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81-584: The Air War Plans Division (AWPD) was an American military organization established to make long-term plans for war. Headed by Harold L. George , the unit was tasked in July 1941 to provide President Franklin D. Roosevelt with "overall production requirements required to defeat our potential enemies." The plans that were made at the AWPD eventually proved significant in the defeat of Nazi Germany . The AWPD went beyond offering basic production requirements and provided

162-540: A two-front war against Britain and Japan. This was the contingency which most worried US war planners, since it entailed a two-ocean war against major naval powers. Although the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance was terminated by the 1921 Four-Power Treaty , American generals did not rule out the possibility of Britain wanting to seek an alliance with Japan again if war ever broke out. Theories developed in War Plan Red-Orange were useful during World War II, when

243-697: A combination of British plans and those from the AWPD, to create the Anglo-American Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO). On 20 June 1941, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) were established as a way to combine and streamline two conflicting air commands: GHQ Air Force and the Army Air Corps. Major General Henry H. Arnold commanded the USAAF and formed an Air Staff to lead it; within

324-579: A comprehensive air plan which was designed to defeat the Axis powers . The plan, AWPD-1 , was completed in nine days. The plan emphasized using heavy bombers to carry out precision bombing attacks as the primary method of defeating Germany and its allies. A year later, after the United States became directly involved in World War II , AWPD delivered a second plan— AWPD-42 —which slightly changed

405-919: A final step to achieving enemy capitulation, but such an attack was optional: "No special bombardment unit [would be] set up for this purpose." The plan also described, in less detail, how to use air power to draw a defensive perimeter around the Western Hemisphere and around America's interests in Alaska, Hawaii, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines in the Pacific Ocean. In the Atlantic, AWPD indicated bases be developed in Iceland, Newfoundland, and Greenland to augment bases in

486-673: A healthier economy. Opponents of the policy included a powerful supporter of the isolationist America First Committee , Senator Burton K. Wheeler . Wheeler obtained a copy of the Victory Program, classified Secret , from a source within the Air Corps, and on 4 December 1941 leaked the plan to two isolationist newspapers, the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times-Herald . Vocal public opposition to

567-491: A new commission on March 28, 1918. George went to France that September with an initial assignment to the 7th Aviation Instruction Center (bombardment) at Clermont-Ferrand . Two months later he was posted to Ourches-sur-Meuse with the 163d Aero Squadron , one of two DH-4B day bomber squadrons of the new 2nd Day Bombardment Group, Second Army Air Service. In the week in which it saw action in November 1918, just prior to

648-571: A second term in 1959. During his second term, George established an annual award to honor outstanding Beverly Hills police officers, given in the name of Clinton H. Anderson, the city's police chief. In 1955, George was recalled to active duty in the United States Air Force for eight months as a special consultant to the Air Force Chief of Staff . George was relieved from active duty November 4, 1955. By 1984, George

729-583: A secondary defensive posture was to be held against Japan. Royal Air Force Air Vice-Marshal John Slessor and other airmen present at the conference agreed on the general concept of using strategic bombing by both British and American air units based in the United Kingdom to reduce Axis military power in Europe. Incorporating this work in April 1941, the joint U.S. Army-Navy Board developed Rainbow 5 ,

810-479: A small group of "bomber mafia" members (including Hansell, Kuter, and Kenneth N. Walker ) to prepare AWPD–1 , an estimate of air resources needed in the event of war that became the plan for the air war against Germany. He was promoted to colonel on January 2, 1942, and to brigadier general on April 19, 1942, when he took command of the Air Corps Ferrying Command (ACFC). In June 1942, ACFC

891-583: A storm of controversy in the US, with isolationist politicians claiming Roosevelt was violating his pledge to keep the country out of the European war, while Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson accused the newspapers of unpatriotic behavior and suggested it would be a dereliction of duty for the War Department not to plan for every contingency. Germany publicly ridiculed the plan the next day, doubting "whether

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972-427: A very profitable military contractor, reaching $ 100M in sales in 1948. George expanded the company beyond the manufacture of aircraft to focus on the new field of military electronics, primarily by bringing together expert electronics designer Dean Wooldridge and engineer-businessman Simon Ramo , both hired by George in 1946. In August 1953, Ramo and Wooldridge resigned. George followed a few months later to help form

