The 21st Panzer Division was a German armoured division best known for its role in the battles of the North African Campaign from 1941 to 1943 during World War II when it was one of the two armoured divisions making up the Deutsches Afrikakorps (DAK). It was first formed as the 5th Light Division in early 1941.
152-478: Airborne assault British Sector American Sector Normandy landings American Sector Anglo-Canadian Sector Logistics Ground campaign American Sector Anglo-Canadian Sector Breakout Air and Sea operations Supporting operations Aftermath Operation Goodwood was a British offensive during the Second World War , which took place between 18 and 20 July 1944 as part of
304-439: A badly scattered drop) but two of its groups concentrated on glider missions. By the end of April joint training with both airborne divisions ceased when Taylor and Ridgway deemed that their units had jumped enough. The 50th TCW did not begin training until April 3 and progressed more slowly, then was hampered when the troops ceased jumping. A divisional night jump exercise for the 101st Airborne scheduled for May 7, Exercise Eagle,
456-576: A blocking position on the northern approaches to Sainte-Mère-Église with a single platoon while the rest reinforced the 3rd Battalion when it was counterattacked at mid-morning. The 1st Battalion did not achieve its objectives of capturing bridges over the Merderet at la Fière and Chef-du-Pont, despite the assistance of several hundred troops from the 507th and 508th PIRs. 21st Panzer Division (Wehrmacht) The Italian army group in North Africa
608-546: A cohesive unit and was split up into Battle Groups ( Kampfgruppen ) Pfeiffer and Gruen . They were subsequently renamed Battle Groups Stenkhoff and Schuette , which took part in the Battle of Kasserine Pass . Major General Von Hulsen surrendered the remnants of the division on 13 May 1943. After Africa, the division was reformed in Europe, where it garrisoned Caen, until 16th field luftwaffe division relieved it of its duty. It
760-625: A compromise was reached. Because of the heavier German presence, Bradley, the First Army commander, wanted the 82nd Airborne Division landed close to the 101st Airborne Division for mutual support if needed. Major General J. Lawton Collins , commanding the VII Corps , however, wanted the drops made west of the Merderet to seize a bridgehead. On May 27 the drop zones were relocated 10 miles (16 km) east of Le Haye-du-Puits along both sides of
912-620: A concept that contradicted Montgomery's policy of never employing an unbalanced force. By mid-July, the Second Army had 2,250 medium tanks and 400 light tanks in the bridgehead, of which 500 were in reserve to replace losses. The armoured element of the Second Army consisted of the Guards Armoured Division , 7th Armoured Division and the 11th Armoured Division and the 4th Armoured Brigade , 8th Armoured Brigade , 27th Armoured Brigade and 33rd Armoured brigades,
1064-581: A day-long battle failed to take Saint-Côme-du-Mont and destroy the highway bridges over the Douve. The glider battalions of the 101st's 327th Glider Infantry Regiment were delivered by sea and landed across Utah Beach with the 4th Infantry Division. On D-Day its third battalion, the 1st Battalion 401st GIR, landed just after noon and bivouacked near the beach. By the evening of June 7, the other two battalions were assembled near Sainte Marie du Mont . The 82nd Airborne's drop, mission "Boston", began at 01:51. It
1216-616: A few key officers were held over for continuity. The 14 groups assigned to IX TCC were a mixture of experience. Four had seen significant combat in the Twelfth Air Force . Four had no combat experience but had trained together for more than a year in the United States. Four others had been in existence less than nine months and arrived in the United Kingdom one month after training began. One had experience only as
1368-410: A mile away near St. Germain-de-Varreville. The team was unable to get either its amber halophane lights or its Eureka beacon working until the drop was well in progress. Although the second pathfinder serial had a plane ditch in the sea en route, the remainder dropped two teams near DZ C, but most of their marker lights were lost in the ditched airplane. They managed to set up a Eureka beacon just before
1520-546: A plane load of troops numbering 15-18 men. To achieve surprise, the parachute drops were routed to approach Normandy at low altitude from the west. The serials took off beginning at 22:30 on June 5, assembled into formations at wing and command assembly points, and flew south to the departure point, code-named "Flatbush". There they descended and flew southwest over the English Channel at 500 feet (150 m) MSL to remain below German radar coverage. Each flight within
1672-747: A position to support Luck's men and to act as a general reserve and the rest of the divisional panzergrenadiers, with towed anti-tank guns and assault guns , were dug in amongst the villages of the Caen plain. The 21st Panzer Division reconnaissance and pioneer battalions, were positioned on the Bourguébus Ridge to protect the corps artillery, which consisted of around 48 field and medium guns with an equal number of Nebelwerfer rocket launchers. The LXXXVI Corps had 194 artillery pieces, 272 Nebelwerfers and 78 anti-aircraft and anti-tank 88 mm guns . One battery of four 88 mm anti-aircraft guns from
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#17327661011931824-589: A raid against the Colombelles steelworks complex to the north-east of the city, which was a failure. The factory area remained in German hands, its tall chimneys providing observation posts that overlooked the Orne bridgehead. At 01:00 on 11 July, elements of the 153rd (Highland) Infantry Brigade , supported by Sherman tanks of the 148th Regiment Royal Armoured Corps , moved against the German position. The intention
1976-484: A route that avoided Allied naval forces and German anti-aircraft defenses along the eastern shore of the Cotentin. On April 12 a route was approved that would depart England at Portland Bill , fly at low altitude southwest over water, then turn 90 degrees to the southeast and come in "by the back door" over the western coast. At the initial point the 82nd Airborne Division would continue straight to La Haye-du-Puits, and
2128-602: A second attack by the 7th Armoured Division, when a severe storm descended upon the English Channel on 19 June. The storm lasted for three days, significantly delaying the Allied build-up. Most of the landing craft and ships already at sea were driven back to ports in Britain; towed barges and other loads (including 2.5 mi (4.0 km) of floating roadways for the Mulberry harbours ) were lost and 800 craft were stranded on
2280-464: A serial by chalk numbers (literally numbers chalked on the airplanes to aid paratroopers in boarding the correct airplane), were organized into flights of nine aircraft, in a formation pattern called "vee of vee's" (vee-shaped elements of three planes arranged in a larger vee of three elements), with the flights flying one behind the other. The serials were scheduled over the drop zones at six-minute intervals. The paratroopers were divided into sticks ,
2432-425: A serial was 1,000 feet (300 m) behind the flight ahead. The flights encountered winds that pushed them five minutes ahead of schedule, but the effect was uniform over the entire invasion force and had negligible effect on the timetables. Once over water, all lights except formation lights were turned off, and these were reduced to their lowest practical intensity. Twenty-four minutes 57 miles (92 km) out over
2584-673: A series of military operations carried by the United States as part of Operation Overlord , the invasion of Normandy by the Allies on June 6, 1944, during World War II . In the opening maneuver of the Normandy landings , about 13,100 American paratroopers from the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions , then 3,937 glider infantrymen , were dropped in Normandy via two parachute and six glider missions. The divisions were part of
2736-430: A standard panzer division. German industry was unable to provide the vehicles for these units, and only a single brigade was formed, known as Schnelle Brigade West . This was largely fitted out with captured French half tracks and light tanks that had been armoured and up-gunned by a mechanical engineer by the name of Alfred Becker . Working at a conversion facility near Paris called Baukommando Becker , Becker provided
