128-828: The Manchester Blitz (also known as the Christmas Blitz ) was the heavy bombing of the city of Manchester and its surrounding areas in North West England during the Second World War by the German Luftwaffe . It was one of three major raids on Manchester, an important inland port and industrial city; Trafford Park in neighbouring Stretford was a major centre of war production. Air raids began in August 1940, and in September 1940
256-515: A 250 kg bomb underneath the fuselage, the later model arriving during the battle. The Bf 109, unlike the Stuka , could fight on equal terms with RAF fighters after releasing its ordnance . At the start of the battle, the twin-engined Messerschmitt Bf 110C long-range Zerstörer ("Destroyer") was also expected to engage in air-to-air combat while escorting the Luftwaffe bomber fleet. Although
384-538: A base for the successful prosecution of the air and sea war against England". On 29 November, OKW "Directive No. 9 – Instructions For Warfare Against The Economy Of The Enemy" stated that once this coastline had been secured, the Luftwaffe together with the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) was to blockade UK ports with sea mines. They were to attack shipping and warships and make air attacks on shore installations and industrial production. This directive remained in force in
512-488: A better position than they were at its beginning". People referred to raids as if they were weather, stating that a day was "very blitzy". According to Anna Freud and Edward Glover , London civilians surprisingly did not suffer from widespread shell shock , unlike the soldiers in the Dunkirk evacuation . The psychoanalysts were correct, and the special network of psychiatric clinics opened to receive mental casualties of
640-579: A crowd surge after a woman fell down the steps as she entered the station. A single direct hit on a shelter in Stoke Newington in October 1940 killed 160 civilians. Communal shelters never housed more than one seventh of Greater London residents. Peak use of the Underground as shelter was 177,000 on 27 September 1940 and a November 1940 census of London found that about 4% of residents used
768-601: A disaster with or without German air superiority. Regardless of the ability of the Luftwaffe to win air superiority, Hitler was frustrated it was not happening quickly enough. With no sign of the RAF weakening and the Luftflotten suffering many losses, OKL was keen for a change in strategy. To reduce losses further, strategy changed to prefer night raids, giving the bombers greater protection under cover of darkness. It
896-527: A greater loss of manpower. On 7 September, the Germans shifted away from the destruction of the RAF's supporting structures. German intelligence suggested Fighter Command was weakening, and an attack on London would force it into a final battle of annihilation while compelling the British Government to surrender. The decision to change strategy is sometimes claimed as a major mistake by OKL. It
1024-557: A last resort once the British economy had been damaged and the Luftwaffe had full air superiority. On 2 July, OKW requested preliminary plans. In Britain, Churchill described "the great invasion scare" as "serving a very useful purpose" by "keeping every man and woman tuned to a high pitch of readiness". Historian Len Deighton stated that on 10 July Churchill advised the War Cabinet that invasion could be ignored, as it "would be
1152-518: A more capable opponent than any it had previously met: a sizeable, highly coordinated, well-supplied, modern air force. The Luftwaffe's Messerschmitt Bf 109E and Bf 110C fought against the RAF's workhorse Hurricane Mk I and the less numerous Spitfire Mk I ; Hurricanes outnumbered Spitfires in RAF Fighter Command by about 2:1 when war broke out. The Bf 109E had a better climb rate and was up to 40 mph faster in level flight than
1280-529: A most hazardous and suicidal operation". On 11 July, Hitler agreed with Raeder that invasion would be a last resort, and the Luftwaffe advised that gaining air superiority would take 14 to 28 days. Hitler met his army chiefs, von Brauchitsch and Halder , at the Berchtesgaden on 13 July where they presented detailed plans on the assumption that the navy would provide safe transport. Von Brauchitsch and Halder were surprised that Hitler took no interest in
1408-624: A policy of unrestricted bombing. His hope was—for reasons of political prestige within Germany itself—that the German population would be protected from the Allied bombings. When this proved impossible, he began to fear that popular feeling would turn against his regime, and he redoubled efforts to mount a similar "terror offensive" against Britain in order to produce a stalemate in which both sides would hesitate to use bombing at all. A major problem in
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#17327731705531536-404: A positive result. However, the use of delayed-action bombs , while initially very effective, gradually had less impact, partly because they failed to detonate. The British had anticipated the change in strategy and dispersed its production facilities, making them less vulnerable to a concentrated attack. Regional commissioners were given plenipotentiary powers to restore communications and organise
1664-446: A similar proposal; when rebuffed, he told Churchill that interference with German domination would mean war. To Hitler's great annoyance, all his diplomacy failed to stop Britain from declaring war when he invaded Poland. During the fall of France, he repeatedly discussed peace efforts with his generals. When Churchill came to power, there was still wide support for Halifax, who as Foreign Secretary openly argued for peace negotiations in
1792-420: A specific segment of British industry such as aircraft factories, or against a system of interrelated industries such as Britain's import and distribution network, or even in a blow aimed at breaking the morale of the British population. The Luftwaffe 's strategy became increasingly aimless over the winter of 1940–1941. Disputes among OKL staff revolved more around tactics than strategy. This method condemned
1920-446: A study (in 1939) on the possibility of an invasion of Britain and concluded that it also required naval superiority. The Luftwaffe said invasion could only be "the final act in an already victorious war." Hitler first discussed the idea of an invasion at a 21 May 1940 meeting with Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, who stressed the difficulties and his own preference for a blockade. OKW Chief of Staff Jodl's 30 June report described invasion as
2048-590: A surprise to the Jagdwaffe , although the German pilots retained a strong belief that the 109 was the superior fighter. The British fighters were equipped with eight Browning .303 (7.7mm) machine guns while most Bf 109Es had two 20mm cannons supplemented by two 7.92mm machine guns. The 20mm cannons were much more effective than the .303; during the Battle it was not unknown for damaged German bombers to limp home with up to two hundred .303 hits. At some altitudes,
