Second phase
144-588: The Bereznegovatoye–Snigirevka offensive (Russian: Березнеговато-Снигирёвская Наступательная Операция, Bereznegovato-Snigirovskaya Nastupatel'naya Operatsiya) was an offensive operation conducted in southern Ukraine by the Soviet 3rd Ukrainian Front against the German 6th Army and Romanian 3rd Army of Army Group A , in March 1944. It was part of the second stage of the strategic Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive . After
288-441: A mechanized corps . It was supported by one breakthrough artillery division and four anti-aircraft artillery divisions , among others. The elements of the 4th Ukrainian Front that fought in the operation fielded seventeen additional infantry divisions and a mechanized corps, supported by two breakthrough artillery divisions and an anti-aircraft artillery division. They numbered 115,537 men and 2,925 guns on 1 February, not including
432-589: A 224-gun artillery salute was fired in Moscow. A special 37th Army detachment prevented the German demolition of the power stations in the city and the Saksahan dams. After the capture of Krivoi Rog, the 37th Army advanced to the Inhulets west of the city, and the 46th Army to the Inhulets south of the city. On 25 February the 8th Guards and 6th Armies resumed the advance to the Inhulets. The 5th Shock Army resumed
576-462: A 30-minute artillery preparation. Blizzard conditions made the advance difficult and grounded Soviet aviation, but in the first two days the two armies advanced between 5 and 12 kilometers (3.1 and 7.5 mi) in heavy fighting in mud and snow. Against German counterattacks, the 37th Army's 82nd Rifle Corps reached the city outskirts from the northeast on 21 February. At the same time, the 46th Army's 6th Guards Rifle Corps and 34th Rifle Corps reached
720-528: A breakdown of their losses. Finally, the losses of the flak units, which were operating in the rear area of the 6th Army but were under subordination of the Luftflotte 4 , are not counted either- the biggest unit among these was the 15th Flak Division. Thus, based on the aforementioned factors, the total losses of the 6th Army, plus Luftwaffe anti-aircraft units and paramilitary organizations attached to it, were close to 30,000. Another indication of this are
864-405: A bridgehead northwest of Malaya Lepetikha . For the next several days, the advance paused as ammunition and artillery were brought up, awaiting the resumption of the attack on Krivoi Rog. During this lull in the fighting, the German 6th Army reorganized its forces due to the heavy losses suffered. In addition to the disbandment of the 125th, two regiments of the 302nd were combined into one, while
1008-461: A further Soviet advance. The German troops conducted a stubborn resistance and repeated counterattacks to hinder Soviet attempts to force a crossing. In several days of fighting, Soviet troops overcame the Ingulets and captured several bridgeheads on the opposite bank. Directing the front for further operations, Stavka wrote Malinovsky on 28 February, communicating that the most important task of
1152-430: A limited extent, the panzer regiments are worn-out, and most of them are currently without operational tanks. The divisions have thus lost their character and value as panzer divisions. The losses in armoured vehicles were not even remotely compensated for by the reassignments or the corresponding supply of spare parts. [...] 8.) The mood and attitude of the troops were often depressed by the high number of casualties and
1296-414: A line east of Kamenka, but this was abandoned after Schörner reported that such an action would lead to the loss of most of the vehicles. Continuing the attack in the spring rasputitsa , which made roads impassable, the 46th Army's 4th and 34th Guards Rifle Divisions reached the key rail junction of Apostolovo, the German 6th Army's main supply base, on the evening of 4 February. There, the remnants of
1440-476: A pair of one-lane pontoon bridges at the far southern end of the bridgehead at Velikaya (Bolshaya) Lepetikha . The remainder of the 6th Army sector, facing north and slightly east, stretched between positions 18 miles (29 km) north of Krivoi Rog and 30 miles (48 km) north of Apostolovo, where the sole rail line supplying the army branched north and towards Nikopol. The positions ran across open steppe divided at right angles by numerous ravines and
1584-535: A reconsideration of the operational plans for the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts. He concluded that a German withdrawal from the Nikopol bridgehead was likely and thus advocated a renewed attack to begin between 10 and 12 January 1944. Stavka approved his plan, and after preparations between 10 and 12 January, the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts began the attack. The former's 8th Guards and 46th Armies advanced towards Apostolovo against XXX Army Corps on 10 January, and
SECTION 10
#17327796490021728-526: A result of the recent fighting. In addition to the exhausted state of the troops, the state of the horses and the performance of the remaining motor vehicles is extremely strained due to the hard demands of the battles and the catastrophic road conditions. The health condition of the troops, which had fallen sharply as a result of the change in the weather, deteriorated even further, since the troops had to fight and march without interruption and under unfavorable operational conditions. Particularly noteworthy are
1872-422: A result, the bridgehead was heavily fortified, with three lines of trenches in its first defensive line, strengthened by barbed wire belts and minefields. All heights and settlements immediately behind the front were turned into fortified strongpoints. These positions were what remained of the fortified German Dnieper line. Despite Hitler's obsession with the bridgehead, the mining of manganese ore ceased during
2016-512: A significant impact on the mood. Just how badly depleted the units were can be shown by the example of the 16th Panzergrenadier Division and 9th Panzer Division . As of 21 February 1944, both divisions were rated as having Kampfwert IV (Combat Value 4), meaning that they were fit for limited defensive operations only. The combat strength of their infantry battalions were the following. One month later, on 25 March 1944, remnants of these divisions were ordered to pull out from Ukraine and move to
2160-752: A total of 15,368. According to its reports in the German Federal Military Archive , the army lost 13,240 men, including 8,390 wounded and 4,850 killed or missing, between 11 and 29 February. The 6th Army High Command report, completed on 13 March 1944, provides near-complete figures for the army losses in February 1944. According to it, casualties of the 6th Army divisions, together with the subordinated corps ( Korpstruppen ), army ( Armeetruppen ) and army group ( Heerestruppen ) general headquarters (GHQ) combat units, amounted to 3,302 killed, 11,707 wounded, 4,281 missing, and 5,588 sick for
2304-493: A total of 24,878 casualties. The total 6th Army losses, however, were somewhat higher than this number. The document explicitly states that losses of the 62nd and 123rd Infantry Divisions, 97th Jäger Division, 16th Panzergrenadier Division and 3rd Mountain Division are given only for the first half of February (1-15), the precise losses in the second half of the month were not possible to establish for these divisions. In addition,
2448-404: Is having a significant impact on combat effectiveness. Due to the increasing shortage of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers, the internal structure of the troops in the worn-out divisions will no longer be able to cope with greater stress at present. In order to increase the fighting and resistance power, a large number of fresh, energetic and capable officers must be brought in. It
2592-433: Is so weakened that it can no longer fulfill its most necessary tasks. The bulk of the bridge equipment is lost in the mud. Increased and rapid supply of replacements on an exceptional scale to speed up the refitting of the weakened units, if possible by air transport, is a particular requirement, with engineer replacements also a priority. 3.) The bulk of the army's divisions lost a large part of their weapons and equipment in
