pairwise comparisons, using the procedure given in Robert's Rules of Order described above. For N candidates, this requires N − 1 pairwise hypothetical elections. For example, with 5 candidates there are 4 pairwise comparisons to be made, since after each comparison, a candidate is eliminated, and after 4 eliminations, only one of
4368-483: The Iraq War primarily because of the political effects of FPP and that proportional representation would have prevented Britain's involvement in the war. To a greater extent than many others, the first-past-the-post method encourages "tactical voting". Voters have an incentive to vote for a candidate who they predict is more likely to win, as opposed to their preferred candidate who may be unlikely to win and for whom
4459-652: The Middle Ages as an assembly representing the gentry of the counties and cities of the Kingdom, each of which elected either one or two members of parliament (MPs) by block plurality voting . Starting in the 19th century, electoral reform advocates pushed to replace these multi-member constituencies with single-member districts. Elections to the Canadian House of Commons have always been conducted with FPP. The United States broke away from British rule in
4550-640: The Schulze method, use the information contained in the sum matrix to choose a winner. Cells marked '—' in the matrices above have a numerical value of '0', but a dash is used since candidates are never preferred to themselves. The first matrix, that represents a single ballot, is inversely symmetric: (runner, opponent) is ¬(opponent, runner). Or (runner, opponent) + (opponent, runner) = 1. The sum matrix has this property: (runner, opponent) + (opponent, runner) = N for N voters, if all runners were fully ranked by each voter. [REDACTED] Suppose that Tennessee
4641-434: The absence of) of party primaries maybe strengthen or weaken this effect. In general, FPP has no mechanism that would benefit more moderate candidates and many supporters of FPP defend it electing the largest and most unified (even if more polarizing) minority over a more consensual majority supported candidate. Allowing people into parliament who did not finish first in their district was described by David Cameron as creating
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#17327909599994732-453: The alternative vote (better known as instant runoff voting outside the UK) achieves this better than other systems. Supporters and opponents of FPP often argue whether FPP advantages or disadvantages extremist parties. Among single-winner systems, FPP suffers from the center squeeze phenomenon , where more moderate candidates are squeezed out by more extreme ones. However, the different types (or
4823-411: The basis for defining preference and determined that Memphis voters preferred Chattanooga as a second choice rather than as a third choice, Chattanooga would be the Condorcet winner even though finishing in last place in a first-past-the-post election. An alternative way of thinking about this example if a Smith-efficient Condorcet method that passes ISDA is used to determine the winner is that 58% of
4914-605: The candidates from most (marked as number 1) to least preferred (marked with a higher number). A voter's ranking is often called their order of preference. Votes can be tallied in many ways to find a winner. All Condorcet methods will elect the Condorcet winner if there is one. If there is no Condorcet winner different Condorcet-compliant methods may elect different winners in the case of a cycle—Condorcet methods differ on which other criteria they satisfy. The procedure given in Robert's Rules of Order for voting on motions and amendments
5005-496: The complete order of finish (i.e. who won, who came in 2nd place, etc.). They always suffice to determine whether there is a Condorcet winner. Additional information may be needed in the event of ties. Ties can be pairings that have no majority, or they can be majorities that are the same size. Such ties will be rare when there are many voters. Some Condorcet methods may have other kinds of ties. For example, with Copeland's method , it would not be rare for two or more candidates to win
5096-424: The context in which elections are held, circular ambiguities may or may not be common, but there is no known case of a governmental election with ranked-choice voting in which a circular ambiguity is evident from the record of ranked ballots. Nonetheless a cycle is always possible, and so every Condorcet method should be capable of determining a winner when this contingency occurs. A mechanism for resolving an ambiguity
5187-416: The country in question in circumstances where the government's legislative agenda has broad public support, albeit potentially divided across party lines, or at least benefits society as a whole. However handing a legislative voting majority to a government which lacks popular support can be problematic where said government's policies favor only that fraction of the electorate that supported it, particularly if