2176-659: A waste of strategic effort. The defeat of France in June 1940 introduced the prospect for the first time of independent air action against Britain. A July Fliegercorps I paper asserted that Germany was by definition an air power: "Its chief weapon against England is the Air Force, then the Navy, followed by the landing forces and the Army." In 1940, the Luftwaffe would undertake a " strategic offensive ... on its own and independent of
2304-591: Is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been secured. England can then be blockaded from Western France at close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines extend the range of the blockade." When war commenced, Hitler and the OKW ( Oberkommando der Wehrmacht or "High Command of the Armed Forces") issued a series of directives ordering, planning and stating strategic objectives. "Directive No. 1 for
2432-458: Is argued that persisting with attacks on RAF airfields might have won air superiority for the Luftwaffe . Others argue that the Luftwaffe made little impression on Fighter Command in the last week of August and first week of September and that the shift in strategy was not decisive. It has also been argued that it was doubtful the Luftwaffe could have won air superiority before the "weather window" began to deteriorate in October. It
2560-541: Is derived from the This was their finest hour speech delivered by Winston Churchill in the House of Commons on 18 June, more than three weeks prior to the generally accepted date for the start of the battle: ... What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that the battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life and
2688-577: Is reserved to me. Attacks on the English homeland are to be prepared, bearing in mind that inconclusive results with insufficient forces are to be avoided in all circumstances. Both France and the UK declared war on Germany; on 9 October, Hitler's "Directive No. 6" planned the offensive to defeat these allies and "win as much territory as possible in the Netherlands, Belgium, and northern France to serve as
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#17327731705532816-453: The Luftwaffe had an unclear strategy and poor intelligence. The OKL had not been informed that Britain was to be considered a potential opponent until early 1938. It had no time to gather reliable intelligence on Britain's industries. Moreover, the OKL could not settle on an appropriate strategy. German planners had to decide whether the Luftwaffe should deliver the weight of its attacks against
2944-459: The Luftwaffe switched its main effort to night attacks. This became official policy on 7 October. The air campaign soon got underway against London and other British cities. However, the Luftwaffe faced limitations. Its aircraft— Dornier Do 17 , Junkers Ju 88 , and Heinkel He 111s —were capable of carrying out strategic missions but were incapable of doing greater damage because of their small bomb loads. The Luftwaffe 's decision in
3072-450: The Luftwaffe was expected to do so over Britain. From July until September 1940 the Luftwaffe attacked Fighter Command to gain air superiority as a prelude to invasion. This involved the bombing of English Channel convoys, ports, and RAF airfields and supporting industries. Destroying RAF Fighter Command would allow the Germans to gain control of the skies over the invasion area. It was supposed Bomber Command, Coastal Command , and
3200-516: The Reichsmarschall 's own explanation was that Hitler wanted to know only how many bombers there were, not how many engines each had. In July 1939, Göring arranged a display of the Luftwaffe 's most advanced equipment at Rechlin , to give the impression the air force was more prepared for a strategic air war than was actually the case. Although not specifically prepared to conduct independent strategic air operations against an opponent,
3328-632: The British Red Cross and the Salvation Army worked to improve conditions. Entertainment included concerts, films, plays and books from local libraries. Although only a small number of Londoners used the mass shelters, when journalists, celebrities and foreigners visited they became part of the Beveridge Report , part of a national debate on social and class division. Most residents found that such divisions continued within
3456-603: The Committee on Imperial Defence estimated that an attack of 60 days would result in 600,000 dead and 1.2 million wounded. News reports of the Spanish Civil War , such as the bombing of Barcelona , supported the 50-casualties-per-tonne estimate. By 1938, experts generally expected that Germany would try to drop as much as 3,500 tonnes in the first 24 hours of war and average 700 tonnes a day for several weeks. In addition to high-explosive and incendiary bombs ,
3584-723: The German High Command began planning Operation Barbarossa , the invasion of the Soviet Union . Bombing failed to demoralise the British into surrender or do much damage to the war economy; eight months of bombing never seriously hampered British war production, which continued to increase. The greatest effect was to force the British to disperse the production of aircraft and spare parts. British wartime studies concluded that most cities took 10 to 15 days to recover when hit severely, but some, such as Birmingham, took three months. The German air offensive failed because
3712-511: The Hull Blitz . The port cities of Bristol , Cardiff , Portsmouth , Plymouth , Southampton , Sunderland , Swansea , Belfast , and Glasgow were also bombed, as were the industrial centres of Birmingham , Coventry , Manchester , and Sheffield . More than 40,000 civilians were killed by Luftwaffe bombing during the war, almost half of them in the capital, where more than a million houses were destroyed or damaged. In early July 1940,
3840-526: The Indian ". Although the intensity of the bombing was not as great as pre-war expectations, thus making an equal comparison impossible, no psychiatric crisis occurred because of the Blitz even during the period of greatest bombing of September 1940. An American witness wrote, "By every test and measure I am able to apply, these people are staunch to the bone and won't quit ... the British are stronger and in
3968-542: The London Underground stations. Although many civilians had used them for shelter during the First World War, the government in 1939 refused to allow the stations to be used as shelters so as not to interfere with commuter and troop travel and the fears that occupants might refuse to leave. Underground officials were ordered to lock station entrances during raids but by the second week of heavy bombing,
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4096-526: The Luftwaffe was formally announced, with Walther Wever as Chief of Staff. The 1935 Luftwaffe doctrine for "Conduct of Air War" ( Luftkriegführung ) set air power within the overall military strategy, with critical tasks of attaining (local and temporary) air superiority and providing battlefield support for army and naval forces. Strategic bombing of industries and transport could be decisive longer-term options, dependent on opportunity or preparations by
