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59-468: The Wahinda are a clan or class (better than a tribe) of Eastern Africa, especially Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi, where they had a ruling role among different tribes. They originated from the North as shown by their physical aspect The Wahinda believed the drum was so holy that seeing one of them would be fatal to any person other than the sultan. The late Sam Magara , a Ugandan military leader,

118-464: A "useless attack" which ultimately only alerted Obote to the start of an insurgency in southern Uganda, causing him to increase security and thus prevent foreign arms shipments from reaching the rebels in Uganda. Directly after the battle, several PRA members regarded their raid as a failure, and Museveni had to raise their morale by framing the operation as a partial success. Kainerugaba cautioned that

177-533: A clear view of what was happening and direct his men, Museveni positioned himself at a mound near the gate. There, he was fired upon from the staff quarters; despite Tumwine's requests that he take cover, Museveni refused, remaining on the mound. Having failed at breaking through, Magara drove the Peugeot back to the gate and informed the PRA leader that the assault on the armoury had failed. Museveni responded by ordering

236-450: A counter-attack. Accordingly, they decided to break off the assault and withdrew. With the troops of Magara and Tumwine back at the gate, Museveni agreed to retreat, but first ordered his men to take whatever guns and ammunition they could find at the parts of the camp which they had taken, namely the guardroom, communications center, and military transport section. With 13 additional guns and six or eight vehicles which they had captured,

295-521: A coup or split off to form a separate rebel force in Rwenzori Mountains. Magara's circle was suspected of working with the Gang of Four in this regard. Kagame reportedly stopped the plot in its tracks. Museveni rushed back to retake command after being informed of the situation and held several meetings with his troops to restore order. He was able to defuse the internal tensions by introducing

354-544: A detailed code of conduct for the NRA. Magara was subsequently sidelined within the NRA. In August 1982, Magara and other NRA members secretly entered the Ugandan capital Kampala, where he intended to visit a dentist due to a tooth problem. However, their cover was blown and their hideout encircled by UNLA soldiers. While several NRA fighters were able to escape, Magara attempted to retrieve crucial documents before leaving, and

413-578: A flat tire at Katigondo; as they had no replacement, the PRA leader was forced to walk 19 kilometres (12 mi) to Nyendo where he asked a friend, Nathan Ruyondo, to loan him his Peugeot 304 . He claimed that he needed the car to get to a relative's wedding. Ruyondo agreed to lend the Peugeot; he would never see his car again. Museveni and his two comrades finally arrived at the meeting place at 3:00am on 6 February. However, their delay caused them to miss Kafuniza's group that had been waiting at Rwemiyaga since 4 February. The UNLF-AD members, assuming that

472-468: A former Libyan ally, but also allegedly worked with Israelis , opponents of Gaddafi. Accordingly, the PRA was not promised any Libyan supplies. In addition, Museveni's network already came under strong pressure in 1980. Pro-Obote forces moved to assassinate ex-FRONASA officers in the UNLA to prevent them from defecting or rebelling, depriving the PRA of potential recruits and insiders. Museveni suspected that

531-407: A renewed attack with Tumwine's fighters supporting Magara's section. This time, the rebels got closer, with one PRA militant able to throw a grenade into the armoury; however, it did not explode. Another shot an RPG at the arms depot, but it did little damage. Both Magara and Tumwine came to the conclusion that their attack was lasting too long, and gave the camp's garrison the opportunity to organize

590-410: A result of the continuing tensions within the NRA; the NRA command gave orders that nobody should discuss his demise. NRA veteran John Kazoora claimed that it "was clear that [Magara] was betrayed and a victim of intrigue". Ultimately, two of Magara's alleged co-conspirators, Mugabi and Muchunguzi, were killed under disputed circumstances; Muchunguzi was allegedly executed by Kagame. Magara's family

649-577: The Popular Resistance Army (PRA). He tapped and expanded his existing network of supporters in Kampala and the rest of Uganda, while trying to organize weapons shipments from abroad. In this regard, he was similar to the UFF and UFM which had been promised arms supplies from Libya . However, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi distrusted Museveni as the latter had not just fought against Amin,

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708-592: The Uganda People's Defence Force , the NRA's successor organization, while Patricia Magara became a lawyer. As a result of Magara's activities as a rebel, the family spent the 1970s and early 1980s mostly in exile in Kenya, eventually returning to Uganda in 1984. Battle of Kabamba The raid was planned by the PRA and another rebel group, the UNLF-AD , to seize weapons in order to start an insurgency against

