Sŏhŭng County is a county in North Hwanghae province, North Korea .
213-760: In 1952, during the Korean War , the North Koreans established a military training school in Sohung County called the Kumgang Political Institute with approximately 1,500 cadets. It was headed by South Korean Kim Ung-bin. Sŏhŭng county is divided into 1 ŭp (town) and 20 ri (villages): As of 2015, Sohung county had a population of around 100,000 people, with approximately 30,000 of these living in Sohung town. Sŏhŭng county
426-520: A Joint Security Area at Panmunjom . The conflict caused more than 1 million military deaths and an estimated 2 to 3 million civilian deaths, a larger proportion of civilian deaths than in World War II or the Vietnam War . Alleged war crimes include the mass killing of suspected communists by Seoul and the torture and starvation of prisoners of war by Pyongyang. North Korea became one of
639-586: A "withdrawal by water and air without delay from Hungnam area to Pusan- Pohang-dong area." The larger exodus was to be by sea, with the Hungnam defenses contracting as Corps' forces were loaded, but airlift was to be employed for as long as Yonpo Airfield remained within the shrinking perimeter. The evacuation began on 12 December with the 1st Marine Division boarding ships and sailing for Pusan on 15 December, they assembled at Masan on 18 December and passed to Eighth Army control. The 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment
852-446: A Korean civilian driving a 3 ⁄ 4 -ton truck pulled out from behind the halted vehicles to proceed south and partially entered the northbound lane to get past the parked trucks. Walker's driver swerved away from the oncoming truck but was unable to avoid a collision. The impact threw Walker's vehicle sideways and overturned it, and all occupants were thrown out and injured. Walker was unconscious and had no discernible pulse when he
1065-490: A PVA soldier during the sporadic encounters along the army right, he was beginning to believe that all enemy troops immediately east of him were KPA. PVA forces, then, possibly were moving south, not into position for a close-in envelopment but around the Eighth Army some distance to the east through the X Corps’ rear area. Since Almond's forces were concentrating at Hamhung and Hungnam far to the northeast, any such march by
1278-516: A battalion of the ROK 23d Regiment, which moved south out of Hongch’on and with the reserve ROK 5th Regiment, 3rd Division, which dropped south from Ch’unch’on to a point west of the KPA position and then struck eastward against it. The concerted effort cleaned out most of the roadblock on the 31st. The battalion of the ROK 23rd Regiment returned to Hongch’on while the ROK 5th Regiment and the leading battalion of
1491-660: A brigade, stood along Route 1 along the lower banks of the Han and the Imjin; IX Corps, with two divisions, blocked Routes 33 and 3 right at the 38th Parallel. Spreading ROK forces along the remainder of the line proved more frustrating. Transportation requirements exceeded available trucks: resistance from KPA troops in the central region slowed the ROK; and general confusion among the sketchily trained ROK units caused further delay. But by 23 December Walker managed to get ROK III Corps up from southern Korea and, with three divisions, emplaced in
1704-572: A central sector adjoining IX Corps on the east. The ROK front lay below Line B , almost exactly on the 38th Parallel, with its center located about 8 miles (13 km) north of Ch’unch’on. In more rugged ground next east, ROK II Corps occupied a narrow one division front astride Route 24, which passed southwestward through the Hongch’on River valley. II Corps thus blocked what otherwise could provide PVA/KPA forces easy access south through central Korea over Route 29 and to lateral routes leading west to
1917-444: A command post... I could read it in the faces of... leaders, from sergeants right on up to the top. They were unresponsive, reluctant to talk. I had to drag information out of them. There was a complete absence of that alertness, that aggressiveness, that you find in troops whose spirit is high." The attack that Ridgway had hoped would be possible he now considered plainly out of the question. He also considered it imperative to strengthen
2130-570: A decision to attack, MacArthur replied, "The Eighth Army is yours, Matt. Do what you think best." Whereas previously MacArthur had played a key and direct role in planning and conducting tactical operations. He would do so no longer. Ridgway would make all the decisions regarding the employment of the Eighth Army with no requirement to refer them to MacArthur for approval. Ridgway would always inform MacArthur in detail of those decisions, but MacArthur would never question him. Before leaving for Korea at noon, Ridgway radioed his formal assumption of command of
2343-585: A four-day reconnaissance of the Line B front that took him to all Corps and divisions except the ROK Capital Division on the east coast, whose sector was quiet and unthreatened by impending PVA/KPA action. By evening of the 30th he was back at Eighth Army headquarters in Taegu, much disturbed by what he had learned. The Eighth Army was clearly a dispirited command. "I could sense it the moment I came into