4224-665: The North Sea and severely damaged another, causing it to crash land in Germany. Notes Citations Bibliography The Blitz Britain The Blitz 1942–1945 The Blitz was a German bombing campaign against the United Kingdom , from 7 September 1940 to 11 May 1941, for a little more than 8 months during the Second World War . The Germans conducted mass air attacks against industrial targets, towns, and cities, beginning with raids on London towards
4352-702: The Palace Theatre on Oxford Street was hit. The heaviest raids occurred on the nights of 22/23 and 23/24 December 1940, killing an estimated 684 people and injuring more than 2,000. Manchester Cathedral , the Royal Exchange , the Free Trade Hall and the Manchester Assize Courts were among the large buildings damaged. On the night of 22/23 December, 272 tons of high explosives were dropped, and another 195 tons
4480-678: The Phoney War , civilians were aware of the deadly power of aerial attacks through newsreels of Barcelona, the Bombing of Guernica and the Bombing of Shanghai . Many popular works of fiction during the 1920s and 1930s portrayed aerial bombing, such as H. G. Wells ' novel The Shape of Things to Come and its 1936 film adaptation , and others such as The Air War of 1936 and The Poison War . Harold Macmillan wrote in 1956 that he and others around him "thought of air warfare in 1938 rather as people think of nuclear war today". Based in part on
4608-571: The Royal Navy could not operate under conditions of German air superiority. The Luftwaffe 's poor intelligence meant that their aircraft were not always able to locate their targets, and thus attacks on factories and airfields failed to achieve the desired results. British fighter aircraft production continued at a rate surpassing Germany's during the Battle of Britain by 2 to 1. The British produced 10,000 aircraft in 1940, in comparison to Germany's 8,000. The replacement of pilots and aircrew
4736-491: The United States Army Air Corps (USAAC) adopted much of this apocalyptic thinking. The policy of RAF Bomber Command became an attempt to achieve victory through the destruction of civilian will, communications and industry. The Luftwaffe took a cautious view of strategic bombing , but the OKL did not oppose the strategic bombardment of industries or cities. It believed it could greatly affect
4864-585: The Battle period he sought neutrality or a peace treaty with Britain. In a secret conference on 23 May 1939, Hitler set out his rather contradictory strategy that an attack on Poland was essential and "will only be successful if the Western Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same time" with a surprise attack. "If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, and if France
4992-595: The Bf 109 could outclimb the British fighter. It could also engage in vertical-plane negative- g manoeuvres without the engine cutting out because its DB 601 engine used fuel injection ; this allowed the 109 to dive away from attackers more readily than the carburettor -equipped Merlin. On the other hand, the Bf 109E had a much larger turning circle than its two foes. In general, though, as Alfred Price noted in The Spitfire Story : ... the differences between
5120-423: The Blitz. The programme favoured back garden Anderson shelters and small brick surface shelters. Many of the latter were abandoned in 1940 as unsafe. Authorities expected that the raids would be brief and in daylight, rather than attacks by night, which forced Londoners to sleep in shelters. Deep shelters provided most protection against a direct hit. The government did not build them for large populations before
5248-538: The British Foreign Secretary , Lord Halifax , and certain elements of the British public favoured a negotiated peace with an ascendant Germany, Churchill and a majority of his Cabinet refused to consider an armistice. Instead, Churchill used his skilful rhetoric to harden public opinion against capitulation and prepare the British for a long war. The Battle of Britain has the unusual distinction that it gained its name before being fought. The name
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5376-705: The British Isles on 24 December; one crashed in the sea near Blackpool and the other, loaded with incendiaries and flares, crashed in flames near Sussex with no survivors. Neighbouring Salford , Stretford and other districts were also badly damaged by the bombing. It is estimated that more than 215 people were killed and 910 injured in Salford, and more than 8,000 homes were damaged or destroyed. Seventy-three were killed in Stretford, and many more were injured. In June 1941, German bombs damaged
5504-527: The British trade". Instead of the Wehrmacht attacking the French, the Luftwaffe with naval assistance was to block imports to Britain and attack seaports. "Should the enemy resort to terror measures – for example, to attack our towns in western Germany" they could retaliate by bombing industrial centres and London. Parts of this appeared on 29 November in "Directive No. 9" as future actions once
5632-499: The Channel. In September, RAF Bomber Command night raids disrupted the German preparation of converted barges, and the Luftwaffe's failure to overwhelm the RAF forced Hitler to postpone and eventually cancel Operation Sea Lion. The Luftwaffe proved unable to sustain daylight raids, but their continued night-bombing operations on Britain became known as the Blitz. Germany's failure to destroy Britain's air defences and force it out of
5760-632: The Conduct of the War", dated 31 August 1939, instructed the invasion of Poland on 1 September as planned . Potentially, Luftwaffe "operations against England" were to: dislocate English imports, the armaments industry, and the transport of troops to France. Any favourable opportunity of an effective attack on concentrated units of the English Navy, particularly on battleships or aircraft carriers, will be exploited. The decision regarding attacks on London
5888-401: The French surrender on 22 June 1940, Hitler mainly focused his energies on the possibility of invading the Soviet Union . He believed that the British, defeated on the continent and without European allies, would quickly come to terms. The Germans were so convinced of an imminent armistice that they began constructing street decorations for the homecoming parades of victorious troops. Although
6016-565: The Germans could use poison gas and even bacteriological warfare, all with a high degree of accuracy. In 1939, military theorist Basil Liddell-Hart predicted that 250,000 deaths and injuries in Britain could occur in the first week of war. London hospitals prepared for 300,000 casualties in the first week of war. British air raid sirens sounded for the first time 22 minutes after Neville Chamberlain declared war on Germany . Although bombing attacks unexpectedly did not begin immediately during
6144-671: The Low Countries in the Battle of France , leaving Britain to face the threat of invasion by sea. The German high command recognised the difficulties of a seaborne attack while the Royal Navy controlled the English Channel and the North Sea . On 16 July, Hitler ordered the preparation of Operation Sea Lion as a potential amphibious and airborne assault on Britain, to follow once the Luftwaffe had air superiority over
