Peaceful nuclear explosions ( PNEs ) are nuclear explosions conducted for non-military purposes. Proposed uses include excavation for the building of canals and harbours , electrical generation, the use of nuclear explosions to drive spacecraft, and as a form of wide-area fracking . PNEs were an area of some research from the late 1950s into the 1980s, primarily in the United States and Soviet Union .
152-400: (Redirected from PNET ) PNET may refer to: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty Primitive neuroectodermal tumor Pancreatic neuroendocrine tumor Topics referred to by the same term [REDACTED] This disambiguation page lists articles associated with the title Pnet . If an internal link led you here, you may wish to change
304-445: A stand-off proximity orientation with the asteroid, with the latter method occurring far enough away from the incoming threat to prevent the potential fracturing of the near-Earth object , but still close enough to generate a high thrust laser ablation effect. A 2007 NASA analysis of impact avoidance strategies using various technologies stated: Nuclear stand-off explosions are assessed to be 10–100 times more effective than
456-514: A "cut-off" of fissionable-material production in a "partial" disarmament plan. The British government, then led by Macmillan, had yet to fully endorse a test ban. Accordingly, it pushed the US to demand that the production cut-off be closely timed with the testing moratorium, betting that the Soviet Union would reject this. London also encouraged the US to delay its disarmament plan, in part by moving
608-647: A "peaceful application" of an underground nuclear explosion would not include the developmental testing of any nuclear explosive. Operation Plowshare was the name of the U.S. program for the development of techniques to use nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. The name was coined in 1961, taken from Micah 4:3 ("And he shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people: and they shall beat their swords into plowshares , and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more"). Twenty-eight nuclear blasts were detonated between 1961 and 1973. One of
760-600: A "standstill agreement" on nuclear testing. Nehru viewed a testing moratorium as a crucial first step toward broader and more comprehensive arms control agreements, reflecting his commitment to nuclear disarmament and global peace. In the same year, the British Labour Party , then led by Clement Attlee , called on the UN to ban testing of thermonuclear weapons. 1955 marks the beginning of test-ban negotiations, as Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev first proposed talks on
912-545: A ban), became convinced that the Geneva findings were too optimistic regarding detection of underground tests, though Macmillan warned that using the data to block progress on a test ban might be perceived in the public as a political ploy. In early 1959, Wadsworth told Tsarapkin of new US skepticism towards the Geneva System. While the Geneva experts believed the system could detect underground tests down to five kilotons,
1064-468: A belief that dominance in the nuclear arena, particularly given the size of Soviet conventional forces, was critical to US security. Interest in nuclear control and efforts to stall proliferation of weapons to other states grew as the Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities increased. In 1954, just weeks after the Castle Bravo test, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made the first public call for
1216-607: A canal from the Mediterranean Sea to the Qattara Depression in the Western Desert of Egypt using nuclear demolition. This project proposed to use 213 devices, with yields of 1 to 1.5 megatons, detonated at depths of 100 to 500 m (330 to 1,640 ft) to build this canal for the purpose of producing hydroelectric power. The Smiling Buddha , India 's first explosive nuclear device,
1368-472: A clear nuclear advantage via regular testing and that the negative environmental impacts of such tests were overstated. Furthermore, Strauss repeatedly emphasized the risk of the Soviet Union violating a ban, a fear Eisenhower shared. On 7 November 1957, after Sputnik and under pressure to bring on a dedicated science advisor, Eisenhower created the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), which had
1520-566: A cohesive test ban policy, noting his ability to "believe in two mutually contradictory and inconsistent propositions at the same time." Upon assuming the presidency in January 1961, John F. Kennedy was committed to advancing a comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons. He quickly ordered a review of the U.S. negotiating position to revitalize stalled talks, as he believed Eisenhower 's previous approach had been "insufficient" in achieving meaningful progress toward nuclear disarmament. Kennedy saw
1672-509: A component of a ballistic missile defense shield known as Project Excalibur . This created dozens of highly focused X-ray beams that would cause the missile to break up due to laser ablation . Laser ablation is one of the damage mechanisms of a laser weapon , but it is also one of the researched methods behind pulsed laser propulsion intended for spacecraft, though usually powered by means of conventionally pumped, laser arrays. For example, ground flight testing by Professor Leik Myrabo, using
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#17327721988421824-418: A comprehensive ban, but that was abandoned because of technical questions surrounding the detection of underground tests and Soviet concerns over the intrusiveness of proposed verification methods. The impetus for the test ban was provided by rising public anxiety over the magnitude of nuclear tests, particularly tests of new thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs), and the resulting nuclear fallout . A test ban
1976-610: A cutoff in nuclear production should precede a test ban. In the summer of 1957, Khrushchev was at acute risk of losing power, as the Anti-Party Group composed of former Stalin allies Lazar Kaganovich , Georgy Malenkov , and Vyacheslav Molotov launched an attempt to replace Khrushchev as General Secretary of the Communist Party (effectively the leader of the Soviet Union) with Nikolai Bulganin , then
2128-488: A few months later a 47 kilotons explosive was used to seal a higher-pressure blowout at the nearby Pamuk gas field. (For more details, see Blowout (well drilling)#Use of nuclear explosions .) Devices that produced the highest proportion of their yield via fusion-only reactions are possibly the Taiga Soviet peaceful nuclear explosions of the 1970s. Their public records indicate 98% of their 15 kiloton explosive yield
2280-413: A halt to nuclear weapons production (the one-time US demand). In explaining the policy shift, Eisenhower privately said that continued resistance to a test ban would leave the US in a state of "moral isolation." On 8 April 1958, still resisting Khrushchev's call for a moratorium, Eisenhower invited the Soviet Union to join these technical negotiations in the form of a conference on the technical aspects of
2432-480: A highly efficient detonation fallout was relatively limited. Between 1951 and 1958, the US conducted 166 atmospheric tests, the Soviet Union conducted 82, and Britain conducted 21; only 22 underground tests were conducted in this period (all by the US). In 1945, Britain and Canada made an early call for international discussions on the control of atomic power, anticipating the global implications of nuclear technology. At
2584-435: A lead US envoy, offered a new proposal in an attempt to bridge the gap between the two sides. The early Kennedy proposal largely grew out of later Eisenhower efforts, with a ban on all tests but low-yield underground ones (below magnitude 4.75), which would be subject to a three-year moratorium. The US and UK proposed 20 on-site inspections per annum, while the Soviet Union proposed three. The verification procedures included in
2736-519: A limit Eisenhower would revise upward in May 1959—would be banned first, with negotiations on underground and outer-space tests continuing. This proposal was turned down on 23 April 1959 by Khrushchev, calling it a "dishonest deal." On 26 August 1959, the US announced it would extend its year-long testing moratorium to the end of 1959, and would not conduct tests after that point without prior warning. The Soviet Union reaffirmed that it would not conduct tests if