1053-600: The 2d Bombardment Group , which in 1937 had become the first unit equipped with the B-17 Flying Fortress bomber. Promoted to the temporary rank of lieutenant colonel on December 30, 1940, he also filled the position of Executive Officer of the 2nd Bombardment Wing from January 1941. In July 1941, George was appointed assistant chief of staff for Air War Plans Division , a unit of the newly created USAAF Air Staff in Washington. In that capacity he assembled

1134-555: The Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) where he helped refine the precision daylight bomber doctrine taught there. He was promoted to captain during the assignment, on December 1, 1931. Following graduation, George became an instructor at ACTS, teaching air tactics and precision bombing doctrine, and became de facto leader of the influential " Bomber Mafia ". With Haywood S. Hansell , Laurence S. Kuter and Donald Wilson , George researched, debated and codified what

1215-551: The American Civil War and World War I, the American military intervened in the affairs of Latin American countries, including Colombia , Panama , Haiti , Cuba , and Nicaragua . In doing so, parts of "Gray" and "Purple", plans were considered although never officially activated. Some plans were expanded to include war against a coalition of hostile powers. The most detailed was War Plan Red-Orange, which detailed

1296-910: The Casablanca Conference , the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to begin the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) in June and set targeting priorities. Based on these priorities but with some changes, the British Air Ministry issued the Casablanca directive on 4 February, targeting the German military, German industrial and economic systems, and German morale. More methodically, USAAF General Ira C. Eaker assembled an Anglo-American planning team to take

1377-758: The Cavalry as a reserve officer. A month later, he went on active duty with the Cavalry at Fort Myer , Virginia , and married Anna Virginia Helms on August 10. In October George resigned his reserve commission to become a flying cadet with the Aviation Section, U.S. Signal Corps . George attended the ASSC School of Military Aeronautics (an eight-week ground school) set up on the campus of Princeton University and learned to fly at Love Field , Texas , receiving his rating of Reserve Military Aviator and

1458-649: The Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth , Kansas , the following year and returned to Langley as commanding officer of the 96th Bombardment Squadron . George flew to South America as a part of Air Corps goodwill flights in February 1938 and November 1939, and received for his participation the Order of the Southern Cross (Knight) , from the government of Brazil . In 1940, George took command of

1539-658: The Japanese American population. War Plan Red was a plan for war against the British Empire . British dominions and colonies had war plans of different shades of red: the United Kingdom was "Red", Canada "Crimson", India "Ruby", Australia "Scarlet", and New Zealand "Garnet". Ireland , at the time a free state within the British Empire, was named "Emerald". War Plan Black

1620-531: The Mexican Revolution . Thus, War Plan Green was developed. In 1916, US troops under General John Pershing invaded Mexico in search of Pancho Villa , whose army had attacked Columbus, New Mexico ; earlier, American naval forces had bombarded and seized the Mexican port of Veracruz and forced Victoriano Huerta to resign the presidency. In 1917, British intelligence intercepted a telegram from

1701-515: The United States Air Force Academy Cemetery on March 3, 1986. In his directorship of ACTS, George is known today as the unofficial leader of the men in the Army Air Corps who closed ranks and pushed exclusively toward the concept of daylight precision bombing as a strategic, war-winning doctrine. Though he played a fundamental role in the development of U.S. air power strategy, he is perhaps better known as

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1782-596: The "Lieutenant General Harold Lee George Educational Grant Award." In 1991 he was inducted into the Airlift/Tanker Association Hall of Fame. George was awarded: United States Color-coded War Plans During the 1920s and 1930s, the United States Armed Forces developed a number of color-coded war plans that outlined potential US strategies for a variety of hypothetical war scenarios. The plans, developed by

1863-614: The Air Staff, in a subordinate role, should advise the WPD rather than make its own operational or strategic plans. George pushed for greater autonomy—he wished to prepare all plans for all air operations. On 9 July 1941, President Roosevelt asked Frank Knox , the Secretary of the Navy , and Henry L. Stimson , the Secretary of War , for an exploration of the total war production required for

1944-727: The Air Staff, the Air War Plans Division was established with Lieutenant Colonel Harold L. George at its head. George was to coordinate his planning efforts with the War Plans Division (WPD) of the War Department . Up to this point, the WPD was responsible for planning all aspects of Army and Army Air Corps expansion in the U.S. George was challenged by WPD, which contested AWPD's and Air Staff's authority to make strategic plans. WPD recommended that AWPD should be limited to tactical planning, and that

