Misplaced Pages

#919080

72-482: Released on 31 January 2001, USCNS/21 was the most exhaustive review of US national security strategy since the National Security Act of 1947 . USCNS/21 was released in three distinct phases. The first phase, New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century (see further below), anticipates the emerging international security environment within the first quarter of the 21st century and examines how

144-439: A National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom proposes a new national security strategy based on the anticipated 21st century international security environment. The new strategy must consider how to minimize the potential destabilizing effects of the contradictory trends of globalization and political fragmentation while promoting US interests and values worldwide. In developing this new strategy,

216-765: A Study Group, composed of individuals who will be appointed as Department of Defense personnel. Based on the results of this study and the Commission's consideration thereof, the USCNS/21 will advance practical recommendations that the President of the United States , with the support of the Congress , could begin to implement in the Fiscal Year 2002 budget, if desired. New World Coming: American Security in

288-472: A break with past foreign policy doctrine. Brad Patty, an author for the conservative think tank Security Studies Group writes that, "My guess is that members of the Foreign Policy elite will encounter these first pages as a kind of boilerplate, even trite. Notice, though, that those two pages lead directly to a third page that repudiates the whole living body of American foreign policy thought." About

360-564: A key source of advocacy for creating a single unified military department after the war. Following studies by the JCS Joint Strategic Survey Committee on ways to resolve joint roles and missions problems, George Marshall published a memo in support of postwar unification on November 2, 1942. Marshall's memo called for the following: During both World Wars, but particularly World War 2, aviation had become increasingly important. The aircraft carrier had overtaken

432-493: A lack of attention to " logistics in war ," and a "lack of coordination among the services." In the years following the war, President Truman had been pushing for the unification of the armed services until the passing of the National Security Act of 1947, having research conducted on the topic since 1944 and having expressed his desire for Congress to act on the issue as early as April 6, 1946. He stated in

504-620: A letter to Congress on June 15, 1946, that he "consider[s] it vital that we have a unified force for our national defense ." President Truman had worked closely with the Army and the Navy to establish a consensus, but the departments struggled to come to an agreement until 1947. However, even if everyone could admit that a military reorganization was necessary, they could not agree on how it should be done. The process of obtaining even tentative consensus would take nearly four years. On March 28, 1944,

576-493: A neutral planning document, as many academics and even some in uniform think it to be. Rather it was ... intended to serve five primary purposes." Where the incoming executive team has not formulated a national security strategy, such as an after an election in which foreign policy and defense were not important campaign issues, the process of writing the report can be of immense importance: Few things educate new political appointees faster as to their own strategic sensings, or to

648-458: A promising way to save money by reducing duplication, and this would become a theme to which its proponents would repeatedly return. It also created a sense of urgency to quickly institutionalize lessons learned from World War 2. However, the shrinking budgets also created a zero-sum game environment which encouraged interservice bickering by pitting Army and Navy advocates against each other. Before World War II , congressional committees oversaw

720-440: A related House resolution (80 H.Con.Res. 70) on July 16, 1947. The bill received bipartisan support and was passed in both chambers by voice vote . The National Security Act of 1947 was signed into law by President Truman on July 26, 1947, while aboard his VC-54C presidential aircraft Sacred Cow . From 1921 to 1945, Congress considered approximately 50 bills to reorganize the armed forces. Mostly due to opposition by both

792-734: A single uniformed "Commander of all Forces." On June 19, 1945, the Department of the Navy began its own investigation. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal requested an objective investigation of the postwar reorganization by his friend Ferdinand Eberstadt , the former chairman of the Army-Navy Munitions Board and former vice chair of the War Production Board. By late September, Eberstadt had finished his report, and Forrestal forwarded it to

SECTION 10

#1732790113920

864-466: A way forward. On May 13th, Truman held the meeting, and demanded that Patterson and Forrestal find a way to break the impasse by the end of the month due to the urgency of passing unification legislation. He also said that he had accepted the Navy's arguments against the chief of staff. Finally, he told his chief of staff, Admiral William Leahy, to silence criticism of unification by naval officers. May 31st Patterson and Forrestal reported to him that of