2736-573: Is urgently necessary to supply non-commissioned officers from unattacked fronts (Norway, Lapland, France, Balkans), whose personnel and combat situation allow for the training of non-commissioned officers to a particularly high degree, to the worn-out units of the Eastern Front. 2.) The state of personnel and materiel made it necessary to merge the two weakened divisional battle groups into divisional groups and integrate them into weak divisions to replenish them. Exhausting all means at its disposal,
2880-500: The RSO prime mover) and 1,100 motor vehicle trailers (both single-axe and double-axe). There's no similar report prepared about losses in artillery pieces, armoured vehicles and other weapons, but its clear that 6th Army divisions had significant shortfalls in all types of weapons by the start of March 1944, based on the reports of army commander and weekly divisional condition reports at the end of February- start of March 1944. Summarizing
3024-517: The 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts launched a series of unsuccessful assaults against the Nikopol bridgehead and the Krivoi Rog area, which formed a salient . The 3rd Ukrainian Front directed its assaults against the northern part of the salient, while the 4th Ukrainian Front moved against the southern part. Since its capture by the Germans in 1941, the rich deposits of manganese in
SECTION 20
#17327796490023168-524: The 4th Guards Cavalry Corps , operating against the Nikopol bridgehead. These elements of the front fielded 22 rifle divisions, three cavalry divisions, and two mechanized corps. They faced the IV and XXIX Army Corps in the Nikopol bridgehead. The 3rd Ukrainian Front and elements of the 4th Ukrainian Front were tasked in January with destroying the German forces in the area of Nikopol and Krivoi Rog, eliminating
3312-476: The 8th Guards , 6th , and 46th Armies , the 17th Air Army , and the 23rd Tank Corps . The front included only nineteen rifle divisions and a tank corps, and faced the German LVII Panzer , XXX, and XVII Army Corps . General armii Fyodor Tolbukhin 's 4th Ukrainian Front included the 3rd Guards , 5th Shock , and 28th Armies , the 8th Air Army , the 2nd and 4th Guards Mechanized Corps , and
3456-598: The Bereznegovatoye–Snigirevka Offensive operation, the front readied itself for an attack on Odessa . Before the Odessa Offensive 3rd Ukrainian received substantial reinforcements. It now fielded seven Armies: 5th Shock Army, 6th Army, 8th Guards Army, 28th Army, 37th Army, 46th Army and 57th Army. Malinowsky also formed a cavalry-mechanized group consisting of 4th Guards Cavalry Corps and 4th Mechanized Corps under Lt. Gen. Pliev. The target
3600-538: The Ingulets river by the end of February 1944. All divisions of the 6th Army were heavily depleted and exhausted by the end of the month- the army high command rated the combat value of most of their divisions at level 4 ( Kampfwert IV ), meaning that they were fit for limited defensive operations only. Summarizing the situation of the 6th Army at the start of March 1944, the army commander, Generaloberst Karl-Adolf Hollidt , reported: The fierce defensive battles of
3744-591: The Southern Bug River , where they attempted to stop the Soviet advance. Pursuing the retreating German troops, the forces of the center and left wing of the front reached the Southern Bug and the approaches to Nikolayev between 16 and 20 March. The 394th Rifle Division of the 46th Army reached the Southern Bug in the Troitskoye area on 16 March, and in two days of fighting the division forced
3888-412: The watercourses of five major rivers. A single hard-surfaced road passed through the army's sector, designated Through Road IV, but it was unusable due to its proximity to the frontline, except for a small area at Krivoi Rog. Due to a total lack of suitable road building materials, the German forces were unable to construct hard-surfaced roads. As a result, when the roads turned to mud ( rasputitsa ) in
4032-412: The 123rd Infantry Division of XXX Corps and elements of the 9th Panzer Division were concentrated in an all-around defense with up to 3,000 men, 80 guns, and 30 tanks and assault guns. The 4th Guards attacked from the north and east, and the 34th Guards from the west and northwest. With the assistance of locals, the scouts from the 34th Guards Division found a gap in German defenses 4 kilometers northwest of
4176-488: The 23rd Panzer Division, which fielded around 60 tanks. The Soviet attack towards Sholokhovo threatened to cut off the supply route for the German troops in the Nikopol bridgehead. In the first days of the offensive, despite bad weather, Soviet aviation was active over the front. As a result of the Soviet attacks, on 2 February, the German 6th Army was transferred back to Army Group A, commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Ewald von Kleist . Schörner ordered his forces to evacuate
4320-562: The 28th Army forced a crossing of the Dnieper in the Kakhovka area, capturing bridgeheads on the right bank. Developing the offensive along the northern bank of the Dnieper, the 28th Army forced a crossing of the Ingulets in its lower course and soon entered battle for Kherson . Despite the stubborn German resistance, the 49th Guards and 295th Rifle Divisions liberated the important port city on 13 March, establishing complete Soviet control of
4464-417: The 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps and the front reserve artillery. The diversionary attacks of the Soviet 6th and 37th Armies began on the morning of 30 January. The latter's 82nd Rifle Corps with the 15th and 28th Guards and 188th Rifle Divisions achieved the most success, breaking through the German line, in an 8-kilometer sector and advancing 3–4 kilometers (1.9–2.5 mi) from Veselyye Terny against
Bereznegovatoye–Snigirevka offensive - Misplaced Pages Continue
4608-606: The 302nd Division and the remnants of the 9th Panzer Division and the units that had managed to make it out of the bridgehead from IV, XVII, and XXIX Army Corps. In order to secure the corridor, the retreat route for troops east of the Kamenka, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht , the German supreme command, projected an attack to attack the Soviet units in the flank by retaking Sholokhovo followed by an advance towards Kamenka, as well as recapturing Bolshaya Kostromka. The weakness of
4752-567: The 302nd Division rendered this broad offensive unfeasible, resulting in the additional commitment of the 17th, 9th, and 258th Infantry Divisions as well as the 97th Jäger Division of IV and XXIX Corps to a counterattack west against Bolshaya Kostromka, as well as a counterattack towards Apostolovo to restore communications to the west by reopening the Tok–Novosemyonovka railway line. The counterattack met with initial success, recapturing Nikolayevka and Novosemyonovka. Beginning on 8 February,
4896-414: The 302nd Infantry Division with a regiment each from the 17th and 302nd Divisions, supported by the 9th Infantry Division began its attack on Bolshaya Kostromka. The settlement was recaptured except for its eastern edge in fierce fighting, during which the German forces suffered heavy casualties. A 9 February 8 Guards Army tank-supported counterattack against Tok was stopped after nearly destroying elements of
5040-454: The 37th Army reached the Southern Bug and after two days of sustained fighting on 24 March liberated Voznesensk . In the fighting near Voznesensk the German 257th Infantry Division suffered heavy losses. Within 13 days, the 3rd Ukrainian Front had managed to decisively beat the 6th Army. A very large Soviet territory (more than 20,000 km), between the Inhulets and Southern Bug Rivers
5184-520: The 387th Infantry Division was merged into the 258th. Alarm units were scraped together from artillerymen who had lost their guns, rear personnel, and stragglers. In addition, the previous fighting had caused a lack of pioneers, bridging equipment, vehicles, guns, infantry ammunition, and tanks. The 17th and 294th Divisions had also suffered heavy losses in the attempt to clear the retreat route, though troops of IV and XVII Army Corps held their positions at Marinskoye. The 97th Jäger and 24th Panzer Divisions,