767-625: The regime of Idi Amin , dictator of Uganda from 1971 to 1979. In 1973, Magara's brother Martin Mwesiga was killed during a shootout between FRONASA militants and Amin's security forces. Afterwards, Magara and his family fled into exile. Exiled to Tanzania , he began studying at the University of Dar es Salaam for a master's degree . There, he met his future wife, Joy. The two relocated to Kenya, where they married in Nairobi in 1977. Magara

826-535: The " Gang of Four ", a Communist opposition faction. Together, they visited the bases of the UNLF-AD , the Gang of Four's armed wing, in the Rwenzori Mountains . Meanwhile, the political rivalry between Museveni and Obote escalated in violence, as supporters of both carried out assassinations against each other. Magara and ex-FRONASA cadres under his leadership murdered several ex- Kikosi Maalum fighters who were loyal to Obote. In early 1981, Magara

885-549: The 34 to 41 PRA fighters to carry out the attack alone. Upon arriving at the Kabamba Military Barracks, the group was unable to deceive or silently subdue two sentries, causing a shootout and alerting the camp. A single Tanzanian soldier consequently took up position at the camp's armoury and defended it, preventing the PRA from capturing it. However, the rebels suffered only very light casualties and were able to withdraw in good order with some loot, meaning that

944-832: The Bush War's remainder, and eventually fully joined his group. In June 1981, a new rebel coalition was organised, with the PRA and Lule's UFF agreeing to unite as the National Resistance Movement (NRM). Museveni was made vice-chairman of the National Resistance Council, the group's political body, and Chairman of the High Command of the National Resistance Army (NRA), the Movement's armed organ. Later into

1003-721: The Libyan arms shipments from reaching the UFF and UFM, causing them to accuse Museveni of having acted too soon. Meanwhile, the forces of the "Gang of Four" gradually scattered, having been demoralized by their inability to take part in the Kabamba raid and still lacking guns. The UNLF-AD continued to wage a fairly effective propaganda campaign against Obote, but was never able to become a major militant group. The group stopped its independent insurgency in July 1982. However, several of its members went on to cooperate with Museveni's forces during

1062-531: The NRA's internal security network alleged that he was planning to overthrow Museveni. Magara was eventually killed by security forces in Kampala in late 1982. Sam Emmanuel Magara was an ethnic Bahima, and part of the Muhinda clan. He was born to Mutembeya, a sub-county chief in Ankole . Sam Magara joined Yoweri Museveni 's Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) at an early point. FRONASA worked to overthrow

1121-416: The NRA, with many common fighters fearing that they too might be summarly killed. In addition, Magara formed a clique with fellow NRA officers Jack Muchunguzi, Hannington Mugabi and Joram Mugume. The NRM's internal security network led by Paul Kagame began to suspect that Magara and his allies were conspiring against Museveni. Kagame's network believed that the clique planned to take power from Museveni in

1180-427: The PRA had been attacked by security forces, had initially decided to relocate to another position to observe their rendezvous area. When the PRA continued to fail to appear, Kafuniza ordered his men to withdraw to their hideouts in the Rwenzori Mountains . Undeterred, Museveni split his PRA force into three sections: The first, led by Sam Magara would strike at the armoury, the second under Tumwine would eliminate

1239-427: The PRA militants withdrew and drove to Nabingola. The entire battle lasted about an hour, and the rebels suffered only one casualty, with one PRA militant being shot in the leg. Kainerugaba summarized that the PRA assault on Kabamba became generally known as "somewhat of a botched job". Researchers Tom Cooper and Adrien Fontanellaz argued that the battle constituted a "partial failure" for the PRA. Guweddeko called it

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1298-457: The PRA that security at the base usually dropped around 8:00am, when the garrison would switch from a state of alert to go training or take a break. Accordingly, the raid was scheduled for dawn; the element of surprise was crucial for the success of the attack. UNLF-AD militant Emmanuel Kafuniza later alleged that the raid was originally planned for 5 February 1981. Kabamba housed a substantial garrison. According to researcher Muhoozi Kainerugaba,

1357-591: The PRA's first operation which culminated in the Battle of Kabamba in February 1981. He served as one of the rebel commanders during this clash. His unit was supposed to capture the armoury of the Kabamba Military Barracks, but was unable to do so. In March, he was appointed commander of the PRA's 2nd Section, operating along the Kampala – Bombo Road. Museveni often left Magara in command of