2888-477: A transport (cargo carrying) group and the last had been recently formed. Joint training with airborne troops and an emphasis on night formation flying began at the start of March. The veteran 52nd Troop Carrier Wing (TCW), wedded to the 82nd Airborne, progressed rapidly and by the end of April had completed several successful night drops. The 53rd TCW, working with the 101st, also progressed well (although one practice mission on April 4 in poor visibility resulted in
3040-628: The 21st Panzer Division and the attack by XXX Corps bogged down in front of Tilly-sur-Seulles , west of Caen, against the Panzer Lehr Division . The 7th Armoured Division pushed through a gap in the German front line and tried to capture the town of Villers-Bocage in the German rear. The Battle of Villers-Bocage saw the vanguard of the 7th Armoured Division withdraw from the town but by 17 June, Panzer Lehr had been forced back and XXX Corps had taken Tilly-sur-Seulles. The British postponed plans for further offensive operations, including
3192-722: The 2nd New Zealand Division at the Battle of Mersa Matruh . The British were defeated and fell back to a new line at El Alamein . In a series of battles fought in July 1942, the Eighth Army was able to stop the advance of the Afrika Korps at the First Battle of El Alamein . Shortages in equipment, ammunition and fuel limited further actions. Rommel made a last effort to break through the British positions on 31 August 1942 at
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#17327661011933344-624: The 45-minute bombardment, the troops and tanks of the 11th Armoured Division moved out of their concentration areas towards the start line. H Hour was set for 07:45 and on schedule, the artillery switched to a creeping barrage, which moved ahead of the 11th Armoured Division. As the division moved off, more artillery opened fire on Cuverville, Demouville, Giberville, Liberville, Cagny and Émiéville and dropped harassing fire on targets as far south as Garcelles-Secqueville and Secqueville la Campagne. Fifteen minutes later, American heavy bombers dropped 1,340 long tons (1,360 t) of fragmentation bombs in
3496-420: The 9th and 10th SS Panzer divisions, so that they could not oppose Goodwood or Cobra. Supported by 450 guns, the British attack made use of artificial moonlight and started well despite disruption caused by German artillery fire. By dawn XII Corps had captured several of its objectives including the important height of Hill 113, although the much-contested Hill 112 remained in German hands. By committing
3648-568: The Allied Expeditionary Air Force , approved the use of the recognition markings on May 17. For the troop carrier aircraft this was in the form of three white and two black stripes, each two feet (60 cm) wide, around the fuselage behind the exit doors and from front to back on the outer wings. A test exercise was flown by selected aircraft over the invasion fleet on June 1, but to maintain security, orders to paint stripes were not issued until June 3. The 300 men of
3800-461: The Allies on the first day. The division was formed from the elements of the newly created Schnelle Division West (Fast Division West), a newly designed, highly mobile type of formation that was intended to be able to cover a great deal of territory to reach a point of invasion. It was thought that a number of these formations would be set up in France, each with greater mobility and transport than
3952-543: The Battle of Alam el Halfa , but the Germans were again repulsed. In a series of battles in this area the 21st Panzer Division commander Von Bismarck was killed by a British mine and Oberst C. H. Lungerhausen took command until Major General Heinz von Randow arrived on 18 September. On 23 October 1942, the British offensive and the Second Battle of El Alamein began. The Germans were overwhelmed and 21st Panzer
4104-617: The Royal Navy , whose targets were German gun batteries located near the coast in the region of Cabourg and Franceville. The engineering resources of the Second Army, I Corps and VIII Corps and the divisional engineers worked from 13 to 16 July to build six roads from west of the Orne River to the start lines east of the river and the Caen Canal. Engineers from I Corps strengthened bridges and built two new sets of bridges across
4256-603: The TO&;E of the C-47 Skytrain groups would be increased from 52 to 64 aircraft (plus nine spares) by April 1 to meet his requirements. At the same time the commander of the U.S. First Army , Lieutenant General Omar Bradley , won approval of a plan to land two airborne divisions on the Cotentin Peninsula , one to seize the beach causeways and block the eastern half at Carentan from German reinforcements,
4408-543: The Touques River . The terrain between Caen and Vimont was especially promising, being open, dry and conducive to mobile operations. Since the Allied forces greatly outnumbered the Germans in tanks and mobile units, a fluid fast-moving battle was to their advantage. Hampered by congestion in the beachhead and forced to divert effort to attack strongly held German positions along the 9.3 mi (15.0 km) route to
4560-586: The U.S. Fifth Army during the Salerno landings , codenamed Operation Avalanche, in September 1943. However, a shortcoming of the system was that within 2 miles (3.2 km) of the ground emitter, the signals merged into a single blip in which both range and bearing were lost. The system was designed to steer large formations of aircraft to within a few miles of a drop zone, at which point the holophane marking lights or other visual markers would guide completion of
4712-580: The invasion of Normandy went through several preliminary phases throughout 1943, during which the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) allocated 13½ U.S. troop carrier groups to an undefined airborne assault. The actual size, objectives, and details of the plan were not drawn up until after General Dwight D. Eisenhower became Supreme Allied Commander in January 1944. In mid-February Eisenhower received word from Headquarters U.S. Army Air Forces that
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4864-543: The pathfinder companies were organized into teams of 14-18 paratroops each, whose main responsibility would be to deploy the ground beacon of the Rebecca/Eureka transponding radar system, and set out holophane marking lights. The Rebecca, an airborne sender-receiver, indicated on its scope the direction and approximate range of the Eureka, a responsor beacon. The paratroops trained at the school for two months with
5016-422: The 101st Airborne Division would make a small left turn and fly to Utah Beach . The plan called for a right turn after drops and a return on the reciprocal route. However the change in drop zones on May 27 and the increased size of German defenses made the risk to the planes from ground fire much greater, and the routes were modified so that the 101st Airborne Division would fly a more southerly ingress route along
5168-547: The 101st at Portbail , code-named "Muleshoe", was approximately 10 miles (16 km) south of that of the 82d, "Peoria", near Flamanville . Despite precise execution over the channel, numerous factors encountered over the Cotentin Peninsula disrupted the accuracy of the drops, many encountered in rapid succession or simultaneously. These included: Flak from German anti-aircraft guns resulted in planes either going under or over their prescribed altitudes. Some of
5320-652: The 11th Armoured Division had 336 casualties. I Corps was to attack along the left flank of the main armoured thrust. The 3rd Division moved forward at 07:45 hours, supported by 27th Armoured Brigade. American airborne landings in Normandy Airborne assault British Sector American Sector Normandy landings American Sector Anglo-Canadian Sector Logistics Ground campaign American Sector Anglo-Canadian Sector Breakout Air and Sea operations Supporting operations Aftermath American airborne landings in Normandy were
5472-552: The 11th Armoured Division, was to capture Cagny and Vimont. Starting last, the 7th Armoured Division was to move south beyond the Garcelles-Secqueville ridge. Further advances by the armoured divisions were to be conducted only on Dempsey's order. The detailed orders for the II Canadian Corps were issued a day later, for the capture of Colombelles, the remaining portion of Caen and then be ready to move on
5624-464: The 16th Luftwaffe Field Division, having also been placed into reserve, this oversight was rectified before 18 July. Battle groups of the 21st Panzer Division with around 50 Panzer IV and 34 assault guns , were expected near Route nationale 13 . The 1st SS Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler was identified in reserve with an estimated 40 Panther tanks and 60 Panzer IV and the presence of two heavy tank battalions equipped with Tiger tanks