2888-533: A new US proposal by which only tests deemed verifiable by the Geneva System would be banned, including all atmospheric, underwater, and outer-space tests within detection range. Underground tests measuring more than 4.75 on the Richter scale would also be barred, subject to revision as research on detection continued. Adopting Macmillan's quota compromise, the US proposed each nuclear state be subject to roughly 20 on-site inspections per year (the precise figure based on
3040-410: A non-nuclear, conventionally powered pulsed laser test-bed , successfully lifted a lightcraft 72 meters in altitude by a method similar to ablative laser propulsion in 2000. A powerful solar system based soft X-ray, to ultraviolet , laser system has been calculated to be capable of propelling an interstellar spacecraft, by the light sail principle, to 11% of the speed of light . In 1972 it
3192-428: A pair of widely circulated academic papers challenging the claim of Teller and others that a clean, fallout-free nuclear bomb could be developed, due to the formation of carbon-14 when nuclear devices are detonated in the air. A one-megaton clean bomb, Sakharov estimated, would cause 6,600 deaths over 8,000 years, figures derived largely from estimates on the quantity of carbon-14 generated from atmospheric nitrogen and
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#17327721988423344-590: A precursor to a test ban. On 1 July 1958, responding to Eisenhower's call, the nuclear powers convened the Conference of Experts in Geneva , aimed at studying means of detecting nuclear tests. The conference included scientists from the US, Britain, the Soviet Union, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Poland, and Romania. The US delegation was led by James Fisk, a member of PSAC, the Soviets by Evgenii Fedorov, and
3496-413: A process analogous to fracking , the flow of petroleum and natural gas in tight formations ; this was developed most in the Soviet Union, with an increase in the production of many well heads being reported. In 2015, billionaire entrepreneur Elon Musk popularized an approach in which the cold planet Mars could be terraformed by the detonation of high-fusion-yielding thermonuclear devices over
3648-507: A roadblock to an agreement was removed as Macmillan and Eisenhower, over opposition from the Department of Defense, agreed to consider a test ban separately from broader disarmament endeavors. On 13 April 1959, facing Soviet opposition to on-site detection systems for underground tests, Eisenhower proposed moving from a single, comprehensive test ban to a graduated agreement where atmospheric tests—those up to 50 km (31 mi) high,
3800-478: A scheme would be able to detect 90% of underground detonations, accurate to 5 kilotons, and atmospheric tests with a minimum yield of 1 kiloton. The US had initially advocated for 650 posts, versus a Soviet proposal of 100–110. The final recommendation was a compromise forged by the British delegation. In a widely publicized and well-received communiqué dated 21 August 1958, the conference declared that it "reached
3952-593: A second Panama Canal , as well as an alternative to the Suez Canal . The largest excavation experiment took place in 1962 at the Department of Energy 's Nevada Test Site . The Sedan nuclear test carried out as part of Operation Storax displaced 12 million tons of earth, creating the largest man-made crater in the world, generating a large nuclear fallout over Nevada and Utah . Three tests were conducted in order to stimulate natural gas production , but
4104-407: A significant build-up of strontium-90 in bones of babies and helped galvanise public support for a ban on atmospheric nuclear testing in the US. Lewis Strauss and Edward Teller , dubbed the "father of the hydrogen bomb," both sought to tamp down on these fears, arguing that fallout [at the dose levels of US exposure] were fairly harmless and that a test ban would enable the Soviet Union to surpass
4256-556: A significant increase in U.S. defense spending, a move that was soon mirrored by the Soviet Union . This escalation intensified the arms race and placed the test-ban negotiations within a broader context of heightened military competition. Despite these growing tensions, Kennedy( JFK ) remained committed to pursuing a comprehensive test ban, recognizing it as a crucial step toward curbing the nuclear arms race. On 21 March 1961, test-ban negotiations resumed in Geneva and Arthur Dean ,
4408-564: A temporary basis (a duration of roughly 1 year, versus the Soviet proposal of 4–5 years), but this could only happen after verifiable tests had been banned and a seismic research group (the Seismic Research Program Advisory Group) convened. The Soviet Union responded positively to the counterproposal and the research group convened on 11 May 1960. The Soviet Union also offered to keep an underground ban out of
4560-537: A test ban before its own testing program was completed. Following the Soviet declaration, Eisenhower called for an international meeting of experts to determine proper control and verification measures—an idea first proposed by British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd . The advocacy of PSAC, including that of its chairmen James Rhyne Killian and George Kistiakowsky , was a key factor in Eisenhower's eventual decision to initiate test-ban negotiations in 1958. In
4712-483: A test ban in 1958. There was also increased environmental concern in the Soviet Union. In the mid-1950s, Soviet scientists began taking regular radiation readings near Leningrad , Moscow , and Odessa and collected data on the prevalence of strontium-90, which indicated that strontium-90 levels in western Russia approximately matched those in the eastern US. Rising Soviet concern was punctuated in September 1957 by
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4864-527: A test ban in the late 1950s. The proliferation of thermonuclear weapons coincided with a rise in public concern about nuclear fallout debris contaminating food sources, particularly the threat of high levels of strontium-90 in milk (see the Baby Tooth Survey ). This survey was a scientist and citizen led campaign which used "modern media advocacy techniques to communicate complex issues" to inform public discourse. Its research findings confirmed
5016-562: A test ban. The British governments of 1954–58 (under Conservatives Winston Churchill , Anthony Eden , and Harold Macmillan ) also quietly resisted a test ban, despite the British public favoring a deal, until the US Congress approved expanded nuclear collaboration in 1958 and until after Britain had tested its first hydrogen bombs . In their view, testing was necessary if the UK nuclear program were to continue to develop. This opposition
5168-442: A test-ban, specifically the technical details of ensuring compliance with a ban. The proposal was, to a degree, a concession to the Soviet Union, as a test ban would be explored independent of the previously demanded cutoff in fissionable-material production. Khrushchev initially declined the invitation, but eventually agreed "in spite of the serious doubts" he had after Eisenhower suggested a technical agreement on verification would be
5320-476: A testing series and the US was about to begin Operation Hardtack I , a series of atmospheric, surface-level, and underwater nuclear tests. Eisenhower instead insisted that any moratorium be linked to reduced production of nuclear weapons. In April 1958, the US began Operation Hardtack I as planned. The Soviet declaration concerned the British government, which feared that the moratorium might lead to
5472-399: A variety of agreements. Most notable among these is the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNE Treaty). The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty of 1996 prohibits all nuclear explosions, regardless of whether they are for peaceful purposes or not. Since that time the topic has been raised several times, often as a method of asteroid impact avoidance . In
5624-480: A yield of 15 megatons of TNT , more than double the expected yield. This unexpectedly high yield caused widespread radioactive fallout, leading to severe environmental and human consequences. The Castle Bravo test resulted in the worst radiological event in US history as radioactive particles spread over more than 11,000 square kilometers (4,200 sq mi), affected inhabited areas (including Rongelap Atoll and Utirik Atoll ), and sickened Japanese fishermen aboard