936-616: A year later, Schadlow would comment that the NSS had "achieved the state of mattering". In March 2021, President Joe Biden published the 2021 Interim National Security Strategy (NSS), which recommitted the United States to the NATO alliance and outlined the country's global priorities, concluding that the United States "must demonstrate that democracies can still deliver for our people. It will not happen by accident – we have to defend our democracy, strengthen it and renew it.." On October 12, 2022,

1008-488: Is "only in matters relating to the conduct of the present war" and that these authorities will expire "six months after the termination of the war." During World War II, then- chief of staff of the Army George Marshall brought the idea of unification of the armed services to President Franklin D. Roosevelt , but "he was routinely rebuffed on the grounds that a substantive discussion of this option while

1080-472: Is the gravest threat to US national security, even over weapons proliferation and terrorism. The Commission recommends: The Commission finds that the US government has failed to restructure itself to the post–Cold War world. It recommends significant restructuring to re-align government offices, branches, and procedures with the global realities of the 21st century as well as ensure that,"strategy once again drives

1152-643: The Cabinet -level War Department and Navy Department , and while each department was separate from the other, both were able to obtain aircraft . During this time, the President had a level of authority over the departments. After the attack on Pearl Harbor , Congress passed the First War Powers Act , which authorized the sitting president "to make such redistribution of functions among executive agencies as he may deem necessary" provided that it

1224-654: The National Military Strategy . The stated intent of the Goldwater–Nichols legislation is broadly accepted as valid for effective political discourse on issues affecting the nation's security—the Congress and the Executive need a common understanding of the strategic environment and the administration's intent as a starting point for future dialogue. That said, however, it is understood that in

1296-596: The Roberts Commission , and would continue to be investigated through almost the end of the century. One of the findings that emerged was the probable role of intelligence failures linked to interservice bickering between Pearl Harbor's Army and Navy commanders, General Walter Short and Admiral Husband Kimmel. Though not a court martial, the Roberts Commission explicitly accused the two of dereliction of duty for not conferring to coordinate in light of

1368-465: The US government's structure, legislation, and policy to reflect a new national security strategy based on the anticipated 21st century international security environment. According to the US Commission on National Security/21st Century Charter: The Department of Defense recognizes that America should advance its position as a strong, secure, and persuasive force for freedom and progress in

1440-588: The "ambitious and specific target" of "doubl[ing] the size of the world's poorest economies within a decade." The Bush doctrine reflected an effort to move from the Cold War doctrine of deterrence to one that could deal with terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda as well as nation-states such as Iraq or Iran . The document also treated AIDS as a threat to national security, promising efforts to reduce its spread and devastating effects. Published in March 2006,

1512-658: The 21st Century was the first report completed by the Commission. Released on 15 September 1999, it attempts to provide a picture of the international security environment within the first quarter of the 21st century and the anticipated role of the US in that environment. The Commission anticipates an increasingly technologically, economically, and socially integrated world, i.e. increasing globalization amidst social and political fragmentation. The report provides twelve basic assumptions of that environment and fourteen conclusions based on those assumptions. Released on 15 April 2000, Seeking

SECTION 20

#1732790113920

1584-492: The Biden Administration sent its classified National Security Strategy to Congress. According to an unclassified fact sheet released to the public, the strategy said the U.S. faced two strategic challenges: a post-cold war competition between superpowers and transnational challenges that range from climate change to global health issues. The document said that “the most pressing strategic challenge facing our vision

1656-572: The Commandant of the Marine Corps, Alexander Vandegrift, addressed the committee. The hearings ended on May 19, 1944. Due to the increasingly apparent disagreements between the two departments, committee members and military leaders agreed that a fight between them would be bad for the war effort. In June, the committee reported the time was not right for legislation, but encouraged the two departments to continue to study unification. While

1728-405: The Commission suggests a number of strategic considerations: Building on these considerations, the Commission suggests categorizing US national interests into three categories: survival, critical, and significant. Survival interests are defined as, "without which America would cease to exist as we know it". These interests encompass safety from direct attacks by hostile states and terrorists through