5278-436: The districts, it is more likely that a single party will hold a majority of legislative seats under FPP than happens in a proportional system, and under FPP it is rare to elect a majority government that actually has the support of a majority of voters. Because FPP permits many wasted votes , an election under FPP is more easily gerrymandered. Through gerrymandering , electoral areas are designed deliberately to unfairly increase
5369-399: The election a center squeeze . By contrast, both Condorcet methods and score voting would return Nashville (the capital of Tennessee). Perhaps the most striking effect of FPP is the fact that the number of a party's seats in a legislature has nothing to do with its vote count in an election, only in how those votes were geographically distributed. This has been a target of criticism for
5460-629: The elections in Canada in 2019 and 2021 as well as in Japan in 2003 . Even when a party wins more than half the votes in an almost purely two-party-competition, it is possible for the runner-up to win a majority of seats. This happened in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in 1966 , 1998 , and 2020 and in Belize in 1993 . Even with only two parties and equally-sized constituencies, winning
5551-407: The electorate divides on tribal, religious, or urban–rural lines. There is also the perceived issue of unfair coalitions where a smaller party can form a coalition with other smaller parties and form a government, without a clear mandate as was the case in the 2009 Israeli legislative election where the leading party Kadima , was unable to form a coalition so Likud , a smaller party, managed to form
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#17327909599995642-474: The eventual winner (though it will always elect someone in the Smith set ). A considerable portion of the literature on social choice theory is about the properties of this method since it is widely used and is used by important organizations (legislatures, councils, committees, etc.). It is not practical for use in public elections, however, since its multiple rounds of voting would be very expensive for voters, for candidates, and for governments to administer. In
5733-542: The finishing post). In social choice , FPP is generally treated as a degenerate variant of ranked voting , where voters rank the candidates, but only the first preference matters. As a result, FPP is usually implemented with a choose-one ballot , where voters place a single bubble next to their favorite candidate. FPP has been used to elect the British House of Commons since the Middle Ages . Throughout
5824-407: The first preferences matter. As such, the votes would be counted as 42% for Memphis, 26% for Nashville, 17% for Knoxville, and 15% for Chattanooga. Since Memphis has the most votes, it would win a FPTP election, even though it is far from the center of the state and a majority of voters would prefer Nashville . Similarly, instant-runoff voting would elect Knoxville , the easternmost city. This makes
5915-470: The following sum matrix: When the sum matrix is found, the contest between each pair of candidates is considered. The number of votes for runner over opponent (runner, opponent) is compared with the number of votes for opponent over runner (opponent, runner) to find the Condorcet winner. In the sum matrix above, A is the Condorcet winner because A beats every other candidate. When there is no Condorcet winner Condorcet completion methods, such as Ranked Pairs and
6006-439: The government to give in to political blackmail and to reach compromises"; Tony Blair , defending FPP, argued that other systems give small parties the balance of power, and influence disproportionate to their votes. The concept of kingmakers is adjacent to how Winston Churchill criticized the alternative vote system as "determined by the most worthless votes given for the most worthless candidates." meaning that votes for
6097-454: The group, known as the Smith set , always exists. The Smith set is guaranteed to have the Condorcet winner in it should one exist. Many Condorcet methods elect a candidate who is in the Smith set absent a Condorcet winner, and is thus said to be "Smith-efficient". Condorcet voting methods are named for the 18th-century French mathematician and philosopher Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat,
6188-481: The individual constituencies supermajorities will lead to the vote fracturing. It has been suggested that the distortions in geographical representation provide incentives for parties to ignore the interests of areas in which they are too weak to stand much chance of gaining representation, leading to governments that do not govern in the national interest. Further, during election campaigns the campaigning activity of parties tends to focus on marginal seats where there
6279-588: The largest party in Hungary since 2010 by changing the electoral system to mostly use FPP instead of the previous mixed system using mostly the two-round system . Since 2010, Fidesz has implemented other anti-democratic reforms that now mean the European Parliament no longer qualifies Hungary as a full democracy. Electoral reform campaigners have argued that the use of FPP in South Africa was