5776-471: Is more favorable to weapons development and tests". The Operation Plowshare program included 27 nuclear tests designed towards investigating these non-weapon uses from 1961 through 1973. Due to the inability of the U.S. physicists to reduce the fission fraction of low-yield (approximately 1 kiloton) nuclear devices that would have been required for many civil engineering projects, when long-term health and clean-up costs from fission products were included in
5928-558: The Lucky Dragon upon whom "ashes of death" had rained. In the same year, a Soviet test sent radioactive particles over Japan. Around the same time, victims of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima visited the US for medical care, which attracted significant public attention. In 1961, the Soviet Union tested the Tsar Bomba , which had a yield of 50 megatons and remains the most powerful man-made explosion in history, though due to
6080-531: The Kyshtym disaster , which forced the evacuation of 10,000 people after an explosion at a nuclear plant. Around the same time, 219 Soviet scientists signed Pauling's antinuclear petition. Soviet political elites did not share the concerns of others in the Soviet Union. However; Kurchatov unsuccessfully called on Khrushchev to halt testing in 1958. On 14 June 1957, following Eisenhower's suggestion that existing detection measures were inadequate to ensure compliance,
6232-632: The Premier of the Soviet Union . The attempted ouster, which was foiled in June, was followed by a series of actions by Khrushchev to consolidate power. In October 1957, still feeling vulnerable from Anti-Party Group's ploy, Khrushchev forced out defense minister Georgy Zhukov , cited as "the nation's most powerful military man." On 27 March 1958, Khrushchev forced Bulganin to resign and succeeded him as Premier. Between 1957 and 1960, Khrushchev had his firmest grip on power, with little real opposition. Khrushchev
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6384-464: The Qattara Depression in Egypt, an area that lies below sea level. The core problem of the entire project was the water supply to the depression. Calculations by Bassler showed that digging a canal or tunnel would be too expensive, therefore Bassler determined that the use of nuclear explosive devices, to excavate the canal or tunnel, would be the most economical. The Egyptian government declined to pursue
6536-470: The Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union approved a decision to halt nuclear testing, conditional on other nuclear powers doing the same. Khrushchev then called on Eisenhower and Macmillan to join the moratorium. Despite the action being met with widespread praise and an argument from Dulles that the US should reciprocate, Eisenhower dismissed the plan as a "gimmick"; the Soviet Union had just completed
6688-466: The 1950s as "an embarrassing series of American reversals," suggesting a lack of real US commitment to arms control efforts. The historian Robert Divine also attributed the failure to achieve a deal to Eisenhower's "lack of leadership," evidenced by his inability to overcome paralyzing differences among US diplomats, military leaders, national security experts, and scientists on the subject. Paul Nitze would similarly suggest that Eisenhower never formulated
6840-466: The 21 August communiqué. Nevertheless, pleased by the findings, the Eisenhower administration proposed negotiations on a permanent test ban and announced it would self-impose a year-long testing moratorium if Britain and the Soviet Union did the same. This decision amounted to a victory for John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles (then the Director of Central Intelligence ), and PSAC, who had argued within
6992-658: The Anglo-American plan were unacceptable to Tsarapkin, who responded with separate proposals rejected by the Western powers. Specifically, the Soviet Union proposed a "troika" mechanism: a monitoring board composed of representatives of the West, the Soviet Union, and nonaligned states that would require unanimity before acting (effectively giving the Soviet Union veto authority). In May 1961, Kennedy attempted via secret contact between Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and
7144-761: The Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water , prohibited all test detonations of nuclear weapons except for those conducted underground . It is also abbreviated as the Limited Test Ban Treaty ( LTBT ) and Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ( NTBT ), though the latter may also refer to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which succeeded the PTBT for ratifying parties. Negotiations initially focused on
7296-578: The Baruch Plan as a US attempt to secure its nuclear dominance, and called for the US to halt weapons production and release technical information on its program. The Acheson–Lilienthal paper and Baruch Plan would serve as the basis for US policy into the 1950s. Between 1947 and 1954, the US and Soviet Union discussed their demands within the United Nations Commission for Conventional Disarmament. A series of events in 1954, including
7448-502: The British delegation by William Penney , who had led the British delegation to the Manhattan Project. Whereas the US approached the conference solely from a technical perspective, Penney was specifically instructed by Macmillan to attempt to achieve a political agreement. This difference in approach was reflected in the broader composition of the US and UK teams. US experts were primarily drawn from academia and industry. Fisk
7600-525: The Castle Bravo test and spread of fallout from a Soviet test over Japan, redirected the international discussion on nuclear policy. Additionally, by 1954, both US and Soviet Union had assembled large nuclear stockpiles, reducing hopes of complete disarmament. In the early years of the Cold War , the US approach to nuclear control reflected a strain between an interest in controlling nuclear weapons and
7752-481: The Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests) and agreed to a temporary moratorium (the Soviet Union joined the moratorium shortly after this date). The moratorium would last for close to three years. The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests convened in Geneva at Moscow's request (the Western participants had proposed New York City ). The US delegation was led by James Jeremiah Wadsworth , an envoy to
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#17327721988427904-447: The Eisenhower administration for separating a test ban from larger disarmament efforts, and a defeat for the Department of Defense and AEC, which had argued to the contrary. In May 1958, Britain had informed the US that it would be willing to join a testing moratorium on 31 October 1958, by which point it would have finished its hydrogen-bomb testing, conditional on the US providing Britain with nuclear information following amendment of
8056-523: The Interests of National Economy and Program No. 7— Nuclear Explosions for the National Economy . The initial program was patterned on the U.S. version, with the same basic concepts being studied. One test, Chagan test in January 1965, has been described as a "near clone" of the U.S. Sedan shot. Like Sedan, Chagan also resulted in a massive plume of radioactive material being blown high into
8208-586: The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, argued that the Soviet system would be unable to prevent secret tests. That year, the AEC published a report arguing that the continuing testing moratorium risked "free world supremacy in nuclear weapons," and that renewed testing was critical for further weapons development. The joint committee also held hearings in April which cast doubt on the technical feasibility and cost of
8360-573: The Macmillan–Eisenhower proposal. But US-Soviet relations soured after an American U-2 spy plane was shot down in Soviet airspace in May 1960. The Paris summit was abruptly cancelled and the Soviet Union withdrew from the seismic research group, which subsequently dissolved. Meetings of the Geneva Conference continued until December, but little progress was made as Western-Soviet relations continued to grow more antagonistic through
8512-770: The Manhattan Project, who was skeptical of Warren's then-theoretical claims. Warren's arguments were lent credence in the scientific community and public by the Castle Bravo test of 1954. Eisenhower, as president, first explicitly expressed interest in a comprehensive test ban that year, arguing before the National Security Council , "We could put [the Russians] on the spot if we accepted a moratorium ... Everybody seems to think that we're skunks, saber-rattlers and warmongers. We ought not miss any chance to make clear our peaceful objectives." Then-Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had responded skeptically to