2025-650: The American strategic bombing and invasion plans by massing air defenses around key industries and by greatly increasing Atlantic Ocean attacks so that an Allied invasion fleet could not be formed. Hitler directed his forces opposing the Soviet Union to go on the defensive so that they could hold their ground at least cost. Four days later, after visiting the Eastern Front and seeing the extent of his strategic failures there, Hitler "angrily and irrationally rescinded Directive 39" and focused his armies once again on

2106-616: The Army Air Forces to Defeat Our Potential Enemies , or AWPD-1, standing for "Air War Plans Division, plan number one", was the first concrete result of AWPD; it was delivered on 12 August after nine days of preparation. The plan used industrial web theory to describe how air power could be used to attack vulnerable nodes in Germany's economy, including electrical power systems, transportation networks, and oil and petroleum resources. The civil population of Berlin could be targeted as

2187-565: The Army to halt when it became known that the Army was constructing a plan for a war with Germany; isolationists opposed any consideration of involvement in a future European conflict. This may have encouraged the Army to focus on more speculative scenarios for planning exercises. During the 1910s, relations between Mexico and the United States were often volatile. In 1912, US President William Howard Taft considered sending an expeditionary force to protect foreign-owned property from damage during

2268-655: The B-36 would not be needed now that the United Kingdom appeared secure from attack. AWPD-1 identified 154 targets in four areas of concern: electric power, transportation, petroleum and the Luftwaffe , the German Air Force. An arbitrary time frame was given, suggesting that six months after the strategic bombing forces were ready for large-scale attacks, the enemy targets would be destroyed. AWPD-42 called for 177 targets to be hit, covering seven strategic areas, with

2349-661: The Bombardment Section in the Operations Division of the Office of the Chief of Air Service . Later that year, still at the rank of first lieutenant, he was one of several young air officers to testify at Mitchell's court-martial. In July 1929, George was ordered to Hawaii for two years with the 5th Composite Group at Luke Field . In September, 1931, he went to Maxwell Field , Alabama , to study at

2430-654: The COA was superseded by the Joint Target Group, a combined service unit organized by the JCS. Harold L. George In 1934, George helped institute the Order of Daedalians , and served as that organization's first Wing Commander. During World War II, George led the Air Transport Command , taking it from 130 obsolescent aircraft to 3,000 modern transports, operated by 300,000 airmen. Following

2511-591: The COA's list of targets and schedule them for combined bomber operations. This unnamed group, sometimes called the CBO Planning Team, was led by Hansell and included among others USAAF Brigadier General Franklin Anderson and RAF Air Commodore Sidney Osborne Bufton . Finished in April 1943, the plan recommended 18 operations during each three-month phase against a total of 76 specific targets. The Combined Bomber Offensive began on 10 June 1943. In late 1944,

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2592-592: The German foreign ministry to its embassy in Mexico City offering an alliance against the United States and assistance in the Mexican reconquest of the Southwest . Released to American newspapers, the Zimmermann Telegram helped turn American opinion against Germany and further poisoned the atmosphere between the US and Mexico. Relations with Mexico remained tense into the 1920s and 1930s. Between

2673-690: The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor , the Chicago Tribune , with the headline " F. D. R. 's War Plans!", along with The Times Herald of Washington, D.C., published the Rainbow Five plan. The articles, both by the Tribune' s Washington correspondent, Chesly Manly, revealed plans to build a 10-million-man Army with a five-million-man expeditionary force to be sent to Europe in 1943 in order to defeat Nazi Germany . The publication ignited

2754-509: The Joint Board had adopted a system of hues, symbols, and shorthand names to represent nations. Many war plans became known by the color of the country to which they were related, a convention that lasted through World War II . As the convention of using colors took root, some were eventually reused, such as Grey, which originally referred to Italy but eventually became a plan for the capture and occupation of Portugal 's Azores . In all

2835-594: The Joint Planning Committee (which later became the Joint Chiefs of Staff ), were officially withdrawn in 1939 at the outbreak of World War II in favor of five "Rainbow" plans developed to meet the threat of a two-ocean war against multiple enemies. The desire for the Army and Navy to utilize the same symbols for their plans gave rise to the use of colors in US war planning. By the end of 1904,