5328-405: The 3rd Guards and 28th Armies began supporting attacks to assist the 5th Shock Army. The 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps with around 30 tanks and self-propelled guns entered the breakthrough in 5th Shock's sector at 15:00 and advanced up to 11 kilometers (6.8 mi) by the end of the day against dogged German resistance, outpacing 5th Shock, which advanced up to 7 kilometers (4.3 mi). On 2 February
5472-482: The 3rd Guards, 5th Shock, and 28th Armies began the pursuit that day against German rearguard detachments, advancing between 4 and 14 kilometers. The last German unit to evacuate the northern portion of the bridgehead from IV Army Corps was the 302nd Infantry Division, whose pioneers blew up the bridge over the Dnieper at Nikopol at midnight on 6 February. The German pioneers also destroyed abandoned guns and vehicles as well as infrastructure in Nikopol. Velikaya Lepetikha
5616-435: The 3rd Guards, 5th Shock, and 28th Armies continued to attack, but only the 5th Shock was able to make small gains, though on 3 February the 4th Ukrainian Front advance reached a depth of 8 kilometers. The three Soviet armies continued their attacks along the previous routes on 4 February, but were again unsuccessful. Taking advantage of the German retreat from their main line of resistance in the Nikopol bridgehead on 5 February,
5760-460: The 3rd Mountain Division. To fully secure the retreat route, the 125th Infantry Division of XVII Corps was tasked with taking the eastern edge of Bolshaya Kostromka, launching its attack on 10 February with the support of the 302nd Division. The attack fully cleared the settlement and the 125th continued the advance towards Novosemyonovka and Apostolovo. The strong German counterattack towards Apostolovo by units of IV Army Corps, among others, struck
5904-550: The 3rd Mountain managed to disable several Soviet armored vehicles near Perevizskiye, but the right flank of its pioneer battalion was turned on 6 February by a tank attack into the settlement. A counterattack supported by assault guns and a regiment of the 3rd Mountain retook the northern part of the settlement, enabling the establishment of a coherent German line east of the Basavluk. With the Soviet advance there briefly halted, 6th Army command planned to recapture Sholokovo and hold
Bereznegovatoye–Snigirevka offensive - Misplaced Pages Continue
6048-546: The 3rd Ukrainian Front engaged in the Iassy-Kishinev Offensive , which resulted in the release of all the Moldavian SSR, and Romania declaring war on Germany. On 8 September, after breaking diplomatic ties and declaring war on Bulgaria, Soviet troops entered the territory of Bulgaria and occupied part of the country . The next day a Bulgarian communist led coalition organized a coup and took over
6192-723: The 3rd Ukrainian Front had forces involved in the Siege of Budapest , including 46th Army . Its troops crossed the Danube and seized a bridgehead on its right bank. In January 1945, they repelled the enemy counter-attacks, trying to relieve the forces surrounded in Budapest, and in March, during the German Operation Frühlingserwachen , a counter-offensive broke the German troops in the area of Lake Balaton . The successful completion of this battle made possible
6336-557: The 46th Army a bridgehead north of Shyroke. Soviet documents in the Central Archives of the Russian Ministry of Defense estimated that they had captured 4,600 German military personnel during the offensive. For the month of February, in its casualty reports submitted to higher headquarters every ten days, the German 6th Army reported casualties of 2,905 killed, 10,018 wounded, and 2,445 missing, for
6480-495: The 46th Army advanced northwest of Apostolovo, the 8th Guards Army advanced to the southwest of that city, and the Soviet 6th Army entered the Novovorontsovka area. On 10 February, the 3rd Guards Army transferred to the 3rd Ukrainian Front, but was soon withdrawn to Stavka Reserve. The 5th Shock Army, also transferred to the 3rd Ukrainian, crossed the Dnieper in conditions worsened by floating ice on 10 February and captured
6624-426: The 46th and 8th Guards Armies, where on the night of 3 March they sizable bridgeheads over the Ingulets, to the west of Shirokoye and south of Krivoy Rog. Based on this success, the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Army General Rodion Malinovsky , decided to make a breakthrough towards Novyi Buh with Vasily Chuikov 's 8th Guards Army from the bridgehead west of Shirokoye and Vasily Glagolev 's 46th Army from
6768-541: The 4th Guards Mechanized Corps was withdrawn to the reserve in the Apostolovo area due to losses. During the next several days, the German troops held the Dnieper marshes and the Nikopol–Dudchino road, allowing elements of five infantry divisions, including several from XVII Corps, to retreat, although losing almost all their heavy equipment. Simultaneously, the 37th Army continued to fight south of Veselyye Terny,
6912-472: The 4th Guards Mechanized Corps with 120 tanks and assault guns was inserted into the Soviet breakthrough in the sector of the 8th Guards Army at 16:00 on 1 February. In its advance, the 4th Guards scattered retreating units of the 123rd Infantry Division of the XXX Army Corps and captured 85 soldiers, before reaching the northern outskirts of Kamenka and Sholokhovo by the end of the day and running into
7056-419: The 4th Ukrainian Front, supported by General-leytenant Timofey Khryukin 's 8th Air Army, were to destroy the German troops in the Nikopol bridgehead – the IV and XXIX Army Corps of Group Schörner, commanded by General der Infanterie Friedrich Mieth and General der Panzertruppe Erich Brandenberger , respectively. General-leytenant Karp Sviridov 's 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps was to be inserted into
7200-560: The 5th Guards Tank Army which penetrated north of Kryvyi Rih, and was only halted by the stubborn German defence and length of its own logistic tail. On conclusion, both operations allowed the two Fronts to create a single Krementchug-Dnipropetrovsk bridgehead that expanded to Zaporizhzhia due to the breaching of the Wotan Line by the Southern Front. Later, units of the 6th Army seized bridgeheads south of Zaporizhzhia , and by
7344-422: The 62nd Infantry Division of LVII Panzer Corps. Stubborn resistance and counterattacks slowed the Soviet advance, which devolved into what American historian Earl F. Ziemke described as a "series of uncoordinated skirmishes." The Soviet 6th Army attacked with its 60th Guards and 244th Rifle Divisions , managing to carve a small foothold in the defenses of XVII Army Corps northeast of Nikopol. Chuikov began
SECTION 50
#17327796490027488-431: The 6th Army were very high, especially in terms of motor vehicles. According to the army's Oberquartiermeister report, in February 1944, as a result of difficult retreats and breakouts in muddy conditions, the army lost a total of 8,200 trucks of all capacities and models, 2,900 passenger cars (ordinary and cross-country), 2,400 motorcycles (both solo and with sidecar), 650 artillery prime movers of all capacities (including
7632-495: The 6th Army's lines, capturing Apostolovo on 5 February, splitting the army in half. Nikopol fell on 8 February, but despite heavy losses the troops in the bridgehead, including the German IV Army Corps , were able to retreat across the Dnieper. The IV Army Corps launched an unsuccessful counterattack against Apostolovo around this time, resulting in a temporary Soviet pause in order to prepare for
7776-596: The Bulgarian First , Second and Fourth Armies. The Danube Flotilla was assigned to the Front's operational control. This included the 83rd Naval Infantry Brigade. In the first half of October 1943, Southwestern Front (3rd Ukrainian Front from 20 October) commanded by Army General Rodion Malinovsky was tasked with attacking the German Panther-Wotan line , and later securing the bridgeheads on
