Communications-based train control ( CBTC ) is a railway signaling system that uses telecommunications between the train and track equipment for traffic management and infrastructure control. CBTC allows a train's position to be known more accurately than with traditional signaling systems. This can make railway traffic management safer and more efficient. Rapid transit system (and other railway systems) are able to reduce headways while maintaining or even improving safety.
71-466: A CBTC system is a "continuous, automatic train control system utilizing high-resolution train location determination, independent from track circuits ; continuous, high-capacity, bidirectional train-to-wayside data communications; and trainborne and wayside processors capable of implementing automatic train protection (ATP) functions, as well as optional automatic train operation (ATO) and automatic train supervision ( ATS ) functions," as defined in
142-457: A double track and often contain multiple parallel tracks. Main line tracks are typically operated at higher speeds than branch lines and are generally built and maintained to a higher standard than yards and branch lines. Main lines may also be operated under shared access by a number of railway companies, with sidings and branches operated by private companies or single railway companies. Railway points (UK) or switches (US) are usually set in
213-413: A moving block system as shown in the second figure, the train position and its braking curve is continuously calculated by the trains, and then communicated via radio to the wayside equipment. Thus, the wayside equipment is able to establish protected areas, each one called Limit of Movement Authority (LMA), up to the nearest obstacle (in the figure the tail of the train in front). Movement Authority (MA)
284-695: A railway is a track that is used for through trains or is the principal artery of the system from which branch lines , yards , sidings , and spurs are connected. It generally refers to a route between towns, as opposed to a route providing suburban or metro services. It may also be called a trunk line, for example the Grand Trunk Railway in Canada, or the Trunk Line in Norway. For capacity reasons, main lines in many countries have at least
355-409: A Frequency Spectrum for Critical Safety Applications dedicated to Urban Rail Systems) to reserve a frequency band specifically for radio-based urban rail systems. Such decision would help standardize CBTC systems across the market (a growing demand from most operators) and ensure availability for those critical systems. As a CBTC system is required to have high availability and particularly, allow for
426-488: A better adaptation of the transport offer to the actual demand, allows significant energy savings reducing the power consumption. The primary risk of an electronic train control system is that if the communications link between any of the trains is disrupted then all or part of the system might have to enter a failsafe state until the problem is remedied. Depending on the severity of the communication loss, this state can range from vehicles temporarily reducing speed, coming to
497-418: A brake application to reduce speed a penalty brake application is made automatically. Due to the more sensitive handling and control issues with North American freight trains, ATC is almost exclusively applied to passenger locomotives in both inter-city and commuter service with freight trains making use of cab signals without speed control. Some high-volume passenger railroads such as Amtrak , Metro North and
568-507: A careful analysis of the benefits and risks of a given CBTC architecture (centralized vs. distributed) must be done during system design. When CBTC is applied to systems that previously ran under complete human control with operators working on sight it may actually result in a reduction in capacity (albeit with an increase in safety). This is because CBTC operates with less positional certainty than human sight and also with greater margins for error as worst-case train parameters are applied for
639-543: A fully redundant architecture of the CBTC system may however achieve high availability values by itself. In principle, CBTC systems may be designed with centralized supervision systems in order to improve maintainability and reduce installation costs. If so, there is an increased risk of a single point of failure that could disrupt service over an entire system or line. Fixed block systems usually work with distributed logic that are normally more resistant to such outages. Therefore,
710-416: A graceful degradation, a secondary method of signaling might be provided to ensure some level of non-degraded service upon partial or complete CBTC unavailability. This is particularly relevant for brownfield implementations (lines with an already existing signalling system) where the infrastructure design cannot be controlled and coexistence with legacy systems is required, at least, temporarily. For example,
781-572: A halt or operating in a degraded mode until communications are re-established. If communication outage is permanent some sort of contingency operation must be implemented which may consist of manual operation using absolute block or, in the worst case, the substitution of an alternative form of transportation . As a result, high availability of CBTC systems is crucial for proper operation, especially if such systems are used to increase transport capacity and reduce headway. System redundancy and recovery mechanisms must then be thoroughly checked to achieve