2916-554: The Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation, competing directly with Hughes by developing ballistic missile defenses. In 1958, Ramo-Wooldridge would merge with Thompson Products, to become Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, which was shortened to TRW in 1965. After moving there in 1948, George was elected to the City Council of Beverly Hills, California , in 1952, and in 1954 he was elected mayor, a one-year term. He served

2997-403: The Soviet Union and the United Kingdom would be defeated, and that an invasion of Europe would become remote. The strategy of weakening Germany by bombing, long before an invasion could be prepared, gave hope that America would not lose any allies in the interim. On 9 September 1941, the president asked for more detail regarding allocation of aircraft based on estimates of peacetime production for

3078-598: The UK, where he had been working under General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Air Planner, and under General Carl Andrew Spaatz as Deputy Theater Air Officer. Marshall ordered Hansell to hurry back to AWPD and that "the results of the work of this group are of such far-reaching importance that it will probably determine whether or not we control the air." Hansell brought with him VIII Bomber Command Chief of Intelligence Colonel Harris Hull and RAF Group Captain Bobby Sharp, as well as

3159-475: The United Kingdom. Elsewhere, bases were to be established in India and staging areas arranged in Siberia. Finally, the plan detailed large tactical air formations to assist in an invasion of Europe and to fight in the land campaigns to follow, to be ready by Spring 1944—the same time that invasion forces would be ready. Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall approved AWPD-1 in September, as did Secretary of War Stimson. Army planners were worried that both

3240-422: The United States engaged the Axis powers in both the Atlantic and Pacific simultaneously. Japan took the opportunity afforded by World War I to establish itself as a major strategic power in the Pacific Ocean. Most American officials and planners then considered a war with Japan to be highly likely. The fear lessened when the civilian government of Japan temporarily halted its program of military expansion, but it

3321-468: The United States faced war on multiple fronts against a coalition of enemies. Therefore, the Joint Planning Board developed a new series of "Rainbow" plans —the term being a logical extension of the previous "color" plans. The assumptions and plans for Rainbow 5 were discussed extensively in the Plan Dog memo , which concluded ultimately that the United States would adhere to a Europe first strategy in World War II. On December 4, 1941, three days before

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3402-414: The United States to prevail in case of war. The WPD, in order to project long-term numbers, realized that the Rainbow 5 plan would be used as a basis for production quantities, but it lacked detailed air power figures. Stimson requested of Robert A. Lovett , Assistant Secretary of War for Air, that the USAAF be tapped for their ideas about production numbers. After some bureaucratic delay, the AWPD received

3483-428: The aircraft production plans that the Navy submitted, but with one vital change: the four-engined bombers the Navy wanted would be built as Air Corps bombers, flown by USAAF units. The Navy was not at all satisfied with AWPD-42. The Navy's intention to divert 1250 land-based heavy bombers from AAF requirements, to use for long-range patrol and for attacking enemy vessels, was dismissed in favor of USAAF flights to achieve

3564-510: The armistice, the 163d flew 69 sorties in support of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive . George observed that massed bombers, flying in formation, swamped enemy defenses and so reduced the attacker's casualties. In 1919, George clerked part time for U.S. Supreme Court Justice James McReynolds , and graduated in 1920 from the National University School of Law with an LL.B. degree. In France, George met William "Billy" Mitchell and became convinced that Mitchell's vision of an independent Air Force

3645-438: The attack. After 7 December, all of America's former plans required revision—none had projected such early involvement in direct combat. Orvil Anderson was asked to rewrite the air plans. On 15 December, Anderson submitted AWPD-4, mostly a restatement of the goals of AWPD-1, but with augmented quantities to meet the greater needs of a two-front war. The number of combat aircraft was increased by 65%, and total aircraft production

3726-523: The combat aircraft to 19,520 and the total to 146,000. Numbers increased again in AWPD-42, which proposed that combat aircraft should top 63,000 in 1943. Total U.S. aircraft production, including for the Navy, was set at 139,000 until it was realized that the goal could not be reached by American industry. 107,000 was instead proposed. AWPD-1 projected a force of 2.1 million airmen. AWPD-42 increased this to 2.7 million. In drawing up AWPD-1, George had predicted that two very heavy bombers that were on

