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91-531: NIEs are considered to be "estimative" products, in that they present what intelligence analysts estimate may be the course of future events. Coordination of NIEs involves not only trying to resolve any inter-agency differences, but also assigning confidence levels to the key judgments and rigorously evaluating the sourcing for them. Each NIE is reviewed and approved for dissemination by the National Intelligence Board (NIB), which comprises

182-435: A standard code for the presumed reliability of the source and of the information. The U.S. Intelligence Community uses some formal definition of the kinds of information. Collation describes the process of organizing raw data, interpolating known data, evaluating the value of data, putting in working hypotheses. The simplest approaches often are an excellent start. With due regard for protecting documents and information,

273-555: A 2007 webpage of the US Intelligence Board describes ( emphasis added ) "the National Operations Security (OPSEC) Program - a means to identify, control, and protect unclassified information and evidence associated with U.S. national security programs and activities. If not protected, such information often provides an opportunity for exploitation by adversaries or competitors working against

364-470: A NIE is drafted, the relevant National Intelligence Officer (NIO) produces a concept paper or 'terms of reference' (TOR) and circulates it throughout the IC for comment. The TOR defines the key estimative questions, determines drafting responsibilities, and sets the drafting and publication schedule. Several IC analysts from different agencies produce the initial text of the estimate. The NIC then meets to critique

455-603: A National OPSEC Advisory Committee (NOAC). In 1988, President Ronald Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 298 (NSDD-298) that established a national policy and outlined the OPSEC five-step process. Also mandated within NSDD-298, was the establishment of the Interagency OPSEC Support Staff (IOSS). The IOSS mission is to assist in implementing the national-level OPSEC program as directed by

546-537: A Zen-like state in which they allow the data to "speak" to them. Others may meditate, or even seek insight in dreams, hoping for an insight such as that given to August Kekulé in a daydream that resolved one of the fundamental structural problems of organic chemistry. Krizan took criteria from. Regardless of its form or setting, an effective collation method will have the following attributes: Semantic maps are related to mind maps, but are more amenable to computer discovery of relationships. The more interactive that

637-452: A broader scope against the then-major intelligence collection disciplines. While MASINT was defined as a formal discipline in 1986, it was sufficiently specialized not to be discussed in general counterintelligence documents of the next few years. All US departments and agencies with intelligence functions are responsible for their own security abroad. In many governments, the responsibility for protecting intelligence and military services

728-558: A central element of this plan. Our tradecraft enables analysts to provide "value-added" to consumers of intelligence by ensuring: Analytic tradecraft skills also serve as " force multipliers ", helping us provide top-quality analysis: On January 2, 2015, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) issued Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203, which "establishe[d] Intelligence Community (IC) Analytic Standards that govern

819-420: A college team together, or are simply aware that the team they oppose today might be the team to which they might be traded tomorrow. If a technique is personal, rather than a proprietary idea of a coach, one professional might be quite willing to show a nominal opponent how he does some maneuver. Watanabe observed If you are examining a problem and there is no intelligence available, or the available intelligence

910-403: A great deal can be done with pieces of paper, a whiteboard, a table, and perhaps a corkboard. Maps often are vital adjuncts, maps that can be written upon. There are automated equivalents of all of these functions, and each analyst will have a personal balance between manual and machine-assisted methods. Unquestionably, when quantitative methods such as modeling and simulation are appropriate,

1001-599: A means of detecting the existence and setting of radio receivers. Even though the principles of OPSEC go back to the beginning of warfare, formalizing OPSEC as a US doctrine began with a 1965 study called PURPLE DRAGON, ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to determine how the North Vietnamese could get early warning of ROLLING THUNDER fighter-bomber strikes against the North, and ARC LIGHT B-52 missions against

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1092-515: A perspective on the Soviet strategy, which was not available from photography. As the White House requested more CIA and Navy support for photography, it simultaneously searched for HUMINT and SIGINT from Cuba, as well as diplomatic HUMINT. Until John F. Kennedy was briefed by excellent briefers, such as Dino Brugioni , he probably did not understand the capabilities of IMINT. Frequently,