1800-470: The Commissions specific recommendations for each area. The Commission believes that the combination of weapons proliferation and terrorism will result in increased vulnerability to the US homeland. "A direct attack against American citizens on American soil is likely over the next quarter century". In order protect the homeland against this threat, the Commission suggests: The Commission finds that

1872-529: The Department of the Navy and the War Department, all but one failed to reach the floor of the House, and even this one was defeated by a vote of 153 to 135 in 1932. However, by the end of World War 2, several factors forced leaders to more seriously consider restructuring the military to improve unity. By 1945, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor had already been investigated several times, for example by

1944-640: The Department of the Navy. Aside from the unification of the three military departments, the act established the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency , the latter of which is headed by the Director of Central Intelligence . The legislation was a result of efforts by Harry S. Truman beginning in 1944. President Truman proposed the legislation to Congress on February 26, 1947. The bill

2016-525: The House and Senate, and would go into effect for the 80th United States Congress. Additionally, in August, Thomas suggested to Truman that he use an executive order to execute some unification changes, for example by creating a Council of Common Defense led by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. Thomas believed that forcing the military to operate under unification for several months might convince all involved, particularly Congress, that unification legislation

2088-584: The House passed a resolution introduced by Rep. James W. Wadsworth (R-NY) to create a Select Committee On Postwar Military Policy, and this began the debate. The committee chair was Rep. Clifton A. Woodrum (D-VA), and the committee itself was made up of seven members of the Naval Affairs Committee, seven members of the Military Affairs Committee, and nine other members. Though the War Department considered asking for

2160-626: The Marine Corps, all of which had been ended by congressional oversight. He noted Marine Corps successes such as the prediction of the course of the Pacific War by Pete Ellis, and a history of extreme frugality that did not characterize other services. Finally, he denounced the War Department plan as a transparent attempt to quietly marginalize and disband the Marine Corps by removing its congressional protection. On May 7th, Clark Clifford, Truman's lead for unification legislation, told General Norstad and Assistant Secretary of War Stuart Symington that

2232-494: The Marine Corps. In January 1946, Senator Elbert D. Thomas formed a subcommittee within the Senate Military Affairs Committee to draft unification legislation. The subcommittee included Vice Admiral Arthur Radford and Major General Lauris Norstad as advisors from the Department of the Navy and the War Department. On April 9th, the subcommittee introduced the bill, S. 2044. Its key points were

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century - Misplaced Pages Continue

2304-607: The Muslim population in Afghanistan and throughout the world. The objective of the National Security Strategy is to create a stable situation for the world, including those countries struggling with insurgencies . "The most effective long-term measure for conflict and resolution is the promotion of democracy and economic development." In order to promote democracy and economic development communication with

2376-849: The Navy , and the newly established Department of the Air Force (DAF) into the National Military Establishment (NME). The act also created the position of the secretary of defense as the head of the NME. It established the United States Air Force under the DAF, which worked to separate the Army Air Forces into its own service. It also protected the Marine Corps as an independent service under

2448-477: The Navy's response. The same month, Forrestal asked Sen. David Walsh, the chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, to hold hearings of his own so that the Navy would have a chance to properly present their counterargument to the War Department Proposal. At the same time, the Commandant directed the head of Marine Corps Schools, Merrill Twining, to create a Marine Corps Board to do the same for

2520-483: The Richardson Committee presented their findings and recommendations. They found that most Army officers and about half the Navy officers favored unification to a single service, but disagreed on the details. The committee's recommendations went even farther than McNarney's, calling not only for one civilian secretary overseeing the military and none overseeing the individual services, but also calling for

2592-564: The Senate. From October 7th to December 17, 1945, the Senate Military Affairs Committee conducted hearings to consider unification bills. These included not only S. 84, but also S. 1482, introduced in the middle of the hearings by Sens. Edwin C. Johnson (D-CO) and Harley M. Kilgore (D-WV). However, the hearings mostly became a venue for the two departments, increasingly at odds, to give their official positions on different unification plans. On October 30th, General J. Lawton Collins presented

