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82-460: Third Front may refer to: Third Front (China) , development campaign to relocate national defense facilities and industry Third Front (India) , a political alliance Tamazuj , also known as The Third Front, a rebel group in Sudan Topics referred to by the same term [REDACTED] This disambiguation page lists articles associated with

164-614: A General Staff report commissioned by deputy chief Yang Chengwu which evaluated the distribution of Chinese industry, noted that they were primarily concentrated in 14 major coastal cities which were vulnerable to nuclear attack or air raids, and recommended that the General Staff research measures to guard against a sudden attack. Major transportation hubs, bridges, ports and some dams were close to these major cities. Destruction of these infrastructures could lead to disastrous consequences. This evaluation prompted Mao to advocate for

246-577: A Party Work Conference in May 1973 resolved to re-direct state investment efforts from the Third Front to the northeast and the coastal regions, the Third Front was no longer the country's most critical economic objective. Agriculture and light industry became more important priorities. As Reform and Opening Up began in 1978, China began to gradually wind down Third Front projects with a "shut down, cease, merge, transform, and move" strategy. In 1984,

328-635: A bigger global market share by reducing price competition among SOEs abroad and increasing vertical integration. Overall, China's focus on SOEs during the Xi era have demonstrated a commitment to using SOEs to serve non-market objectives and increasing CCP control of SOEs while taking some limited steps towards market liberalization, such as increasing mixed (state and private) ownership of SOEs. Along with increased mergers, promotion of mixed ownership, and management of state capital have continued; results have been mixed. Transitioning solely state-owned enterprises to

410-487: A long period of time, without the major innovations and key core technologies achieved by state-owned enterprises, and without state-owned enterprises' long-term commitment to a large number of social responsibilities, there would be no economic independence and national security for China, no continuous improvement in people's lives, and no socialist China standing tall in the East of the world. Xi Jinping Thought also emphasizes

492-498: A means necessary for socialist development given the level of China's development at the time. In mobilizing and recruiting workers for Third Front Projects, the Party instructed recruiters to "take Mao's strategic thought as the guiding principle, teach employees to consider the big picture, resolutely obey the needs of the country, take pride in supporting Third Front construction ... and help solve employees' concrete problems." In

574-528: A mixed ownership was announced in 2013 at the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and re-affirmed by the 19th Party Congress . Following an August 2015 directive, SOEs' articles of association are required to specify the leading role of party organizations in their firms. The 2015 directive also increases the importance of party organizations within SOEs by requiring that

656-616: A political governance system in China’s SOEs—a Party-dominated governance system characterized by Party leadership, state ownership, Party cadre management, Party participation in corporate decision-making, and intra-Party supervision. CCP branches within China's SOEs are the governing bodies which make important decisions and inculcate its ideology . When China's SOEs were first created, they served as instruments for carrying out national goals and providing social stability via

738-512: A race against time with American imperialism and Soviet revisionism." Policymakers adopted military-style thinking, framing project selection in the rhetoric of "choos[ing] the proper targets to attack" and "concentrat[ing] forces to wage wars of annihilation" on a focused number of projects. Workers themselves often linked their tasks to broader conflicts, for example describing the drilling of tunnels as an act in opposition to "American wolves," thereby advancing "the people of Vietnam's war " with

820-531: A strategic rear for retreat, and we should be prepared to go into the mountains [to become guerilla]. We need a place like this. The "Big Third Front" ( da sanxian ) included the Northwest and Southwest provinces like Qinghai, Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan. In comparison, the "First Front" was composed of the major cities from Manchuria down to the Pearl River Delta and the "Second Front" referred to

902-579: A war, while China's population and industries were concentrated on the east coast. As one of his inspirations for the Third Front, Mao cited the negative example of Chiang Kai-Shek 's failure to establish sufficient industry away from the coast prior to the Second Sino-Japanese war , resulting in the Nationalist government being forced to retreat to a small inland industrial base in the face of Japanese invasion. In April 1964, Mao read

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984-430: Is a geo-military concept: it is relative to the "First Front" area that is close to the potential war fronts. The Third Front region covered 13 provinces and autonomous regions with its core area in the Northwest (including Shaanxi , Gansu , Ningxia , and Qinghai ) and Southwest (including today's Sichuan , Chongqing , Yunnan , and Guizhou ). Its development was motivated by national defense considerations following