3807-646: The combined numbers of U.S. Army and U.S. Navy aircraft; he asked for the "number of combat aircraft by types which should be produced in this country for the Army and our Allies in 1943..." This meant that the Navy's aircraft needs, which were significant, were not requested, but that the aircraft needs for America's allies would be included, allies that were to receive a certain number of Navy-type aircraft. Hansell decided to make his plan wholly inclusive of all American aircraft requirements—Army, Navy, and Allied—so that there would be no misunderstanding about how aircraft-producing resources would be allocated. Hansell accepted

3888-399: The drawing board, the Boeing B-29 Superfortress and the Consolidated-Vultee B-36 , would be ready in time to take part in the attack on Germany. Delays in both programs kept them from consideration in Europe. In AWPD-42, the B-29 was shifted to attacks on Japan, and the B-36 development at Consolidated-Vultee was slowed in favor of manufacturing more B-24 Liberators . The extra-long range of

3969-408: The earlier plan to incorporate lessons learned from eight months of the war. Neither AWPD-1 nor AWPD-42 were approved as combat battle plans or war operations; they were simply accepted as guidelines for the production of materiel and the creation of necessary air squadrons. Finally, in 1943, an operational aerial warfare plan was agreed in meetings between American and British war planners, based on

4050-530: The entire world shipping would be sufficient to transport 5,000,000 troops to Europe, much less supply them there." Privately, the German general staff saw the publication of the plans as extremely valuable intelligence and used its threat of a five-million-man US force in 1943 to argue for temporarily stalling the faltering invasion of the Soviet Union , and concentrating German forces in the west. Adolf Hitler vehemently rejected that idea. Historian Thomas Fleming suggests that Germany might have prevailed against

4131-444: The face of the enemy and under difficult conditions. George took the ferrying command from 130 obsolescent aircraft to 3,000 modern military transports , and expanded the personnel from 11,000 to 300,000. For this major contribution to his country, George received the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Distinguished Flying Cross, and Air Medal, as well as decorations from Great Britain, France, Brazil, Peru and China. After

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4212-411: The final version of general military guidelines the U.S. would follow in case of war. At the beginning of August 1941, the AWPD consisted of only four officers: Harold L. George, Orvil Anderson , Kenneth Walker (each one a lieutenant colonel), and Major Haywood S. Hansell . To help answer the urgent need for planning, George could have sent a couple of his air officers to WPD to assist them, following

4293-538: The first commander of Air Transport Command—the man who guided and expanded that organization throughout World War II. The Order of Daedalians has, since 1956, awarded the "Lieutenant General Harold L. George Civilian Airmanship Award", a trophy " presented annually to the pilot, copilot and/or crew of a United States certified commercial airline selected by a Federal Aviation committee to have demonstrated ability, judgment and/or heroism above and beyond normal operational requirements. " The Air Force Aid Society bestows

4374-428: The highest priority being enemy aircraft production. Other priorities were submarine pens and building yards, transportation systems, electric power generation and distribution, the petroleum industry, aluminum refining and manufacture, and the synthetic rubber industry. Hansell considered it a mistake to remove electricity from the top priority, and worse still to place submarine pens there. Political expediency dictated

4455-417: The little data compiled from five UK-based raids which had been flown by U.S. bombers. Hansell was assisted on a consultative basis by George, Kuter and Walker, old AWPD-1 hands, and by Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm Moss, who was a sharp businessman in civil life. The team had just 11 days to finish the work. Arnold was more closely involved than before in leading the group and formulating the new plan. Like AWPD-1,

4536-426: The lofty aircraft production proposal "will be given the highest priority and whatever preference is needed to insure its accomplishment." AWPD-1 called for the production of 61,800 aircraft, of which 37,000 would be trainers and 11,800 would be for combat. The remaining 13,000 would be military transport aircraft and other types. Of the combat aircraft, 5000 were to be heavy and very heavy bombers. AWPD-4 increased

4617-431: The men believed would be a war-winning strategy that Wilson termed " industrial web theory ". In 1934, George was made director of the Department of Air Tactics and Strategy, and vigorously promoted the doctrine of precision bombing in which massed air fleets of heavy bombers would be commanded independently of naval or ground warfare needs. George was promoted to the temporary rank of major in July 1936. He graduated from