1183-578: A policy official he never read ... analytic papers. Why? "Because they were nonadhesive." As Blackwill explained, they were written by people who did not know what he was trying to do and, so, could not help him get it done: "When I was working at State on European affairs, for example, on certain issues I was the Secretary of State. DI analysts did not know that—that I was one of a handful of key decision makers on some very important matters." More charitably, he now characterizes his early periods of service at

1274-422: A potential problem situation at an early and unclear stage is at a disadvantage as compared with others, such as policymakers, whose first exposure may come at a later stage when more and better information is available." The receipt of information in small increments over time also facilitates assimilation of this information into the analyst's existing views. One item of information may not be sufficient to prompt

1365-438: A psychological context. Johnston suggests the three major components of that context are: Devlin observes that while traditional logical work does not consider socialization, work on extending logic into the real world of intelligence requires it. "The first thing to note, and this is crucial, is that the process by which an agent attaches meaning to a symbol always takes place in a context, indeed generally several contexts, and

1456-732: A representative of the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the General Services Administration. The IOSS will: Nothing in this directive: NSDD 298 preceded the creation of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who assumed some responsibilities previously held by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The Director of Central Intelligence

1547-404: A research laboratory. At the combat end, if an enemy SIGINT interception antenna can be targeted, thoroughly bombing it and its associated electronics will definitely end its career as a SIGINT threat. In slight less dramatic fashion, it can be taken under electronic attack , and strong enough electromagnetic signals directed at it to conceal any friendly signals, and perhaps to overload and destroy

1638-544: A result, NSA played a major role in adapting OPSEC to peacetime operations, and in informally communicating OPSEC concepts to other agencies. Thus, non-DoD agencies began to establish their own programs, and OPSEC was on its way to becoming a national program. DOE began to assume a role in the peacetime application of OPSEC by participating in the JCS OPSEC conferences and interfacing with other Federal agencies. In 1980, DOE began establishing its own OPSEC program and, by 1983,

1729-480: A smaller central counterintelligence staff. Aldrich Ames was in the Counterintelligence Branch of Europe Division, where he was responsible for directing the analysis of Soviet intelligence operations. US military services have had a similar and even more complex split. Some of the overarching CI tasks are described as The US definition of counterintelligence, however, is narrowing, while

1820-443: A spy that counterintelligence should target. CI refers to efforts made by intelligence organizations to prevent hostile or enemy intelligence organizations from successfully gathering and collecting intelligence against them. Frank Wisner , a well-known CIA operations executive said of the autobiography of Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles , that Dulles "disposes of the popular misconception that counterintelligence

1911-512: Is a basic OSINT defense. In democratic societies, even in wartime, censorship must be watched carefully lest it violate reasonable freedom of the press, but the balance is set differently in different countries and at different times. Britain is generally considered to have a very free press, but the UK does have the DA-Notice, formerly D-notice system. Many British journalists find that this system

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2002-484: Is a way of reducing the ambiguity of highly ambiguous situations. Many analysts prefer the middle-of-the-road explanation, rejecting high or low probability explanations. Analysts may use their own standard of proportionality as to the risk acceptance of the opponent, rejecting that the opponent may take an extreme risk to achieve what the analyst regards as a minor gain. The analyst must avoid the special cognitive traps for intelligence analysis projecting what she or he wants

2093-550: Is always dependent on those contexts. An analytic study of the way that people interpret symbols comes down to an investigation of the mechanism captured by the diagram: [agent] + [symbol] + [context] +. . . + [context] → [interpretation] Things that are true about contexts include: The discipline of critical discourse analysis will help organize the context. Michael Crichton , in giving examples of physicians communicating with other physicians, points out that laymen have trouble following such discourses not only because there

2184-575: Is approved, policymakers are alerted and a crisis team is often convened, with the mission of providing time-sensitive intelligence on the situation to all relevant customers. Experienced analysts recommend seeing oneself as a specialist on a team, with 5–10 key players. Learn something about each of them, both in terms of how they express themselves, and how you can reinforce their strengths and support their weaknesses. The analyst must constantly ask himself, "what do they want/need to know? How do they prefer to have it presented? Are they still trying to select