2664-483: The Thomas Bill could not pass in its current form, and that the Naval Affairs Committee hearings were causing it to lose more support every day. He also admitted he had been swayed by some of the Navy's objections, especially regarding the role of the chief of staff. Clifford recommended that Truman meet with the secretaries of War and the Navy and their advisors to clarify points of agreement and disagreement and find

2736-404: The US fits into that environment. The second phase, Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom (see further below), proposes a new US national security strategy based on the anticipated threats and conditions outlined in the first phase report. The third phase, Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for Change (see further below), recommends changes to

2808-597: The US military two case studies of joint operations between Europe and the Pacific. In the Pacific, the Army and Navy had experienced constant friction from command and logistics problems. In Europe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) , created based on the British Chiefs of Staff Committee , had smoothed over these coordination problems and became President Roosevelt's principal military advisors. The JCS became

2880-516: The United States's security depended on reviving its economy. The drafters of the new Strategy made a conscious decision to remove terms such as "Islamic radicalism", instead speaking of terrorism generally. The 2010 NSS said that in order to defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan , the United States needs to engage in a large amount of interagency cooperation and communication with

2952-687: The War Department and Department of the Navy "get in line" behind the official White House policy. When questioned about Army lobbying tactics, Truman claimed ignorance, but stated he was opposed to all congressional lobbying by the two departments. On April 30th, the Senate Naval Affairs Committee began hearings to consider S. 2044. On May 6th, Commandant of the Marine Corps Alexander Vandegrift testified. His testimony noted that on multiple occasions there had been efforts to marginalize and disband

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century - Misplaced Pages Continue

3024-538: The War Department plan in all respects. The hearings concluded as Congress went into its Christmas recess with the two departments and their congressional allies at an impasse. Over the course of the 1945 hearings, Navy and Marine Corps resistance to the War Department plan began to coalesce. In October, on the advice of Admiral Radford, Forrestal created the Secretary's Committee on Research on Reorganization (SCOROR) to track unification developments and help manage

3096-534: The War Department's plan. It combined features of recommendations made by the Richardson committee (other than Richardson's dissent) and Marshall's original plan from November 1942. Its key recommendations included the following: On November 29th, Assistant Secretary of the Navy H. Struve Hensel presented the Department of the Navy's plan. It was the recommendations of the Eberstadt Report, but left

3168-576: The Woodrum Committee met, the JCS continued to study the problem by convening their own committee of two Army officers and two Navy officers. It was led by former Pacific Fleet commander Admiral James O. Richardson . The Richardson committee interviewed eighty commanders both at war and in Washington, almost all of flag rank, to get their thoughts on postwar reorganization. On April 18, 1945,

3240-408: The adversarial environment that prevails, this report can only provide a beginning point for the dialogue necessary to reach such a "common" understanding. The requirement of producing this report along with the budget request leads to an iterative, interagency process involving high level meetings that helps to resolve internal differences in foreign policy agendas. However, "this report was not to be

3312-535: The battleship as the Navy's premier surface combatant. Army airmen had called for an independent air service since 1919, and the Army's Air Corps had already been expanded into what bordered on a separate service. Finally, the advent of nuclear weapons delivered by bombers led some leaders, such as Curtis LeMay , to believe air power would inevitably become more decisive than ground warfare or sea power. The time seemed right to create an independent air force, but it would require congressional action. Immediately following

3384-536: The chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, David Walsh. The 200 page report's key recommendations included the following: On January 3, 1945, the first day of the 79th Congress, Rep. Jennings Randolph (D-WV) submitted unification bill H.R. 550 to the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department. Two days later, Sen. Lister Hill (D-AL) introduced a similar bill, S. 84, in

3456-441: The civilian population of the host-nation is essential. The Stability Operations Field Manual states that success depends on a U.S. ability to build local institutions and in the establishment of a legitimate permanent government, which builds trust between the citizens and the counterinsurgency personnel." The National Security Strategy establishes the interagency coordination in order to conduct useful public diplomacy to secure

3528-422: The country was at war might undermine the war effort ." On August 26, 1944, future president Harry S. Truman , who was a senator at the time, wrote that "under such a set-up [of unification] another Pearl Harbor will not have to be feared" in his article "Our Armed Forces Must Be United". Military problems apparent during World War II that turned attention to the need for unification were a lack of preparedness ,