5776-554: The 21st Panzer Division and the Tigers of the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion, failed when the German tanks came under fire from their own guns and two Tigers were knocked out. An isolated Tiger II (King Tiger) attempting to manoeuvre out of danger, was caught by an Irish Guards Sherman tank that had also become detached from its unit. The Sherman crew fired into the Tiger and then rammed it; anti-tank fire from other British units then penetrated
5928-457: The 21st Panzer was the linchpin of the assault. Just days earlier, on 30 January 1942, Major General Georg von Bismarck was appointed as the new divisional commander. Gazala was taken on 5 June 1942, and during the battle from 20 to 21 June, 21st Panzer along with 90th Light Division and 15th Panzer Division broke through the Tobruk perimeter, capturing nearly 35,000 prisoners. As a result,
6080-676: The 21st Panzer were then almost entirely lost in the Falaise Pocket . The remnants of the unit merged with the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division . Of the 223 tanks of the 21st and other Divisions captured in the area by British forces between 8–31 August, about three quarters were abandoned/destroyed by their crews. In December, Rundstedt decided not to commit the 21st to offensive actions in Operation Wacht am Rhein , leaving it to provide flank cover, which probably saved it from total destruction. On 29 December, 21st Panzer reported
6232-407: The 272nd Infantry Division and two battle groups were detached from the division. Kampfgruppe Waldmüller was moved close to Falaise and Kampfgruppe Wünsche to Lisieux , 40 kilometres (25 mi) east of Caen. Although Kampfgruppe Waldmüller was later ordered to rejoin the rest of the division at Lisieux, on 17 July Eberbach halted this move. Operation Greenline was launched by XII Corps during
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6384-595: The 2nd Flak-Sturm Regiment , was positioned in Cagny, while in the villages along the Bourguébus Ridge there was a screen of 44 x 88 mm anti-tank guns from the 200th Tank Destroyer Battalion. Most of the LXXXVI Corps artillery was beyond the ridge covering the Caen–Falaise road. Facing Caen to the west of the Caen–Falaise road was the I SS Panzer Corps . On 14 July, elements of the 272nd Infantry Division took over
6536-532: The 31st and 34th Tank brigades and the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade . At 10:00 on 13 July, Dempsey met with Crocker, Lieutenant-General Simonds of II Canadian Corps and O'Connor. Later that day, the first written order for Operation Goodwood—named after the Glorious Goodwood race meetings—was issued. The document contained only preliminary instructions and general intentions; it was to stimulate detailed planning, and alterations were expected. The order
6688-535: The 4th AGRA. Each field gun had 500 rounds, each medium piece 300 rounds and each heavy gun or howitzer 150 rounds. Prior to the assault these were to attempt to suppress German anti-tank and field artillery positions. During the attack they would provide the 11th Armoured Division with a rolling barrage and anti-aircraft defence. The guns would also assist the attacks launched by the 3rd Infantry and 2nd Canadian Infantry divisions and fire on targets as requested. Additional support would be provided by three ships of
6840-493: The 4th Division had already seized the exit. The 3rd Battalion of the 501st PIR, also assigned to DZ C, was more scattered, but took over the mission of securing the exits. A small unit reached the Pouppeville exit at 0600 and fought a six-hour battle to secure it, shortly before 4th Division troops arrived to link up. The 501st PIR's serial also encountered severe flak but still made an accurate jump on Drop Zone D. Part of
6992-448: The 501st PIR before the changes of May 27). Those of the 82nd were west (T and O, from west to east) and southwest (Drop Zone N) of Sainte-Mère-Eglise. Each parachute infantry regiment (PIR), a unit of approximately 1800 men organized into three battalions, was transported by three or four serials , formations containing 36, 45, or 54 C-47s, and separated from each other by specific time intervals. The planes, sequentially designated within
7144-487: The 51st (Highland) Infantry Division, was to secure the eastern flank by capturing the area around Émiéville , Touffréville and Troarn . The II Canadian Corps would simultaneously launch Operation Atlantic, a supporting attack on the VIII Corps western flank, to capture Caen south of the Orne river. The British and Canadian operations were tentatively scheduled for 18 July and Cobra was postponed for two days, to enable
7296-469: The 5th Light and 4th Italian divisions, which was a big success, as the British began a retreat that would, by April, see German forces pushing into Egypt after an advance of some 600 miles (970 km). In late April and into May, the 5th Light Division was joined by elements of 15th Panzer Division forming the Afrika Corps . In late summer the 90th Light Infantry Division was formed and joined
7448-401: The 82nd Airborne Division, also wanted a glider assault to deliver his organic artillery. The use of gliders was planned until April 18, when tests under realistic conditions resulted in excessive accidents and destruction of many gliders. On April 28 the plan was changed; the entire assault force would be inserted by parachute drop at night in one lift, with gliders providing reinforcement during
7600-423: The 9th SS Panzer Division, the Germans managed by the end of the day to largely restore their line, although a counter-attack against Hill 113 failed. Attacks next day by XII Corps gained no further ground and during the evening of 17 July, the operation was closed down and the British force on Hill 113 withdrawn. Operation Pomegranate began on 16 July, in which XXX Corps was to capture several important villages. On
7752-592: The Africa Corps. On 15 August 1941, the 5th Light Division was redesignated 21st Panzer Division. After being renamed the 21st Panzer Division, the unit did not enjoy any particular success throughout the remainder of the year. The British regrouped and were reinforced, and formed the British Eighth Army made up of XIII Corps and XXX Corps . Eighth Army launched Operation Crusader on 18 November 1941, which forced Rommel to retreat to El Agheila by
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#17327661011937904-633: The Axis forces around Tobruk, which were being hard-pressed by XIII Corps, obliged them to withdraw. On returning to Sidi Rezegh, the division lost Major-General Johann von Ravenstein , who was captured while on reconnaissance during 29 November. Although joined by the Special Use Division Africa ( 90th Light Infantry Division after 27 November 1941), a formation which was also made up from an assortment of smaller elements in August 1941,
8056-467: The Bourguébus Ridge. Dempsey believed that if the operation were to succeed, his tanks would need to be on the ridge by the first afternoon and cancelled a second attack by heavy bombers scheduled for then although this was to be in direct support of the advance towards the ridge, he was concerned that the 11th Armoured Division should not have to wait for it. Close air support for Goodwood would be provided by 83 Group RAF , to neutralise German positions on
8208-552: The British Eighth Army fell back. The fighting had taken its toll on the division, with the 15th and 21st Panzer only able to field 44 tanks between them. Four-fifths of their transport vehicles had been captured when they crossed into Egypt. The British prepared a new defensive position at Mersa Matruh. 21st Panzer was used to sweep behind the British XIII Corps, where it engaged in an intense combat with
8360-412: The British had reached the ridge and the villages of Bras and Bourguébus. Some losses were inflicted on the German tanks but attempts to advance further were met by determined opposition, including fire from the rear from pockets of resistance that had been bypassed. General Eberbach ordered a counter-attack, "not a defensive move but a full armoured charge". The 1st SS Panzer Division was to attack across
8512-523: The British. Trained crews sufficient to pilot 951 gliders were available, and at least five of the troop carrier groups intensively trained for glider missions. Because of the requirement for absolute radio silence and a study that warned that the thousands of Allied aircraft flying on D-Day would break down the existing system, plans were formulated to mark aircraft including gliders with black-and-white stripes to facilitate aircraft recognition. Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory , commander of