1416-566: The UFF and UFM that he still had over 10,000 supporters within the UNLA who were waiting to launch a large-scale rebellion. Accordingly, the UFF and UFM decided to wait both for the arrival of the Libyan weapons shipments as well as Museveni's promised uprising within the UNLA to start their own rebellions. For the time being, both groups wanted no unrest which could threaten the arrival of the promised Libyan supplies. We were going back to reclaim our guns; we knew they were there and we wanted them back. —PRA veteran Elly Tumwine In contrast,

1475-547: The UNLA, to revolt across the country. As the Kabamba Military Barracks were used as a training camp, the location could also be infiltrated by PRA supporters, providing the rebels with insiders and intelligence. In addition, one of the camp's main weapons depots was located just 100 metres (330 ft) behind the main entrance. In theory, the PRA could launch a lightning attack on the camp and escape with as much materiel as possible before pro-government forces would be able to react. Ex-FRONASA members who worked at Kabamba informed

1534-629: The Ugandan opposition including Museveni. Several rebel groups emerged to battle Obote's regime and its military, the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), in the Ugandan Bush War . In December 1980, Museveni called for his closest supporters and allies to meet in Makindye ; Magara was among the attendants. The group discussed plans to launch an insurgency. Museveni tasked Magara to link up with supporters of

1593-485: The armoury, as they had held all administrative and communications nodes in the base for an hour. Comparing it to the start of another guerrilla war, namely Fidel Castro 's attack on the Moncada Barracks , Kainerugaba stated that Museveni's operation actually went rather well, and concluded that it was a "qualified success and not a catastrophe". Both analysts as well as participants of the battle agreed that

1652-567: The base was defended by "several companies " belonging to the Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF). Political scientist Jeremy M. Weinstein specifies that the camp housed about 1,500 men, including over 100 Tanzanian guards and trainers; the rest were UNLA trainees. The Gang of Four sent a group of seven UNLF-AD militants led by Kafuniza to meet up with the PRA for the attack on Kabamba. The PRA rebels, consisting of just 34 to 41 militants with 27 guns, left Kampala in two vehicles in

1711-415: The common negative assessments of the Kabamba raid are not entirely warranted. He described the rebels' intelligence gathering before the raid as "first rate", and argued that the PRA's ability to dominate the battle despite being numerically extremely inferior to the base's defenders was impressive. He also pointed out that the rebels had been able to achieve all objectives besides their main aim of capturing

1770-449: The desperately needed weapons and ammunition. This desire also possessed a motivational factor, as Kabamba housed many weapons confiscated from FRONASA. Furthermore, the PRA hoped that a successful attack on the camp would boost its image throughout the country and make its revolt against Obote widely known. Most importantly, the attack was supposed to inspire ex-FRONASA fighters, both those who had returned to civilian life or enlisted in

1829-400: The different factions within the UNLA enlisted thousands of fighters and began to conspire against each other. As a result of the political infighting and powers of the armed factions, Uganda's first post-Amin provisional government led by President Yusuf Lule was unstable. Lule was dismissed on 20 June 1979, and replaced by Godfrey Binaisa who lacked his own power base. In May 1980, Binaisa

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1888-487: The disputed election, its military situation was difficult. The demobilized ex-FRONASA fighters had surrendered most of their old weaponry, and the Museveni loyalists within the UNLA were spread across the country. As a result, a coup d'état was not feasible, and Museveni instead decided to launch a long-term guerrilla war . With a small force consisting of ex-FRONASA officers and his bodyguards, Museveni secretly organized

1947-563: The entire PRA when leaving the field. In April, he co-commanded a rebel raid on Kakiri . In June 1981, a new rebel coalition was organised, with the PRA and the Uganda Freedom Fighters agreeing to unite as the National Resistance Movement (NRM), with the National Resistance Army (NRA) as armed wing. Museveni became Chairman of the High Command of the NRA, while Magara was appointed the NRA's deputy commander after his predecessor, Ahmed Seguya, died of sickness. Magara

2006-432: The evening of 5 February 1981. The main group drove in a lorry, while Museveni followed in a pickup truck with two companions. The PRA groups wanted to meet up at the old wreck of an armoured personnel carrier near Makoole. The main group, led by Lieutenant Elly Tumwine arrived first, disembarked, and changed into uniforms in the bush . However, the plan already began to derail at this point. Museveni's pickup truck had

2065-434: The gate. At this point, the Peugeot suddenly accelerated and raced past the lorry to the armoury. Tumwine then shouted the agreed code word for opening fire, whereupon the militants shot and killed the two sentries. Kagame's team heard the shots, and began their own attack at the officers' quarters. However, the shooting alarmed a Tanzanian soldier who was guarding the arms depot, and he promptly barricaded himself, preventing