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#1732773234465852-509: A high robustness in operation. With the increased availability of the CBTC system, there is also a need for extensive training and periodical refresh of system operators on the recovery procedures . In fact, one of the major system hazards in CBTC systems is the probability of human error and improper application of recovery procedures if the system becomes unavailable. Communications failures can result from equipment malfunction, electromagnetic interference , weak signal strength or saturation of
923-470: A more severe penalty application that will bring the train to a stop. Neither system requires explicit speed control or adherence to a braking curve . The Union Pacific system requires an immediate brake application that cannot be released until the train's speed has been reduced to 40 mph (64 km/h) (for any train traveling above that speed). Then, the train's speed must be further reduced to no more than 20 mph (32 km/h) within 70 seconds of
994-757: A variety of applications as shown in the figure below (mid 2011). They range from some implementations with short track, limited numbers of vehicles and few operating modes (such as the airport APMs in San Francisco or Washington ), to complex overlays on existing railway networks carrying more than a million passengers each day and with more than 100 trains (such as lines 1 and 6 in Madrid Metro , line 3 in Shenzhen Metro , some lines in Paris Metro , New York City Subway and Beijing Subway , or
1065-414: Is a general class of train protection systems for railways that involves a speed control mechanism in response to external inputs. For example, a system could effect an emergency brake application if the driver does not react to a signal at danger. ATC systems tend to integrate various cab signalling technologies and they use more granular deceleration patterns in lieu of the rigid stops encountered with
1136-489: Is also planned to be used on the soon to open Line 5 Eglinton line, however, Unlike on Line 1, the system on Line 5 will be supplied by Bombardier Transportation using its Cityflo 650 technology. The TTC plans to convert Line 2 Bloor-Danforth and Line 4 Sheppard to ATC in the future, subject to funding availability and being able to replace the current non-ATC compatible fleet on Line 2 with trains that are, with an estimated date of completion by 2030. ATC systems in
1207-410: Is compared with the speed limit and the brakes are applied automatically if the train is travelling too fast. The brakes are released as soon as the train slows below the speed limit. This system offers a higher degree of safety, preventing collisions that might be caused by driver error, so it has also been installed in heavily used lines, such as Tokyo's Yamanote Line and some subway lines. Although
1278-472: Is considered as a basic enabler technology for this purpose. There are four grades of automation available: CBTC systems allow optimal use of the railway infrastructure as well as achieving maximum capacity and minimum headway between operating trains, while maintaining the safety requirements. These systems are suitable for the new highly demanding urban lines, but also to be overlaid on existing lines in order to improve their performance. Of course, in
1349-620: Is different from that of its neighbours. From 1978 until 1987, the Swedish ATC system was trialled in Denmark, and a new Siemens -designed ATC system was implemented between 1986 and 1988. In consequence of the Sorø railway accident , which occurred in April 1988, the new system was progressively installed on all Danish main lines from the early 1990s onwards. Some trains (such as those employed on
1420-436: Is evolving, making use of the latest techniques and components to offer more compact systems and simpler architectures. For instance, with the advent of modern electronics it has been possible to build in redundancy so that single failures do not adversely impact operational availability. Moreover, these systems offer complete flexibility in terms of operational schedules or timetables, enabling urban rail operators to respond to
1491-597: Is generally incompatible with ERTMS / ETCS (as in the case of the Bothnia Line which is the first railway line in Sweden to exclusively use ERTMS/ETCS), and with the aim of Trafikverket to eventually replace ATC-2 with ERTMS/ETCS over the next few decades, a Special Transmission Module (STM) has been developed to automatically switch between ATC-2 and ERTMS/ETCS. In 1906, the Great Western Railway in
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#17327732344651562-677: Is however not used on the Copenhagen S-train commuter network, where another, incompatible safety system called HKT ( da:Hastighedskontrol og togstop ) had been in use from 1975–2022, as well as on the Hornbæk Line , which uses a much more simplified ATP system introduced in 2000. All aforementioned systems are gradually being replaced by the modern and worldwide CBTC signalling standard as of 2024. Bane NOR —the Norwegian government's agency for railway infrastructure—uses
1633-412: Is sortable, and is initially sorted by year. Click on the [REDACTED] icon on the right side of the column header to change sort key and sort order. 2021 (Tuen Ma Line and former West Rail Line) Brownfield (other sections) Greenfield (other sections) Line M4: UTO Line 5, Kelana Jaya Line Line 12, Putrajaya Line Automatic train control Automatic train control ( ATC )