8664-576: The Caen–Vimont railway line for the evening and replacement tanks were brought forward for all divisions, with the 11th Armoured receiving priority. German recovery teams went forward to recover as many of their tanks as possible, as few replacements were available. Unnoticed by the British, a gap had been created between Emièville and Troan. This was closed during the night by the 12th SS Panzer Division, which had lost ten tanks, en route, to air attacks. A number of minor German counter-attacks were launched from
8816-537: The DZ was covered by pre-registered German fire that inflicted heavy casualties before many troops could get out of their chutes. Among the killed were two of the three battalion commanders and one of their executive officers. A group of 150 troops captured the main objective, the la Barquette lock, by 04:00. A staff officer put together a platoon and achieved another objective by seizing two foot bridges near la Porte at 04:30. The 2nd Battalion landed almost intact on DZ D but in
8968-476: The Douve River (which would also provide a better visual landmark at night for the inexperienced troop carrier pilots). Over the reluctance of the naval commanders, exit routes from the drop zones were changed to fly over Utah Beach, then northward in a 10 miles (16 km) wide "safety corridor", then northwest above Cherbourg . As late as May 31 routes for the glider missions were changed to avoid overflying
9120-412: The First Army to secure its start line around Saint-Lô . Detailed planning began on Friday 14 July but the next day, Montgomery issued a written directive ordering Dempsey to change the plan from a "deep break-out" to a "limited attack". Anticipating that the Germans would be forced to commit their armoured reserves, rather than risk a massed British tank breakthrough, VIII Corps was instructed to "engage
9272-652: The First US Army on 18 July. Montgomery ordered Dempsey to "go on hitting: drawing the German strength, especially the armour, onto yourself—so as to ease the way for Brad". In early July, Montgomery had been informed by the Adjutant-General to the Forces , Ronald Adam that due to the manpower shortage in Britain, the pool of replacements to maintain his infantry strength was nearly exhausted. Dempsey proposed an attack consisting solely of armoured divisions,
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#17327661011939424-433: The German armour in battle and 'write it down' to such an extent that it is of no further value to the Germans". He was to take any opportunity to improve the Second Army's position—the orders stated that "a victory on the eastern flank will help us to gain what we want on the western flank"—but not to endanger its role as a "firm bastion" on which the success of the forthcoming American offensive would depend. The objectives of
9576-515: The German forces in this theatre were still vulnerable. In the early months of 1942 the supply situation improved, with the British island fortress of Malta coming under intense air attack, allowing Axis supply convoys from Italy to get through. The British Operation Acrobat was planned to drive the DAK back to Tripoli , but a quick counter-offensive by Rommel surprised the British and pushed them back out of Cyrenaica. Reaching Derna by 3 February 1942,
9728-442: The German front line positions had been neutralised, with the survivors left "dazed and incoherent". Dust and smoke had impaired the ability of the bomber crews to identify all their targets and others on the periphery of the bombing zones had remained untouched. Cagny and Émiéville were extensively bombed but most of the defenders were unscathed and recovered in time to meet the British advance, both places having clear lines of fire on
9880-501: The German minefield in front of the Highland Division. This was largely accomplished during the night of 16/17 July, when they cleared and marked fourteen gaps. By the morning of 18 July, 19 40 ft (12 m)-wide gaps had been completed, each for one armoured regiment to pass through at a time. The 159th Infantry Brigade (11th Armoured Division) with the divisional and 29th Armoured Brigade headquarters, crossed into
10032-598: The German tanks knocked out were because of armour-piercing ammunition; the rest by a roughly equal combination of infantry anti-tank weapons, artillery, aircraft rockets or cannon, or were abandoned/destroyed by their crews. The last major action the 21st Panzer took part in on the Western Front was the stubborn resistance it gave the British Guards Armoured Division during Operation Bluecoat , on 1 August 1944. The surviving forces of
10184-605: The German-held Bourguébus Ridge, the area between Bretteville-sur-Laize and Vimont and to inflict maximum casualties on the Germans. On 18 July, the British I Corps conducted an attack to secure a series of villages to the east of VIII Corps; to the west, the II Canadian Corps launched Operation Atlantic , synchronised with Goodwood, to capture the Caen suburbs south of the Orne River. When
10336-470: The Germans were expecting a large attack out of the Orne bridgehead, the British anticipated meeting resistance from the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division bolstered by SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 25 of the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend . Signals intelligence found that the Hitler Youth had been moved into reserve and although it was slow to discover that SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 25 was not with
10488-474: The Merderet. The 101st Airborne Division's 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), which had originally been given the task of capturing Sainte-Mère-Église , was shifted to protect the Carentan flank, and the capture of Sainte-Mère-Église was assigned to the veteran 505th PIR of the 82nd Airborne Division. For the troop carriers, experiences in the Allied invasion of Sicily the previous year had dictated
10640-501: The Normandy beachhead and Operation Cobra , the First US Army attack which began on 25 July, caused the weaker German defences opposite to collapse. The historic Normandy town of Caen was a D-Day objective for the British 3rd Infantry Division , which landed on Sword Beach on 6 June 1944. The capture of Caen, while "ambitious", was called the most important D-Day objective assigned to I Corps ( Lieutenant-General John Crocker ). Operation Overlord called for Second Army to secure
10792-486: The Normandy beaches, until the next high tides in July. After a few days to recover from the storm, the British began Operation Epsom on 26 June. The newly arrived VIII Corps (Lieutenant-General Richard O'Connor ), was to attack west of Caen, southwards across the Odon and Orne rivers, capture an area of high ground near Bretteville-sur-Laize , encircling the city. The attack was preceded by Operation Martlet , to secure
10944-446: The Orne and the canal. The engineers were also to construct another two sets of bridges by the end of the first day. II Canadian Corps planned to construct up to three bridges across the Orne as quickly as possible to give I Corps and VIII Corps exclusive access to the river and the canal bridges north of Caen. Engineers from the 51st (Highland) Infantry Division, with a small detachment from the 3rd Infantry Division, were ordered to breach
11096-534: The Orne bridgehead during the night of 16/17 July and the rest of the division followed the next night. The Guards and 7th Armoured divisions were held west of the river until the operation began. As the final elements of the 11th Armoured Division moved into position and the VIII Corps headquarters took up residence in Bény-sur-Mer , more gaps in the minefields were blown, the forward areas were signposted and routes to be taken marked with white tape. Augmenting
11248-578: The Orne bridgehead, a pocket of ground east of the river taken by the Allies on D-Day in Operation Deadstick . The 11th Armoured Division was to advance south-west over Bourguébus Ridge and the Caen–Falaise road, aiming for Bretteville-sur-Laize. The Guards Armoured Division was to push south-east to capture Vimont and Argences and the 7th Armoured Division, starting last, was to aim south for Falaise. The 3rd Infantry Division, supported by part of
11400-547: The Tiger's armour. Both crews abandoned their vehicles and most of the German crew was captured. The 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion later attacked the Coldstream Guards but was forced to withdraw by massed anti-tank fire. It took the Guards the rest of the day to capture Cagny, which was found abandoned when infantry entered the village. Attempts to resume the advance were met by determined German resistance. Starting last,