8664-480: The McMahon Act. The US Congress approved amendments permitting greater collaboration in late June. Following Soviet assent on 30 August 1958 to the one-year moratorium, the three countries conducted a series of tests in September and October. At least 54 tests were conducted by the US and 14 by the Soviet Union in this period. On 31 October 1958 the three countries initiated test-ban negotiations (the Conference on
8816-539: The PNE Treaty and in accord with the Non-Proliferation Treaty . Articles IV and V of the PNE Treaty set forth the agreed verification arrangements. In addition to the use of national technical means, the treaty states that information and access to sites of explosions will be provided by each side, and includes a commitment not to interfere with verification means and procedures. The protocol to
8968-491: The PNE Treaty sets forth the specific agreed arrangements for ensuring that no weapon-related benefits precluded by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty are derived by carrying out a nuclear explosion used for peaceful purposes, including provisions for use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, seismic monitoring, and on-site inspection. The agreed statement that accompanies the treaty specifies that
9120-413: The PNE Treaty, the signatories agreed: not to carry out any individual nuclear explosions having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons TNT equivalent ; not to carry out any group explosion (consisting of a number of individual explosions) having an aggregate yield exceeding 1,500 kilotons; and not to carry out any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons unless the individual explosions in
9272-455: The Soviet Union allowed in late November 1958 for explicit control measures to be included in the text of the drafted treaty. By March 1959, the negotiators had agreed upon seven treaty articles, but they primarily concerned uncontroversial issues and a number of disputes over verification persisted. First, the Soviet verification proposal was deemed by the West to be too reliant on self-inspection, with control posts primarily staffed by citizens of
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#17327721988429424-429: The Soviet Union as "both powerful and responsible." At the 20th Communist Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev declared that nuclear war should no longer be seen as "fatalistically inevitable." Simultaneously, however, Khrushchev expanded and advanced the Soviet nuclear arsenal at a cost to conventional Soviet forces (e.g., in early 1960, Khrushchev announced demobilization of 1.2 million troops). On 31 March 1958,
9576-478: The Soviet Union insisted that the inspection quota be determined on a political basis, not a scientific one. The Soviet offer faced a mixed reception. In the US, Senator Hubert Humphrey and the Federation of American Scientists (which was typically seen as supportive of a test ban) saw it as a clear step towards an agreement. Conversely, AEC chairman John A. McCone and Senator Clinton Presba Anderson , chair of
9728-449: The Soviet Union privately suggested it would accept a quota of three inspections per year. The US argued that the quota should be set according to scientific necessity (i.e., be set according to the frequency of seismic events). In June 1959, a report of a panel headed by Lloyd Berkner , a physicist, was introduced into discussions by Wadsworth. The report specifically concerned whether the Geneva System could be improved without increasing
9880-427: The Soviet Union put forth a plan for a two-to-three-year testing moratorium. The moratorium would be overseen by an international commission reliant on national monitoring stations, but, importantly, would involve no on-the-ground inspections. Eisenhower initially saw the deal as favorable, but eventually came to see otherwise. In particular, Strauss and Teller, as well as Ernest Lawrence and Mark Muir Mills , protested
10032-440: The Soviet Union the ability to conduct secret tests and move ahead in the arms race. The degree of Eisenhower's interest in a test ban is a matter of some historical dispute. Stephen E. Ambrose writes that by early 1960, a test ban had become "the major goal of his Presidency, indeed of his entire career," and would be "his final and most lasting gift to his country." Conversely, John Lewis Gaddis characterizes negotiations of
10184-540: The UN, the British by David Ormsby-Gore , the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs , and the Soviets by Semyon K. Tsarapkin , a disarmament expert with experience dating back to the 1946 Baruch Plan. The Geneva Conference began with a Soviet draft treaty grounded in the Geneva System. The three nuclear weapons states (the "original parties") would abide by a test ban, verified by the Geneva System, and work to prevent testing by potential nuclear states (such as France). This
10336-623: The US While the test ban was not a focus on conversations, a positive meeting with Eisenhower at Camp David eventually led Tsarapkin to propose a technical working group in November 1959 that would consider the issues of on-site inspections and seismic decoupling in the "spirit of Camp David." Within the working group, Soviet delegates allowed for the timing of on-site inspections to be grounded in seismic data, but insisted on conditions that were seen as excessively strict. The Soviets also recognized
10488-636: The US and UK continued to observe a moratorium. To break the deadlock over verification, Macmillan proposed a compromise in February 1959 whereby each of the original parties would be subject to a set number of on-site inspections each year. In May 1959, Khrushchev and Eisenhower agreed to explore Macmillan's quota proposal, though Eisenhower made further test-ban negotiations conditional on the Soviet Union dropping its Control Commission veto demand and participating in technical discussions on identification of high-altitude nuclear explosions . Khrushchev agreed to
10640-429: The US assented to a two-year testing moratorium proposed by the Soviet Union, but required that it be linked to restrictions on the production of fissionable material with military uses, a condition that the Soviet Union rejected. While Eisenhower insisted on linking a test ban to a broader disarmament effort (e.g., the production cut-off), Moscow insisted on independent consideration of a test ban. On 19 September 1957,
10792-508: The US conducted the first contained underground test at the Nevada Test Site , codenamed Rainier . The Rainier shot complicated the push for a comprehensive test ban, as underground tests could not be as easily identified as atmospheric tests. Despite Eisenhower's interest in a deal, his administration was hamstrung by discord among US scientists, technicians, and politicians. At one point, Eisenhower complained that "statecraft
10944-431: The US in nuclear capabilities. Teller also suggested that testing was necessary to develop nuclear weapons that produced less fallout. Support in the US public for a test ban to continue to grow from 20% in 1954 to 63% by 1957. Moreover, widespread antinuclear protests were organized and led by theologian and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Albert Schweitzer , whose appeals were endorsed by Pope Pius XII , and Linus Pauling ,
11096-566: The US now believed that it could only detect tests down to 20 kilotons (in comparison, the Little Boy bomb dropped on Hiroshima had an official yield of 13 kilotons). As a result, the Geneva detection regime and the number of control posts would have to be significantly expanded, including new posts within the Soviet Union. The Soviets dismissed the US argument as a ruse, suggesting that the Hardtack data had been falsified. In early 1959,
11248-438: The US pursue a test ban agreement with the Soviet Union before testing its first thermonuclear weapon, but his interest in international controls was echoed in the 1946 Acheson–Lilienthal Report , which had been commissioned by President Harry S. Truman to help construct US nuclear weapons policy. J. Robert Oppenheimer , who had led Los Alamos National Laboratory during the Manhattan Project, exerted significant influence over
11400-425: The US would not be held to its testing moratorium when it expired on 31 December 1959, though pledged to not test if Geneva talks progressed. The Soviet Union followed by reiterating its decision to not test as long as Western states did not test. In early 1960, Eisenhower indicated his support for a comprehensive test ban conditional on proper monitoring of underground tests. On 11 February 1960, Wadsworth announced