7920-520: The Dnieper in order to link up with the 4th Ukrainian Front. The 8th Guards and 46th Armies were to attack on a 21-kilometer (13 mi), with a density of 140 guns and mortars and nine tanks and self-propelled guns per kilometer. General-leytenant Vladimir Sudets ' 17th Air Army provided air support for the 3rd Ukrainian Front. Meanwhile, General-leytenant Dmitry Lelyushenko 's 3rd Guards, General-leytenant Vyacheslav Tsvetayev 's 5th Shock, and General-leytenant Alexey Grechkin 's 28th Armies of
8064-429: The Dnieper to cut off the German troops around Nikopol, capturing Bolshaya Kostromka, Novosemyonovka, and Verkhnemikhailovka. The 4th Ukrainian Front began its attack on the Nikopol bridgehead on 31 January, with the 5th Shock Army's 50th Guards Rifle Division pushing the German troops back 1.5 kilometers (0.93 mi) in an attack beginning at 04:00. At 08:00 the 54th Guards Rifle Division began its attack. At noon
8208-426: The German 6th Army fielded twenty divisions (including three panzer) with an average combat strength of 2,500 and eight assault gun battalions, as well as a large number of artillery and pioneer units. Of these, eight infantry divisions (four each in IV and XXIX Army Corps) and three assault gun battalions formed part of Group Schörner in the Nikopol bridgehead. The German infantry units had been reinforced by scraping
8352-646: The German LVII Panzer Corps at Krivoi Rog and the XVII Army Corps of General der Gebirgstruppe Hans Kreysing at Nikopol, respectively. The main blow of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was planned to be delivered against the XXX Army Corps of General der Artillerie Maximilian Fretter-Pico by General-leytenant Vasily Glagolev 's 46th Army, General-polkovnik Vasily Chuikov 's 8th Guards Army, and General-leytenant Trofim Tanaschishin 's 4th Guards Mechanized Corps towards Apostolovo and
8496-440: The German positions. The same day the other armies of the front began advancing in their sectors. Thus, the defending forces of the 6th Army were subjected to attack along an extensive front. The attack of the 3rd Ukrainian Front took place at the same time as the offensives of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to the north. The 8th Guards Army took the first German defensive positions, but German opposition continued, relying on
8640-459: The German rearguard to retreat across the river. The division forced a crossing of the river and seized a bridgehead on the night of 18–19 March. To the left, the 8th Guards Army reached the western bank of the river south of Nova Odesa and prepared the attack on Odessa. The 57th and 37th Armies, on the right wing of the front, broke through the German defenses and liberated the rail junction of Dolinskaya and road junction of Bobrynets , and then
8784-428: The German troops began to withdraw, in accordance with Schörner's order, to the Dnieper crossings at Velikaya Lepetikha and Nikopol, which were under constant Soviet air attacks and shelling. These disrupted the German withdrawal, but despite heavy losses, Group Schörner was able to withdraw across the river, beginning with the 3rd Mountain Division at Nikopol. German resistance stymied the Soviet advance: on 2 February
SECTION 60
#17327796490028928-462: The Ingulets and Dnieper. The 28th Army , with five rifle divisions and Karp Sviridov 's 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps , was slated to be used to take Kherson and for operations in the Nikolayev sector. Giving this directive, Stavka believed that the front would have more success in the zone of the 6th and 5th Shock Armies. However, the troops of the front had more significant advances in the zones of
9072-553: The Nikopol bridgehead over the Dnieper , the easternmost protrusion of a salient centred on the key rail junction of Apostolovo . On 3 November, these two corps were temporarily transferred to the 1st Panzer Army , and within weeks they became part of Group Schörner under the command of General der Gebirgstruppe Ferdinand Schörner along with the XVII Army Corps to the north. During November and December,
9216-483: The Nikopol bridgehead on the same day and retreat to a line beginning at the mouth of the Basavluk, 20 kilometers (12 mi) west of Nikopol, and ending at Dolinzevo, 10 kilometers (6.2 mi) east of Krivoi Rog, known as the Ursula position. Sholokhovo fell that morning, although the Soviet advance was temporarily halted to the south by the replacement battalions of the 258th and 302nd Divisions. In order to hold open
9360-580: The Nikopol bridgehead, and pushing the German troops back behind the line of the Inhulets and the Southern Bug . On 29 December 1943, Marshal Sovetskogo Soyuza Aleksandr Vasilevsky , the representative of the Soviet high command, Stavka , reported that the defeat of the German troops opposing the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Zhitomir–Berdichev offensive and the redirection of the 2nd Ukrainian Front towards an attack on Kirovograd forced
9504-689: The Southern Bug, abandoning almost all artillery, heavy equipment and transport. The mass of the 8th Guards Army was still fighting in the Bashtanka and Vladimirovka area against the German XXIX. Army Corps . The 37th Rifle Corps (Maj. Gen. Sergei Gorokhov) of the 5th Shock Army, advancing from the east on Snigirevka, was still too far to help in the encirclement. The 370th, 304th, 335th and 9th Infantry Divisions suffered particularly heavy losses. On 15 March, Bereznegovatoye and Snigirevka were liberated by Soviet troops. The German troops withdrew behind
9648-405: The Soviet attack, the German 6th Army reported casualties of 1,339 killed, 4,865 wounded, and 446 missing. Casualties of 834 killed, 3,214 wounded, and 419 missing were reported in the next ten-day period between 21 and 31 January. On the day that the attacks concluded, Vasilevsky submitted a new plan to Stavka for an attack to begin on 30 January. The 3rd Ukrainian Front was given the main role in
9792-554: The Soviet gains paved the way for subsequent advances during the second phase of the Dnieper–Carpathian offensive. The offensive resulted in the loss of the German salient and at least 25,000 total casualties being inflicted on the units of 6th Army in the fighting. Due to heavy personnel and material losses, most of the divisions of the 6th Army were greatly reduced in their combat effectiveness after this offensive, being fit only for limited defensive operations. 6th Army
9936-510: The Soviet tanks after the latter outran their supporting infantry. Continued German counterattacks reduced the breach to about a mile by the end of the day. In four to five days of stubborn fighting, the Soviet troops were unable to make decisive gains. The 3rd Ukrainian Front wedged into the German line between 6 and 8 kilometers (3.7 and 5.0 mi) through preponderance in infantry, but could not break through due to German resistance, shortages of ammunition and its lack of tanks, which prevented
10080-405: The advance against Krivoi Rog, in the northwest portion of the salient. Two armies of the 3rd Ukrainian Front began the advance towards that city on 17 February, and captured it on 22 February. Other armies from the front then resumed the advance and captured several bridgeheads over the Inhulets river, which became the next German defensive line. Fighting in the area died down, but
10224-636: The area of Nikopol had been used in Germany for the production of high-strength steel. Adolf Hitler repeatedly stressed the crucial importance of this area, telling his commanders that the "Loss of Nikopol would mean the end of the war." The Nikopol bridgehead also held operational significance because it could serve as a springboard for an assault to relieve German troops trapped in Crimea , and Hitler refused demands by Army Group South commander Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein for its evacuation. As