4698-454: The military planning of other nation-states. Often, junior military officers were given the task of updating each plan to keep them trained and busy (especially in the case of War Plan Crimson, the invasion of Canada). Some of the war plan colors were revised over time, possibly resulting in confusion. Although the US had fought its most recent war against Germany and would fight another within twenty years, intense domestic pressure emerged for

4779-626: The new framework was based largely on untried bombing theory. The report, entitled Requirements for Air Ascendancy, 1942 , or AWPD-42, was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on 6 September 1942. Harry Hopkins had obtained his copy at 1 am the day it was to be released, and Hopkins read it in time to tell Roosevelt over breakfast that the plan was sound. Roosevelt called Stimson to say he approved it, but Stimson hadn't had not seen it; nor had Marshall when Stimson called him. Hansell left hurriedly for England so that he would not have to face Marshall's anger at being caught unprepared. AWPD-42

4860-457: The next nine months. In AWPD-2, Arnold and George designated two-thirds of the aircraft to be pooled for anti-Axis purposes such as Lend-Lease and one-third to be sent to the USAAF. Roosevelt incorporated the Army's, Navy's and Air Staff's detailed plans into an executive policy he called his "Victory Program". Roosevelt hoped to engage public opinion in favor of the Victory Program because the increase in production it promised meant more jobs and

4941-412: The oilfields of the Caucasus, and German U-boats in the Atlantic sank 589 ships in early 1942. On 25 August, Arnold received word of the president's request from Army Chief of Staff George Marshall. The individual AWPD-1 team members had been reassigned to a wide variety of posts and duties, so to perform the reassessment Arnold recommended Hansell, recently made brigadier general. Marshall cabled Hansell in

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5022-465: The overworked WPD, who approved as long as AWPD held to the guidelines of ABC-1 and Rainbow 5. George sought out men he knew were bombing advocates. He obtained temporary help from five more air officers: Lieutenant Colonels Max F. Schneider and Arthur W. Vanaman , and Majors Hoyt S. Vandenberg , Laurence S. Kuter , and Samuel E. Anderson . All but Samuel E. Anderson had passed through ACTS, where precision bombing theories were ascendant. Orvil Anderson

5103-403: The plan ceased three days later on 7 December, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor . Congress soon passed the Victory Program with few changes. German agents monitoring American newspapers wired the compromised secret program to Berlin where Franz Halder , Chief of the German General Staff , realized its critical importance. On 12 December, Adolf Hitler issued Directive 39 which countered

5184-422: The plans, the US referred to itself as "Blue". The plan that received the most consideration was War Plan Orange , a series of contingency plans for fighting a war with Japan alone, outlined unofficially in 1919 and officially in 1924. Orange formed some of the basis for the actual campaign against Japan in World War II and included the huge economic blockade from mainland China and the plans for interning

5265-436: The preceding decade, but was sure that the Army and the War Department would not accept a strategy that assumed air attack would prevail alone. Instead, he intended to implement a middle path which began with strategic air attack but contained allowances for the eventual support of a ground invasion. In requesting autonomy to make his own plans, George gained approval from General Arnold and from General Leonard T. Gerow , head of

5346-459: The request. In early 1941, American, Canadian and British war planners convened in Washington D.C. for a series of secret planning sessions called the American–British Conference , or ABC-1, to determine a course of action should the United States become a belligerent in the war. An overarching strategy of Europe first was agreed to, where American energies would primarily be directed against Germany, Italy and their European conquests, during which

5427-440: The same goals. The Navy expected that command and control differences between the services, as well as differing targeting preferences, would create impossible barriers to successful employment of the notional USAAF patrol bombers against enemy naval forces. The Navy flatly rejected AWPD-42, which barred acceptance by the JCS, but by 15 October 1942 the president had established it as the U.S.'s aircraft manufacturing plan, saying that

5508-400: The shift in target priorities, not pure strategic considerations. Targeting proved a difficult task for AWPD—attaining the proper selection required a wide range of intelligence input as well as operational considerations. In December 1942, Arnold set up the Committee of Operations Analysts (COA) to better study the problem. The COA performed target selection for the USAAF. In January 1943 at

5589-404: The standard Army policy since air warfare first arose in World War I . An air plan would have been made emphasizing tactical air coordination with ground forces, one which targeted Axis military formations and supplies in preparation and support of an invasion. George wished to implement the strategic bombing theories that had been debated and refined at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) during