6272-610: The Luftwaffe High Command ( Oberkommando der Luftwaffe , OKL) did not develop a methodical strategy for destroying British war industry. Poor intelligence about British industry and economic efficiency led to OKL concentrating on tactics rather than strategy. The bombing effort was diluted by attacks against several sets of industries instead of constant pressure on the most vital. In the 1920s and 1930s, airpower theorists such as Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell claimed that air forces could win wars, obviating
6400-403: The Luftwaffe lacked the means to do much damage to Britain's war economy beyond laying naval mines . Joseph Schmid , in charge of Luftwaffe intelligence, presented a report on 22 November 1939, stating that, "Of all Germany's possible enemies, Britain is the most dangerous." This "Proposal for the Conduct of Air Warfare" argued for a counter to the British blockade and said "Key is to paralyse
6528-604: The Luftwaffe mainly targeting coastal-shipping convoys, as well as ports and shipping centres such as Portsmouth . On 1 August, the Luftwaffe was directed to achieve air superiority over the RAF, with the aim of incapacitating RAF Fighter Command ; 12 days later , it shifted the attacks to RAF airfields and infrastructure . As the battle progressed, the Luftwaffe also targeted factories involved in aircraft production and strategic infrastructure. Eventually, it employed terror bombing on areas of political significance and on civilians. The Germans had rapidly overwhelmed France and
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#17327731705536656-467: The Luftwaffe, ordered the new policy on 6 September 1940. From 7 September 1940, London was systematically bombed by the Luftwaffe for 56 of the following 57 days and nights. Notable attacks included a large daylight attack against London on 15 September , a large raid on 29 December 1940 against London resulting in a firestorm known as the Second Great Fire of London , and a large raid on
6784-795: The Minister in charge of Defence Coordination, Sir Thomas Inskip , sided with Dowding that "The role of our air force is not an early knock-out blow" but rather was "to prevent the Germans from knocking us out" and fighter squadrons were just as necessary as bomber squadrons. The Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) gave the Luftwaffe Condor Legion the opportunity to test air fighting tactics with their new aeroplanes. Wolfram von Richthofen became an exponent of air power providing ground support to other services. The difficulty of accurately hitting targets prompted Ernst Udet to require that all new bombers had to be dive bombers , and led to
6912-522: The OKW reviewed the potential for an air- and seaborne invasion of Britain: the Kriegsmarine was faced with the threat the Royal Navy's larger Home Fleet posed to a crossing of the English Channel , and together with the German Army viewed control of airspace as a necessary precondition. The German navy thought air superiority alone was insufficient; the German naval staff had already produced
7040-477: The Rotol (constant speed propeller) equipped Hurricane Mk I, depending on altitude. The speed and climb disparity with the original non-Rotol Hurricane was even greater. By mid-1940, all RAF Spitfire and Hurricane fighter squadrons converted to 100 octane aviation fuel, which allowed their Merlin engines to generate significantly more power and an approximately 30 mph increase in speed at low altitudes through
7168-535: The Soviet Union. Erhard Milch organised rapid expansion, and following the 1933 Nazi seizure of power , his subordinate Robert Knauss formulated a deterrence theory incorporating Douhet's ideas and Tirpitz's "risk theory" . This proposed a fleet of heavy bombers to deter a preventive attack by France and Poland before Germany could fully rearm. A 1933–34 war game indicated a need for fighters and anti-aircraft protection as well as bombers. On 1 March 1935,
7296-619: The Spitfire and the Me 109 in performance and handling were only marginal, and in a combat they were almost always surmounted by tactical considerations of which side had seen the other first, which had the advantage of sun, altitude, numbers, pilot ability, tactical situation, tactical co-ordination, amount of fuel remaining, etc. The Bf 109E was also used as a Jabo ( jagdbomber , fighter-bomber ) – the E-4/B and E-7 models could carry
7424-544: The Tube and other large shelters, 9% in public surface shelters and 27% in private home shelters, implying that the remaining 60% of the city stayed at home. The government distributed Anderson shelters until 1941 and that year began distributing the Morrison shelter , which could be used inside homes. Public demand caused the government in October 1940 to build new deep shelters within the Underground to hold 80,000 people but
7552-481: The abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of a perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, "This was their finest hour". From the outset of his rise to power, Adolf Hitler expressed admiration for Britain, and throughout
7680-508: The air staff that war with Britain or even Russia was a possibility. The amount of firm operational and tactical preparation for a bombing campaign was minimal, largely because of the failure by Hitler as supreme commander to insist upon such a commitment. Ultimately, Hitler was trapped within his own vision of bombing as a terror weapon, formed in the 1930s when he threatened smaller nations into accepting German rule rather than submit to air bombardment. This had important implications. It showed
7808-415: The amount of space available and made detailed preparations for transporting evacuees. A trial blackout was held on 10 August 1939 and when Germany invaded Poland on 1 September, a blackout began at sunset. Lights were not allowed after dark for almost six years, and the blackout became by far the most unpopular aspect of the war for civilians, even more than rationing . The relocation of the government and
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#17327731705537936-433: The army and navy. It could be used to overcome a stalemate, or used when only destruction of the enemy's economy would be conclusive. The list excluded bombing civilians to destroy homes or undermine morale, as that was considered a waste of strategic effort, but the doctrine allowed revenge attacks if German civilians were bombed. A revised edition was issued in 1940, and the continuing central principle of Luftwaffe doctrine
8064-402: The attacks closed due to lack of need. Although the stress of the war resulted in many anxiety attacks, eating disorders, fatigue, weeping, miscarriages, and other physical and mental ailments, society did not collapse. The number of suicides and drunkenness declined, and London recorded only about two cases of "bomb neurosis" per week in the first three months of bombing. Many civilians found that
8192-435: The balance of power on the battlefield by disrupting production and damaging civilian morale. OKL did not believe air power alone could be decisive, and the Luftwaffe did not adopt an official policy of the deliberate bombing of civilians until 1942. The vital industries and transport centres that would be targeted for shutdown were valid military targets. It could be claimed civilians were not to be targeted directly, but