10368-454: The army fielded 260,000 men, 6,420 guns and mortars, 480 tanks and assault guns, and 560 aircraft. However, a quarter of the tanks, assault guns, and artillery pieces were unserviceable. In addition, a shortage of anti-aircraft ammunition prevented the German ground forces from defending against Soviet air superiority, which Schörner described as "absolute" in a report to the 6th Army command. Soviet air attacks attacked supply lines and prevented
10512-438: The army formed numerous alarm units [Alarm-Einheiten] from artillerymen, personnel of supply trains, rear services and scattered troops, whose reliability is, as experience has shown, very limited, and integrated them into the weakened units. All human reserves are now exhausted. The replacements in no way cover the losses that have occurred. Due to the particularly high shortage of engineers in all divisions, this important weapon
10656-658: The army's divisions lost a large part of their weaponry and equipment in recent battles as a result of breakthrough battles with reversed fronts and through rough terrain. The considerable shortage of infantry weapons, motor vehicles, especially prime movers, anti-tank guns and equipment of all kinds results in extraordinary difficulties in combat management, supply and subsequent training needs. [...] The level of training sank further due to high losses of officers, NCOs and old enlisted men. The battles and withdrawal movements, with their constant strain on all forces, took away any possibility of training. [...] The mood and attitude of
10800-484: The attack southwest from a bridgehead on the Dnieper on 26 February and reached the line of Velikaya Aleksandrovka and Dudchino three days later. The Inhulets became the main German defensive line as a convenient natural barrier, although the 8th Guards Army's 35th and 57th Guards Rifle Divisions captured a bridgehead in the Shyroke area. Almost simultaneously, the 37th Army captured a bridgehead west of Krivoi Rog, and
10944-475: The attack, with the tank corps being inserted on the 13 October; the 12th Army attacked from the north, and 3rd Guards from the south of Zaporizhzhia . Germans retreated from Zaporizhzhia, destroying the railway bridge over Dnieper behind themselves. On 23 October Malinovsky , who wanted to take Dnipropetrovsk , and trap the First Panzer Army in the eastern reaches of the Dnieper bend, inserted
11088-473: The beginning of the Vienna Offensive on 16 March, in conjunction with the left wing 2nd Ukrainian Front . Thereafter the front's forces completed the liberation of Hungary, expelled the enemy from the eastern part of Austria and took its capital, Vienna . The Front included 57th Army from October to December 1944. On 15 June 1945, the on the basis of a Stavka directive on May 29, 1945, the front
11232-440: The breakthrough in the 5th Shock Army's sector. Over three nights between 16 and 18 January, the 8th Guards Army was concentrated by reducing its sector west of the Dnieper, and divisions from the Soviet 6th Army crossed the Dnieper to take over the former's previous positions. The 46th Army was concentrated on the flank of the 8th Guards Army, and the 37th Army moved forward on the 46th Army's right. The 4th Guards Mechanized Corps
11376-618: The bridgehead southwest of Krivoi Rog. Yefim Pushkin 's 23rd Tank Corps with 102 tanks and sixteen self-propelled guns was slated for commitment to exploit of the breakthrough in the zone of the 46th Army, while the Cavarly-Mechanized Group of Lieutenant General Issa Pliyev was slated for commitment in the zone of the 8th Guards Army. The group included Trofim Tanaschishin 's 4th Guards Mechanized Corps with 100 tanks and 23 self-propelled guns as well as Pliyev's own 4th Guards Cavalry Corps. The group, upon reaching Novy Bug,
11520-492: The bridgehead, a salient centered around the supply base and rail junction of Apostolovo , and German troops in the Krivoi Rog area. Following another failed attack in mid-January, the Nikopol–Krivoy Rog offensive was launched by the 3rd Ukrainian Front to the north of the salient on 30 January, and elements of the 4th Ukrainian Front to the south of it joined in a day later. The Soviet troops broke through
11664-469: The casualties were inflicted on the 5th Shock Army. German equipment losses in the evacuation of the bridgehead were heavy, with several divisions having lost their entire complement of heavy weapons. In the following days, fierce fighting took place over a narrow corridor held by German troops west of Nikopol, centered on a westward-facing defensive line composed of forces withdrawn from the bridgehead around Marinskoye and Perevizskiye, including elements of
11808-482: The city of Novy Bug, having split the front of the German 6th Army in half, creating conditions for a deep envelopment of the German right flank. Novy Bug was the headquarters of the German 6th Army, and contained depots with provisions, fuel, ammunition and uniforms. The city was fortified, surrounded by two unbroken lines of trenches. The Soviet attack took the German defenders by surprise and they were unable to offer resistance. The 9th Guards Cavalry Division pursued
11952-502: The city, and its 105th Guards Rifle Regiment penetrated the German position and captured the railway station early on the morning of 5 February. Around this time the rest of the two divisions launched the attack, and Apostolovo was captured by 8:00 that morning. The loss of Apostolovo split the German 6th Army in half, one part in the area of Krivoi Rog and the other in the area of Nikopol and Marganets , as LVII Panzer Corps around Krivoi Rog had thus lost contact with XXX Army Corps following
12096-530: The city, while the 4th Ukrainian Front's 3rd Guards Army attacked from the south after crossing the Dnieper. Its 266th Rifle Division and 5th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade were among the first into the city. The city was cleared of German troops by 8 February, after a night of heavy street fighting with elements of the retreating 302nd Division. Between 1 and 10 February, the 4th Ukrainian Front's 3rd Guards, 5th Shock, and 28th Armies suffered casualties of 1,725 killed, 4,960 wounded, and 94 missing. The majority of
12240-430: The city. The German counterattack ran out of steam due to Soviet air attacks on 12 February when the 125th was forced to retreat to its original positions; its losses in the fighting were so severe that it had to be disbanded in the following days. However, the 8th Guards Army was significantly weakened due to muddy road conditions causing its artillery and tanks to lag behind, as well as ammunition shortages. On 10 February
12384-470: The collapse of the German Nikopol bridgehead in February 1944 , 6th Army was forced to conduct a costly and difficult withdrawal, retreating behind the Ingulets river at the end of the month in conditions of early spring thaw . As a result of the heavy battles of the previous month, all divisions of the 6th Army were heavily depleted by the start of March 1944. The 3rd Ukrainian Front, in pursuit of
12528-400: The creation of a strong attack group. Hollidt briefly considered withdrawing the 24th Panzer Division from the Nikopol bridgehead to lead a counterattack against the Soviet gains in the north, but decided against it after the 4th Ukrainian Front began its attack against the bridgehead. The 4th Ukrainian Front suffered a similar lack of success and the attacks were halted by 17 January to allow
12672-425: The eastern and southeastern outskirts of the city. The bulk of the German defenses were concentrated in the east, where it was anticipated that the main blow would come. Exploiting weak points discovered by Soviet reconnaissance, the 37th and 46th Armies moved into the city at dawn on 22 February from the northwest and southeast, respectively; it was cleared by 16:00 that day. In celebration of the capture of Krivoi Rog,
12816-589: The eastern bank of the Dnieper on the Izyum - Dnipropetrovsk axis during the Battle of the Lower Dnieper . But the first attempt to establish bridgeheads failed. Three infantry armies: 8th Guards , 3rd Guards and the 12th Army , and two corps, 1st Guards Mechanized and 23rd Tank with 17th Air Army providing air support were assembled for the new assault. On 10 October 1943 Chuikov's 8th Guards launched