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#17328009929452556-520: A future independent state. Due to political disagreements and influence from their backers, the zones formed their own governments in 1948. The DPRK was led by Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang , and the ROK by Syngman Rhee in Seoul ; both claimed to be the sole legitimate government of all of Korea and engaged in border clashes as internal unrest was fomented by communist groups in the south. On 25 June 1950,
2769-509: A general attack across the 38th parallel, rather than a limited operation in Ongjin. Kim was concerned that South Korean agents had learned about the plans and that South Korean forces were strengthening their defenses. Stalin agreed to this change. While these preparations were underway in the North, there were clashes along the 38th parallel, especially at Kaesong and Ongjin, many initiated by
2982-408: A larger force believed to include a division and a reinforced regiment struck southwestward through the ROK 9th Division's flimsy position at the left of ROK I Corps. Entering the rear area of the narrow ROK II Corps' sector, the attack force by 30 December established a strong roadblock on the central arterial, Route 29, almost 25 miles (40 km) below Ch’unch’on. By extending these gains, especially
3195-498: A line was too long for the forces available and that the logistical problems posed by the high, road-poor mountains then separating Eighth Army and X Corps were too great. By concentrating the X Corps in the Hamhung area, MacArthur countered, he was creating a "geographic threat" to enemy lines of communication that made it tactically unsound for PVA forces to move south through the opening between those units. In any event, he predicted,
3408-641: A main effort against the South Korean capital over the Uijongbu-Seoul axis. In addition, PVA/KPA artillery positions sighted from the air disclosed a large number of guns generally astride an extension of the I and IX Corps boundary, all well disposed to support an attack through the Wonsan-Seoul corridor. Further, aerial observers had spotted a buildup of bridging materials near the Imjin. Prisoners confirmed these indications. Several revealed that
3621-461: A main offensive toward Seoul would open on the night of 31 December, and an officer from the 38th Army said that the offensive would begin with a coordinated attack by the 38th, 39th, 40th and 42nd Armies. As Ridgway flew into Seoul and visited the western front by jeep during the afternoon of 31 December, vanguards of the PVA 116th Division , 39th Army moved down to the Imjin near Korangp'o-ri to begin
3834-596: A national political constitution on 17 July and elected Syngman Rhee as president on 20 July. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) was established on 15 August 1948. In the Soviet-Korean Zone of Occupation, the Soviets agreed to the establishment of a communist government led by Kim Il Sung. The 1948 North Korean parliamentary elections took place in August. The Soviet Union withdrew its forces in 1948 and
4047-497: A preliminary, Walker obtained MacArthur's agreement to erase the southern segment of the Eighth Army-X Corps boundary so the peninsula below the 39th Parallel , more generally south of a line between Pyongyang and Wonsan. He also arranged air and naval surveillance of the east coast south of X Corps’ position to detect enemy coastal movements while he was extending his line. He chose coast-to-coast positions running from
4260-414: A result of this tendency, the line troops had not maintained proper contact with enemy forces or learned enough about the terrain to their front. He promptly rebuked his subordinates for failing to meet these two basic combat requirements. They were to patrol until they had defined the enemy's positions and determined the strengths of units opposite them, and he warned that he "didn’t want to ask any man where
4473-508: A river crossing in a withdrawal, made his extensive preparations a matter of "reasonable prudence." Walker also was convinced that the PVA/KPA were now capable of opening an offensive at any time. He still had no solid contact with PVA/KPA forces, but by pressing intelligence sources over the previous two weeks he had obtained sufficient evidence to predict an imminent attack and to forecast the strength, paths, objective, and even possible date of
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#17328009929454686-598: A small group to remain in Seoul, south to Taegu . He already had directed the removal of major supply stores located in or above Seoul to safer positions below the Han River and had ordered the reduction of stocks held in the Inchon port complex. On the 18th he assigned Corps' boundaries along Line C and described the deployment of army reserve units to cover a withdrawal to this first line below Seoul. Two days later he ordered
4899-615: A telegram. Mao accepted the decision made by Kim and Stalin to unify Korea but cautioned Kim over possible US intervention. Soviet generals with extensive combat experience from World War II were sent to North Korea as the Soviet Advisory Group. They completed plans for attack by May and called for a skirmish to be initiated in the Ongjin Peninsula on the west coast of Korea. The North Koreans would then launch an attack to capture Seoul and encircle and destroy