6370-514: The late 18th century, and its constitution provides for an electoral college to elect its president. Despite original intentions to the contrary, by the mid-19th century this college had transformed into a de facto use of FPP for each state's presidential election. This further morphed through the introduction of the party primary , which made American elections into a two-round system in practice. Non-plurality voting systems have been devised since at least 1299, when Ramon Llull came up with both
6461-526: The latter, smaller parties act as 'kingmakers' in coalitions as they have greater bargaining power and therefore, arguably, their influence on policy is disproportional to their parliamentary size- this is largely avoided in FPP systems where majorities are generally achieved. FPP often produces governments which have legislative voting majorities, thus providing such governments the legislative power necessary to implement their electoral manifesto commitments during their term in office. This may be beneficial for
6552-501: The leading party receive a majority of the votes. The position is sometimes summarized, in an extreme form, as "all votes for anyone other than the runner-up are votes for the winner." This is because votes for these other candidates deny potential support from the second-placed candidate, who might otherwise have won. Following the extremely close 2000 U.S. presidential election , some supporters of Democratic candidate Al Gore believed one reason he lost to Republican George W. Bush
6643-403: The least supported candidates may change the outcome of the election between the most supported candidates. In this case however, this is a feature of the alternative vote, since those votes would have otherwise been wasted (and in some sense this makes every vote count, as opposed to FPP), and this effect is only possible when no candidate receives an outright majority of first preference votes. it
6734-428: The method, many arguing that a fundamental requirement of an election system is to accurately represent the views of voters. FPP often creates "false majorities" by over-representing larger parties (giving a majority of the parliamentary/legislative seats to a party that did not receive a majority of the votes) while under-representing smaller ones. In Canada, majority governments have been formed due to one party winning
6825-411: The north of England. This pattern hides the large number of votes for the non-dominant party. Parties can find themselves without elected politicians in significant parts of the country, heightening feelings of regionalism. Party supporters (who may nevertheless be a significant minority) in those sections of the country are unrepresented. In the 2019 Canadian federal election Conservatives won 98% of
6916-411: The number of seats won by one party by redrawing the map such that one party has a small number of districts in which it has an overwhelming majority of votes (whether due to policy, demographics which tend to favor one party, or other reasons), and many districts where it is at a smaller disadvantage. The British Electoral Reform Society (ERS) says that regional parties benefit from this system. "With
7007-471: The number required for victory. For example, in the UK general election of 2005 , 52% of votes were cast for losing candidates and 18% were excess votes—a total of 70% "wasted" votes. On this basis a large majority of votes may play no part in determining the outcome. This winner-takes-all system may be one of the reasons why "voter participation tends to be lower in countries with FPP than elsewhere." The effect of
7098-425: The one above, one can find the overall results of an election. Each ballot can be transformed into this style of matrix, and then added to all other ballot matrices using matrix addition . The sum of all ballots in an election is called the sum matrix. Suppose that in the imaginary election there are two other voters. Their preferences are (D, A, C, B) and (A, C, B, D). Added to the first voter, these ballots would give
7189-419: The original 5 candidates will remain. To confirm that a Condorcet winner exists in a given election, first do the Robert's Rules of Order procedure, declare the final remaining candidate the procedure's winner, and then do at most an additional N − 2 pairwise comparisons between the procedure's winner and any candidates they have not been compared against yet (including all previously eliminated candidates). If
7280-653: The other hand received one seat per 34,000 votes. The winner-takes-all nature of FPP leads to distorted patterns of representation, since it exaggerates the correlation between party support and geography. For example, in the UK the Conservative Party represents most of the rural seats in England, and most of the south of England, while the Labour Party represents most of the English cities and most of