2275-498: Is best understood. While a good analyst must be able to consider, thoughtfully, alternative viewpoints, an analyst must be willing to stand by his or her position. This is especially important in specialized areas, when the analyst may be the only one that reads every field report, every technical observation on a subject. "Believe in your own professional judgments. Always be willing to listen to alternative conclusions or other points of view, but stand your ground if you really believe

2366-482: Is essentially a negative and responsive activity, that it moves only or chiefly in reaction to situations thrust upon it and in counter to initiatives mounted by the opposition" Rather, he sees that can be most effective, both in information gathering and protecting friendly intelligence services, when it creatively but vigorously attacks the "structure and personnel of hostile intelligence services. In 1991 and 1995 US Army manuals dealing with counterintelligence, CI had

2457-605: Is insufficient, be aggressive in pursuing collection and in energizing collectors. ... As an analyst, you have the advantage of knowing both what the consumer needs to know (sometimes better than the consumer knows himself) and which collectors can obtain the needed intelligence. Aggressively pursue collection of information you need. In the Intelligence Community, we have the unique ability to bring substantial collection resources to bear in order to collect information on important issues. An analyst needs to understand

2548-660: Is not always clear, under this doctrine, who is responsible for all intelligence collection threats against a military or other resource. The full scope of US military counterintelligence doctrine has been moved to a classified publication, Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations , so publicly it is unknown if that problem is clarified there. More specific countermeasures against intelligence collection disciplines are listed below If accessible, use SATRAN reports of satellites overhead to hide or stop activities while being viewed See additional detail on Project Slammer , which

2639-645: Is now seen as primarily a counter the Human Intelligence HUMINT to Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS). FIS is a term of art that covers both nations and non-national groups, the latter including terrorists, or organized crime involved in areas that are considered fundamental threats to national security The National Counterintelligence Strategy of 2005 states the CI mission as: The 2007 US joint intelligence doctrine restricts its primary scope to counter-HUMINT, which usually includes counter-terror. It

2730-414: Is part of intelligence cycle management . Disciplines involved in "positive security", or measures by which one's own society collects information on its actual or potential security, complement security. For example, when communications intelligence identifies a particular radio transmitter as one used only by a particular country, detecting that transmitter inside one's own country suggests the presence of

2821-400: Is specialized vocabulary in use, but the discourse takes place in an extremely high context. One physician may ask a question about some diagnostic test, and the other will respond with a result from an apparently unrelated test. The shared context was that the first test looked for evidence of a specific disease, while the answer cited a test result that ruled out the disease. The disease itself

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2912-585: Is split. Historically, CIA assigned responsibility for protecting its personnel and operations to its Office of Security, while it assigned the security of operations to multiple groups within the Directorate of Operation: the counterintelligence staff and the area (or functional) unit, such as Soviet Russia Division. At one point, the counterintelligence unit operated quite autonomously, under the direction of James Jesus Angleton . Later, operational divisions had subordinate counterintelligence branches, as well as

3003-561: Is the application of individual and collective cognitive methods to weigh data and test hypotheses within a secret socio-cultural context. The descriptions are drawn from what may only be available in the form of deliberately deceptive information; the analyst must correlate the similarities among deceptions and extract a common truth. Although its practice is found in its purest form inside national intelligence agencies , its methods are also applicable in fields such as business intelligence or competitive intelligence . Intelligence analysis

3094-503: Is transmitted, especially through free space, but also through wired networks capable of being wiretapped. It includes several disciplines, both including those for protecting the hostile acquisition of information either from the patterns of flow of messages , or the content of messages (e.g., encryption . It also includes a number of disciplines that protect against the inadvertent emanation of unprotected information from communications systems. This article discusses physical security in