1066-428: Is reflected in the slogans at the time such as “Choose the best people and best horses for the Third Front," “prepare for war, prepare for famine, for the people” ( 备战备荒, 为人民 ; bèizhàn bèihuāng, wéi rénmín ), and "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, never hegemony." Incomplete statistics show that between 1964 and 1970, 380 large projects, 145 thousand workers and 38 thousand units of equipment, were moved from

1148-481: The CCP committee secretary and the chair of the board must be the same person. According to Xi, "[T]he dominant role of state ownership cannot be changed, and the leading role of the state-economy cannot be changed." In Xi Jinping Thought , the historical importance of state-owned enterprises is highlighted: [W]ithout the important material foundation that state-owned enterprises have laid for China's development over

1230-486: The Daqing oilfield and use revolutionary spirit to overcome all difficulties." The Party did not attempt to hide the challenges of working on the Third Front, however, and told local officials to "speak clearly about the difficulties, not boast, and not make empty promises." Because Chinese policymakers believed that the risks of invasion from foreign powers were imminent, Third Front workers were instructed to "engage in

1312-687: The Nationalist government , preparing for the Second Sino-Japanese War , drafted a policy to move industries to Northwest and Southwest of the country, in particular to develop the mining and heavy industry. Although the policy laid the seeds of industrial development in the Northwest, during the Civil War development eventually died down. After the failure of the Great Leap Forward , China's leadership slowed

1394-606: The People's Liberation Army . They are expected "to work together with grassroots organizations to collect intelligence and information, dissolve and/or eliminate security concerns at the budding stage," according to the People's Liberation Army Daily . In 2024, the Chinese government announced SOE management would be assessed based on stock market performance. As of 2022 , SASAC oversees 97 centrally owned companies. These are

1476-561: The Third Five-Year Plan should “solve the problems of food, clothes, and other life necessities” (jiejue chichuanyong). Zhou Enlai , in his report of the State Council on March 28, also reported that “[the government] should put agriculture in the primary place of the nation's economy. The economic planning should follow the priorities such that agriculture comes first, light industries comes next, heavy industries have

1558-407: The iron rice bowl . Financial performance of SOEs was not a major concern until China's reform era. With the exception of a small number of national monopolies, SOEs compete in the market as privately enterprises do. State ownership does not prevent SOEs from seeking to make profits; rather they are incentivized to make profits to increase the value of the state's assets. SOEs have monopolies in

1640-704: The workforce . Ninety-one (91) of these SOEs belong to the 2020 Fortune Global 500 companies. Almost 867,000 enterprises have a degree of state ownership, according to Franklin Allen of Imperial College London . The role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in SOEs has varied at different periods but has increased during the Xi Jinping administration , with the CCP formally taking a commanding role in all SOEs as of 2020. For example, Lai Xiaomin ,

1722-401: The 1965 to 1980 period was 20.52 billion RMB (the equivalent of the equivalent of US$ 2.5 billion). From 1964-1974, China invested more than 40% of its industrial capacity in Third Front regions. Ultimately, construction of the Third Front cost accounting for more than a third of China's spending over the 15 year period in which the Third Front construction occurred. The Third Front was

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1804-493: The Chinese government increasingly funded SOE consolidation, supplying massive subsidies and favoring SOEs from a regulatory standpoint. These efforts helped SOEs to crowd out foreign and domestic private sector competitors. As part of China Western Development program, China's five large state-owned hydropower companies planned, underwrote, and built the majority of dams on the river and its tributaries. Beginning in 2007, central government SOEs were required to provide to

1886-472: The Chinese interior where they would be more protected in event of foreign invasion. Beginning the late 1970s, SOEs became allowed to pay bonuses to workers. In 1984, the State Council issued a directive to expand the autonomy of SOEs. SOEs were also allowed to sell surplus goods on the market once they had met their quotas. Through the reform of "substituting taxes with profits" ( li gai shui )

1968-534: The Economic Commission issued regulations for projects which were being relocated to the Third Front, mandating that all relocated projects had to be approved by the central Party and that none could be approved by local governments themselves. Administrative changes occurred in February 1965, as the State Council further consolidated central control of the Third Front construction. It converted