8320-552: The beginning of the National Socialist regime until 1939, there was a debate in German military journals over the role of strategic bombardment, with some contributors arguing along the lines of the British and Americans. General Walther Wever (Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff 1 March 1935 – 3 June 1936) championed strategic bombing and the building of suitable aircraft, although he emphasised
8448-447: The best way to retain mental stability was to be with family, and after the first few weeks of bombing, avoidance of the evacuation programmes grew. The cheerful crowds visiting bomb sites were so large they interfered with rescue work. Pub visits increased in number (beer was never rationed), and 13,000 attended cricket at Lord's . People left shelters when told instead of refusing to leave, although many housewives reportedly enjoyed
8576-410: The bombing of opponents than air defence, although he promoted the development of a bomber force in the 1930s and understood it was possible to use bombers for strategic purposes. He told OKL in 1939 that ruthless employment of the Luftwaffe against the heart of the British will to resist would follow when the moment was right. Hitler quickly developed scepticism toward strategic bombing, confirmed by
8704-902: The break from housework. Some people even told government surveyors that they enjoyed air raids if they occurred occasionally, perhaps once a week. Despite the attacks, defeat in Norway and France , and the threat of invasion, overall morale remained high. A Gallup poll found only 3% of Britons expected to lose the war in May 1940. Another poll found an 88% approval rating for Churchill in July. A third poll found 89% support for his leadership in October. Support for peace negotiations declined from 29% in February. Each setback caused more civilians to volunteer to become unpaid Local Defence Volunteers . Workers worked longer shifts and over weekends. Contributions rose to
8832-431: The breakdown of production would affect their morale and will to fight. German legal scholars of the 1930s carefully worked out guidelines for what type of bombing was permissible under international law. While direct attacks against civilians were ruled out as "terror bombing", the concept of attacking vital war industries—and probable heavy civilian casualties and breakdown of civilian morale—was ruled as acceptable. From
8960-461: The civil service was also planned but would only have occurred if necessary so as not to damage civilian morale. Not only was there evacuation over land, but also by ship. The Children's Overseas Reception Board was organised by the government to help parents send their children overseas to four British Dominions —Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. The programme evacuated 2,664 boys and girls (ages 5–15) until its ending in October after
9088-401: The coast had been conquered. On 24 May 1940 "Directive No. 13" authorised attacks on the blockade targets, as well as retaliation for RAF bombing of industrial targets in the Ruhr. After the defeat of France, the OKW felt they had won the war, and some more pressure would persuade Britain to give in. On 30 June, the OKW Chief of Staff Alfred Jodl issued his paper setting out options: the first
9216-470: The commander of Luftflotte 3 (1 February 1939 – 23 August 1944) and Hans Jeschonnek , Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff (1 February 1939 – 19 August 1943). The Luftwaffe was not pressed into ground support operations because of pressure from the army or because it was led by ex-soldiers; indeed, the Luftwaffe favoured a model of joint inter-service operations rather than independent strategic air campaigns. Hitler paid less attention to
9344-402: The conduct of air and sea warfare against England" issued on 1 August attempted to keep all the options open. The Luftwaffe's Adlertag campaign was to start around 5 August, subject to weather, with the aim of gaining air superiority over southern England as a necessary precondition of invasion, to give credibility to the threat and give Hitler the option of ordering the invasion. The intention
9472-496: The continent, and on 30 June the OKW Chief of Staff, Alfred Jodl , issued his review of options to increase pressure on Britain to agree to a negotiated peace. The first priority was to eliminate the RAF and gain air supremacy. Intensified air attacks against shipping and the economy could affect food supplies and civilian morale in the long term. Reprisal attacks of terror bombing had the potential to cause quicker capitulation, but
9600-536: The continuing influence of the 1935 "Conduct of the Air War" doctrine, the main focus of the Luftwaffe command (including Göring) was in concentrating attacks to destroy enemy armed forces on the battlefield, and "blitzkrieg" close air support of the army succeeded brilliantly. They reserved strategic bombing for a stalemate situation or revenge attacks, but doubted if this could be decisive on its own and regarded bombing civilians to destroy homes or undermine morale as
9728-575: The defending armies in Norway in early 1940 created a significant political crisis in Britain. In early May 1940, the Norway Debate questioned the fitness for office of the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain . On 10 May, the same day Winston Churchill became British Prime Minister, the Germans initiated the Battle of France with an aggressive invasion of French territory. RAF Fighter Command
9856-618: The development of the Knickebein system for night time navigation. Priority was given to producing large numbers of smaller aeroplanes, and plans for a long-range, four-engined strategic bomber were cancelled. The early stages of the Second World War saw successful German invasions on the continent, aided decisively by the air power of the Luftwaffe, which was able to establish tactical air superiority with great effectiveness. The speed with which German forces defeated most of
9984-703: The distribution of supplies to keep the war economy moving. London had nine million people—a fifth of the British population—living in an area of 750 square miles (1,940 square kilometres), which was difficult to defend because of its size. Based on experience with German strategic bombing during World War I against the United Kingdom, the British government estimated that 50 casualties—with about one-third killed—would result for every tonne of bombs dropped on London. The estimate of tonnes of bombs an enemy could drop per day grew as aircraft technology advanced, from 75 in 1922, to 150 in 1934, to 644 in 1937. In 1937
10112-536: The effect on morale was uncertain. On the same day, the Luftwaffe Commander-in-Chief, Hermann Göring issued his operational directive: to destroy the RAF, thus protecting German industry, and also to block overseas supplies to Britain. The German Supreme Command argued over the practicality of these options. In "Directive No. 16 – On preparations for a landing operation against England" on 16 July, Hitler required readiness by mid-August for