3185-476: Is used fairly, although there always be arguments. In the specific context of counterintelligence, note that Peter Wright , a former senior member of the Security Service who left their service without his pension, moved to Australia before publishing his book Spycatcher . While much of the book was reasonable commentary, it did reveal some specific and sensitive techniques, such as Operation RAFTER ,

3276-703: The Joint Military Intelligence College , University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (Security and Intelligence Studies major), and Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies . The goal of the Analytic Tradecraft Notes of the Central Intelligence Agency 's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) include the Pursuit of expertise in analytic tradecraft is

3367-508: The Allies launched an air offensive against a target system that they really did not understand: the V-1 cruise missile. Their rationale to attack ("if the enemy apparently valued it, then it must be worth attacking") may have been rational when there were large numbers of aircraft and pilots, but it might not be applicable to current situations, at least not until analysts rule out the possibility of

3458-513: The CIA, of his office, and of himself. He stood his ground, however; the Agency supported him, and eventually he was proven right. He did not make a lot of friends, but he did his job. Intelligence analysts are expected to give policymakers' opinions both support and reality checks. The most effective products have several common features: Reality checking is not to be underestimated. In World War II,

3549-755: The DNI and other senior leaders within the Intelligence Community. National Intelligence Estimates were first produced in 1950 by the Office of National Estimates . This office was superseded in 1973 by National Intelligence Officers. This group of experts became the National Intelligence Council in 1979. In the early years, the National Intelligence Council reported to the Director of Central Intelligence in his role as

3640-555: The Department had the only formal OPSEC program outside DOD. Since that time, DOE has continued to refine and adapt the OPSEC concept to meet the specific needs of its mission. In 1983, DOE was a member of the Senior Interagency Group for Intelligence (SIG-I), an advisory group of the National Security Council. SIG-I proposed the establishment of a national policy on OPSEC and the formation of

3731-399: The Director, National Security Agency, is designated Executive Agent for interagency OPSEC training. In this capacity, he has responsibility to assist Executive departments and agencies, as needed, to establish OPSEC programs; develop and provide interagency OPSEC training courses; and establish and maintain an Interagency OPSEC Support Staff (IOSS), whose membership shall include, at a minimum,

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3822-459: The IC of politicization after the release of the NIE on Iraq's WMD programs because they believed they supported the policy decision to invade Iraq. Congress has investigated the issue of politicization within the IC numerous times, as have independent commissions. To date, these investigations have never found evidence of politicization by analysts. Intelligence analysis Intelligence analysis

3913-755: The NSC Staff and in State Department bureaus as ones of "mutual ignorance" "DI analysts did not have the foggiest notion of what I did; and I did not have a clue as to what they could or should do." Blackwill explained how he used his time efficiently, which rarely involved reading general CIA reports. "I read a lot. Much of it was press. You have to know how issues are coming across politically to get your job done. Also, cables from overseas for preparing agendas for meetings and sending and receiving messages from my counterparts in foreign governments. Countless versions of policy drafts from those competing for

4004-497: The President's blessing. And dozens of phone calls. Many are a waste of time but have to be answered, again, for policy and political reasons. "One more minute, please, on what I did not find useful. This is important. My job description called for me to help prepare the President for making policy decisions, including at meetings with foreign counterparts and other officials...Do you think that after I have spent long weeks shaping

4095-480: The President. The NSDD directs IOSS to provide or facilitate OPSEC training and act as a consultant to Executive departments and agencies required to have OPSEC programs. Operations security (OPSEC), in a widely accepted meaning, relates to identifying the information that is most critical to protect regarding future operations, and planning activities to: Contrary to the US Department of Defense definition,

4186-573: The South. The methodology used was to consider what information the adversary would need to know in order to thwart the flights and the sources from which the adversary might collect this information. It became apparent to the team that although traditional security and intelligence countermeasures programs existed, reliance solely upon them was insufficient to deny critical information to the enemy—especially information and indicators relating to intentions and capabilities. The group conceived and developed

4277-620: The Soviet KGB . Personnel security measures are as important as physical security. Counter-HUMINT measures might have detected the documents being transferred and taken to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Many of the greatest enemy penetrations of a country's secrets came from people who were already trusted by that government. Logically, if your service desires to find out your opponent's secrets, you do not try to recruit