2050-622: The First Front, that new projects should be built concealed in the mountains, and that industrial enterprises, research institutes, and universities should be moved to the Third Front. Every Third Front project was a state-owned enterprise. The most significant Small Third Front Project was Shanghai's. At its largest, the Shanghai Small Front had 54,000 workers, 17,000 families, and 81 work units. The "rear base" in Anhui

2132-641: The Guiyang-Kunming lines linked all southwest provincial capitals using rail for the first time. The Xiangfan-Chongqing and Hunan-Guizhou connected the central and western provinces by rail for the first time. Chinese policy-makers determined that vehicle manufacturing should be advanced, and therefore the First Automotive Works transferred a third of its workforce to develop the Second Automobile Works as part of

2214-617: The PLA's enforcement of political discipline and suppression of the factions that had emerged during the Cultural Revolution. Those who did not return to work would be viewed as engaging in "splittist activities" ( fenlie huodong ) which risked undermining preparations to defend China from potential invasion. The perceived necessity of rushing construction in preparation for foreign invasion, along with constraints on resources, resulted in defects in many Third Front projects. Among

2296-494: The Party established centralized organizations to direct the Third Front construction. The highest Third Front-specific administrative body was the Third Front Construction Support and Examination Small Group , which was tasked with providing physical and financial resources for the building of the Third Front. This Small Group was led by Economic Commission Vice Director Gu Mu . It also formed

2378-523: The Planning Commission recommended that the First and Second Fronts no longer view supporting the Third Front as their "primary task," instead downgrading the Third Front assistance to an "important task." The Planning Commission also stated concerns about the amount of Third Front funding leading to neglect of heavy industry elsewhere, as well as insufficient investment in agriculture. After

2460-641: The Small Third Front). Other key leadership, including Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi , and Li Fuchun, did not fully support the notion of the Third Front. Instead, they continued to emphasize the coastal development and consumer focus pursuant to the Third Five Year Plan. In their view, small-scale commerce should be emphasized to raise the standard of living. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident on August 2, 1964, however, quickly changed

2542-717: The Southwest Railroad Construction headquarters to oversee railroad development. Another body, the Southwest Third Front Preparatory Small Group, was established to oversee regional construction and planning. It was led by Li Jingquan . It in turn established a planning group to administer the industrial complex being developed in Panzhihua and another planning group to administer conventional weapons production around Chongqing. On December 1, 1964,

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2624-651: The State Council issued a report concluding that 48% of Third Front enterprises still had marketable products and favorable business prospects. In the Seventh Five-Year Plan between 1986 and 1990, Third Front plants not making a profit were allowed to shut down. Some Third Front plants moved out of the mountains and caves to nearby small and medium sized cities where the geography and transportation were less difficult. Plants with workshops spread across many places gathered in one place. Third Front plants, especially military plants, were encouraged to produce for

2706-608: The Third Five Year Plan, consistent with its changing focus to preparations for the possibility that "the imperialists [would] launch an aggressive war against China." The hallmark of the Third Front Movement was a strategic shift to China's interior. On August 12, 1964, Zhou Enlai approved enormous industrial development in southwest China: Panzhihua Iron and Steel (in Sichuan), Liupanshui coal mines (in Guizhou), and

2788-837: The Third Front Preparatory Small Group into the Southwest Third Front Commission and required it to work with central ministries in fulfilling needs for labor, equipment, and building materials. The State Council put this Commission within the Economic Commission's supervision and then within the jurisdiction of the Infrastructure Committee when it was created in March 1965. In an August 19, 1965 report, Li Fuchun , Bo Yibo and Luo Ruiqing suggested that no new projects should be constructed in major cities in

2870-465: The Third Front construction was relatively isolated, close knit communities with a high degree of social capital formed, which also helped facilitate the eventual privatization of Third Front plants. State-owned enterprises of China A state-owned enterprise of China ( Chinese : 国有企业) is a legal entity that undertakes commercial activities on behalf of an owner government . As of 2017 , China has more SOEs than any other country, and