10240-634: The end of the Battle of Britain in 1940 (a battle for daylight air superiority between the Luftwaffe and the Royal Air Force over the United Kingdom). By September 1940, the Luftwaffe had lost the Battle of Britain and the German air fleets ( Luftflotten ) were ordered to attack London, to draw RAF Fighter Command into a battle of annihilation . Adolf Hitler and Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring , commander-in-chief of
10368-402: The experience of German bombing in the First World War, politicians feared mass psychological trauma from aerial attacks and the collapse of civil society. In 1938, a committee of psychiatrists predicted three times as many mental as physical casualties from aerial bombing, implying three to four million psychiatric patients. Winston Churchill told Parliament in 1934, "We must expect that, under
10496-475: The extent to which Hitler mistook Allied strategy for one of morale breaking instead of one of economic warfare , with the collapse of morale as a bonus. Hitler was much more attracted to the political aspects of bombing. As the mere threat of it had produced diplomatic results in the 1930s, he expected that the threat of German retaliation would persuade the Allies to adopt a policy of moderation and not to begin
10624-621: The first independent strategic bombing campaign. Hitler's 1925 book Mein Kampf mostly set out his hatreds: he only admired ordinary German World War I soldiers and Britain, which he saw as an ally against communism. In 1935 Hermann Göring welcomed news that Britain, as a potential ally, was rearming. In 1936 he promised assistance to defend the British Empire, asking only a free hand in Eastern Europe, and repeated this to Lord Halifax in 1937. That year, von Ribbentrop met Churchill with
10752-475: The first phase of the Battle of Britain. It was reinforced on 24 May during the Battle of France by "Directive No. 13", which authorised the Luftwaffe "to attack the English homeland in the fullest manner, as soon as sufficient forces are available. This attack will be opened by an annihilating reprisal for English attacks on the Ruhr Basin." By the end of June 1940, Germany had defeated Britain's allies on
10880-435: The following night. Almost 2,000 incendiaries were also dropped on the city over the two nights. The aircraft spread fanwise over the city and adopted the by-then familiar tactic of dropping flares followed by incendiaries and high explosives with later waves targeting the fires caused by the earlier attacks. There were other less intensive bombing raids across Britain and two German aircraft were reported to have been lost over
11008-552: The government relented and ordered the stations to be opened. Each day orderly lines of people queued until 4:00 pm, when they were allowed to enter the stations. In mid-September 1940, about 150,000 people a night slept in the Underground, although by winter and spring the numbers declined to 100,000 or less. Battle noises were muffled and sleep was easier in the deepest stations, but many people were killed from direct hits on stations. In March 1943, 173 men, women and children were crushed to death at Bethnal Green tube station in
11136-413: The importance of aviation in operational and tactical terms. Wever outlined five points of air strategy: Wever argued that OKL should not be solely educated in tactical and operational matters but also in grand strategy, war economics, armament production and the mentality of potential opponents (also known as intelligence analysis ). Wever's vision was not realised, staff studies in those subjects fell by
11264-434: The interwar period to concentrate on medium bombers can be attributed to several reasons: Hitler did not intend or foresee a war with Britain in 1939, the OKL believed a medium bomber could carry out strategic missions just as well as a heavy bomber force, and Germany did not possess the resources or technical ability to produce four-engined bombers before the war. Although it had equipment capable of doing serious damage,
11392-420: The invasion plans, unlike his usual attitude toward military operations, but on 16 July he issued Directive No. 16, ordering preparations for Operation Sea Lion. The navy insisted on a narrow beachhead and an extended period for landing troops; the army rejected these plans: the Luftwaffe could begin an air attack in August. Hitler held a meeting of his army and navy chiefs on 31 July. The navy said 22 September
11520-516: The long continuity of our institutions and our Empire . The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into
11648-463: The managing of the Luftwaffe was Göring. Hitler believed the Luftwaffe was "the most effective strategic weapon", and in reply to repeated requests from the Kriegsmarine for control over naval aircraft insisted, "We should never have been able to hold our own in this war if we had not had an undivided Luftwaffe ". Such principles made it much harder to integrate the air force into
11776-464: The merger of the British army and navy air services into the Royal Air Force (RAF). Its first Chief of the Air Staff , Hugh Trenchard , was among the military strategists in the 1920s, like Giulio Douhet , who saw air warfare as a new way to overcome the bloody stalemate of trench warfare . Interception was expected to be nearly impossible, with fighter planes no faster than bombers. Their slogan
11904-441: The military structure encouraged the emergence of a major "communications gap" between Hitler and the Luftwaffe , which other factors helped to exacerbate. For one thing, Göring's fear of Hitler led him to falsify or misrepresent what information was available in the direction of an uncritical and over-optimistic interpretation of air strength. When Göring decided against continuing Wever's original heavy bomber programme in 1937,
12032-463: The need for land and sea combat. It was thought that " the bomber will always get through " and could not be resisted, particularly at night. Industry, seats of government and communications could be destroyed, depriving an opponent of the means to make war. Bombing civilians would cause a collapse of morale and a loss of production in the remaining factories. Democracies, where public opinion was allowed, were thought particularly vulnerable. The RAF and
12160-579: The night of 10–11 May 1941. The Luftwaffe gradually decreased daylight operations in favour of night attacks to evade attacks by the RAF, and the Blitz became a night bombing campaign after October 1940. The Luftwaffe attacked the main Atlantic seaport of Liverpool in the Liverpool Blitz . The North Sea port of Hull , a convenient and easily found target or secondary target for bombers unable to locate their primary targets, suffered
12288-423: The offensive over Britain to failure before it began. In an operational capacity, limitations in weapons technology and quick British reactions were making it more difficult to achieve strategic effect. Attacking ports, shipping and imports as well as disrupting rail traffic in the surrounding areas, especially the distribution of coal, an important fuel in all industrial economies of the Second World War, would net