1704-418: Is the permission for a train to move to a specific location within the constraints of the infrastructure and with supervision of speed. End of Authority is the location to which the train is permitted to proceed and where target speed is equal to zero. End of Movement is the location to which the train is permitted to proceed according to an MA. When transmitting an MA, it is the end of the last section given in
1775-402: Is the use of leaky feeder cable that, while having higher initial costs (material + installation) achieves a more reliable radio link. With the emerging services over open ISM radio bands (i.e. 2.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz) and the potential disruption over critical CBTC services, there is an increasing pressure in the international community (ref. report 676 of UITP organization, Reservation of
1846-492: Is varying according to the continuous updates of the train location and speed, maintaining the safety requirements. This results in a reduced headway between consecutive trains and an increased transport capacity . Modern CBTC systems allow different levels of automation or grades of automation (GoA), as defined and classified in the IEC 62290–1. In fact, CBTC is not a synonym for " driverless " or "automated trains" although it
1917-599: The BMT Canarsie Line in New York City was outfitted with a backup automatic block signaling system capable of supporting 12 trains per hour (tph), compared with the 26 tph of the CBTC system. Although this is a rather common architecture for resignalling projects, it can negate some of the cost savings of CBTC if applied to new lines. This is still a key point in the CBTC development (and is still being discussed), since some providers and operators argue that
1988-661: The British Rail Automatic Warning System (AWS). Starting in 2017, the Toronto Transit Commission began the implementation of ATC on to Line 1 Yonge–University , at a cost of $ 562.3 million. Awarding the contract to Alstom in 2009, the TTC will be able to reduce the headway between trains on Line 1 during rush hours, and allow an increase in the number of trains operating on Line 1. Work would however not begin until
2059-474: The IEEE 1474 standard. CBTC is a signalling standard defined by the IEEE 1474 standard. The original version was introduced in 1999 and updated in 2004. The aim was to create consistency and standardisation between digital railway signalling systems that allow for an increase in train capacity through what the standard defines as high-resolution train location determination. The standard therefore does not require
2130-481: The Long Island Rail Road require the use of speed control on freight trains that run on all or part of their systems. While cab signalling and speed control technology has existed since the 1920s, adoption of ATC only became an issue after a number of serious accidents several decades later. The Long Island Rail Road implemented its Automatic Speed Control system within its cab signalled territory in
2201-773: The Senseki Line in 2011, followed by the Saikyō Line in 2017, and the Koumi Line in 2020. It is considered to be Japan's equivalent to ETCS Level 3 . Several subway lines in South Korea use ATC, in some cases enhanced with ATO. All lines use ATC. All lines are enhanced with ATO. Other than on Lines 1 and 2 (MELCO cars only), all lines use ATC. Line 2 (VVVF cars), Line 5 cars, Line 6 cars, Line 7 cars, and Line 8 cars have their ATC systems enhanced with ATO. Denmark's system of ATC (officially designated ZUB 123 )
Communications-based train control - Misplaced Pages Continue
2272-711: The Singapore North East Line . CBTC has its origins in the loop-based systems developed by Alcatel SEL (now Thales ) for the Bombardier Automated Rapid Transit (ART) systems in Canada during the mid-1980s. These systems, which were also referred to as transmission-based train control (TBTC), made use of inductive loop transmission techniques for track to train communication, introducing an alternative to track circuit based communication. This technology, operating in
2343-416: The signalling system perspective, the first figure shows the total occupancy of the leading train by including the whole blocks which the train is located on. This is due to the fact that it is impossible for the system to know exactly where the train actually is within these blocks . Therefore, the fixed block system only allows the following train to move up to the last unoccupied block 's border. In
2414-630: The Åsta accident occurred in 2000, the implementation of DATC on the Røros Line was accelerated, and it became operational in 2001. In Sweden the development of ATC started in the 1960s (ATC-1), and was formally introduced in the early-1980s together with high-speed trains (ATC-2/Ansaldo L10000). As of 2008, 9,831 km out of the 11,904 km of track maintained by Swedish Transport Administration —the Swedish agency responsible for railway infrastructure—had ATC-2 installed. However, since ATC-2
2485-581: The Øresundståg service and some X 2000 trains) have both the Danish and the Swedish systems, while others (e.g. ten of the ICE-TD trains) are fitted with both the Danish and the German systems. The ZUB 123 system is now considered by Banedanmark , the Danish railway infrastructure company, to be obsolete and the entire Danish rail network is expected to be converted to ETCS Level 2 by 2030. The ZUB 123 system