12960-468: The effective employment of German artillery by destroying communications, in addition to hindering the movement of reserve forces by disrupting command and control. The Soviet troops totaled 705,000 men, 8,048 guns and mortars, 390 tanks, and 1,200 combat aircraft, as well as 140 Polikarpov U-2 and Polikarpov R-5 reconnaissance aircraft. The 3rd Ukrainian Front fielded thirty infantry divisions, including one airborne fighting as infantry, in addition to
13104-525: The end of December, along with 2nd Ukrainian Front held on the Dnieper major strategic stronghold. After the liberation of right-bank Ukraine by troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, in collaboration with 4th Ukrainian Front by making Nikopol-Krivoy Rog Operation 1944, the took to the district Ingulets , where in March–April launched an offensive at the Nikolayev-Odessa area. After carrying out
13248-417: The five divisions of the XVII Army Corps in the area of Marganets and Nikopol. In six days, the 3rd Ukrainian Front had broken through the German defenses and advanced between 45 and 60 kilometers (28 and 37 mi), inflicting heavy losses on the 6th Army. From Apostolovo, the 46th Army continued to advance west towards the Inhulets, while the 8th Guards Army and 4th Guards Mechanized Corps attempted to reach
13392-501: The flooded river and fortified settlements. By the evening of 6 March the battle continued with the previous intensity, but the advance of the infantry slowed slightly. To strengthen the attack, Malinovsky committed the Cavalry-Mechanized Group. Under pouring rain, along soaked roads, the Cavalry-Mechanized Group approached the front. Late in the evening of 6 March the group reached the frontline and in conjunction with
13536-482: The front fielded 57 rifle and three cavalry divisions, a tank corps, two mechanized corps, and one fortified region. The Soviet troops totaled 500,000 personnel, 9,000 guns and mortars, 372 tanks, and 551 combat aircraft. As a result of the Nikopol-Krivoy Rog Offensive last month, 6th Army had to conduct a costly and difficult withdrawal in conditions of early spring thaw , retreating behind
13680-422: The front was to force a crossing of the Ingulets no later than 2 March in one of the sectors between Shesternya and Bolshaya Aleksandrovkaya and to move the 6th Army and most of the 5th Shock Army across the river with the goal of turning the German defense on the lower course of the Ingulets and collapsing the German troops defending Nikolayev. The left wing of the 5th Shock Army was tasked with advancing between
13824-677: The government, eventually switching sides and declaring war on Germany. From 28 September - 20 October 1944 3rd Ukrainian Front in collaboration with the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia with the participation of troops of the Fatherland Front in Bulgaria carried out the Belgrade Offensive , which resulted in the liberation of the capital of Yugoslavia, Belgrade , and most of Serbia . In October 1944 - February 1945,
13968-409: The heavy mental and physical strain. They will only be lifted again when the front is strengthened and refitting will begin. The contradiction between the shortage of weapons and especially of ammunition, which had been noticeable at the front for a long time, and the sufficient production of weapons and ammunition constantly mentioned in the propaganda, which is clearly recognizable to every soldier, has
14112-461: The infantry and tanks of the 8th Guards and 46th Armies jumped off at 09:15. Fierce fighting ensued as the Soviet troops broke through the defenses of the 46th and 123rd Infantry Divisions and the 16th Panzergrenadier Division, inflicting heavy losses and forcing them to retreat, leaving behind artillery, vehicles, and ammunition. The Soviet advance carried into the positions of the 9th Panzer Division. Closely cooperating with infantry and artillery,
14256-477: The infantry pushed the German defenders from their lines. Exploiting the breakthrough, the Cavalry-Mechanized Group penetrated deep into the German defenses, cut the line of communications, and struck the German supply depots, quickly advancing towards Novy Bug. On the morning of 8 March reconnaissance reported that at the Novy Bug station German troops were unloading trains with tanks, ammunition, and uniforms. It
14400-564: The installations and the Dam were partly destroyed. At the same time the Koniev's 2nd Ukrainian Front was attacking towards the Kryvyi Rih from the north with the 7th Guards Army, but the 1st Panzer Army was saved for the moment as Koniev's assault on Kryvyi Rih stalled at Ingulets river north of Kherson. However, Vatutin commanding the 1st Ukrainian Front located north of Poltava sent
14544-444: The junction of the 8th Guards and 46th Armies on 11 February. The few Soviet units in the area were forced to withdraw, and by the end of the day the German troops had gained 8 to 10 kilometers, threatening the recapture of Apostolovo. Malinovsky hastily rushed the 48th Guards Rifle Division and two anti-tank artillery regiments forward from the front reserve, and the 82nd Guards and 152nd Rifle Divisions were concentrated to defend
14688-533: The last battles, in particular due to the impassable terrain caused by the early onset of the muddy period [Schlammperiode]. The number of vehicles lost is unusually high. Some divisions do not have a single anti-tank gun. The stock of communications equipment has become so low due to the high losses that command and control is extremely difficult; one corps no longer has any command and control equipment at all. Numerous supply facilities are without their specialized equipment. 4.) The panzer divisions are only mobile to
14832-439: The last few weeks have been the toughest test of the army's endurance. The mentally and physically overstrained troops had to give their last. Only through draconian performance demands could the set operational goals be achieved. Due to heavy personnel and material losses, the majority of army divisions are now physically, numerically and materially worn-out. The combat value and mobility of the divisions has declined even further as
14976-582: The latter returned from its abortive march to the Korsun Pocket , attacked to the west of Bolshaya Kostromka on 15 February to link up with LVII Panzer Corps. Erasing a Soviet penetration, they reported the capture of 221 guns, 66 anti-tank guns, and 62 machine guns. This allowed for a relatively unharrassed 6th Army retreat towards the Inhulets. The attack on Krivoi Rog was conducted by the 37th and 46th Armies against five German infantry divisions and two Panzer divisions from LVII Panzer Corps. The former
15120-481: The latter's 3rd Guards, 5th Shock, and 28th Armies attacked the IV and XXIX Army Corps in the Nikopol bridgehead on 12 January. The attack of the 3rd Ukrainian Front on 10 January, spearheaded by what a German report estimated as 80 tanks, and preceded by an artillery barrage, included nine rifle divisions from both armies, advancing in two waves. It was stopped after gaining 3 miles (4.8 km) by two German panzer divisions, which claimed to have destroyed two-thirds of
15264-496: The losses of Army Group A for February 1944. At the time, this army group consisted of the 6th Army in southern Ukraine and the 17th Army cut off in Crimea. The losses of the army group for February amounted to 40,500 killed, wounded, missing and sick in total. Since the 17th Army had a quiet month in Crimea and saw little fighting, the vast majority of these losses can be attributed to the 6th Army. The material losses of all sorts of
15408-461: The losses of the paramilitary 'Wehrmacht entourage' ( Wehrmacht Gefolge ), which were attached to the 6th Army and supported it (members of O.T. , RAD , Reichsbahn etc.) are not included. As the Red Army penetrated deep into the rear areas of the 6th Army during this offensive, where these organizations were located at, they sustained some losses as well, but there are no documents that give