11552-399: The West. The proposal would serve as the basis of the Soviet negotiating position through 1957. Eisenhower had supported nuclear testing after World War II . In 1947, he rejected arguments by Stafford L. Warren , the Manhattan Project's chief physician, concerning the detrimental health effects of atmospheric testing, agreeing instead with James Bryant Conant , a chemist and participant in
11704-402: The aluminum sphere located 18 metres (60 ft) from the detonation point, with slightly over 25 millimetres (1 in) of surface material absent upon recovery. These spheres are often referred to as " Lew Allen 's balls", after the project manager during the experiments. The ablation data collected for various materials and the distances the spheres were propelled, serve as the bedrock for
11856-644: The atmosphere by following the movements of fallout aerosols . After the Van Allen Belts surrounding Earth were discovered about in 1958, James Van Allen suggested that a nuclear detonation would be one way of probing the magnetic phenomenon. Data obtained from the August 1958 Project Argus test shots, a high-altitude nuclear explosion investigation, were vital to the early understanding of Earth's magnetosphere . Soviet nuclear physicist and Nobel peace prize recipient Andrei Sakharov also proposed
12008-584: The atmosphere, with an estimated 20% of the fission products with it. Detection of the plume over Japan led to accusations by the U.S. that the Soviets had carried out an above-ground test in violation of the Partial Test Ban Treaty , but these charges were later dropped. The later, and more extensive, "Deep Seismic Sounding" Program focused on the use of much smaller explosions for various geological uses. Some of these tests are considered to be operational, not purely experimental. These included
12160-399: The atmosphere. These were ignored and downplayed until the program was terminated in 1977, due in large part to public opposition, after $ 770 million had been spent on the project. The Soviet Union conducted a much more vigorous program of 239 nuclear tests, some with multiple devices, between 1965 and 1988 under the auspices of Program No. 6—Employment of Nuclear Explosive Technologies in
12312-451: The closeness of the Soviet proposal to earlier Western proposals, the US reversed its position on the provisions and rejected the Soviet offer "in the absence of more general control agreements," including limits on the production of fissionable material and protections against a surprise nuclear strike . The May 1955 proposal is now seen as evidence of Khrushchev's "new approach" to foreign policy, as Khrushchev sought to mend relations with
12464-584: The commission's proceedings. Finally, the Soviet Union preferred temporary inspection teams drawn from citizens of the country under inspection, while the West insisted on permanent teams composed of inspectors from the Control Commission. Additionally, despite the initial positive response to the Geneva experts' report, data gathered from Hardtack operations of 1958 (namely the underground Rainier shot) would further complication verification provisions as US scientists, including Hans Bethe (who backed
12616-479: The comparatively low yield explosion created by the water prospecting (LCROSS) Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite mission, which launched in 2009 and released the "Centaur" kinetic energy impactor, an impactor with a mass of 2,305 kg (5,081 lb), and an impact velocity of about 9,000 km/h (5,600 mph), releasing the kinetic energy equivalent of detonating approximately 2 tons of TNT (8.86 GJ ). The first preliminary examination of
12768-436: The complex technical questions of a test ban, driven in part by a strong interest among American experts to lower the error rate of seismic test detection technology. Some, including Kistiakowsky, would eventually raise concerns about the ability of inspections and monitors to successfully detect tests. The primary product of negotiations under Eisenhower was the testing moratorium without any enforcement mechanism. Ultimately,
12920-493: The composition of Earth's mantle , analogous to the exploration geophysics practice of mineral prospecting with chemical explosives in " deep seismic sounding " reflection seismology . Project A119 , proposed in the 1960s, which as Apollo scientist Gary Latham explained, would have been the detonating of a "smallish" nuclear device on the Moon in order to facilitate research into its geologic make-up. Analogous in concept to
13072-455: The conclusion that it is technically feasible to set up ... a workable and effective control system for the detection of violations of a possible agreement on the worldwide cessation of nuclear weapons tests." The technical findings, released on 30 August 1958 in a report drafted by the Soviet delegation, were endorsed by the US and UK, which proposed that they serve as the basis for test-ban and international-control negotiations. However,
13224-443: The conference. At particular issue was the ability of sensors to differentiate an underground test from an earthquake. There were four techniques examined: measurement of acoustic waves , seismic signals, radio waves , and inspection of radioactive debris. The Soviet delegation expressed confidence in each method, while Western experts argued that a more comprehensive compliance system would be necessary. The Conference of Experts
13376-512: The contemporary risk models at the time, along with the assumption that the world population is "thirty billion persons" in a few thousand years. In 1961, Sakharov was part of the design team for a 50 megaton "clean bomb", which has become known as the Tsar Bomba , detonated over the island of Novaya Zemlya . In the spring of 1957, the US National Security Council had explored including a one-year test moratorium and
13528-463: The copper coil in his MK generators by a big superconductor solenoid to magnetically compress and focus underground nuclear explosions into a shaped charge effect. He theorized this could focus 10 positively charged protons per second on a 1 mm surface, then envisaged making two such beams collide in the form of a supercollider . Underground nuclear explosive data from peaceful nuclear explosion test shots have been used to investigate
13680-483: The cost, there was virtually no economic advantage over conventional explosives except for potentially the very largest projects. The Qattara Depression Project was developed by Professor Friedrich Bassler during his appointment to the West German ministry of economics in 1968. He put forth a plan to create a Saharan lake and hydroelectric power station by blasting a tunnel between the Mediterranean Sea and
13832-410: The country housing the posts and a minimal role for officials from the international supervisory body. The West insisted that half of a control post staff be drawn from another nuclear state and half from neutral parties. Second, the Soviet Union required that the international supervisory body, the Control Commission, require unanimity before acting; the West rejected the idea of giving Moscow a veto over
13984-546: The discord within American circles, particularly among scientists, was made clear in hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Disarmament, chaired by Senator Hubert Humphrey . The hearings featured conflicting testimony from the likes of Teller and Linus Pauling, as well as from Harold Stassen, who argued that a test ban could safely be separated from broader disarmament, and AEC members, who argued that
14136-446: The earliest known human painting.) Both climatology and particularly aerosol science, a subfield of atmospheric science , were largely created to answer the question of how far and wide fallout would travel. Similar to radioactive tracers used in hydrology and materials testing, fallout and the neutron activation of nitrogen gas served as a radioactive tracer that was used to measure and then help model global circulations in
14288-415: The effect of eroding the AEC's monopoly over scientific advice. In stark contrast to the AEC, PSAC promoted a test ban and argued against Strauss's claims concerning its strategic implications and technical feasibility. In late 1957, the Soviet Union made a second offer of a three-year moratorium without inspections, but lacking any consensus within his administration, Eisenhower rejected it. In early 1958,