4368-457: The agenda, I have to be told a day or two before the German foreign minister visits Washington why he is coming?" Weasel-wording is problematic in intelligence analysis; still, some things truly are uncertain. Arguably, when uncertainties are given with probabilities or at least some quantification of likelihood, they become less a case of weasel wording and more a case of reflecting reality as it

4459-439: The analyst to change a previous view. The cumulative message inherent in many pieces of information may be significant but is attenuated when this information is not examined as a whole. The Intelligence Community's review of its performance before the 1973 Yom Kippur War noted [in the only declassified paragraph]. The problem of incremental analysis—especially as it applies to the current intelligence process—was also at work in

4550-651: The analyst will want computer assistance, and possibly consultation from experts in methodology. When combining maps and imagery, especially different kinds of imagery, a geographic information system is usually needed to normalize coordinate systems, scale and magnification , and the ability to suppress certain details and add others. Outlining, possibly in a word processing program, or using visualization tools such as mind maps can give structure, as can file folders and index cards. Data bases, with statistical techniques such as correlation , factor analysis , and time series analysis can give insight. Some analysts speak of

4641-476: The best course of action, or have they committed and now need to know the obstacles and vulnerabilities on their chosen path?" Others on the team may know, how to handle the likely challenges. The analyst's contribution is in recognizing the unlikely, or providing connections that are not obvious. Consumers must get information in a timely manner, not after they commit to a decision they might not have made having rougher information available sooner. Sometimes, when

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4732-399: The brackets and secured with a combination padlock. Other security measures might be closing drapes or blinds over the window of a room where classified information is handled, and might be photographed by an adversary at a height comparable to that of the window. No matter how physically secure a SCIF may be, it is no more secure than the people with access to it. One severe security breach

4823-521: The change resulted from newly collected intelligence or whether analysts changed their position to support a specific political agenda. For example, the IC accusation of politicization surfaced after the key judgments of NIEs on the ballistic missile threat to the United States changed between 1993 and 1995. Some Republicans claimed the IC politicized the findings to support President Clinton's policy against missile defense systems. Democrats accused

4914-481: The context of information cycle security; see Physical security for a more general view of the topic. Protection of both sensitive information in human-readable form, as well as of cryptographic equipment and keys, is the complement of communications security. The strongest cryptography in the world cannot protect information that, when not being sent through strong cryptographic channels, is left in an area where it can be copied or stolen. It's useful to look at some of

5005-615: The continental U.S. At the other extreme, the secure conference and work area in the US Embassy in Moscow, where the new building was full of electronic bugs, had extra security measures making it a "bubble" inside as secure a room as was possible. In each case, however, the plans must be preapproved by a qualified security expert, and the SCIF inspected before use, and periodically reinspected. Facilities for less sensitive material do not need

5096-425: The current, estimative, operational, research, science and technology, or warning context. Serendipity plays a role here, because the collected and analyzed information may meet any or all of these criteria. A good example is warning intelligence. Military and political analysts are always watching for predefined indication that an emergency, such as outbreak of war, or a political coup, is imminent. When an indicator

5187-488: The definition of Operations Security (OPSEC) seems to be broadening. The manuals of the early 1990s describedCI as responsible for overall detection of, and protection from, threats to the intelligence cycle. With the 2005-2007 National Counterintelligence Strategy statements, it is no longer clear what function is responsible for the overall protection of the intelligence cycle. In this recent US doctrine, although not necessarily that of other countries, counterintelligence (CI)

5278-469: The details of which have been expanded upon by the Department of Energy OPSEC complements (emphasis in ( NSDD 298 )) physical , information , personnel , computer , signals, communications, and electronic security measures. Note that this does not include counter-HUMINT or counter-IMINT. If the definition of counterintelligence is redefined to cover counter-HUMINT, a scope begins to emerge, although an official term still seems lacking to deal with