2556-826: The 1950s after a pair of deadly accidents caused by ignored signals. After the Newark Bay Lift Bridge Disaster the state of New Jersey legislated use of speed control on all major passenger train operators within the State. While speed control is used on many passenger lines in the United States, in most cases it has been adopted voluntarily by the railroads that own the lines. Only three freight railroads, Union Pacific , Florida East Coast and CSX Transportation , have adopted any form of ATC on their own networks. The systems on both FEC and CSX work in conjunction with pulse code cab signals , which in
2627-542: The 30–60 kHz frequency range to communicate trains and wayside equipment, was widely adopted by the metro operators in spite of some electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) issues, as well as other installation and maintenance concerns (see SelTrac for further information regarding transmission-based train-control). As with new application of any technology, some problems arose at the beginning mainly due to compatibility and interoperability aspects. However, there have been relevant improvements since then, and currently
2698-475: The ATC applies the brakes automatically when the train speed exceeds the speed limit, it cannot control the motor power or train stop position when pulling into stations. However, the automatic train operation (ATO) system can automatically control departure from stations, the speed between stations, and the stop position in stations. It has been installed in some subways. However, ATC has three disadvantages. First,
2769-533: The Automatic Train Control (ATC) system was developed for high-speed trains like the Shinkansen , which travel so fast that the driver has almost no time to acknowledge trackside signals. Although the ATC system sends AF signals carrying information about the speed limit for the specific track section along the track circuit . When these signals are received on board, the train's current speed
2840-510: The MA. It is important to mention that the occupancy calculated in these systems must include a safety margin for location uncertainty (in yellow in the figure) added to the length of the train. Both of them form what is usually called 'Footprint'. This safety margin depends on the accuracy of the odometry system in the train. CBTC systems based on moving block allows the reduction of the safety distance between two consecutive trains. This distance
2911-564: The Sub-Surface network in London Underground ). Despite the difficulty, the table below tries to summarize and reference the main radio-based CBTC systems deployed around the world as well as those ongoing projects being developed. Besides, the table distinguishes between the implementations performed over existing and operative systems ( brownfield ) and those undertaken on completely new lines ( Greenfield ). This list
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2982-525: The Swedish system of ATC. Trains can therefore generally cross the border without being specially modified. However, unlike in Sweden, the ATC system used in Norway differentiates between partial ATC ( delvis ATC , DATC), which ensures that a train stops whenever a red signal is passed, and full ATC (FATC), which, in addition to preventing overshooting red signals, also ensures that a train does not exceed its maximum allowed speed limit. A railway line in Norway can have either DATC or FATC installed, but not both at
3053-447: The UK developed a system known as "automatic train control". In modern terminology, GWR ATC is classified as an automatic warning system (AWS). This was an intermittent train protection system that relied on an electrically energised (or unenergised) rail between, and higher than, the running rails. This rail sloped at each end and was known as an ATC ramp and would make contact with a shoe on
3124-407: The United States are almost always integrated with existing continuous cab signalling systems. The ATC comes from electronics in the locomotive that implement some form of speed control based on the inputs of the cab signalling system. If the train speed exceeds the maximum speed allowed for that portion of track, an overspeed alarm sounds in the cab. If the engineer fails to reduce speed and/or make
3195-463: The braking pattern, while ensuring ride comfort. There is also an emergency braking pattern outside the normal braking pattern and the ATC system applies the emergency brakes if the train speed exceeds this emergency braking pattern. The digital ATC system has a number of advantages: To date, the following digital ATC systems are used: ATACS is a moving block ATC system similar to CBTC , developed by RTRI and first implemented by JR East on
3266-534: The case of CSX was inherited from the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac railroad on its single main line. Union Pacific's was inherited on portions of the Chicago and Northwestern east–west main line and works in conjunction with an early two aspect cab signaling system designed for use with ATC. On CSX and FEC more restrictive cab signal changes require the engineer to initiate a minimum brake application or face