12416-497: The original Salford Royal Hospital on Chapel Street at the junction with Adelphi Street, killing 14 nurses. On 11 March 1941, Old Trafford football stadium, the home of Manchester United F.C. , was hit by a bomb aimed at the industrial complex of Trafford Park , wrecking the pitch and demolishing the stands. The stadium was rebuilt after the war and reopened in 1949, until which time United played at Manchester City's Maine Road stadium. In June 1941, German bombs damaged
12544-521: The other services", according to an April 1944 German account of their military mission. Göring was convinced that strategic bombing could win objectives that were beyond the army and navy, and gain political advantages in the Third Reich for the Luftwaffe and himself. He expected air warfare to decisively force Britain to negotiate, as all in the OKW hoped, and the Luftwaffe took little interest in planning to support an invasion. The Luftwaffe faced
12672-455: The overall strategy and produced in Göring a jealous and damaging defense of his "empire" while removing Hitler voluntarily from the systematic direction of the Luftwaffe at either the strategic or operational level. When Hitler tried to intervene more in the running of the air force later in the war, he was faced with a political conflict of his own making between himself and Göring, which
12800-430: The period of heaviest bombing had passed before they were finished. By the end of 1940 improvements had been made in the Underground and in many other large shelters. Authorities provided stoves and bathrooms and canteen trains provided food. Tickets were issued for bunks in large shelters, to reduce the amount of time spent queuing. Committees quickly formed within shelters as informal governments, and organisations such as
12928-425: The period of large-scale night attacks known as the Blitz , that lasted from 7 September 1940 to 11 May 1941. German historians do not follow this subdivision and regard the battle as a single campaign lasting from July 1940 to May 1941, including the Blitz. The primary objective of the German forces was to compel Britain to agree to a negotiated peace settlement . In July 1940, the air and sea blockade began, with
13056-684: The police headquarters. Manchester continued to be bombed by the Luftwaffe throughout the war, and became the target of airborne V-1 flying bombs . On Christmas Eve 1944, Heinkel He 111 bombers flying over the Yorkshire coast launched 45 flying bombs at Manchester. No V-1s landed in Manchester itself, but 27 people in neighbouring Oldham were killed by a stray bomb. Another 17 people were killed elsewhere and 109 wounded overall. RAF De Havilland Mosquitos shot down one German bomber over
13184-412: The possibility of an invasion he called Operation Sea Lion , unless the British agreed to negotiations. The Luftwaffe reported that it would be ready to launch its major attack early in August. The Kriegsmarine Commander-in-Chief, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder , continued to highlight the impracticality of these plans and said sea invasion could not take place before early 1941. Hitler now argued that Britain
13312-577: The pressure of continuous attack upon London, at least three or four million people would be driven out into the open country around the metropolis". Panic during the Munich crisis , such as the migration by 150,000 people to Wales, contributed to fear of social chaos. The government planned the evacuation of four million people—mostly women and children—from urban areas, including 1.4 million from London. It expected about 90% of evacuees to stay in private homes, conducted an extensive survey to determine
13440-408: The results of the Blitz. He frequently complained of the Luftwaffe 's inability to damage industries sufficiently, saying, "The munitions industry cannot be impeded effectively by air raids ... usually, the prescribed targets are not hit". While the war was being planned, Hitler never insisted upon the Luftwaffe planning a strategic bombing campaign and did not even give ample warning to
13568-532: The shelters and many arguments and fights occurred over noise, space and other matters. Anti-Jewish sentiment was reported, particularly around the East End of London, with anti-Semitic graffiti and anti-Semitic rumours, such as that Jewish people were "hogging" air raid shelters. Contrary to pre-war fears of anti-Semitic violence in the East End, one observer found that the "Cockney and the Jew [worked] together, against
13696-610: The sinking of the SS ; City of Benares with the loss of 81 children out of 100 on board. Much civil defence preparation in the form of shelters was left in the hands of local authorities and many areas such as Birmingham , Coventry , Belfast , and the East End of London did not have enough shelters. The unexpected delay to civilian bombing during the Phoney War meant that the shelter programme finished in June 1940, before
13824-579: The tradition of British diplomacy, to secure British independence without war. On 20 May, Halifax secretly requested a Swedish businessman to make contact with Göring to open negotiations. Shortly afterwards, in the May 1940 War Cabinet Crisis , Halifax argued for negotiations involving the Italians, but this was rejected by Churchill with majority support. An approach made through the Swedish ambassador on 22 June
13952-427: The use of an Emergency Boost Override . In September 1940, the more powerful Mk IIa series 1 Hurricanes started entering service in small numbers. This version was capable of a maximum speed of 342 mph (550 km/h), some 20 mph more than the original (non-Rotol) Mk I, though it was still 15 to 20 mph slower than a Bf 109 (depending on altitude). The performance of the Spitfire over Dunkirk came as
14080-602: The war because of cost, time to build and fears that their safety would cause occupants to refuse to leave to return to work or that anti-war sentiment would develop in large congregations of civilians. The government saw the leading role taken by the Communist Party in advocating the building of deep shelters as an attempt to damage civilian morale, especially after the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939. The most important existing communal shelters were
14208-441: The war was the first major German defeat in the Second World War. The Battle of Britain takes its name from the speech given by Prime Minister Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on 18 June: "What General Weygand called the 'Battle of France' is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin." Strategic bombing during World War I introduced air attacks intended to panic civilian targets and led in 1918 to
14336-731: The wayside, and the Air Academies focused on tactics, technology and operational planning rather than on independent strategic air offensives. In 1936, Wever was killed in an air crash, and the failure to implement his vision for the new Luftwaffe was largely attributable to his successors. Ex-army personnel and his successors as Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, Albert Kesselring (3 June 1936 – 31 May 1937) and Hans-Jürgen Stumpff (1 June 1937 – 31 January 1939) are usually blamed for abandoning strategic planning for close air support . Two prominent enthusiasts for ground-support operations (direct or indirect) were Hugo Sperrle ,