15552-423: The main attack on 31 January by having his troops conduct reconnaissance with one battalion from each first-echelon rifle division in order to retain surprise, instead of conducting reconnaissance with one to two battalions from each corps between one and three days preceding the operation, a tactic that later became known as the special echelon. At dawn, a 50-minute Soviet artillery and air bombardment commenced, and
15696-407: The newly arrived 46th Army into combat. Together with 8th Guards it was trying to trap German forces against the western bank of Dnieper between Dnipropetrovsk and Dniprodzerzhynsk , the site of the huge Dnieper Hydroelectric Station . The 46th Army units tried to get to the station in time to prevent the destruction of the dam by retreating German troops. On 25 October Dnipropetrovsk was taken, but
15840-434: The northern part of the salient, Hollidt withdrew his three panzer divisions from the front to become an armored reserve for the former on 24 January. Within days, however, he had to transfer an infantry division to Crimea and two infantry division equivalents to the 8th Army . This was capped by the sending of the 24th Panzer Division, the army's best equipped panzer division, on a 310-kilometer (190 mi) march to reinforce
15984-407: The northernmost portion of Ukraine. Around this time, Manstein transferred the 1st Panzer Army to the northern sector, leaving a few of its infantry divisions behind in the Nikopol bridgehead; these joined the 6th Army. On 4 January 1944 , Manstein flew to Führer Headquarters expressly to persuade Hitler to allow a withdrawal from Nikopol and Crimea in order to shorten the front, but his request
16128-442: The numerous cases of frostbite, total infestation with lice, intestinal diseases and general physical exhaustion. In addition to the existing large shortage of officers, there were further heavy combat losses. Due to the drop in the number and quality of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers, the inner structure of the troops in the worn-out divisions will no longer be able to cope with heavier loads. [...] The bulk of
16272-603: The operation, and was reinforced with the 37th Army from the 2nd Ukrainian Front with six rifle divisions, the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps from the 4th Ukrainian Front, and the 31st Guards Rifle Corps from Stavka Reserve with three rifle divisions. The front received 64 tanks, and was replenished with significant quantities of ammunition and fuel. The 4th Ukrainian Front also received more ammunition. Vasilevsky's plan stipulated that General-leytenant Mikhail Sharokhin 's 37th Army and General-leytenant Ivan Shlemin 's Soviet 6th Army were to launch diversionary attacks towards
16416-462: The personal commitment of all officers and draconian performance demands could the defense against the stubbornly fighting, constantly strengthening enemy be ensured. Nevertheless, individual divisions had to be dragged along to local attacks, often with bare weapons in the dark. The resulting demands given the fighting situation have been reported to higher authorities. I will only emphasize the most important points: 1.) The large shortage of officers
16560-511: The rear units for manpower, which enabled the 17th , 111th , and 258th Infantry Divisions and the 3rd Mountain Division to field 7,855 combat infantrymen by 16 January. Though the remainder of these were combat-experienced veterans, 5,500 were transferred from the rear units. The German 6th Army was nominally supported by the 1st Air Corps of Luftflotte 4 . At the beginning of the Nikopol–Krivoy Rog Offensive on 30 January,
16704-478: The rest of Ukraine that fell to Germany in 1941. Following the Soviet advance to the Dnieper in the Battle of the Dnieper during late 1943, German forces managed to hold to the Nikopol bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnieper, the area of manganese ore mines of crucial importance to German war production that Adolf Hitler insisted on holding. In November and December, the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts conducted multiple unsuccessful attacks against
16848-458: The retreat of 9th Panzer Division from Apostolovo. In addition, attacks by Soviet assault aviation disrupted the movement of the 3rd Mountain Division at the Tok railroad station on the single rail line by destroying locomotives, preventing the evacuation of German wounded. Meanwhile, the 8th Guards Army and 4th Guards Mechanized Corps captured Kamenka and Perevizskiye, threatening the encirclement of
16992-401: The retreat route for units east of the Dnieper and secure the railway bridge over the Basavluk near Perevizskiye, the 3rd Mountain Division used its replacement and pioneer battalions in conjunction with 258th Division alarm units to counterattack elements of the 8th Guards Army and 4th Guards Mechanized Corps, but lost nearly half of their strength in the fighting. The tank-destroyer battalion of
17136-599: The retreating 6th Army, crossed the flooded Ingulets river and established numerous bridgeheads on its western bank at the end of February 1944. This would become a staging ground for a new offensive. After the defeat of the 6th Army during the Nikopol–Krivoi Rog offensive and its retreat behind the Ingulets , the High Command of the Wehrmacht decided to use this overflowing river as a defense line and not allow
17280-492: The retreating German troops from the east, the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps from the northeast, and the 30th Cavalry Division from the south and southwest, reaching the outskirts of Novy Bug. The German defenders used houses as concealment, and were cleared by 8:00 on the morning of 8 March. The German troops abandoned equipment and tanks in the retreat. After the capture of Novy Bug the Cavarly-Mechanized Group
17424-422: The right bank. As a result of the Soviet attacks from the east, north, west and south ten German divisions ( XVII. , XXXXIV. , LII. And IV. Army Corps ) on the left wing of the front in the area of Bereznegovatoye and Snigirevka were threatened with complete encirclement and destruction. Hollidt ordered the encircled troops to break out to the west in small groups and even alone if necessary on 13 March. At
17568-492: The right flank of the 1st Panzer Army on 28 January during the Battle of the Korsun–Cherkassy Pocket , significantly reducing the armored forces available to the German 6th Army. The latter was left with only the 9th Panzer Division for a reserve, which fielded only thirteen tanks – a third of its authorized strength – and had a much-reduced number of infantry and artillery. Following the transfers in late January,
17712-419: The same time the German troops prepared defenses on the Southern Bug and in the Nikolayev area, with the 5th Luftwaffe Field Division and 1031st Motorized Regiment on the line outside of Nikolayev. The troops encircled in the area of Bereznegovatoye and Singirevka were destroyed, but significant units, benefiting from gaps in the line of the Cavalry-Mechanized Group, managed to break through to Nikolayev and beyond
17856-473: The southern wing, simultaneously carried out attacks from the east and south against the right wing (LXXII and XXXXIV Army Corps) of the 6th Army. Sustained fighting developed for Berislav , located on the steep banks of the Dnieper. On 11 March the 4th and 5th Guards Motor Rifle Brigades of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps cleared the city. Between 11 and 12 March Vasily Margelov 's 49th Guards Rifle Division and Aleksandr Dorofeyev 's 295th Rifle Division from
18000-432: The three-week heavy defensive fighting and how badly it damaged the 6th Army, the army commander, Generaloberst Karl-Adolf Hollidt , reported on 20 February 1944: Due to the mental and physical overstraining of the troops in the heavy defensive battles of the last few weeks and the high personnel and material losses, most of the divisions of the army are now physically, numerically and materially worn-out. Only through