3337-643: The case of upgrading existing lines the design, installation, test and commissioning stages are much more critical. This is mainly due to the challenge of deploying the overlying system without disrupting the revenue service. The evolution of the technology and the experience gained in operation over the last 30 years means that modern CBTC systems are more reliable and less prone to failure than older train control systems. CBTC systems normally have less wayside equipment and their diagnostic and monitoring tools have been improved, which makes them easier to implement and, more importantly, easier to maintain. CBTC technology
3408-413: The communications medium. In this case, an interruption can result in a service brake or emergency brake application as real time situational awareness is a critical safety requirement for CBTC and if these interruptions are frequent enough it could seriously impact service. This is the reason why, historically, CBTC systems first implemented radio communication systems in 2003, when the required technology
3479-542: The delivery of brand new trains with ATC compatibility and the retirement of older rolling stock that was not compatible with the new system. ATC was introduced in phases, beginning with a test on 4 November 2017 during regular service between Dupont and Yorkdale stations. It was first introduced in a permanent manner with the opening of the Toronto–York Spadina subway extension on 17 December 2017, between Vaughan and Sheppard West stations. Implementation of
3550-454: The design (e.g. guaranteed emergency brake rate vs. nominal brake rate). For instance, CBTC introduction in Philly's Center City trolley tunnel resulted initially in a marked increase in travel time and corresponding decrease in capacity when compared with the unprotected manual driving. This was the offset to finally eradicate vehicle collisions which on-sight driving cannot avoid and showcases
3621-479: The driver failed to acknowledge this warning within a preset time, the brakes of the train would be applied. In testing, the GWR demonstrated the effectiveness of this system by sending an express train at full speed past a distant signal at caution. The train was brought safely to a stand before reaching the home signal. If the signal associated with the ramp was clear, the ramp was energised. The energized ramp would lift
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#17327732344653692-498: The driver retained full command of braking. The term is especially common in Japan , where ATC is used on all Shinkansen (bullet train) lines, and on some conventional rail and subway lines, as a replacement for ATS. The accident report for the 2006 Qalyoub accident mentions an ATC system. In 2017, Huawei was contracted to install GSM-R partly to provide communication services to automatic train protection systems. In Japan,
3763-488: The headway cannot be increased due to the idle running time between releasing the brakes at one speed limit and applying the brakes at the next slower speed limit. Second, the brakes are applied when the train achieves maximum speed, meaning reduced ride comfort. Third, if the operator wants to run faster trains on the line, all the related relevant wayside and on-board equipment must be changed first. The following analogue systems have been used: The digital ATC system uses
3834-539: The initial cab signal drop. Failure to apply the brakes for these speed reductions will result in a penalty application. All three freight ATC systems provide the engineer with a degree of latitude in applying brakes in a safe and proper manner, since improper braking can result in a derailment or a runaway. None of the systems are in effect in difficult or mountainous terrain. Main line (railway) The main line , or mainline in American English , of
3905-409: The modern CBTC systems the trains continuously calculate and communicate their status via radio to the wayside equipment distributed along the line. This status includes, among other parameters, the exact position, speed, travel direction and braking distance . This information allows calculation of the area potentially occupied by the train on the track. It also enables the wayside equipment to define
3976-435: The next train ahead is computed. The on-board memory also saves data on track gradients, and speed limits over curves and points. All this data forms the basis for ATC decisions when controlling the service brakes and stopping the train. In a digital ATC system, the running pattern creates determines the braking curve to stop the train before it enters the next track section ahead occupied by another train. An alarm sounds when
4047-608: The older automatic train stop (ATS) technology. ATC can also be used with automatic train operation (ATO) and is usually considered to be the safety-critical part of a railway system. There have been numerous different safety systems referred to as "automatic train control" over time. The first experimental apparatus was installed on the Henley branch line in January 1906 by the Great Western Railway , although it would now be referred to as an automatic warning system (AWS) because
4118-418: The points on the line that must never be passed by the other trains on the same track. These points are communicated to make the trains automatically and continuously adjust their speed while maintaining the safety and comfort ( jerk ) requirements. So, the trains continuously receive information regarding the distance to the preceding train and are then able to adjust their safety distance accordingly. From