2952-444: The Third Front construction, the fourteen largest cities in China's potentially vulnerable regions included approximately 60% of the country's manufacturing, 50% of its chemical industries, and 52% of its national defense industries. In particular, the northeast was China's industrial center. China's population centers were concentrated in eastern coastal areas where they would be vulnerable to attack by air or water. In constructing

3034-477: The Third Front railroad projects built between 1969 and 1971, all but the Chengdu-Kunming railway suffered from major defects. Three such projects were completed in the early 1970s but still not fully operational until the late 1970s. The primary achievement of railroad construction during the Third Front construction was the building of ten new interprovincial lines. Building the Chengdu-Kunming and

3116-662: The Third Front region. More than 1,100 large and medium-sized projects were established during the Third Front period. With large projects such as Chengdu-Kunming Railway , Panzhihua Iron and Steel , Second Auto Works , the Third Front Movement stimulated previously poor and agricultural economies in China's southwest and northwest. Dozens of cities, such as Mianyang , Deyang , Panzhihua in Sichuan, Guiyang in Guizhou, Shiyan in Hubei , emerged as major industrial cities. However,

3198-505: The Third Front slowed during 1966. As the Cultural Revolution ignited leftist extremism, Lin Biao , Chen Boda also replaced Li Fuchun, Peng Dehuai , and Deng Xiaoping as the actual leaders of the Third Front Movement. By comparison to the rest of the country, Third Front work was less disrupted by the Cultural Revolution, consistent with the broader pattern that central officials acted to protect national security-related work units throughout

3280-750: The Third Front, China built a self-sufficient base industrial base area as a strategic reserve in the event of war with the Soviet Union or the United States. The campaign was centrally planned. It was carried out primarily in secret, and was only mentioned in the People's Daily for the first time in 1978. China built 1,100 Third Front projects (encompassing 1,945 industrial enterprises and research institutions) between 1965 and 1980. Major universities, including both Tsinghua University and Peking University , opened campuses in Third Front cities. The overall cost of Third Front projects during

3362-450: The Third Front, for example, required structural reinforcement for the caverns into which they were built and tunnels to allow exhaust to escape. As Planning Commission Director, Li Fuchun set design rules stating that Third Front projects should not attempt to be "big and complete" or incorporate major administrative, social service, or other buildings not involved in production. Instead, project leaders were directed to make do with what

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3444-426: The Third Front. Rural recruits were inclined to view it as an advancement from work in the countryside to better compensated industrial work. These material benefits helped ease the family separations that could occur as a result of Third Front work assignments. Urban recruits who already worked at state-owned enterprises in more developed coastal areas were more likely to be apprehensive because they already received

3526-498: The United States. Third Front factories often assigned workers to read the classic Mao speeches Remember Norman Bethune , The Foolish Old Man who Moved Mountains , and Serve the People . After Nixon's China trip in 1972, investment to the Third Front region gradually declined. Rapprochement between the United States and China decreased the fear of invasion which motivated the Third Front construction. In August 1972,

3608-556: The Zhenbao Island incident as part of broader pattern of aggression. Perceiving the border clash in connection with the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Chinese policy-makers became concerned that the Soviet Union might view the Chinese domestic turmoil during the Cultural Revolution as a reason for similar military intervention. The central Party's efforts to accelerate Third Front work in June 1969 also became entwined with

3690-412: The benefits of working at such enterprises. If such urban recruits declined a Third Front assignment, they would lose their Party membership and right to work at state-owned enterprises. Third Front workers did, however, receive a "subsidy to keep secrets" ( baomi fei ). According to academic Covell F. Meyskens's analysis of remuneration based on Third Front work unit gazetteers, approximately 75% of

3772-402: The building of railroads to connect Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou. The Third Front construction was primarily carried out in secret, with the location for Third Front projects following the principle of “close to the mountains, dispersed, and hidden” ( 靠山, 分散, 隐蔽 ; kàoshān, fēnsàn, yǐnbì ). This principle was motivated by national defense considerations; plants were required to be hidden in

3854-403: The campaign. In Sichuan province, China developed an integrated nuclear sector which included uranium mining and processing facilities. Electronics manufacturing expanded during the Third Front and by 1980, inland China accounted for more than half of the country's electronics production capacity and work force. Major production facilities were built in Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Guizhou, with