5369-541: The draft before it is circulated to the broader IC. Representatives from the relevant IC agencies meet to hone and coordinate line-by-line the full text of the NIE. Working with their agencies, representatives also assign the confidence levels to each key judgment. IC representatives discuss the quality of sources with intelligence collectors to ensure the draft does not contain erroneous information. The IC must overcome several challenges to produce accurate and useful strategic intelligence assessments, including: Throughout

5460-646: The electronics of the SIGINT facility. SIGINT protection for office buildings may require a room to be electronically shielded. The basic methods of countering IMINT are to know when the opponent will use imaging against one's own side, and interfering with the taking of images. In some situations, especially in free societies, it must be accepted that public buildings may always be subject to photography or other techniques. Countermeasures include putting visual shielding over sensitive targets or camouflaging them. When countering such threats as imaging satellites, awareness of

5551-496: The extremes of physical security, to have a standard of reference. A U.S. Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence Facility (SCIF) is a room or set of rooms, with stringent construction standards, to contain the most sensitive materials, and where discussions of any security level can take place. A SCIF is not a bunker, and might slow down, but certainly not stop, a determined entry attempt that used explosives. There can be individual variations in construction based on specific conditions;

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5642-406: The general capabilities and limitations of collection systems...If the analyst is in a technical discipline, the analyst might have an insight about a collection system that the operators have not considered ... If you are not frequently tasking collectors and giving them feedback on their reporting, you are failing to do an important part of your job. Peers, both consumer and analyst, also have

5733-560: The head of the Intelligence Community ; however, in 2005, the Director of National Intelligence became the head of the Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Community's faulty assessments on Iraqi WMD in 2002 highlights the role Congress plays in promoting the analytic rigor and utility of strategic intelligence assessments, such as National Intelligence Estimates. Senior civilian and military policymakers, including congressional leaders, typically request NIEs. Before

5824-426: The highest policymaker levels, and why there needs to be a delicately balanced relationship, built of trust, between a policymaker and his closest intelligence advisors. "Being an intelligence analyst is not a popularity contest...But your job is to pursue the truth. I recall a colleague who forwarded an analysis that called into question the wisdom behind several new US weapon systems. This analysis caused criticism of

5915-472: The intelligence service will organize the production process and its output to mirror the customer organization. Government production by the single-source intelligence agencies is largely organized geographically or topically, to meet the needs of all-source country, region, or topic analysts in the finished-intelligence producing agencies. In terms of intended use by the customer, both business and government producers may generate intelligence to be applied in

6006-404: The intelligence supports a certain conclusion. Just because someone is your boss, is a higher grade, or has been around longer than you does not mean he or she knows more about your account than you do. You are the one who reads the traffic every day and who studies the issue". At the same time, Watanabe observes, "It is better to be mistaken than wrong". Not willing to be wrong is also a disease of

6097-497: The interests of the US." Even though there are legitimate concerns about adversaries exploiting open societies, there must be vigilance that a broader definition of OPSEC has created concerns that national security may be used to conceal the politically embarrassing or marginally legal, rather than protecting legitimate functions. What constitutes OPSEC? A Presidential-level National Security Decision Directive formalized it as five steps,

6188-555: The late 1970s, the military services established their own OPSEC programs and published implementing directives and regulations. By the end of the decade, they were conducting their own surveys. After the Vietnam War, a number of the individuals who had been involved in the development or application of the OPSEC concept were either already working for, or went to work with the National Security Agency (NSA). As

6279-652: The methodology of analyzing U.S. operations from an adversarial viewpoint to find out how the information was obtained. The team then recommended corrective actions to local commanders. They were successful in what they did, and to name what they had done, they coined the term "operations security." After the Vietnam War ended in 1973 the JCS adopted the OPSEC instruction developed by the CINCPAC OPSEC branch and published it as JCS Publication 18, “Doctrine for Operations Security”. Originally classified, an unclassified version

6370-435: The need to use secure communications, and instruction on using them properly so that they do not become vulnerable to specialized technical interception . Methods of including encryption and traffic flow security may be needed in addition to, or instead of, specialized shielding of the equipment. The range of methods possible in counter-SIGINT cover a wide range of what is appropriate in a combat zone to what can be done in