7371-585: The party colors). Because voters have to predict who the top two candidates will be, results can be significantly distorted: Proponents of other voting methods in single-member districts argue that these would reduce the need for tactical voting and reduce the spoiler effect . Examples include preferential voting systems, such as instant runoff voting , as well as the two-round system of runoffs and less tested methods such as approval voting and Condorcet methods . Wasted votes are seen as those cast for losing candidates, and for winning candidates in excess of
7462-426: The procedure's winner does not win all pairwise matchups, then no Condorcet winner exists in the election (and thus the Smith set has multiple candidates in it). Computing all pairwise comparisons requires ½ N ( N −1) pairwise comparisons for N candidates. For 10 candidates, this means 0.5*10*9=45 comparisons, which can make elections with many candidates hard to count the votes for. The family of Condorcet methods
7553-469: The same number of pairings, when there is no Condorcet winner. A Condorcet method is a voting system that will always elect the Condorcet winner (if there is one); this is the candidate whom voters prefer to each other candidate, when compared to them one at a time. This candidate can be found (if they exist; see next paragraph) by checking if there is a candidate who beats all other candidates; this can be done by using Copeland's method and then checking if
7644-553: The same time. On the other hand, the Constitution Society published a report in April 2019 stating that, "[in certain circumstances] FPP can ... abet extreme politics , since should a radical faction gain control of one of the major political parties, FPP works to preserve that party's position. ...This is because the psychological effect of the plurality system disincentivises a major party's supporters from voting for
7735-658: The seats in Alberta and Saskatchewan with only 68% of the vote. The lack of non-Conservative representation gives the appearance of greater Conservative support than actually exists. Similarly, in Canada's 2021 elections, the Conservative Party won 88% of the seats in Alberta with only 55% of the vote, and won 100% of the seats in Saskatchewan with only 59% of the vote. First-past-the-post within geographical areas tends to deliver (particularly to larger parties)
7826-426: The set before doing the procedure for that Condorcet method. Condorcet methods use pairwise counting. For each possible pair of candidates, one pairwise count indicates how many voters prefer one of the paired candidates over the other candidate, and another pairwise count indicates how many voters have the opposite preference. The counts for all possible pairs of candidates summarize all the pairwise preferences of all
7917-486: The voter might express two first preferences rather than just one. If a scored ballot is used, voters rate or score the candidates on a scale, for example as is used in Score voting , with a higher rating indicating a greater preference. When a voter does not give a full list of preferences, it is typically assumed that they prefer the candidates that they have ranked over all the candidates that were not ranked, and that there
8008-420: The voters, a mutual majority , ranked Memphis last (making Memphis the majority loser ) and Nashville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville above Memphis, ruling Memphis out. At that point, the voters who preferred Memphis as their 1st choice could only help to choose a winner among Nashville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville, and because they all preferred Nashville as their 1st choice among those three, Nashville would have had
8099-448: The voters. Pairwise counts are often displayed in a pairwise comparison matrix , or outranking matrix , such as those below. In these matrices , each row represents each candidate as a 'runner', while each column represents each candidate as an 'opponent'. The cells at the intersection of rows and columns each show the result of a particular pairwise comparison. Cells comparing a candidate to themselves are left blank. Imagine there
8190-532: The winner is the candidate preferred by a majority of voters. When results for every possible pairing have been found they are as follows: The results can also be shown in the form of a matrix: ↓ 2 Wins ↓ 1 Win As can be seen from both of the tables above, Nashville beats every other candidate. This means that Nashville is the Condorcet winner. Nashville will thus win an election held under any possible Condorcet method. While any Condorcet method will elect Nashville as
8281-523: The winner, if instead an election based on the same votes were held using first-past-the-post or instant-runoff voting , these systems would select Memphis and Knoxville respectively. This would occur despite the fact that most people would have preferred Nashville to either of those "winners". Condorcet methods make these preferences obvious rather than ignoring or discarding them. On the other hand, in this example Chattanooga also defeats Knoxville and Memphis when paired against those cities. If we changed
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