3936-594: The central government a portion of their capital income, stock dividends, property transfer income, enterprise liquidated income, and other state-owned capital income. SOEs were major beneficiaries of China's stimulus program following the Great Recession , which began a period where the private sector withdrew and the state-owned sector expanded. The pace of SOE mergers has increased under Xi. The goals of China's current SOE mergers include an effort to create larger and more competitive national champions with

4018-495: The civilian market ( junzhuanmin ). As plants built during the Third Front construction were privatized over the period 1980 to 2000, many became owned by former managers and technicians. As one example, Shaanxi Auto Gear General Works was privatized and became Shaanxi Fast Auto Drive Company; as of 2022 it is the largest automotive transmission manufacturer and its annual revenues exceed US$ 10 billion. Through its distribution of infrastructure, industry, and human capital around

4100-490: The coastal areas to the Third Front region. Most of these firms came from cities like Shanghai , Beijing , Shenyang , Dalian , Tianjin, Nanjing . Approximately 400 state-owned enterprises were re-located from coastal cities to secret locations in China's interior regions. In 1969, Third Front construction accelerated following the Chinese-Soviet border clash at Zhenbao Island. Chinese policy-makers interpreted

4182-406: The concept of the Third Front to locate critical infrastructure and national defense facilities away from areas where they would be vulnerable to invasions. Describing the geographical foundation of the concept, he stated: Our first front is coastal regions, second front is the line that cuts from Baotou to Lanzhou and southwest is the third front ... in the period of the atomic bomb, we need

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4264-462: The country's interior. Mao objected to the preliminary proposal because ”[t]he Third Five-Year Plan […] need[s] to set basic industries in the Southwest.” He said that agricultural and defense industries are like fists, basic industries are like the hip. “The fists cannot be powerful unless the hip is well seated.” According to Mao's judgment, there was possibility that China would be involved in

4346-412: The country, the Third Front created favorable conditions for subsequent market development, private enterprise, and township and village enterprises . Once remote regions that were part of the Third Front continue to benefit from the influx of specialists during the Third Front construction and many enterprises, including many private ones, are legacies of the movement. Because each plant built during

4428-410: The country. Panzhihua, for example, was less impacted by the Cultural Revolution. Besides newly built large projects, many Third Front plants were spinoffs or entirely moved from existing plants in other parts of the country. In a document issued in early 1965, plants in the First and Second Fronts were required to contribute their best equipment and workers to the Third Front Movement. This priority

4510-546: The creation of a heavy industrial zone as a safe haven for retreat in the event of foreign invasion during State Planning Meetings in May 1964. Subsequently referred to as the Big Third Front, this inland heavy industrial base was to be built up with the help of enterprises re-located from the coast. At a June 1964 Politburo meeting, Mao also advocated that each province should also establish its own military industrial complex as an additional measure (subsequently named

4592-456: The designs of many Third Front projects were uneconomic due to their location or deficient due to their hurried construction. For national defense reasons, location choices for the Third Front projects followed the guiding principle “Close to mountains, dispersed, hidden” ( kaoshan, fensan, yinbi ). Many Third Front projects were located in remote areas that were hard to access and far away from supplies and potential markets. The Third Front Movement

4674-550: The discussion about the Third Five-Year Plan. Mao became concerned that the United States could strike China's nuclear weapons facilities in Lanzhou and Baotou and advocated even more strongly for development of the Third Front. Other key leadership's fear of attack by the United States increased also, and the Third Front received broad support thereafter. In 1965, Yu Qiuli was given the lead role in developing

4756-816: The escalation of the Vietnam War after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident , the Sino-Soviet Split and small-scale border skirmishes between China and the Soviet Union. The Third Front campaign industrialized part of China's rugged interior and agricultural region. Between 1964 and 1980, China invested 205 billion yuan in the Third Front Region, accounting for 39.01% of total national investment in basic industries and infrastructure. Millions of factory workers, cadres , intellectuals, military personnel, and tens of millions of construction workers, flocked to

4838-536: The forefront of global seaport construction, and most new ports built by them are part of the Belt and Road Initiative . State-owned banks are important sources of funding for port construction. SOEs that compete in the market are largely owned by provincial or sub-provincial governments. A significant cluster of these SOEs are joint ventures with foreign companies in the automotive industry . In addition to their own operations, SOEs invest in private enterprises. From