11552-646: The Troarn area and on the main German gun line on the Bourguébus Ridge. Only 25 bombers in the three waves were lost, all to German anti aircraft fire. Aerial support for the operation was then handed over to 800 fighter-bombers of 83 Group and 84 Group. The bombing put the 22nd Panzer Regiment and the III Company, 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion temporarily out of action, causing varying degrees of damage to their tanks. Some were overturned, some were destroyed and twenty were later found abandoned in bomb craters. Most of
11704-482: The U.S. VII Corps , which sought to capture Cherbourg and thus establish an allied supply port. The two airborne divisions were assigned to block approaches toward the amphibious landings at Utah Beach , to capture causeway exits off the beaches, and to establish crossings over the Douve river at Carentan to help the U.S. V Corps merge the two American beachheads . The assaulting force took three days to block
11856-400: The VIII Corps flank by capturing high ground on the right of the axis of advance. The Germans managed to contain the offensive by committing all their strength, including two panzer divisions just arrived in Normandy, earmarked for an offensive against British and American positions around Bayeux. Several days later, the Second Army made a frontal assault on Caen Operation Charnwood . The attack
12008-513: The air, as the artillery carried on the bombardment" Chester Wilmot , describing the opening of Operation Goodwood Shortly before dawn on 18 July, the Highland infantry in the south of the Orne bridgehead, quietly retired 0.5 mi (0.80 km) from the front line. At 05:45, 1,056 Halifax and Lancaster heavy bombers flying at 3,000 ft (910 m) dropped 4,800 long tons (4,900 t) of high explosive bombs around Colombelles,
12160-527: The approaches to Utah, mostly because many troops landed off-target during their drops. Still, German forces were unable to exploit the chaos. Despite many units' tenacious defense of their strongpoints, all were overwhelmed within the week. [Except where footnoted, information in this article is from the USAF official history: Warren, Airborne Operations in World War II, European Theater ] Plans for
12312-412: The assault force arrived but were forced to use a hand held signal light which was not seen by some pilots. The planes assigned to DZ D along the Douve River failed to see their final turning point and flew well past the zone. Returning from an unfamiliar direction, they dropped 10 minutes late and 1 mile (1.6 km) off target. The drop zone was chosen after the 501st PIR's change of mission on May 27 and
12464-432: The bad weather, but navigating errors and a lack of Eureka signal caused the 2nd Battalion 502nd PIR to come down on the wrong drop zone. Most of the remainder of the 502nd jumped in a disorganized pattern around the impromptu drop zone set up by the pathfinders near the beach. Two battalion commanders took charge of small groups and accomplished all of their D-Day missions. The division's parachute artillery experienced one of
12616-493: The bombing, which he survived by taking cover under his tank. By 08:05, the 2nd Fife and Forfar Yeomanry and the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment of the 29th Armoured Brigade had navigated minefields to reach the Caen–Troarn railway line. The first phase of the rolling barrage ended at 08:30, by which time large numbers of prisoners from the 16th Luftwaffe Division had been taken. By the time the artillery resumed firing at 08:50, only
12768-540: The channel, the troop carrier stream reached a stationary marker boat code-named "Hoboken" and carrying a Eureka beacon, where they made a sharp left turn to the southeast and flew between the Channel Islands of Guernsey and Alderney . Weather over the channel was clear; all serials flew their routes precisely and in tight formation as they approached their initial points on the Cotentin coast, where they turned for their respective drop zones. The initial point for
12920-514: The city and then form a front line from Caumont-l'Éventé –south-east of Caen , to acquire space for airfields and to protect the left flank of the First US Army ( Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley ), while it moved on Cherbourg . Possession of Caen and its surroundings would give the Second Army a staging area for a push south to capture Falaise , which could be used as the pivot for a swing left, to advance on Argentan and then towards
13072-479: The coast to the north of Touffreville and the depleted 16th Luftwaffe Field Division held the next section from Touffreville to Colombelles. Kampfgruppe von Luck , a battle group formed around the 21st Panzer Division 125th Panzergrenadier Regiment, was placed behind these forces with around 30 assault guns. The 21st Panzer Division armoured elements, reinforced with the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion , which included ten King Tigers , were north-east of Cagny in
13224-450: The commander of the 82nd Airborne Division Artillery who had also been temporary assistant division commander (ADC) of the 82nd Airborne Division, replacing Major General William C. Lee , who suffered a heart attack and returned to the United States. Bradley insisted that 75 percent of the airborne assault be delivered by gliders for concentration of forces. Because it would be unsupported by naval and corps artillery, Ridgway, commanding
13376-526: The day. The Germans, who had neglected to fortify Normandy, began constructing defenses and obstacles against airborne assault in the Cotentin, including specifically the planned drop zones of the 82nd Airborne Division. At first no change in plans were made, but when significant German forces were moved into the Cotentin in mid-May, the drop zones of the 82nd Airborne Division were relocated, even though detailed plans had already been formulated and training had proceeded based on them. Just ten days before D-Day,
13528-563: The defence of Vaucelles from the 1st SS Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, who moved into local reserve between the village of Ifs and the east bank of the Orne. The following day the 12th SS Panzer Division was placed in Oberkommando der Wehrmacht ( OKW ) reserve to rest and refit and—on Hitler's orders—to be in a position to meet a feared second Allied landing between the Orne and Seine rivers. The divisional artillery regiment and anti-aircraft battalion remained behind to support
13680-409: The drop. Each drop zone (DZ) had a serial of three C-47 aircraft assigned to locate the DZ and drop pathfinder teams, who would mark it. The serials in each wave were to arrive at six-minute intervals. The pathfinder serials were organized in two waves, with those of the 101st Airborne Division arriving a half-hour before the first scheduled assault drop. These would be the first American and possibly
13832-485: The end of the month with simulated drops in which pathfinders guided them to drop zones. The 315th and 442d Groups, which had never dropped troops until May and were judged the command's "weak sisters", continued to train almost nightly, dropping paratroopers who had not completed their quota of jumps. Three proficiency tests at the end of the month, making simulated drops, were rated as fully qualified. The inspectors, however, made their judgments without factoring that most of
13984-459: The end of the year, allowing the British to re-occupy Cyrenaica and lift the siege of Tobruk. The 21st Panzer, along with 15th Panzer Division , did score a notable victory over XXX Corps (and in particular the 7th Armoured Division ) on 22 November at Sidi Rezegh and broke through to the Egyptian border, posing a threat to the Eighth Army. Over-stretched supply lines and the urgent need to assist
14136-421: The evening of 15 July, with the 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division reinforced by a brigade of 53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division , the 34th Tank Brigade, 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division and the 53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division, minus one brigade. Greenline was intended to convince the German command that the main British assault would be launched west of the Orne, through the positions held by XII Corps and to tie down
14288-425: The first Allied troops to land in the invasion. The three pathfinder serials of the 82nd Airborne Division were to begin their drops as the final wave of 101st Airborne Division paratroopers landed, thirty minutes ahead of the first 82nd Airborne Division drops. Efforts of the early wave of pathfinder teams to mark the drop zones were partially ineffective. The first serial, assigned to DZ A, missed its zone and set up