6461-547: The opponent to think, and using available information to justify that conclusion. Being aware that one's enemies may try to confuse is a relevant factor, especially in the areas of intelligence cycle security and its subdiscipline counterintelligence . During World War II, the German word for counterintelligence art was Funkspiel , or radio game—not a game in the sense of playing fields, but something that draws from game theory and seeks to confuse one's opponents. A set of problem-solving talents are essential for analysts. Since

6552-461: The orbits can guide security personnel to stop an activity, or perhaps cover the sensitive parts, when the satellite is overhead. This also applies to imaging on aircraft and UAVs, although the more direct expedient of shooting them down, or attacking their launch and support area, is an option in wartime. While the concept well precedes the recognition of a discipline of OSINT , the idea of censorship of material directly relevant to national security

6643-570: The other side may be hiding their intention, the analyst must be tolerant of ambiguity, of false leads, and of partial information far more fragmentary than faces the experimental scientist. According to Dick Heuer , in an experiment in which analyst behavior was studied, the process is one of incremental refinement: "with test subjects in the experiment demonstrating that initial exposure to blurred stimuli interferes with accurate perception even after more and better information becomes available...the experiment suggests that an analyst who starts observing

6734-436: The overall defenses of nations, are vulnerable to attack. It is the role of intelligence cycle security to protect the process embodied in the intelligence cycle, and that which it defends. A number of disciplines go into protecting the intelligence cycle. One of the challenges is there are a wide range of potential threats, so threat assessment , if complete, is a complex task. Governments try to protect three things: Defending

6825-599: The overall intelligence program, at a minimum, means taking actions to counter the major disciplines of intelligence collection techniques: To these are added at least one complementary discipline, counterintelligence (CI) which, besides defending the six above, can itself produce positive intelligence. Much, but not all, of what it produces is from special cases of HUMINT. Also complementing intelligence collection are additional protective disciplines, which are unlikely to produce intelligence: These disciplines, along with CI, form intelligence cycle security , which, in turn,

6916-408: The past several decades, the release of a NIE on a controversial policy have usually resulted in charges that the IC politicized its key findings. Charges of politicization come from both Democrats and Republicans, but normally emerge from the side that does not agree with the policy implications of the analysis. Changes or reversals in NIE assessments over time cause some legislators to question whether

7007-567: The period preceding hostilities. Analysts, according to their own accounts, were often proceeding on the basis of the day's take, hastily comparing it with material received the previous day. They then produced in 'assembly line fashion' items which may have reflected perceptive intuition but which [did not] accrue from a systematic consideration of an accumulated body of integrated evidence. Writers on analysis have suggested reasons why analysts come to incorrect conclusions, by falling into cognitive traps for intelligence analysis. Without falling into

7098-427: The physical protection provided by a SCIF. While the most recent policies should be consulted, TOP SECRET needs both an alarmed (with response) high-security filing cabinet with a combination lock; SECRET may relax the alarm requirement but still require the same high-security filing cabinet; CONFIDENTIAL may accept a regular filing cabinet, which has had a bracket welded to each drawer, and a strong steel bar run through

7189-675: The producer is struggling with how to meet the needs of both internal and external customers, the solution is to create two different types of products, one for each type of customer. An internal product might contain detail of sources, collection methods, and analytic techniques, while an external product is more like journalism. Remember that journalists always address: "How" is often relevant to journalists, but, in intelligence, may wander into that delicate area of sources and methods, appropriate only for internal audiences. The external consumer needs to know more of potential actions. Actions exist in three phases: Internal products contain details about

7280-448: The production and evaluation of analytic products; articulates the responsibility of intelligence analysts to strive for excellence, integrity, and rigor in their analytic thinking and work practices..." Stating the objective from the consumer's standpoint is an excellent starting point for goal-setting: Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill ... seized the attention of the class of some 30 [intelligence community managers] by asserting that as