4920-475: The former president of state-owned China Huarong Asset Management announced in 2015 that during the operation of China Huarong Asset Management, the embedded CCP committee will play a central role, and party members will play an exemplary role. As Jin et al. wrote in 2022, The overarching principle of SOE reform is to firmly implement the Party’s leadership and the modern enterprise system. This principle creates

5002-501: The government sought to give SOEs incentives to pursue profits, sought to reduce SOE dependence on the government, and sought to increase market competition. With the goal of boosting innovation and efficiency, more than half of China's largest SOEs had established technical development centers by 1993. The same year, the CCP issued its "Decision on Issues Related to the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economy System." In

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5084-433: The government to use assets as collateral to issue debt or to sell shares to balance budgets. According to academic Wendy Leutert, China's SOEs, "...contribute to central and local governments revenues through dividends and taxes, support urban employment, keep key input prices low, channel capital towards targeted industries and technologies, support sub-national redistribution to poorer interior and western provinces, and aid

5166-555: The industries of telecommunications , military equipment, railroads , tobacco, petroleum , and electric power . SOEs have a primary role in China's energy sector . Its five large state-owned power generation companies are: Datang , Guodian , Huadian , Huaneng , and China Power Investment Corporation . Its state-owned grid companies are State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC) and China Southern Power Grid Corporation . Most Chinese universities are SOEs. China's SOEs are at

5248-437: The lowest priority”. In early 1963, a central planning team (led by Li Fuchun , Li Xiannian , Tan Zhenlin , Bo Yibo ) put “solving the problems of food, clothes, and other life necessities” (解决人民的吃穿用) as the priority of economic works in their proposal for the Third Five-Year Plan. The preliminary draft for the Third Five Year Plan, of which Deng Xiaoping was a major author, had no provision for largescale industrialization in

5330-457: The most SOEs among large national companies. As of the end of 2019, China's SOEs represented 4.5% of the global economy and the total assets of all China's SOEs, including those operating in the financial sector, reached US$ 78.08   trillion. State-owned enterprises accounted for over 60% of China's market capitalization in 2019 and estimates suggest that they generated about 23-28% of China's GDP in 2017 and employ between 5% and 16% of

5412-538: The most expensive industrialization campaign of the Mao-era. Operating on the principle of "choose the best people and best horses for the Third Front," ( 好人好马上三线 ; hǎorén hǎomǎ shàngsānxiàn ) many skilled engineers, scientists, and intellectuals were transferred to Third Front facilities. In this slogan, the "best horses" refers to the best available equipment and resources. Third Front construction methods fused both low-tech and high-tech techniques. In 1937

5494-588: The most widely known electronics factory being Changhong Electric in Mianyang, Sichuan. In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, nearly all work units in China's aerospace industry were established via the Third Front. These Third Front Projects benefitted China's space program through the launch of Dong Fang Hong 1 (China's first satellite) in 1970, expansion of Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center , building Xichang Satellite Launch Center , and building Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center . On September 11, 1964,

5576-625: The mountains and were not allowed to be geographically clustered to minimize the damage of air strikes. These priorities reflected Communist Party leaders' revolutionary experiences as guerillas. Because construction of Third Front projects was based on these non-economic considerations, projects were extremely costly. Dispersing new or re-located industry in rugged terrain required major new infrastructure for utilities, communication, and transportation. Facilities such as factories were sometimes built in subterranean complexes which greatly increased costs. The twenty subterranean powerplants built during

5658-460: The official perspective, it was a political privilege to be selected as a Third Front recruit. Among the important recruitment mechanisms were oath-swearing ceremonies or mobilization meetings held at urban work units or rural communes . At these events, local officials exhorted crowds to join the Third Front construction effort. The Party instructed them to urge workers to "learn from the PLA and

5740-487: The pace of industrialization. It invested more on in China's coastal regions and focused on the production of consumer goods. Construction of the Third Front reversed these trends, developing industry and using mass mobilization for the construction of such industrial projects, an approached that had been suspended after the failures of the Great Leap Forward. In February 1962, Chen Yun had proposed that