14440-431: The first armoured regiment and a portion of the second had crossed the line. Although opposition was still minimal and more prisoners were taken, the two regiments struggled to keep up with the barrage and were moving out of supporting range of their reserves. On schedule, at 09:00, the barrage lifted and 35 minutes later, the lead squadrons reached the Caen–Vimont railway. In reserve, the 23rd Hussars had managed to clear
14592-575: The first day British infantry seized a key objective and took 300 prisoners but the next day there was much inconclusive fighting on the outskirts of Noyers-Bocage and Elements of the 9th SS Panzer Division were committed to the village defence. Although the British took control of the railway station and an area of high ground outside the village, Noyers-Bocage itself remained in German hands. The preliminary operations cost Second Army 3,500 casualties for no significant territorial gains but Greenline and Pomegranate were strategically successful. Reacting to
14744-439: The first railway line only to become embroiled in a 1 + 1 ⁄ 2 -hour engagement with a battery of self-propelled guns of the 200th Assault Gun Battalion, that had been mistaken for Tiger tanks. As the 2nd Fife and Forfar Yeomanry advanced past Cagny, they were engaged by anti-tank guns in Cagny to the east. Within a few minutes at least twelve tanks were disabled. The Yeomanry pressed their advance south and were engaged by
14896-481: The flanks of VIII Corps, strong points such as the village of Cagny, attacking German gun and reserve positions and the interdiction of German troop movements. Each of the VIII Corps brigade headquarters was allocated a Forward Air Control Post . The Germans considered the Caen area to be the foundation of their position in Normandy and were determined to maintain a defensive arc from the English Channel to
15048-532: The following strength: 72 Panzer IV tanks, 38 Panther tanks and 8 Flakpanzer IV . From January 7 to 21 Col Hans von Luck's 125 Regiment of the 21st took part in Operation Nordwind , aiming to sever the American supply line to Strasbourg . Two weeks of heavy fighting in the villages of Rittershoffen and Hatten followed. Luck recalled to Stephen Ambrose fifty years later that the battle was "one of
15200-481: The headquarters of the 11th Armoured Division was hit, as were some tank crews who had survived the fighting. In their fighting around Cagny, the Guards Armoured Division lost fifteen tanks destroyed and 45 tanks damaged. The 11th Armoured Division lost 126 tanks, forty of which were write-offs; the rest were damaged or had broken down. (The loss of 126 tanks of the 219–244 tanks that crossed
15352-587: The larger battle for Caen in Normandy , France. The objective of the operation was a limited attack to the south, from the Orne bridgehead, to capture the rest of Caen and the Bourguébus Ridge beyond. Goodwood was preceded by Operations Greenline and Pomegranate in the Second Battle of the Odon west of Caen, to divert German attention from the area east of Caen. Goodwood began when the British VIII Corps , with three armoured divisions, attacked to seize
15504-406: The light of flares , which revealed a one-way flow of traffic over the Orne into the British bridgehead. Later that day, a British Spitfire was shot down over German lines while photographing defences; British artillery and fighters attempted to destroy the crashed aircraft without success. LXXXVI Corps, reinforced by much artillery, held the front line. The 346th Infantry Division was dug in from
15656-543: The main German gun line on the ridge, while the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment, having shifted westward and exchanged fire with the German garrison in Grentheville, moved around the village and advanced along the southern outskirts of Caen, towards Bras and Hubert-Folie. What had been conceived as an attack towards the Bourguébus Ridge by three armoured divisions, had become an unsupported advance by two tank regiments, out of sight of one other, against massed German fire. By 11:15,
15808-410: The men who jumped from planes at lower altitudes were injured when they hit the ground because of their chutes not having enough time to slow their descent, while others who jumped from higher altitudes reported a terrifying descent of several minutes watching tracer fire streaking up towards them. Of the 20 serials making up the two missions, nine plunged into the cloud bank and were badly dispersed. Of
15960-434: The moment where the Normandy campaign became a battle of attrition . On 10 July, Montgomery, the commander of all the Allied ground forces in Normandy, held a meeting at his headquarters with Dempsey and Bradley. They discussed 21st Army Group operations, following the conclusion of Operation Charnwood and the failure of the First US Army break-out offensive. Montgomery approved Operation Cobra , an attack to be launched by
16112-678: The most accurate of the D-Day drops, half the regiment dropping on or within a mile of its DZ, and 75 percent within 2 miles (3.2 km). The other regiments were more significantly dispersed. The 508th experienced the worst drop of any of the PIRs, with only 25 percent jumping within a mile of the DZ. Half the regiment dropped east of the Merderet, where it was useless to its original mission. The 507th PIR's pathfinders landed on DZ T, but because of Germans nearby, marker lights could not be turned on. Approximately half landed nearby in grassy swampland along
16264-420: The most effective use of the Eureka beacons and holophane marking lights of any pathfinder team. The planes bound for DZ N south of Sainte-Mère-Église flew their mission accurately and visually identified the zone but still dropped the teams a mile southeast. They landed among troop areas of the German 91st Division and were unable to reach the DZ. The teams assigned to mark DZ T northwest of Sainte-Mère-Église were
16416-412: The night formation training. As a result, 20 percent of the 924 crews committed to the parachute mission on D-Day had minimum night training and fully three-fourths of all crews had never been under fire. Over 2,100 CG-4 Waco gliders had been sent to the United Kingdom, and after attrition during training operations, 1,118 were available for operations, along with 301 Airspeed Horsa gliders received from
16568-423: The only element of the 7th Armoured Division to enter the battle was the 5th Royal Tank Regiment (5th RTR). At 17:00 near Cuverville it knocked out two Panzer IVs for the loss of four tanks and then cleared Grentheville, bypassed earlier in the day by the 3rd RTR, taking several prisoners. A German counter-attack by six tanks petered out after two tanks each were destroyed. The 11th Armoured Division pulled back to
16720-443: The only ones dropped with accuracy, and while they deployed both Eureka and BUPS, they were unable to show lights because of the close proximity of German troops. Altogether, four of the six drops zones could not display marking lights. The pathfinder teams assigned to Drop Zones C (101st) and N (82nd) each carried two BUPS beacons. The units for DZ N were intended to guide in the parachute resupply drop scheduled for late on D-Day, but
16872-409: The operation ended on 20 July, the armoured divisions had broken through the outer German defences and advanced 7 mi (11 km) but had been stopped short of Bourguébus Ridge, only armoured cars having penetrated further south and beyond the ridge. While Goodwood failed in its primary aim, it forced the Germans to keep powerful formations opposite the British and Canadians on the eastern flank of
17024-434: The operational objectives, the Second Army initiated a deception plan that included diversionary attacks launched by XII and XXX Corps. The three armoured divisions moved to their staging positions west of the Orne only at night and in radio silence; artillery fire was used to mask the noise of the tank engines. During the hours of daylight all efforts were made to camouflage the new positions. For artillery support, Goodwood
17176-570: The other to block the western corridor at La Haye-du-Puits in a second lift. The exposed and perilous nature of the La Haye de Puits mission was assigned to the veteran 82nd Airborne Division ("The All-Americans"), commanded by Major General Matthew Ridgway , while the causeway mission was given to the untested 101st Airborne Division ("The Screaming Eagles"), which received a new commander in March, Brigadier General Maxwell D. Taylor , formerly