14464-580: The £5,000 " Spitfire Funds" to build fighters and the number of work days lost to strikes in 1940 was the lowest in history. Battle of Britain Asia-Pacific Mediterranean and Middle East Other campaigns Coups Luxembourg The Netherlands Belgium France Britain 1941–1943 1944–1945 Germany Strategic campaigns The Battle of Britain ( German : Luftschlacht um England , lit. 'air battle for England')
14592-500: Was a military campaign of the Second World War , in which the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) of the Royal Navy defended the United Kingdom (UK) against large-scale attacks by Nazi Germany 's air force, the Luftwaffe . It was the first major military campaign fought entirely by air forces. The British officially recognise the battle's duration as being from 10 July until 31 October 1940, which overlaps
14720-485: Was also possible, if RAF losses became severe, that they could pull out to the north, wait for the German invasion, then redeploy southward again. Other historians argue that the outcome of the air battle was irrelevant; the massive numerical superiority of British naval forces and the inherent weakness of the Kriegsmarine would have made the projected German invasion, Unternehmen Seelöwe (Operation Sea Lion),
14848-466: Was decided to focus on bombing Britain's industrial cities, in daylight to begin with. The main focus was London. The first major raid took place on 7 September. On 15 September, on a date known as Battle of Britain Day, a large-scale raid was launched in daylight, but suffered significant loss for no lasting gain. Although there were a few large air battles fought in daylight later in the month and into October,
14976-622: Was desperately short of trained pilots and aircraft. Churchill sent fighter squadrons, the Air Component of the British Expeditionary Force , to support operations in France, where the RAF suffered heavy losses. This was despite the objections of its commander Hugh Dowding that the diversion of his forces would leave home defences under-strength. After the evacuation of British and French soldiers from Dunkirk and
15104-560: Was forbidden a military air force by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles , and therefore air crew were trained by means of civilian and sport flying . Following a 1923 memorandum, the Deutsche Luft Hansa airline developed designs for aircraft such as the Junkers Ju 52 , which could carry passengers and freight, but also be readily adapted into a bomber. In 1926, the secret Lipetsk fighter-pilot school began training Germans in
15232-407: Was holding out in hope of assistance from Russia, and the Soviet Union was to be invaded by mid 1941. Göring met his air fleet commanders, and on 24 July issued "Tasks and Goals" of firstly gaining air supremacy, secondly protecting invasion forces and attacking the Royal Navy's ships. Thirdly, they were to blockade imports, bombing harbours and stores of supplies. Hitler's "Directive No. 17 – For
15360-428: Was more difficult. Both the RAF and Luftwaffe struggled to replace manpower losses, though the Germans had larger reserves of trained aircrew. The circumstances affected the Germans more than the British. Operating over home territory, British aircrew could fly again if they survived being shot down. German crews, even if they survived, faced capture. Moreover, bombers had four to five crewmen on board, representing
15488-456: Was not fully resolved until the war was almost over. In 1940 and 1941, Göring's refusal to co-operate with the Kriegsmarine denied the entire Wehrmacht military forces of the Reich the chance to strangle British sea communications, which might have had a strategic or decisive effect in the war against the British Empire. The deliberate separation of the Luftwaffe from the rest of
15616-532: Was received in silence, but he did not suggest negotiations and this was perceived as being effectively an ultimatum by the British government, which rejected the offer. Halifax kept trying to arrange peace until he was sent to Washington in December as ambassador, and in January 1941 Hitler expressed continued interest in negotiating peace with Britain. A May 1939 planning exercise by Luftflotte 3 found that
15744-651: Was reported to Hitler, making peace negotiations seem feasible. Throughout July, as the battle started, the Germans made wider attempts to find a diplomatic solution. On 2 July, the day the armed forces were asked to start preliminary planning for an invasion, Hitler got von Ribbentrop to draft a speech offering peace negotiations. On 19 July Hitler made this speech to the German Parliament in Berlin, appealing "to reason and common sense", and said he could "see no reason why this war should go on". His sombre conclusion
15872-402: Was that the bomber will always get through , and that the only defence was a deterrent bomber force capable of matching retaliation. Predictions were made that a bomber offensive would quickly cause thousands of deaths and civilian hysteria leading to capitulation. However, widespread pacifism following the horrors of the First World War contributed to a reluctance to provide resources. Germany
16000-546: Was that destruction of enemy armed forces was of primary importance. The RAF responded to Luftwaffe developments with its 1934 Expansion Plan A rearmament scheme, and in 1936 it was restructured into Bomber Command , Coastal Command , Training Command and Fighter Command . The last was under Hugh Dowding , who opposed the doctrine that bombers were unstoppable: the invention of radar at that time could allow early detection, and prototype monoplane fighters were significantly faster. Priorities were disputed, but in December 1937,
16128-467: Was the earliest possible date and proposed postponement until the following year, but Hitler preferred September. He then told von Brauchitsch and Halder that he would decide on the landing operation eight to fourteen days after the air attack began. On 1 August, he issued Directive No. 17 for intensified air and sea warfare, to begin with Adlertag on or after 5 August, subject to weather, keeping options open for negotiated peace or blockade and siege. Under
16256-428: Was to incapacitate the RAF so much that the UK would feel open to air attack, and would begin peace negotiations. It was also to isolate the UK and damage war production, beginning an effective blockade. Following severe Luftwaffe losses, Hitler agreed at a 14 September OKW conference that the air campaign was to intensify regardless of invasion plans. On 16 September, Göring gave the order for this change in strategy, to
16384-497: Was to increase attacks on shipping, economic targets and the RAF: air attacks and food shortages were expected to break morale and lead to capitulation. Destruction of the RAF was the first priority, and invasion would be a last resort. Göring's operational directive issued the same day ordered the destruction of the RAF to clear the way for attacks cutting off seaborne supplies to Britain. It made no mention of invasion. In November 1939,
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