5112-427: A tendency to withdraw without fighting and even to disregard orders. Because it implied cowardice and dereliction of duty, the term was unwarranted. Yet the hard attacks and high casualties of the past week and the apparent Chinese strength had shaken the Eighth Army's confidence. This same doubt had some influence on Walker's decision to give up Pyongyang and would manifest itself again in other decisions to withdraw. But
5325-481: A thrust. Keiser in the meantime had been evacuated because of illness, and Major general Robert B. McClure now commanded the 2nd Infantry Division. To MacArthur, the elaborate preparations for a withdrawal below Seoul indicated that Walker had decided against a determined defense of the city. When MacArthur raised the question, Walker assured him that he would hold Seoul as long as he could. But, Walker pointed out, sudden collapses of ROK forces twice before had placed
5538-484: A trail went and have him tell me he didn’t know." Ridgway did receive another intelligence report from Eight Army intelligence officer Colonel Tarkenton of the estimated strength of the Chinese XIII Army Group. The group's six armies, each with a strength of 29,000, were either along the Eighth Army front or in the immediate PVA/KPA rear area. Tarkenton believed KPA corps totaling 65,800 men also were at
5751-552: A vulnerable link of the central Pusan-Seoul rail line, which served as an Eighth Army supply route. McClure was in the process of moving the 23rd Infantry Regiment and the French battalion to Wonju on the 29th when the KPA attack out of Inje carried behind ROK II Corps farther north. Ridgway consequently ordered McClure to move the remainder of his division to Wonju and to send one regiment 25 miles (40 km) north of that town to Hongch’on where Route 29 from Ch’unch’on and Route 24 from
5964-547: A withdrawal from Korea became necessary during the remaining winter months, MacArthur's command could escape extreme weather conditions at Pusan; finally, an evacuation at any time could be effected faster through the Pusan facilities than through any other port. To permit the longest delaying action possible and to enable an evacuation from the best port, Wright recommended that X Corps be sea lifted from Hungnam as soon as possible and landed in southeastern Korea, that X Corps then join
6177-521: Is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start a disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war." While there was hesitance by some in the US government to get involved, considerations about Japan fed into the decision to engage on behalf of South Korea. After the fall of China to the communists, US experts saw Japan as the region's counterweight to the Soviet Union and China. While there
6390-488: Is served by the P'yŏngbu line of the Korean State Railway . 38°25′35″N 126°10′05″E / 38.42639°N 126.16806°E / 38.42639; 126.16806 This North Korea location article is a stub . You can help Misplaced Pages by expanding it . Korean War Korean Demilitarized Zone established Together: 1,742,000 The Korean War (25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953)
6603-429: The 39th Army had spread out near the Imjin between Routes 1 and 33; the 38th Army sat astride Route 33 below Yonch'on with the 40th Army assembled to its rear; and the 66th Army lay across Routes 3 and 17, its forces pointed at both Uijongbu and Ch’unch’on, with the 42nd Army backing it up at Kumhwa. Further east, the full KPA V Corps, previously in the area now occupied by the 66th Army, had joined KPA II Corps in
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6816-522: The Battle of Chosin Reservoir , UN forces evacuated North Korea in its entirety on 25 December. UN forces then prepared new defensive lines above Seoul for an expected renewal of the PVA offensive. The UN withdrawal from North Korea included many migrations of refugees fleeing from Chinese and North Korean forces that quickly recaptured North Korea. Two notable mass refugee escapes from North Korea include
7029-679: The Capital Division meanwhile continued to withdraw overland. As Walker started his withdrawal from the Sukch’on-Sunch’on-Song-ch’on line on 2 December, Major general Doyle O. Hickey , acting chief of staff of the Far East Command and UN Command, arrived with word from MacArthur that, in effect, allowed Walker to leave behind any equipment and other materiel that he chose as long as they were destroyed. Walker, however, planned not to drop behind Pyongyang until
7242-475: The Cold War between the Soviet Union and US. Fighting ended in 1953 with an armistice but no peace treaty , leading to the ongoing Korean conflict characterized by phases of diplomacy and confrontation. After the end of World War II in 1945, Korea, which had been a Japanese colony for 35 years, was divided by the Soviet Union and the US into two occupation zones at the 38th parallel , with plans for
7455-509: The Hungnam evacuation and the evacuation of Pyongyang. On the night of 28 November UN commander General Douglas MacArthur met with US Eighth Army commander General Walton Walker and US X Corps commander General Edward Almond in Tokyo to assess the position of UN forces. Having received updates from his ground commanders, MacArthur judged that the Eighth Army was in greater danger than
7668-578: The Joint Chiefs of Staff that the UN Command was too weak to make a successful stand when he informed them on 28 November that he was passing to the defensive. The Joint Chiefs fully approved MacArthur's adoption of defensive tactics, but were not convinced that a successful static defense was impossible. They suggested that MacArthur place the Eighth Army in a continuous line across Korea between Pyongyang and Wonsan. MacArthur objected, claiming such