14440-416: The effects of nuclear detonations upon various metal and non-metal materials, occurred in 1955 with Operation Teapot , were a chain of approximately basketball sized spheres of material, were arrayed at fixed aerial distances, descending from the shot tower. In what was then a surprising experimental observation, all but the spheres directly within the shot tower survived, with the greatest ablation noted on
14592-598: The effort was abandoned as impractical because of cost and radioactive contamination of the gas. There were many negative impacts from Project Plowshare's 27 nuclear explosions. For example, the Project Gasbuggy site, located 89 kilometres (55 mi) east of Farmington , New Mexico, still contains nuclear contamination from a single subsurface blast in 1967. Other consequences included blighted land, relocated communities, tritium -contaminated water, radioactivity, and fallout from debris being hurled high into
14744-520: The experts' report failed to address precisely who would do the monitoring and when on-site inspections—a US demand and Soviet concern—would be permitted. The experts also deemed detection of outer-space tests (tests more than 50 kilometers (31 mi) above the earth's surface) to be impractical. Additionally, the size of the Geneva System may have rendered it too expensive to be put into effect. The 30 August report, which contained details on these limitations, received significantly less public attention than
14896-449: The first U.S. proposals for peaceful nuclear explosions that came close to being carried out was Project Chariot , which would have used several hydrogen bombs to create an artificial harbor at Cape Thompson , Alaska. It was never carried out due to concerns for the native populations and the fact that there was little potential use for the harbor to justify its risk and expense. There was also talk of using nuclear explosions to excavate
15048-539: The frequency of seismic events). Tsarapkin responded positively to the US proposal, though was wary of the prospect of allowing underground tests registering below magnitude 4.75. In its own proposal offered 19 March 1960 the Soviet Union accepted most US provisions, with certain amendments. First, the Soviet Union asked that underground tests under magnitude 4.75 be banned for a period of four-to-five years, subject to extension. Second, it sought to prohibit all outer-space tests, whether within detection range or not. Finally,
15200-426: The goal of a comprehensive test ban would be abandoned in favor of a partial ban due to questions over seismic detection of underground tests. Political scientist Robert Gilpin later argued that Eisenhower faced three camps in the push for a test ban. The first was the "control" camp, led by figures like Linus Pauling and astronomer Harlow Shapley , which believed that both testing and possession of nuclear weapons
15352-407: The group could be identified and measured by agreed verification procedures. The parties also reaffirmed their obligations to comply fully with the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The parties reserve the right to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in the territory of another country if requested to do so, but only in full compliance with the yield limitations and other provisions of
15504-549: The idea that earthquakes could be mitigated and particle accelerators could be made by utilizing nuclear explosions, with the latter created by connecting a nuclear explosive device with another of his inventions, the explosively pumped flux compression generator , to accelerate protons to collide with each other to probe their inner workings, an endeavor that is now done at much lower energy levels with non-explosive superconducting magnets in CERN . Sakharov suggested to replace
15656-566: The idea. The Soviet Union conducted a much more exhaustive program than Plowshare, with 239 nuclear tests between 1965 and 1988. Furthermore, many of the "tests" were considered economic applications, not tests, in the Nuclear Explosions for the National Economy program. These included a 30 kilotons explosion being used to close the Uzbekistani Urtabulak gas well in 1966 that had been blowing since 1963, and
15808-450: The ideas considered included blasting a new Panama Canal , constructing the proposed Nicaragua Canal , the use of underground explosions to create electricity ( Project PACER ), and a variety of mining, geological, and radionuclide studies. The largest of the excavation tests was carried out in the Sedan nuclear test in 1962, which released large amounts of radioactive gas into the air. By
15960-420: The late 1960s, public opposition to Plowshare was increasing, and a 1970s study of the economics of the concepts suggested they had no practical use. Plowshare saw decreasing interest from the 1960s, and was officially cancelled in 1977. The Soviet program started a few years after the U.S. efforts and explored many of the same concepts under their Nuclear Explosions for the National Economy program. The program
16112-460: The latter and was noncommittal on the former. A working group in Geneva would eventually devise a costly system of 5–6 satellites orbiting at least 18,000 miles (29,000 km) above the earth, though it could not say with certainty that such a system would be able to determine the origin of a high-altitude test. US negotiators also questioned whether high-altitude tests could evade detection via radiation shielding . Concerning Macmillan's compromise,
16264-420: The latter of whom organized an anti-test petition signed by more than 9,000 scientists across 43 countries (including the infirm and elderly Albert Einstein ). The AEC would eventually concede, as well, that even low levels of radiation were harmful. It was a combination of rising public support for a test ban and the shock of the 1957 Soviet Sputnik launch that encouraged Eisenhower to take steps towards
16416-503: The limited arms-control suggestion of Nehru, whose proposal for a test ban was discarded by the National Security Council for being "not practical." Harold Stassen , Eisenhower's special assistant for disarmament, argued that the US should prioritize a test ban as a first step towards comprehensive arms control, conditional on the Soviet Union accepting on-site inspections, over full disarmament. Stassen's suggestion
16568-462: The link to point directly to the intended article. Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Pnet&oldid=888723774 " Category : Disambiguation pages Hidden categories: Short description is different from Wikidata All article disambiguation pages All disambiguation pages Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty In the U.S., a series of tests were carried out under Project Plowshare . Some of
16720-415: The mostly dry-ice icecaps on the planet. Musk's specific plan would not be very feasible within the energy limitations of historically manufactured nuclear devices (ranging in kilotons of TNT-equivalent), therefore requiring major advancement for it to be considered. In part due to these problems, the physicist Michio Kaku (who initially put forward the concept) instead suggests using nuclear reactors in
16872-400: The necessary quantities to allow study of their properties, was carried out in nuclear explosive device testing. For example, the discovery of the short-lived einsteinium and fermium , both created under the intense neutron flux environment within thermonuclear explosions, followed the first Teller–Ulam thermonuclear device test— Ivy Mike . The rapid capture of so many neutrons required in
17024-443: The non-nuclear alternatives analyzed in this study. Other techniques involving the surface or subsurface use of nuclear explosives may be more efficient, but they run an increased risk of fracturing the target near-Earth object. They also carry higher development and operations risks. Limited Test Ban Treaty The Partial Test Ban Treaty ( PTBT ), formally known as the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in
17176-481: The nuclear pulse propulsion study, Project Orion . The direct use of nuclear explosives, by using the impact of ablated propellant plasma from a nuclear shaped charge acting on the rear pusher plate of a ship, was and continues to be seriously studied as a potential propulsion mechanism. Although likely never achieving orbit due to aerodynamic drag , the first macroscopic object to obtain Earth orbital velocity
17328-541: The number of control posts. Berkner's proposed measures were seen as highly costly and the technical findings themselves were accompanied by a caveat about the panel's high degree of uncertainty given limited data. Around the same time, analysis conducted by the Livermore National Laboratory and RAND Corporation at Teller's instruction found that the seismic effect of an underground test could be artificially dampened (referred to as "decoupling") to