5822-494: The perspective of these private enterprises, this form of partial state ownership is helpful in obtaining financing from banks, particularly as prompts banks to require less collateral. Sometimes in investing in private enterprises, SOEs acquire enough shares to nationalize them. Over the period 2018–2020, 109 publicly traded enterprises with more than $ 100 billion in collective total assets were nationalized in this way. SOEs help stabilize public finance, including through allowing

5904-520: The role of SOEs as part of the dominant position of state ownership necessary for common prosperity . In 2019, a CCP rule required SOE articles of association to require that major decisions must be discussed by the SOE's party committee before they are considered by management or by the board of directors. In 2023, multiple state-owned enterprises, including Shanghai Municipal Investment Group , established internal People's Armed Forces Departments run by

5986-400: The smaller cities located further inland from the First Front. The "Small Third Front" ( xiao sanxian ) referred to rugged or remote areas in more major provinces like Shanxi, Anhui, and Hebei. As with the Big Third Front, Chinese policymakers intended Small Third Front to form a part of a network of military and industrial power that could withstand invasion or nuclear attack. Prior to

6068-560: The state's response to natural disasters, financial crises and social instability." Following the CCP victory in the Chinese Civil War , one of the party's early steps was to nationalize enterprises that the defeated Nationalists had controlled. During the Third Front campaign to develop heavy industry in China's interior regions, almost 400 state-owned enterprises were re-located from coastal cities to secret sites in

6150-405: The studied work units paid salaries above the national norm for the industrial sector. Aside from material consequences, some urban and rural workers saw Third Front work favorably because it was to express their commitment to building Chinese socialism through bringing industry to undeveloped regions and building an industrial base to help protect China in the event of invasion. Construction of

6232-474: The title Third Front . If an internal link led you here, you may wish to change the link to point directly to the intended article. Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Third_Front&oldid=1175260087 " Category : Disambiguation pages Hidden categories: Short description is different from Wikidata All article disambiguation pages All disambiguation pages Third Front (China) "Third Front"

6314-432: The wave of reform thereafter, one goal was to separate SOE management from government and to empower a select group of SOEs with special property rights and autonomy. Consistent with CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji 's strategy of grasping the large, letting go of the small , major SOE reform occurred in 1997, which represented a change from the previously incremental reform efforts. The state

6396-540: Was available, including building rammed earth housing so that more resources could be directed to production. This policy came to be expressed through the slogan, "First build the factory and afterward housing." Potential Third Front workers had to meet physical requirements and had to undergo a political review. The Party forbid recruitment of those whose families were "landlords, rich peasant, counterrevolutionary, bad element, or [...] rightist." Third Front workers had varying reactions to being selected to work on

6478-522: Was busy into the early 1970s; like the rest of the Third Front, its work slowed as China and the United States developed their diplomatic relationship. The Shanghai Small Front office ultimately shut down in 1991. To recruit and develop the labor force responsible for building Third Front projects, the CCP sought to develop a labor force committed to the Third Front campaign as a way to build socialist modernity. The Party emphasized austere living and working, although not as an end in-and-of-itself, but as

6560-613: Was carried out in a hurry. Many Third Front projects were simultaneously being designed, constructed, and put in production, ( biansheji, bianshigong, bianshengchan ). After rapprochement with the United States reduced the national defense considerations underlying the Third Front, investment in its projects decreased. Since the reform of state-owned enterprises starting in the 1980s, many Third Front plants went bankrupt, though some others reinvented themselves and continued to serve as pillars in their respective local economies or were developed into successful private enterprises. Mao created

6642-501: Was encouraged to preserve large SOEs and to allow weaker ones to be "let go" through closing or consolidating. Other major policies that were part of the 1997 reforms included management and employee buyouts and the inclusion of foreign strategic partners. The general trend since 2000 has been for SOEs to increase in importance consistent with a broader resurgence of state activity in the market. SOE mergers have been routine since 2000. Beginning in 2003 with Hu Jintao 's administration,

6724-418: Was the centerpiece of the project and served as "a multi-function manufacturing base for anti-aircraft and anti-tank weaponry. By 1966, it was producing arms including rocket-propelled grenades and anti-aircraft weapons. Steel mills, chemical plants, instrumentation factories, electronic factories, and extensive road infrastructure were also built in the Shanghai Small Front. The Shanghai Small Third Front

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