17328-525: The pair of DZ C were to provide a central orientation point for all the SCR-717 radars to get bearings. However the units were damaged in the drop and provided no assistance. The assault lift (one air transport operation) was divided into two missions, " Albany " and " Boston ", each with three regiment-sized landings on a drop zone. The drop zones of the 101st were northeast of Carentan and lettered A, C, and D from north to south (Drop Zone B had been that of
17480-563: The peninsula in daylight. IX Troop Carrier Command (TCC) was formed in October 1943 to carry out the airborne assault mission in the invasion. Brigadier General Paul L. Williams , who had commanded the troop carrier operations in Sicily and Italy, took command in February 1944. The TCC command and staff officers were an excellent mix of combat veterans from those earlier assaults, and
17632-470: The preliminary artillery bombardment, 2,077 heavy and medium bombers of the Royal Air Force (RAF) and United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) would attack in three waves, in the largest air raid launched in direct support of ground forces in the campaign so far. Speed was of the essence and it was hoped that the aerial bombardment would pave the way for the 11th Armoured Division, rapidly to secure
17784-559: The problem. All matériel requested by commanders in IX TCC, including armor plating, had been received with the exception of self-sealing fuel tanks , which Chief of the Army Air Forces General Henry H. Arnold had personally rejected because of limited supplies. Crew availability exceeded numbers of aircraft, but 40 percent were recent-arriving crews or individual replacements who had not been present for much of
17936-432: The ridge resulted in the loss of 16 British tanks and a small counter-attack during the afternoon was driven off, with the destruction of six German Panthers. Just before 10:00, the Guards Armoured Division caught up with the 11th Armoured Division and pressed on towards Cagny. By 12:00 the leading elements were halted, engaged in fighting. A German counter-attack against the 2nd Armoured Grenadier Guards by 19 tanks from
18088-442: The ridge, while in the Cagny area the 21st Panzer Division was to recover the lost ground. German tanks started to arrive on the ridge around noon and the British tank crews were soon reporting German tanks and guns everywhere. Hawker Typhoon fighter-bombers, carrying RP-3 rockets, were directed onto the ridge during the afternoon, delaying and eventually breaking up the 1st SS Panzer Division counter-attack. A final attempt to storm
18240-467: The ridge; one at dusk was broken up by British artillery and anti-tank fire, which destroyed a Panther and Tiger, another after dark, led by a captured Sherman as a ruse, was repulsed after the Sherman and two Panthers were knocked out by a British anti-tank battery. During the night, German bombers dropped flares over the Orne bridges, which then came under aerial attack. One bridge was slightly damaged and
18392-503: The river. Estimates of drowning casualties vary from "a few" to "scores" (against an overall D-Day loss in the division of 156 killed in action ), but much equipment was lost and the troops had difficulty assembling. Timely assembly enabled the 505th to accomplish two of its missions on schedule. With the help of a Frenchman who led them into the town, the 3rd Battalion captured Sainte-Mère-Église by 0430 against "negligible opposition" from German artillerymen. The 2nd Battalion established
18544-473: The road near the village of Sainte-Foy-de-Montgommery . The fighter made a strafing attack driving the car off the road. Among its occupants was Field Marshal Erwin Rommel , the commander of Army Group B , who was seriously wounded, leaving Army Group B temporarily leaderless. "For forty-five minutes the procession of bombers came on unbroken and when they'd gone, the thunder of the guns swelled up and filled
18696-460: The route the British were to take. The 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion rallied rapidly and got to work digging out their tanks. On Bourguébus Ridge, a number of guns were destroyed by the bombing but most of the artillery and anti-tank guns remained intact. "It was Hell and I am still astonished that I ever survived it. I was unconscious for a while after a bomb had exploded just front of my tank, almost burying me alive." Freiherr von Rosen describing
18848-414: The six serials which achieved concentrated drops, none flew through the clouds. However, the primary factor limiting success of the paratroop units was the decision to make a massive parachute drop at night, because it magnified all the errors resulting from the above factors. A night parachute drop was not again used in three subsequent large-scale airborne operations. The negative impact of dropping at night
19000-410: The start line has been a common feature of accounts of Goodwood but the divisional commander, the VIII Corps historian and Chester Wilmot gave 126 tank losses. Michael Reynolds gave "...at least 125" and Christopher Dunphie 128 losses.) The armoured divisions suffered 521 casualties during the day, Guards Armoured Division suffered 127 casualties, the 7th Armoured Division had 48 casualties and
19152-469: The steelworks, on the positions of the 21st Panzer Division and on the village of Cagny, reducing half of it to rubble. At 06:40 the British artillery opened fire and twenty minutes later, the second wave of bombers arrived. From 10,000–13,000 ft (3,000–4,000 m), American Marauders released 563 long tons (572 t) of fragmentation bombs on the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division, as fighter-bombers attacked German strong points and gun positions. During
19304-458: The strongly held Verrières (Bourguébus) Ridge. If the German front collapsed, a deeper advance would be considered. Second Army intelligence had formed a good estimate of the opposition Goodwood was likely to face, although the German positions beyond the first line of villages had to be inferred, mainly from inconclusive air reconnaissance. The German defensive line was believed to consist of two belts up to 4 mi (6.4 km) deep. Aware that
19456-540: The successful missions had been flown in clear weather. By the end of May 1944, the IX Troop Carrier Command had available 1,207 Douglas C-47 Skytrain troop carrier airplanes and was one-third overstrength, creating a strong reserve. Three quarters of the planes were less than one year old on D-Day, and all were in excellent condition. Engine problems during training had resulted in a high number of aborted sorties, but all had been replaced to eliminate
19608-464: The threats in the Odon Valley, the Germans retained the 2nd Panzer and 10th SS Panzer divisions in the front line and recalled the 9th SS Panzer Division from Corps reserve. The Germans suffered around 2,000 casualties. Terry Copp wrote that the fighting was "one of the bloodiest encounters of the campaign". During the late afternoon of 17 July, a patrolling Spitfire spotted a German staff car on
19760-446: The three armoured divisions were amended to "dominate the area Bourguébus–Vimont–Bretteville", although it was intended that "armoured cars should push far to the south towards Falaise, spread[ing] alarm and despondency". The objectives for the II Canadian Corps remained unchanged and it was stressed that these were vital, only following their achievement would VIII Corps "'crack about' as the situation demands". The 11th Armoured Division
19912-458: The town, the 3rd Infantry Division was unable to assault Caen in force and was stopped short of the outskirts. Follow-up attacks were unsuccessful as German resistance solidified; abandoning the direct approach, Operation Perch —a pincer attack by I Corps and XXX Corps —was launched on 7 June, to encircle Caen from the east and west. I Corps, striking south out of the Orne bridgehead , was halted by
20064-525: The troop carrier crews, but although every C-47 in IX TCC had a Rebecca interrogator installed, to keep from jamming the system with hundreds of signals, only flight leads were authorized to use it in the vicinity of the drop zones. Despite many early failures in its employment, the Eureka-Rebecca system had been used with high accuracy in Italy in a night drop of the 82nd Airborne Division to reinforce
20216-408: The unit with most of its transport and all of its assault guns. On June 17, 1943 Schnelle Brigade West was upgraded to Schnelle Division West , and on June 27, 1943, was assigned the name 21st Panzer Division in memory of the unit that had fought and been captured in North Africa. Major Becker was assigned the command of the division's assault gun battalion, Panzerjäger-Abteilung 200 . The division