4189-554: The protected section for each train is a "block" that moves with and trails behind it, and provides continuous communication of the train's exact position via radio, inductive loop, etc. As a result, Bombardier opened the world's first radio-based CBTC system at San Francisco airport 's automated people mover (APM) in February 2003. A few months later, in June 2003, Alstom introduced the railway application of its radio technology on
4260-484: The reliability of the radio-based communication systems has grown significantly. Moreover, it is important to highlight that not all the systems using radio communication technology are considered to be CBTC systems. So, for clarity and to keep in line with the state-of-the-art solutions for operator's requirements, this article only covers the latest moving block principle based (either true moving block or virtual block , so not dependent on track-based detection of
4331-523: The same time. ATC was first trialled in Norway in 1979, after the Tretten train disaster , caused by a signal passed at danger (SPAD), occurred four years earlier. DATC was first implemented on the section Oslo S - Dombås - Trondheim - Grong between 1983 and 1994, and FATC was first implemented on the Ofoten Line in 1993. The high-speed Gardermoen Line has had FATC since its opening in 1998. After
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#17327732344654402-416: The shoe on the passing locomotive and cause a bell to sound on the footplate. If the system were to fail then the shoe would remain unenergised, the caution state; it therefore failed safe , a fundamental requirement of all safety equipment. The system had been implemented on all GWR main lines, including Paddington to Reading, by 1908. The system remained in use until the 1970s, when it was superseded by
4473-477: The specific traffic demand more swiftly and efficiently and to solve traffic congestion problems. In fact, automatic operation systems have the potential to significantly reduce the headway and improve the traffic capacity compared to manual driving systems. Finally, it is important to mention that the CBTC systems have proven to be more energy efficient than traditional manually driven systems. The use of new functionalities, such as automatic driving strategies or
4544-462: The system on to the remainder of the line was carried out during weekend closures and night time work when the subway would close. There were delays on the project, with deadlines for the complete conversion of Line 1 pushed back multiple times until 2022. ATC conversion was completed to Finch station on 24 September 2022. Converting all of Line 1 to ATC required the installation of 2,000 beacons, 256 signals, and more than one million feet of cable. ATC
4615-407: The track circuits to detect the presence of a train in the section and then transmits digital data from wayside equipment to the train on the track circuit numbers, the number of clear sections (track circuits) to the next train ahead, and the platform that the train will arrive at. The received data is compared with data about track circuit numbers saved in the train on-board memory and the distance to
4686-433: The train approaches the braking pattern and the brakes are applied when the braking pattern is exceeded. The brakes are applied lightly first to ensure better ride comfort, and then more strongly until the optimum deceleration is attained. The brakes are applied more lightly when the train speed drops to a set speed below the speed limit. Regulating the braking force in this way permits the train to decelerate in accordance with
4757-518: The trains) CBTC solutions that make use of the radio communications . CBTC systems are modern railway signaling systems that can mainly be used in urban railway lines (either light or heavy ) and APMs , although it could also be deployed on commuter lines . For main lines , a similar system might be the European Railway Traffic Management System ERTMS Level 3 (not yet fully defined ). In
4828-400: The underside of the passing locomotive. The ramps were provided at distant signals . A development of the design, intended for use at stop signals, was never implemented. If the signal associated with the ramp was at caution, the ramp would not be energised. The ramp would lift the shoe on the passing locomotive and start a timer sequence at the same time sounding a horn on the footplate. If
4899-408: The use of moving block railway signalling, but in practice this is the most common arrangement. Traditional signalling systems detect trains in discrete sections of the track called ' blocks ', each protected by signals that prevent a train entering an occupied block. Since every block is a fixed section of track, these systems are referred to as fixed block systems. In a moving block CBTC system
4970-401: The usual conflicts between operation and safety. The typical architecture of a modern CBTC system comprises the following main subsystems: Thus, although a CBTC architecture is always depending on the supplier and its technical approach, the following logical components may be found generally in a typical CBTC architecture: CBTC technology has been (and is being) successfully implemented for
5041-413: Was mature enough for critical applications. In systems with poor line of sight or spectrum/bandwidth limitations a larger than anticipated number of transponders may be required to enhance the service. This is usually more of an issue with applying CBTC to existing transit systems in tunnels that were not designed from the outset to support it. An alternate method to improve system availability in tunnels
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