17480-500: The offer. At a meeting with Eisenhower in the White House, the group argued that testing was necessary for the US to eventually develop bombs that produced no fallout ("clean bombs"). The group repeated the oft-cited fact, which was supported by Freeman Dyson , that the Soviet Union could conduct secret nuclear tests. In 1958, at the request of Igor Kurchatov, Soviet nuclear physicist and weapons designer Andrei Sakharov published
17632-449: The point that a 300-kiloton detonation would appear in seismic readings as a one-kiloton detonation. These findings were largely affirmed by pro-ban scientists, including Bethe. The third blow to the verification negotiations was provided by a panel chaired by Robert Bacher, which found that even on-site inspections would have serious difficulty determining whether an underground test had been conducted. In September 1959, Khrushchev visited
17784-621: The production of atomic energy. Though Dwight D. Eisenhower , then the Chief of Staff of the United States Army , was not a significant figure in the Truman administration on nuclear questions, he did support Truman's nuclear control policy, including the Baruch Plan's provision for an international control agency, provided that the control system was accompanied by "a system of free and complete inspection." The Soviet Union dismissed
17936-508: The proposed verification measures. Additionally, Teller continued to warn of the dangerous consequences of a test ban and the Department of Defense (including Neil H. McElroy and Donald A. Quarles , until recently its top two officials) pushed to continue testing and expand missile stockpiles. Shortly after the Soviet proposal, Macmillan met with Eisenhower at Camp David to devise a response. The Anglo-American counterproposal agreed to ban small underground tests (those under magnitude 4.75) on
18088-683: The report, particularly in its recommendation of an international body that would control production of and research on the world's supply of uranium and thorium . A version of the Acheson-Lilienthal plan was presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) as the Baruch Plan in June 1946. The Baruch Plan proposed that an International Atomic Development Authority would control all research on and material and equipment involved in
18240-601: The required energy, water vapor, greenhouse gases , and other biologically significant volatiles that could begin to quickly terraform Mars. One such opportunity for this occurred in October 2014 when a "once-in-a-million-years" comet (designated as C/2013 A1 , also known as comet "Siding Spring") came within 140 000 km ( 87 000 miles) of the Martian atmosphere . The discovery and synthesis of new chemical elements by nuclear transmutation , and their production in
18392-497: The security of both Russians and Americans is dangerously weakened." He had also claimed that renewed testing would be "damaging to the American image" and might threaten the "existence of human life." On the campaign trail, Kennedy's test-ban proposal consisted of a continued US testing moratorium, expanded efforts to reach a comprehensive agreement, limit any future tests to those minimizing fallout, and expand research on fallout. Notably, early in his presidency, Kennedy also oversaw
18544-516: The spring of 1958, chairman Killian and the PSAC staff (namely Hans Bethe and Isidor Isaac Rabi ) undertook a review of US test-ban policy, determining that a successful system for detecting underground tests could be created. At the recommendation of Dulles (who had recently come to support a test ban), the review prompted Eisenhower to propose technical negotiations with the Soviet Union, effectively detaching test-ban negotiations from negotiations over
18696-595: The start of the moratorium back to November 1958. At the same time, Macmillan linked British support for a test ban to a revision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act), which prohibited sharing of nuclear information with foreign governments. Eisenhower, eager to mend ties with Britain following the Suez Crisis of 1956, was receptive to Macmillan's conditions, but the AEC and the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy were firmly opposed. It
18848-590: The stimulation and closing-off of the flow of natural gas . At the peak of the Atomic Age , the United States initiated Operation Plowshare , involving "peaceful nuclear explosions". The United States Atomic Energy Commission chairman announced that the Plowshare project was intended to "highlight the peaceful applications of nuclear explosive devices and thereby create a climate of world opinion that
19000-492: The subject in February 1955. On 10 May 1955, the Soviet Union proposed a test ban before the UN Disarmament Commission's "Committee of Five" (Britain, Canada , France , the Soviet Union, and the US). This proposal, which closely reflected a prior Anglo-French proposal, was initially part of a comprehensive disarmament proposal meant to reduce conventional arms levels and eliminate nuclear weapons. Despite
19152-406: The successful Soviet use of nuclear explosions in extinguishing out-of-control gas well fires were widely cited in United States policy discussions of options for stopping the 2010 Gulf of Mexico Deepwater Horizon oil spill . Germany at one time considered manufacturing nuclear explosives for civil engineering purposes. In the early 1970s a feasibility study was conducted for a project to build
19304-599: The summer, punctuated by the Congo Crisis in July and angry exchanges at the UN in September. Macmillan would later claim to President John F. Kennedy that the failure to achieve a test ban in 1960 "was all the fault of the American 'big hole' obsession and the consequent insistence on a wantonly large number of on-site inspections." Eisenhower would leave office with an agreement out of reach, as Eisenhower's technical advisors, upon whom he relied heavily, became mired in
19456-400: The synthesis of einsteinium would provide the needed direct experimental confirmation of the so-called r-process , the multiple neutron absorptions needed to explain the cosmic nucleosynthesis (production) of all chemical elements heavier than nickel on the periodic table in supernova explosions, before beta decay , with the r-process explaining the existence of many stable elements in
19608-403: The test ban as a critical step toward reducing nuclear proliferation and easing Cold War tensions. In making his case for a test ban, Kennedy drew a direct link between continued testing and nuclear proliferation, calling it the "'Nth-country' problem." While a candidate, Kennedy had argued, "For once China , or France, or Sweden , or half a dozen other nations successfully test an atomic bomb,
19760-491: The theory behind decoupling, but dismissed its practical applications. The working group closed in December with no progress and significant hostility. Eisenhower issued a statement blaming "the recent unwillingness of the politically guided Soviet experts to give serious scientific consideration to the effectiveness of seismic techniques for the detection of underground nuclear explosions." Eisenhower simultaneously declared that
19912-552: The time, the U.S. had not yet developed a cohesive policy or strategy regarding nuclear weapons. Vannevar Bush , who had been instrumental in initiating and overseeing the Manhattan Project , sought to leverage this moment to advance his long-term goal of banning nuclear weapons production, despite the project's role in developing them. As a first step in this direction, Bush proposed an international agency dedicated to nuclear control. Bush unsuccessfully argued in 1952 that
20064-515: The treaty under negotiation. In May 1960, there were high hopes that an agreement would be reached at an upcoming summit of Eisenhower, Khrushchev, Macmillan, and Charles de Gaulle of France in Paris. A test ban seemed particularly close in 1960, with Britain and France in accord with the US (though France conducted its first nuclear test in February) and the Soviet Union having largely accepted
20216-474: The typical land-based district heating manner to make isolated tropical biomes on the Martian surface. Alternatively, as nuclear detonations are presently somewhat limited in terms of demonstrated achievable yield, the use of an off-the-shelf nuclear explosive device could be employed to "nudge" a Martian- grazing comet toward a pole of the planet. Impact would be a much more efficient scheme to deliver