3600-474: The design and implementation of US national security policies". The Commission urges Congress to expand its understanding of national security matters, and streamline the appropriations and authorizations committees to make intelligence and security related legislation more efficient and effective. The Commission also recommends: National Security Act of 1947 The National Security Act of 1947 ( Pub.L. 80-253 , 61 Stat. 495 , enacted July 26, 1947)

3672-487: The document and the inter-agency process that preceded it were well-received by foreign policy experts across the political spectrum. Delivered by President Donald Trump on December 18, 2017, the new document named China and Russia as "revisionist powers" while removing "climate change" as a national threat. It also characterized the world as a competitive arena rather than a "community of nations" or "international community" as previous documents had. NSS-2017 represents

SECTION 50

#1732790113920

3744-526: The final Bush White House NSS said it was based on two "pillars": "promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity" and "leading a growing community of democracies." On May 26, 2010, President Barack Obama . issued a new Strategy which was called by United Nations ambassador Susan Rice a "dramatic departure" from its predecessor. The Strategy advocated increased engagement with Russia , China and India . The Strategy also identified nuclear non-proliferation and climate change as priorities, while noting that

3816-441: The following as the priority objectives to the new national security strategy : Released on 31 January 2001, Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for Change suggests "significant changes must be made in the structures and processes of the US national security apparatus". The Commission believes that without these reforms, "American power and influence cannot be sustained". Five key areas are highlighted for reform, followed by

3888-414: The following: On March 15th and 16th, Army Air Corps Commanding General Carl Spaatz and Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower wrote two papers regarding unification JCS 1478/10 and 1478/11, that dealt with Army objectives for postwar unification. Marked "TOP SECRET", the two papers were blunt in their statement of their intent to marginalize the Marine Corps. The Eisenhower-Spaatz proposal's key points were

3960-474: The following: The papers were forwarded to the chief of naval operations, Admiral Chester Nimitz, for his thoughts. There the papers came to the attention of Merritt Edson, the Marine Corps liaison to the chief of naval operations. Edson alerted the commandant of the Marine Corps and the members of the Marine Corps Board, most of whom, particularly Merrill Twining, believed that the only purpose of

4032-515: The hearings to be postponed to prevent an interservice fight that could hurt wartime unity, they decided not to when Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox told Secretary of War Henry Stimson that he also favored unification. The hearings began on April 24, 1944. On the second day, Lieutenant General Joseph McNarney presented the War Department's plan for unification, which was essentially Marshall's plan as laid out in his memo. On May 11th,

4104-508: The papers' high classification was to conceal the Army's goals from Congress. Nimitz replied on March 30th, and included responses by the Commandant and by the head of Naval Aviation, both of whom were strongly against the proposals. Following the bill's introduction, the Department of the Navy openly opposed it. In a press conference on April 11th, Truman said he had not authorized Navy officers to speak against unification, only to offer their honest opinions. He demanded that members of both

4176-432: The population in the countries of Afghanistan and Iraq . On February 6, 2015, Obama issued a new NSS to provide "a vision and strategy for advancing the nation's interests, universal values, and a rules-based international order through strong and sustainable American leadership." The primary author of the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) was Nadia Schadlow , then-deputy national security adviser. Her work on

4248-631: The president is recognized as an invaluable, if not totally daunting, opportunity for a new administration. The National Security Strategy issued on September 17, 2002, contained the controversial Bush doctrine of pre-emptive war . It also contained the notion of military pre-eminence that was reflected in a 1992 Department of Defense paper, "Defense Policy Guidance", prepared by two principal authors ( Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis Libby ) working under Defense Secretary Dick Cheney . The NSS 2002 repeated and re-emphasized efforts to provide foreign aid to countries moving towards Western-style democracy, with

4320-450: The qualities and competencies of the "permanent" government they lead within executive bureaucracies, than to have to commit in writing to the President their plans for the future and how they can be integrated, coordinated and otherwise shared with other agencies and departments. The ability to forge consensus among these competing views on direction, priorities and pace, and getting "on board" important players three political levels down from