20368-462: The west bank of the Orne. On 15 July, German military intelligence warned Panzer Group West that from 17 July, a British attack out of the Orne bridgehead was likely. It was thought that the British would push south-east towards Paris. General Heinrich Eberbach , the commanding officer of Panzer Group West, designed a defensive plan, with its details worked out by his two corps and six divisional commanders. A belt of at least 10 miles (16 km) depth
20520-485: The worst drops of the operation, losing all but one howitzer and most of its troops as casualties. The three serials carrying the 506th PIR were badly dispersed by the clouds, then subjected to intense antiaircraft fire. Even so, 2/3 of the 1st Battalion was dropped accurately on DZ C. The 2nd Battalion, much of which had dropped too far west, fought its way to the Haudienville causeway by mid-afternoon but found that
20672-650: Was abandoned when the divisional staff were killed in an air raid . The division continued to fight as part of the front throughout June and July. Between 6 June and 8 July, 21st Panzer reported the loss of 54 Panzer IVs, with 17 Panzer IVs arriving as replacements. On 3 July a German report stated the following number of enemy tanks destroyed by 21st Panzer according to weapon used: Pz : 37, Sturmgeschütz : 15, Mot. Pak & Flak : 41, Artillery: 3, Infantry: 5. Total 101. To 27 July German tank losses continued in similar numbers. Between 6 June and 7 August, British reports based on captured vehicles suggested that about half of
20824-430: Was allocated 760 guns, with 297,600 rounds of ammunition. The artillery consisted of 456 field pieces from 19 field regiments, 208 medium guns from 13 medium regiments, 48 heavy pieces from 3 heavy regiments and 48 heavy anti-aircraft guns from two heavy anti-aircraft regiments. The artillery was provided by I, VIII, XII and II Canadian Corps as well as the 2nd Canadian Army Group Royal Artillery (AGRA) and
20976-408: Was also a lift of 10 serials organized in three waves, totaling 6,420 paratroopers carried by 369 C-47s. The C-47s carrying the 505th did not experience the difficulties that had plagued the 101st's drops. Pathfinders on DZ O turned on their Eureka beacons as the first 82nd serial crossed the initial point and lighted holophane markers on all three battalion assembly areas. As a result, the 505th enjoyed
21128-487: Was also sent to senior planners in the United Kingdom so that air support for the operation could be secured. When VIII Corps had assembled in Normandy in mid-June, it was suggested that the corps be used to attack out of the Orne bridgehead, to outflank Caen from the east but Operation Dreadnought was cancelled when Dempsey and O'Connor doubted the feasibility of the operation. In the outline for Goodwood, VIII Corps, with three armoured divisions, would attack southwards out of
21280-508: Was constructed, organised into four defence lines. Villages within the belt were fortified and anti-tank guns placed along its southern and eastern edges. To allow tanks to move freely within the belt, the Germans decided not to establish anti-tank minefields between each defensive line. On 16 July, several reconnaissance flights were mounted over the British front but most of these were driven off by anti-aircraft fire. As dark fell, camera-equipped aircraft managed to bring back photographs taken by
21432-405: Was established. German armoured strength was estimated at 230 tanks and artillery strength at 300 field and anti-tank guns. The Second Army believed that 90 guns were in the centre of the battle zone, 40 on the flanks and 20 defending the Caen–Vimont railway line. The British had also located a German gun line on the Bourguébus Ridge but its strength and gun positions were unknown. To mask
21584-429: Was further illustrated when the same troop carrier groups flew a second lift later that day with precision and success under heavy fire. Paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Division "Screaming Eagles" jumped first on June 6, between 00:48 and 01:40 British Double Summer Time . 6,928 troops were carried aboard 432 C-47s of mission "Albany" organized into 10 serials. The first flights, inbound to DZ A, were not surprised by
21736-445: Was in an area identified by the Germans as a likely landing area. Consequently so many Germans were nearby that the pathfinders could not set out their lights and were forced to rely solely on Eureka, which was a poor guide at short range. The pathfinders of the 82nd Airborne Division had similar results. The first serial, bound for DZ O near Sainte-Mère-Église , flew too far north but corrected its error and dropped near its DZ. It made
21888-530: Was postponed to May 11-May 12 and became a dress rehearsal for both divisions. The 52nd TCW, carrying only two token paratroopers on each C-47, performed satisfactorily although the two lead planes of the 316th Troop Carrier Group (TCG) collided in mid-air, killing 14 including the group commander, Col. Burton R. Fleet. The 53rd TCW was judged "uniformly successful" in its drops. The lesser-trained 50th TCW, however, got lost in haze when its pathfinders failed to turn on their navigation beacons. It continued training till
22040-461: Was preceded by Operation Windsor , to capture the airfield at Carpiquet just outside Caen. By 9 July, Caen north of the Orne and Odon rivers had been captured but German forces retained possession of the south bank and a number of important locations, including the Colombelles steel works, whose tall chimneys commanded the area. Shortly after the capture of northern Caen, the British mounted
22192-507: Was put together from the second regiment of the 3rd Panzer Division . These elements were organized into the 5th Light Division when they arrived in Africa from 10 February – 12 March 1941. On 2 March 1941, the first 8.8 cm "88" dual purpose anti-aircraft/anti-tank guns arrived and provided much needed firepower. Although the DAK commander, Erwin Rommel, was under strict orders to remain on the defensive, he ordered an attack on 31 March 1941 by
22344-580: Was reduced to only four tanks by 7 November. During the long retreat to Tunisia , the 21st Panzer fought the rear guard actions. To compound German problems, the Anglo-Americans landed in Morocco and Algeria during Operation Torch and Panzerarmee Afrika , as it was now called, was threatened with annihilation, as it would be caught in a vice. On 21 December, von Randow was killed. By the time it reached Tunis , 21st Panzer had ceased to exist as
22496-643: Was routed by the British Commonwealth Western Desert Force in Operation Compass 9 December 1940 – 9 February 1941 under General Wavell . The German Armed Forces High Command ( Oberkommando der Wehrmacht ) decided to send a "blocking force" to Libya to support the Italian army, commanded by the future Field Marshal Erwin Rommel . The German blocking force at first was based only on Panzer Regiment 5, which
22648-419: Was then moved to Paris, where it remained for rehabilitation and garrison duty until the Allied landings at Normandy . The new division's commander was Oberst Edgar Feuchtinger who was promoted to Generalmajor on 1 August 1943 and Generalleutenant (equivalent to Major-General) exactly a year later. It was heavily engaged in the fighting at the Normandy beachheads, being the only Panzer division to engage
22800-493: Was to lead the advance, screen Cagny and capture Bras , Hubert-Folie , Verrières and Fontenay-le-Marmion . The divisional armoured brigade was to bypass most of the German-held villages in its area, leaving them to be dealt with by follow-up waves. The 159th Infantry Brigade , was initially to act independently of the armoured brigade and capture Cuverville and Démouville . The Guards Armoured Division, advancing behind
22952-535: Was to secure the area for troops from the Royal Engineers to destroy the chimneys before retiring. At 05:00, the British force was ambushed by Tiger tanks and was forced to withdraw after losing nine tanks. The Second Army launched two preliminary operations; according to General Bernard Montgomery , their purpose was to "engage the enemy in battle unceasingly; we must 'write off' his troops; and generally we must kill Germans". Historian Terry Copp called this
23104-535: Was under the command of Rommel, who was responsible for German forces from the Netherlands to the Loire . Rommel had been away from the front during the first days of the invasion on leave to visit his family; he re-assumed command on 9 June. The division was grouped with two panzer divisions, 12SS and Panzer Lehr , under the command of Sepp Dietrich which were to push northwest to retake Bayeux but this plan
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