5670-413: The war by use of air power. The main feature of the plan was the proposal to use massive fleets of heavy bombers to attack economic targets, the choke points of Axis industry. Hansell, fresh from a fact-finding mission to England in which he was briefed on British appreciations of German industrial and military targets, immediately became immersed in the job of target selection. Munitions Requirements of

5751-444: The war he served for a while as director of information for the USAAF and as senior Air Force representative of the military staff of the United Nations. He retired from active duty December 31, 1946, with the rank of lieutenant general dating back to March 1945. George accepted a position at Hughes Aircraft to work for Howard Hughes , along with fellow bomber advocate Ira C. Eaker . Eaker and George transformed Hughes Aircraft into

5832-728: The war, he helped Hughes Aircraft become a very profitable company, and was twice elected mayor of Beverly Hills, California . George was born July 19, 1893, in Somerville, Massachusetts , to Horace and Susan E. George. He attended George Washington University , but decided to interrupt his studies when the United States became directly involved in World War I . George joined the United States Army and on May 21, 1917, received his commission as second lieutenant in

5913-518: Was a plan for war with Germany . The best-known version of Black was conceived as a contingency plan during World War I in case France fell and the Germans attempted to seize French possessions in the Caribbean or launch an attack on the eastern seaboard . Many of the war plans were extremely unlikely given the state of international relations in the 1920s and were entirely in keeping with

5994-414: Was assigned to continue with ongoing projects while the rest of the men concentrated on the new request. On 4 August 1941, the augmented AWPD set to work. George, Walker, Kuter, and Hansell provided the key concepts for the AWPD task force. George's vision was that the plan should not be a simple list of quantities of men and materiel—it should be a clear expression of the strategic direction required to win

6075-590: Was living in Laguna Hills, California . That year, he collected and donated more than $ 21,000 to various Republican Party candidates and conservative causes including the Jesse Helms -founded National Congressional Club and the "Helms for Senate" campaign . On February 24, 1986, George died in Laguna Hills. He was survived by his wife Violette; three daughters and one son. George was interred at

6156-497: Was more than doubled. On 24 August 1942, in light of the grim global situation, President Roosevelt called for a major reassessment of U.S. air power requirements, "in order to have complete air ascendancy over the enemy." The Japanese had expanded quickly in the Pacific Theater , North Africa was being rolled up by Rommel with Egypt threatened, Soviet forces were falling back against the German advances toward Stalingrad and

6237-425: Was projected as the best way to reduce Axis industrial might. An air campaign against two major European objectives was encompassed: first to paralyze Axis industrial power, and second to defeat Axis air power. Axis aircraft factories and aircraft engine plants were to be targeted during 1943–1944 so that, in the spring of 1944, an invasion of Europe could be undertaken. In the president's request, he had not asked for

6318-460: Was redesignated Air Transport Command and tasked to become not just a delivery service of aircraft from factory to the field, but a worldwide cargo and personnel air transportation service. George led it brilliantly throughout World War II, with the able assistance of many staff officers including his deputy, General C. R. Smith , peacetime president of American Airlines . New organizations were formed and new cross-ocean routes were established in

6399-721: Was resumed in 1931. War Plan Orange was the longest and most detailed of the color-designated plans. However, following the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and events in Europe in 1938—1940 (the Anschluss , the Munich Agreement , the German occupation of Czechoslovakia , the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and the German invasion of Poland and Western Europe ), American war planners realized that

6480-760: Was the best future direction for the American military. After the war, George was assigned to the 49th Bombardment Squadron at Kelly Field , Texas. On July 1, 1920, when the Air Service became a combat arm of the line, he transferred to it in the permanent grade of 1st lieutenant. He next served with the 14th Bombardment Squadron at Langley Field , Virginia, and with the Aberdeen Proving Ground , Maryland , from 1921 to 1925. There George assisted Mitchell in his bombing demonstration against old battleships , and helped develop air-to-ship tactics. In August 1925, George went to Washington as chief of

6561-632: Was written under the assumption that the Soviet Union would be knocked out of the war, and that German forces in the East would then be brought to bear against the West. The plan thus assumed that German ground forces defending Europe would be numerically superior to Allied invasion forces, making invasion extremely costly and perhaps impossible. It was also assumed that two-front tension in the German economy would lessen, and Allied damage to Axis industry would be more easily absorbed. An increase in American air power

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