18144-415: The transport of ammunition, foodstuffs and fuel was hampered by impassable roads. The 3rd Ukrainian Front was significantly strengthened by regrouping carried out in the second half of February. By the beginning of March it included the 5th Shock, 8th Guards, 6th, 28th, 37th, 46th and 57th Combined Arms, 17th Air Army, 23rd Tank, 2nd and 4th Guards Mechanized Corps and the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps. In total,
18288-421: The troops to consolidate their positions and to plan a more thorough offensive. Between 11 and 20 January, in the period which included these attacks, the 3rd Guards, 5th Shock, and 28th Armies of the 4th Ukrainian Front suffered total casualties of 3,191 killed and 9,938 wounded, with the 3rd Guards and 28th Armies bearing the brunt of the casualties. In the ten-day period between 11 and 20 January that included
18432-403: The troops were depressed by the heavy mental and physical strain and the extraordinary combat conditions. On the day of the Soviet offensive, 6th Army had the following order of battle. Soviet offensive preparations were largely complete by the end of 5 March, and at dawn on 6 March the troops of the front's main group launched the attack, preceded by a strong artillery barrage and air attacks on
18576-425: The wet winter weather, the railway and tracked vehicles were the sole reliable transportation method, which meant that if Soviet troops could capture Apostolovo they would have effectively cut off the German forces in the bridgehead. At the end of 1943, the 3rd Ukrainian Front, commanded by General armii Rodion Malinovsky , was entrenched on the line of Veselyye Terny , Tomakovka , and Belenkoye . It included
18720-455: The winter of 1943 and 1944 and the previously mined stocks "could not be moved" due to a lack of transport, according to 6th Army chief of staff Generalleutnant Max Bork . On 1 January, 6th Army was transferred from Army Group A , which held the southernmost part of Ukraine west of the Dnieper, to Army Group South, whose sector ran from north of Krivoi Rog to the Pripet marshes in
18864-554: Was a Front of the Soviet Red Army during World War II . It was founded on 20 October 1943, on the basis of a Stavka order of October 16, 1943, by renaming the Southwestern Front . It included 1st Guards Army , 8th Guards Army , 6th , 12th , and 46th Armies and 17th Air Army. Later it included 5th Shock, 4th and 9th Guards Army , 26th , 27th , 28th , 37th , 57th Army, 6th Guards Tank Army , and
19008-636: Was an offensive by the Red Army 's 3rd Ukrainian Front and elements of the 4th Ukrainian Front against the German 6th Army in the area of Nikopol and Krivoi Rog in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in central Ukraine between 30 January and 29 February 1944 . It took place on the Eastern Front of World War II and was part of the wider Dnieper–Carpathian offensive , a Soviet attack against Army Group South to retake
19152-446: Was captured on the morning of 8 February by the 5th Shock and 28th Armies, completing the elimination of the Nikopol bridgehead, after XXIX Army Corps evacuated the small bridgehead remaining there in spite of Hitler's orders to hold it at all costs. On the night of 7 to 8 February, the Soviet 6th Army of the 3rd Ukrainian Front entered Nikopol from the north and east. Its 203rd , 244th, and 333rd Rifle Divisions fought their way into
19296-500: Was decide to attack the station right away. Reaching the station, the Soviet tanks opened fire against the German trains, and cavalry of Ivan Tutarinov 's 9th Guards Cavalry Division and Vasily Golovskoy's 30th Cavalry Division from the east and south entered the station and panicked the German defenders. After fifteen minutes, the station was cleared of German troops, cutting the Dolynska -Nikolayev rail line, and Soviet units moved on
19440-489: Was denied. There were also formidable natural barriers in the area – the Kamenka River in the 3rd Ukrainian Front's sector, and the Dnieper in the 4th Ukrainian Front's sector. Behind the German front line in the Nikopol bridgehead was the marshy floodplain of the Dnieper, which rarely froze in the winter. The only exits from the bridgehead were a temporary bridge in the northern sector east of Nikopol and
19584-878: Was disbanded, and reorganised as the Southern Group of Forces . 26th Army was grouped with 37th Army into the SGF. Front Commander: General of Army Rodion Malinovsky 1st Guards Army 3rd Guards Army : 8th Guards Army : 6th Army : 12th Army 1st Guards Mechanized Corps 23rd Tank Corps 17th Air Army Commanders: Member of the Military Council: Chief of Staff: Nikopol%E2%80%93Krivoi Rog offensive 47°41′49″N 33°58′48″E / 47.697°N 33.980°E / 47.697; 33.980 Second phase The Nikopol–Krivoi Rog offensive (Russian: Никопольско-Криворожская наступательная операция )
19728-572: Was given little respite, as Soviets launched the Bereznegovatoye–Snigirevka offensive one week later and German Inhulets river front soon collapsed. Following the Soviet advance in the Battle of the Dnieper in late 1943, the German 6th Army , commanded by Generaloberst Karl-Adolf Hollidt , escaped a threatened Soviet encirclement and retreated to the Krivoi Rog area, with its IV and XXIX Army Corps clinging on to
19872-428: Was liberated. The 125th Infantry Division was completely destroyed and dissolved by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The 16th Panzer Grenadier Division lost two thirds of its strength, the 9th Panzer Division, the 15th, the 294th, the 302nd, the 304th and the 335th Infantry Divisions lost 50% of their strength and almost all their heavy material. 13,700 German soldiers and officers were captured. Colonel-General Hollidt
20016-453: Was ordered to strike to the south, into the German rear, operating in advance of the left wing of the front. Liberating Bashtanka after fierce fighting, by 12–13 March they cut the German retreat route to the west and reached the Ingulets south of Snigerevka . Troops of the Soviet 6th Army (Lieutenant-General Ivan Shlemin ), the 5th Shock Army (General Vyacheslav Tsvetayev ) and the 28th Army (Lieutenant-General Aleksei Grechkin ), deployed on
20160-638: Was port Nikolayev and large Black Sea port Odessa. The attack opened on 6 March 1944 when Soviet troops forced the Ingulets, the Visun and the Ingul rivers. They assisted the Black Sea Fleet completing the liberation of southern Ukraine, and liberated a large part of the Moldavian SSR and moved to Dniester and, seizing bridgeheads on its right bank, including Kitskansky bridgehead. In August 1944
20304-487: Was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army at the end of March 1944. For the Soviet Union, favorable conditions had been created for a direct attack on the German troops around Odessa and Nikolayev. The 3rd Ukrainian Front launched the Odessa Offensive on 26 March. 3rd Ukrainian Front The 3rd Ukrainian Front ( Russian : Третий Украинский фронт , romanized : Tretiy Ukrainskiy front )
20448-411: Was shifted forward from south of the Dnieper to take positions reinforcing the intersection of the 8th Guards Army and the 46th Army. The concentration of the 3rd and 8th Guards and 37th Armies was picked up by German intelligence; however, the full extent of 8th Guards Army's concentration went undetected and the movement of the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps was missed entirely. Anticipating an attack on
20592-402: Was tasked with striking to the south into the rear of the German and Romanian troops east of Nikolayev. The armies operating to the right and left of the strike group, were also ordered to shift to the offensive, to divide the German defenses and tie their troops down. The preparation for the offensive was conducted under extremely difficult rasputitsa conditions. The regrouping of forces, and
20736-484: Was to attack in a 10-kilometer (6.2 mi) sector northeast of the city and bypass the city from the north, while the latter was tasked with breaking through the center of the German line in a 16-kilometer (9.9 mi) sector and frontally assaulting the city from the southeast. In the breakthrough sectors of the armies, 40 to 50 guns and mortars were concentrated per kilometer. The attack began on 17 February: 37th Army jumped off at 05:00 and 46th Army at 10:00 following
#1998