2124-546: The government and the army. For instance, Obote hindered the integration of thousands of fighters loyal to Museveni into the regular army, with many ex-FRONASA cadres instead being demobilized. The enlisted pro-Museveni fighters were dispersed across the country, preventing them of forming a faction in the army. Even though the demobilization caused considerable unrest within the ex-FRONASA faction, Museveni reasoned with his supporters to surrender their guns to prevent an escalation. Most complied, although some militants refused. At

2183-471: The government of Ugandan President Milton Obote who had assumed power after the disputed December 1980 general election . Despite being prepared through substantial intelligence gathering, the raid faced problems from the start. A part of the rebel strike team, including PRA leader Yoweri Museveni , got delayed. As a result of this delay and a lack of communications, the UNLF-AD militants withdrew, leaving

2242-446: The lack of foreign aid and growing pressure by pro-Obote elements forced the PRA to act. Museveni decided to cooperate with the Gang of Four; this group's main supporter, Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito , had died in 1980, meaning that it also lacked foreign support. The PRA and the Gang of Four's armed wing, UNLF-AD, opted to risk a raid on the Kabamba Military Barracks (also known as Kabamba Training School) to finally get access to

2301-409: The main gate's sentries, and the third under Hannington Mugabi would try to raid the quartermaster's store. A smaller force of four men with pistols, led by Paul Kagame , was ordered to attack the base's communications room. The militants then drove to Nkonge. Unbeknownst to the rest of the fighters, however, Tumwine had gotten temporarily lost at the meeting point and had not gotten into a vehicle. He

2360-404: The main reason for the PRA's failure to take the armoury was the loss of the element of surprise. When Tumwine shot one of the sentries, he warned the rest of the base; Museveni later argued that Tumwine should have tried to subdue the sentry physically. Journalist Derrick Kiyonga agreed, stating that Tumwine "bungled up the operation" by firing the first shot. However, Kainerugaba pointed out that

2419-548: The operation was not a complete failure. In April 1979, Tanzanian forces and the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), a coalition of armed rebel groups united under the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), deposed Ugandan President Idi Amin during the Uganda–Tanzania War . After the conflict's end, a Tanzanian garrison remained behind to keep order in Uganda. A UNLF government

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2478-715: The opposition such as the Democratic Party opted for peaceful resistance against Obote's government, Museveni believed that militant action had become necessary. Other political groups such as Yusuf Lule's Uganda Freedom Fighters (UFF), the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), and the Communist " Gang of Four " also planned to launch insurgencies. The latter organized an armed wing known as the Uganda National Liberation Front – Anti-Dictatorship (UNLF-AD). When Museveni's faction decided to rebel after

2537-461: The preparations for the battle had not included instructions to tackle opponents without guns: Tumwine had no training in hand-to-hand combat, and the attackers had no knives. Furthermore, the rebels lacked explosives to forcibly enter the armoury. Kainerugaba argued that this lack of contingency planning was the main reason why the operation derailed. Kainerugaba claimed that the Battle of Kabamba

2596-416: The pro-Obote forces were also intending to kill him. He repeatedly changed his resting places, often stayed with friends, and only moved around with his bodyguards. Ex-FRONASA fighters also began to carry out revenge killings against ex-members of Kikosi Maalum , loyalists of Obote, worsening the tensions. Despite these difficulties, Bush War veteran and researcher Frederick Guweddeko stated that Museveni told

2655-477: The rebels from gaining access. The armoury was constructed from concrete, partially underground, and well defendable, with only two possible approaches, both of which offered a clear field of fire . Using a machine gun, the Tanzanian guard was able to hold off Magara's section. Meanwhile, Mugabi's group ran to the quartermaster's store, where they met two collaborators from the camp who promptly joined them. To get

2714-427: The start of the PRA's rebellion. Using the small amount of captured equipment, the PRA began to raid police stations. However, the group were attacked by a joined UNLA-TPDF force at Kiboga on 9 February, forcing it to scatter. A few rebels decided to give up at this point, but the rest reunited and continued a low-level insurgency. The assault on Kabama caused Obote's security forces to increase controls; this prevented

2773-471: The time, Museveni still hoped that political change could be achieved through the coming election. Obote won the December 1980 election. The opposition, including Museveni's Uganda Patriotic Movement , disputed the results and claimed widespread fraud. Regardless, Obote assumed power as president, and ruled through repressive methods, including the incarceration and killing of dissidents. Whereas much of