7371-443: The relationship between producer and consumer becomes, the more important will be tools: An analysis should have a summary of the key characteristics of the topic, followed by the key variables and choices. Increasingly deep analysis can explain the internal dynamics of the matter being studied, and eventually to prediction, known as estimation. Intelligence cycle security National intelligence programs , and, by extension,

7462-421: The sources and methods used to generate the intelligence, while external products emphasize actionable target information. Similarly, the producer adjusts the product content and tone to the customer's level of expertise. Even in professional sports, where there are strict anti-fraternization rules on the playing field, players often have deep friendships with counterparts on opposing teams. They might have been on

7553-472: The standards for one inside a secure building inside a military base in the continental US are not quite as stringent as one in an office building in a hostile country. While, in the past, it was assumed that the SCIF itself and a good deal of electronics in it needed specialized and expensive shielding, and other methods, to protect against eavesdropping—most of these are under the unclassified code word TEMPEST , TEMPEST has generally been waived for facilities in

7644-521: The target system being a decoy. If the threat is real, then it might be warranted to defer attack until a massive one can be delivered. The analytic process must be interactive with the customer to succeed. For example, the first IMINT of Soviet missiles during the Cuban Missile Crisis was verified and quickly taken to the President and Secretary of Defense. The highest level of authority immediately requested more detail, but also wanted

7735-544: The totality of security against all threats. This series of articles simply tries to define it for the security of intelligence. Another way of describing the scope was coined, by Kurt Haase, OPSEC Program at the DOE Nevada Operations Office in order to simplify the understanding of OPSEC; it is titled the "Laws of OPSEC": OPSEC measures may include, but are not limited to, counterimagery, cover, concealment, and deception. According to ( NSDD 298 ),

7826-430: The trap of avoiding decisions by wanting more information, analysts also need to recognize that they always can learn more about the opponent. The body of specific methods for intelligence analysis is generally referred to as analytic tradecraft . The academic disciplines examining the art and science of intelligence analysis are most routinely referred to as "Intelligence Studies", and exemplified by institutions such as

7917-756: Was an effort of the Intelligence Community Staff, under the Director of Central Intelligence, to come up with characteristics of Project Slammer, an Intelligence Community sponsored study of espionage. Aspects of physical security, such as guard posts and wandering guards that challenge unidentified persons, certainly help with counter-HUMINT. Security education, also part of OPSEC , is important to this effort. Military and security organizations will provide secure communications, and may monitor less secure systems, such as commercial telephones or general Internet connections, to detect inappropriate information being passed through them. Education on

8008-584: Was by a clerk, Christopher John Boyce , who worked inside the SCIF that held communications equipment and stored documents for a TRW facility in Redondo Beach, California. At this facility, among other sensitive programs, TRW built U.S. reconnaissance satellites for the National Reconnaissance Office and Central Intelligence Agency . Boyce stole documents and gave them to a drug dealer, Andrew Daulton Lee , who sold them to

8099-702: Was never named, but, in the trained context, perfectly obvious to the participants in the discourse. Intelligence analysis is also extremely high context. Whether the subject is political behavior or weapons capabilities, the analysts and consumers share a great deal of context. Intelligence consumers express great frustration with generic papers that waste their time by giving them context they already have internalized. Collection processes provide analysts with assorted kinds of information, some important and some irrelevant, some true and some false (with many shades in between), and some requiring further preprocessing before they can be used in analysis. Raw information reports use

8190-547: Was no longer the head of the intelligence community, and was retitled the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA). The National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), reporting directly to the DNI, also was created after NSDD 298. It is not clear, therefore, if the italicized responsibilities (above) of the DCI may have moved to the DNI or NCIX. Communications security forms an essential part of counterintelligence, preventing an adversary to intercept sensitive information that

8281-450: Was published the following year. The JCS published the first JCS OPSEC Survey Planning Guide, and distributed this publication within DOD and to other Federal agencies. The JCS began presenting a series of annual OPSEC conferences for representatives throughout government. Attendees discussed ways to adapt the OPSEC concept developed for combat operations to the peacetime environment. Throughout

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