4392-447: The question of an independent air force up to Congress. Proponents of the Department of the Navy's plan came across as obstructionists due to the previous Woodrum Committee hearings having framed the debate entirely in terms of the War Department plan. Proponents of the War Department's plan repeatedly emphasized the cost savings it would provide. On December 19th, Truman let Congress know his own thoughts on unification. They mirrored

SECTION 60

#1732790113920

4464-433: The scientific and educational systems of the US are in "serious crisis". It notes how the US is in danger of lagging behind other countries in this arena. "In the next quarter century, we will likely see ourselves surpassed, and in relative decline, unless we make a conscious national commitment to maintain our edge".< The report further highlights the Commission's belief that this decline in emphasis on science and education

4536-414: The security of US allies and preventing potentially hostile alliances from being formed to threaten US national security. Significant interests, "importantly affect the global environment in which the US must act". These interests include spreading democracy abroad and ensuring basic human rights for all the world's citizens. Using these strategic considerations as a foundation, the Commission recommends

4608-610: The twelve points in S. 2044 they agreed on eight and disagreed on four. The points of agreement were as follows: The remaining points of disagreement were the following: The period of rival Military Affairs Committee and Naval Affairs Committee hearings came to an end for good on August 2nd, when Truman signed the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 . It combined the Military Affairs and Naval Affairs Committees into Armed Services Committees in

4680-479: The use of weapons of mass destruction . They also include preserving America's founding principles as outlined in the US Constitution . Critical interests are defined as, "causally one step removed from survival interests". These interests lie in the continuation of key global systems, such as global energy, economic, communications, transportation, and health infrastructures. Other critical interests include

4752-579: The war, confronting the Soviets was a lower priority than ending wartime austerity, balancing the federal budget, and returning to peace. This situation would not change until the Soviet Union developed nuclear weapons in 1949, followed by the Korean War in 1950. In this environment, forces were rapidly demobilized, and budgets were slashed. In Fiscal Year 1946, the military's total budget ceiling

4824-426: The warnings. During World War 2, interservice cooperation remained voluntary, requiring complex interchanges of liaisons for planning and operations. Additionally, the Army and Navy often competed for resources, for example industrial production and new recruits. Enabling operations under these conditions had required the creation of numerous joint agencies and interdepartmental committees. World War 2 had also given

4896-429: The world. Consequently, there is a requirement to: A Commission, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21), will be established to fulfill this requirement, supported by a Study Group. Two individuals who have national recognition and significant depth of experience and public service will oversee the efforts of this Commission and serve as its Co-chairpersons. The study effort shall be conducted by

4968-587: Was a law enacting major restructuring of the United States government 's military and intelligence agencies following World War II . The majority of the provisions of the act took effect on September 18, 1947, the day after the Senate confirmed James Forrestal as the first secretary of defense . The act merged the Department of the Army (renamed from the Department of War ), the Department of

5040-601: Was approximately $ 42 billion. In Fiscal Year 1947, it was $ 14 billion. On V-J Day, the US military consisted of the Army's 91 Army divisions, 9 Marine Corps divisions, 1,166 combat ships in the Navy, and 213 combat groups in the Army Air Forces. By the end of demobilization on June 30, 1947, the Army had 10 divisions, the Marine Corps had 2 divisions, the Navy had 343 combat ships, and the Army Air Forces had 63 groups of which only 11 were fully operational. As forces were reduced and budgets were cut, unification seemed like

5112-578: Was feasible. National Security Strategy (United States) The National Security Strategy ( NSS ) is a document prepared periodically by the executive branch of the United States that lists the national security concerns and how the administration plans to deal with them. The legal foundation for the document is spelled out in the Goldwater–Nichols Act . The document is purposely general in content, and its implementation relies on elaborating guidance provided in supporting documents such as

5184-476: Was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on February 28, 1947, and in the Senate on March 3, 1947. Senator Chan Gurney was the bill's sponsor . Senator Gurney, as chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services , led committee hearings for the bill from mid-March to early May. The bill passed in the Senate on July 9, 1947, and in the House on July 19, 1947. The Senate agreed to

#919080