2832-478: The vehicles, greeting the two sentries. Only one of them, a corporal, had his weapon at hand. The sentries were already suspicious about how the men seemed to take up positions, but Tumwine informed the corporal that they were bringing supplies from the General Headquarters. Seeing that even more fighters were exiting the lorry, the other sentry gradually retreated to get his gun from the guard room at

2891-516: Was "immensely significant both strategically and symbolically", as it signalled for ex-FRONASA members to join the anti-Obote rebellion and involved two future presidents, namely Museveni and Kagame, both of whom had an immense impact on the future history of the African Great Lakes . In addition, influential Rwandan politician and militant Fred Rwigyema was also part of the PRA force at Kabamba. The attack on Kabama officially marked

2950-606: Was also a lawyer, and served in the Save Uganda Movement for some time. Amin was overthrown during the Uganda–Tanzania War of 1978–1979. Magara began training at the Tanzania Military Academy at Monduli . He returned to Uganda in late 1980, where a new political crisis had developed. Ex-President Milton Obote had won the December 1980 election , a result which was heavily contested by

3009-576: Was also deposed and Uganda fell under the control of the UNLF's Military Commission that was supposed to rule until the scheduled December 1980 general election . Meanwhile, remnants of Idi Amin's Uganda Army invaded northwestern Uganda, beginning the Ugandan Bush War . Political infighting also continued within the Military Commission, with Defense Minister Museveni opposing Obote's faction. Over time power shifted to pro-Obote elements in

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3068-419: Was also harsh and worsened the strains within the movement. He executed one of his officers, Shaban Kashanku, after a short trial. Kashanku had temporarily left a NRA camp without permission, and Magara had accused him of being a double agent . Other NRA militants objected to Kashanku's killing, claiming that he had only visited a nearby town. The execution further damaged the already tense relationships within

3127-426: Was designated RO/0005 within the NRA. Museveni consequently ventured abroad, leaving Magara in command of the NRA from June to December 1981. In course of this period, however, the NRA began to experience substantial internal tensions due to ethnic and social differences between the rebel fighters, as the group expanded from just about 200 to over 900 fighters. Despite being described as a charismatic leader, Magara

3186-444: Was forced to run after the convoy, only catching up at Nkonge. The PRA militants rested for a few hours at Nkonge, waiting until the scheduled start of their attack. At about 8:15am or 8:25am, the PRA lorry, followed by the Peugeot, began to approach the Kabamba base. Before they got to the main gate, Kagame's team disembarked for their attack on the communications room. At the main gate, Tumwine and several other fighters got out of

3245-468: Was from the Muhinda clan of the Bahima . Sam Magara Sam Magara (died 2 August 1982) was a Ugandan rebel, and one of the National Resistance Army (NRA)'s leading commanders during the early Ugandan Bush War . A long-time associate of NRA leader Yoweri Museveni , he became the latter's second-in-command in 1981 and assumed command of the NRA in his absence. However, he fell into disfavor after

3304-488: Was installed to rule Uganda, but it was weak and exercised little control over the country. This was in part due to the UNLF's and its army's own internal divisions. One group was loyal to Milton Obote , who had served as president before Amin took power. Yoweri Museveni headed another faction, based on the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA). In an attempt to gain influence in the country's future government and military,

3363-470: Was only informed of his demise six months later, and his sister was able to arrange for a proper burial at Lugogo . He and his brother Martin Mwesiga were exhumed and reburied at Rutooma, Kajara , in 2005. Sam and Joy Magara had four children: Stalin Kanduho (born c. 1975), Patricia Magara (born 1978), Sam Mwerindebiro (born c. 1980), and Emmanuel Noowe. Stalin Kanduho later became an officer in

3422-453: Was part of the small group that formed Museveni's Popular Resistance Army (PRA), a rebel force which was supposed to overthrow Obote's government. At the time, Magara was a 2nd lieutenant and one of the few professionally trained soldiers in Museveni's group. As a result of this background and due to him being a "close comrade" of Museveni, he became the PRA leader's second-in-command . Alongside Museveni and Elly Tumwine , Magara planned

3481-465: Was shot dead by the security forces at the house of Ambassador Katenta Apuuli in Naakulabye on 2 August. His death was regarded as a heavy blow to the NRA, and was reportedly celebrated by Obote's government. The government paraded his corpse, alongside those of other suspected NRA supporters, through Bugoloobi . Rumours quickly emerged within the NRA which alleged that Magara had been killed as

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