20368-463: The universe. The worldwide presence of new isotopes from atmospheric testing beginning in the 1950s led to the 2008 development of a reliable way to detect art forgeries. Paintings created after that period may contain traces of caesium-137 and strontium-90 , isotopes that did not exist in nature before 1945. ( Fission products were produced in the natural nuclear fission reactor at Oklo about 1.7 billion years ago, but these decayed away before
20520-405: The use of peaceful nuclear explosions to create deep seismic profiles. Compared to the usage of conventional explosives or mechanical methods, nuclear explosions allow the collection of longer seismic profiles (up to several thousand kilometres). Alexey Yablokov has stated that all PNE technologies have non-nuclear alternatives and that many PNEs actually caused nuclear disasters. Reports on
20672-406: Was a "900kg manhole cover" propelled by the somewhat focused detonation of test shot Pascal-B in August 1957. The use of a subterranean shaft and nuclear device to propel an object to escape velocity has since been termed a "thunder well". In the 1970s Edward Teller , in the United States, popularized the concept of using a nuclear detonation to power an explosively pumped soft X-ray laser as
20824-424: Was a vice president at Bell Telephone Laboratories and was joined by Robert Bacher and Ernest Lawrence, both physicists who had worked on the Manhattan Project. Conversely, British delegates largely held government positions. The Soviet delegation was composed primarily of academics, though virtually all of them had some link to the Soviet government. The Soviets shared the British goal of achieving an agreement at
20976-407: Was also calculated that a 1 Terawatt, 1-km diameter X-ray laser with 1 angstrom wavelength impinging on a 1-km diameter sail, could propel a spacecraft to Alpha Centauri in 10 years. A proposed means of averting an asteroid impacting with Earth, assuming short lead times between detection and Earth impact , is to detonate one, or a series, of nuclear explosive devices, on , in , or in
21128-594: Was also seen as a means of slowing nuclear proliferation and the nuclear arms race . Though the PTBT did not halt proliferation or the arms race, its enactment did coincide with a substantial decline in the concentration of radioactive particles in the atmosphere. The PTBT was signed by the governments of the Soviet Union , the United Kingdom , and the United States in Moscow on 5 August 1963 before it
21280-405: Was becoming a prisoner of scientists." Until 1957, Strauss's AEC (including its Los Alamos and Livermore laboratories) was the dominant voice in the administration on nuclear affairs, with Teller's concerns over detection mechanisms also influencing Eisenhower. Unlike some others within the US scientific community, Strauss fervently advocated against a test ban, arguing that the US must maintain
21432-436: Was characterized as "highly professional" and productive. By the end of August 1958, the experts devised an extensive control program, known as the "Geneva System," involving 160–170 land-based monitoring posts, plus 10 additional sea-based monitors and occasional flights over land following a suspicious event (with the inspection plane being provided and controlled by the state under inspection). The experts determined that such
21584-405: Was dangerous. Second, there was the "finite containment" camp, populated by scientists like Hans Bethe, which was concerned by perceived Soviet aggression but still believed that a test ban would be workable with adequate verification measures. Third, the "infinite containment" camp, of which Strauss, Teller, and members of the defense establishment were members, believed that any test ban would grant
21736-485: Was derived from fusion reactions, so only 0.3 kiloton was derived from fission. The repeated detonation of nuclear devices underground in salt domes , in a somewhat analogous manner to the explosions that power a car's internal combustion engine (in that it would be a heat engine ), has also been proposed as a means of fusion power in what is termed PACER . Other investigated uses for low-yield peaceful nuclear explosions were underground detonations to stimulate, by
21888-526: Was described by the Indian Government as a peaceful nuclear explosion. In Australia , nuclear blasting was proposed as a way of mining iron ore in the Pilbara . Apart from their use as weapons, nuclear explosives have been tested and used, in a similar manner to chemical high explosives , for various non-military uses. These have included large-scale earth moving, isotope production and
22040-539: Was dismissed by others in the administration over fears that the Soviet Union would be able to conduct secret tests. On the advice of Dulles, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman Lewis Strauss , and Secretary of Defense Charles Erwin Wilson , Eisenhower rejected the idea of considering a test ban outside general disarmament efforts. During the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections, Eisenhower fended off challenger Adlai Stevenson , who ran in large part on support for
22192-645: Was more extensive, eventually conducting 239 nuclear explosions. Some of these tests also released radioactivity, including a significant release of plutonium into the groundwater and the polluting of an area near the Volga River . A major part of the program in the 1970s and 80s was the use of very small bombs to produce shock waves as a seismic measuring tool, and as part of these experiments, two bombs were successfully used to seal blown-out oil wells. The program officially ended in 1988. As part of ongoing arms control efforts, both programs came to be controlled by
22344-427: Was not until after Sputnik in late 1957 that Eisenhower quickly moved to expand nuclear collaboration with the UK via presidential directives and the establishment of bilateral committees on nuclear matters. In early 1958, Eisenhower publicly stated that amendments to the McMahon Act were a necessary condition of a test ban, framing the policy shift in the context of US commitment to its NATO allies. In August 1957,
22496-452: Was opened for signature by other countries. The treaty formally went into effect on 10 October 1963. Since then, 123 other states have become party to the treaty. Ten states have signed but not ratified the treaty. The primary motivation for the treaty stemmed from growing public concern over radioactive fallout from above-ground and underwater nuclear testing, especially as the power of nuclear devices continued to increase. Additionally, there
22648-431: Was personally troubled by the power of nuclear weapons and would later recount that he believed the weapons could never be used. In the mid-1950s, Khrushchev took a keen interest in defense policy and sought to inaugurate an era of détente with the West. Initial efforts to reach accords, such as on disarmament at the 1955 Geneva Summit , proved fruitless, and Khrushchev saw test-ban negotiations as an opportunity to present
22800-499: Was rejected by Anglo-American negotiators due to fears that the verification provisions were too vague and the Geneva System too weak. Shortly after the Geneva Conference began in the fall of 1958, Eisenhower faced renewed domestic opposition to a comprehensive test ban as Senator Albert Gore Sr. argued in a widely circulated letter that a partial ban would be preferable due to Soviet opposition to strong verification measures. The Gore letter did spur some progress in negotiations, as
22952-419: Was tempered by concern that resistance to a test ban might lead the US and Soviet Union to pursue an agreement without Britain having any say in the matter. Members of the Soviet military–industrial complex also opposed a test ban, though some scientists, including Igor Kurchatov , were supportive of antinuclear efforts. France, which was in the midst of developing its own nuclear weapon, also firmly opposed
23104-517: Was widespread apprehension about the broader environmental damage caused by such testing. In 1952–53, both the United States and the Soviet Union detonated their first thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs), which were significantly more powerful than the atomic bombs that had been tested and deployed since the Trinity test in 1945. In 1954, the U.S. conducted the Castle Bravo test at Bikini Atoll as part of Operation Castle , which resulted in
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