7881-542: The Korean People's Army (KPA), equipped and trained by the Soviets, launched an invasion of the south. In the absence of the Soviet Union's representative, the UN Security Council denounced the attack and recommended member states to repel the invasion. UN forces comprised 21 countries, with the US providing around 90% of military personnel. Seoul was captured on 28 June, and by early August,
8094-559: The Pukhan River valley during anti-guerrilla operations. Route 33 thus was protected at important road junctions, and Walker at least had the semblance of an east flank screen all the way from Pyongyang to Seoul. Walker moved the damaged US 2nd Infantry Division from Chunghwa into army reserve at Munsan-ni on the Imjin River 22 miles (35 km) north of Seoul, where General Laurence B. Keiser , with priority on replacements,
8307-683: The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) and its allies were nearly defeated, holding onto only the Pusan Perimeter in the peninsula's southeast. On 15 September, UN forces landed at Inchon near Seoul, cutting off KPA troops and supply lines. UN forces broke out from the perimeter on 18 September, re-captured Seoul, and invaded North Korea in October, capturing Pyongyang and advancing towards the Yalu River —the border with China. On 19 October,
8520-667: The Yalu River prompting Chinese intervention in the war. Despite the initial attacks by the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) in late October-early November, the UN renewed their offensive on 24 November before it was abruptly halted by massive Chinese intervention in the Second Phase Offensive starting on 25 November. Following their defeat by the PVA at the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River and tactical withdrawal at
8733-679: The atomic bombing of Hiroshima . By 10 August, the Red Army had begun to occupy the north of Korea. On 10 August in Washington , US Colonels Dean Rusk and Charles H. Bonesteel III were assigned to divide Korea into Soviet and US occupation zones and proposed the 38th parallel as the dividing line. This was incorporated into the US General Order No. 1 , which responded to the Japanese surrender on 15 August. Explaining
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8946-521: The 23rd Infantry stayed to clear the remainder of the KPA position. The balance of the 23rd Infantry was strung out on Route 29, a battalion at Hoengseong 9 miles (14 km) below the roadblock site, the remainder still in Wonju where the rest of the 2nd Infantry Division was now assembling. While installing the 2nd Division in the Hongch’on-Wonju area might hold off the KPA currently advancing from
9159-438: The 29th approved plans developed by his staff for adjusting Almond's order of battle to permit earlier commitment. Under these plans X Corps headquarters and whichever of Almond's present divisions completed its preparations first would move to Wonju, where Almond would add the US 2nd Infantry Division and possibly one ROK division to his command as substitutes for the two divisions left behind. Even this arrangement would take time;
9372-410: The 30th he had taken several steps toward achieving both. Restoring the Eighth Army's morale and confidence, Ridgway believed, depended mainly on improving leadership throughout his command, but before he would relieve any commander, he wanted personally to see more of the man in action, to know that the relief would not damage the unit involved, and to be sure that he had a better commander available. For
9585-407: The 31st, would require training before it moved to the front. The only units en route to Korea that might be able to move forward upon arrival were two US airborne Ranger companies, the 2nd and 4th . Holding against the threatening enemy offensive, Ridgway judged, rested on committing most of his reserves early and on revitalizing the spirit of the Eighth Army. By the time he returned to Taegu on
9798-668: The 38th parallel and establishing English as the official language during military control. On 8 September, US Lieutenant General John R. Hodge arrived in Incheon to accept the Japanese surrender south of the 38th parallel. Appointed as military governor, Hodge directly controlled South Korea as head of the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK 1945–48). In December 1945, Korea
10011-530: The 38th parallel. Armistice negotiations began in July 1951, but dragged on as the fighting became a war of attrition and the north suffered heavy damage from U.S. bombing . Combat ended on 27 July 1953 with the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement , which allowed the exchange of prisoners and created a 4-kilometre (2.5 mi) wide Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) along the frontline, with
10224-473: The 3rd Division. The leftmost position was not far east of Oro-ri, astride the road leading south from the Pujon Reservoir ( 40°36′40″N 127°32′28″E / 40.611°N 127.541°E / 40.611; 127.541 ); the rightmost blocked the coastal road. the 7th Division block at the right was temporary. Almond's plan for ringing Hamhung and Hungnam now called for ROK I Corps to hold
10437-591: The 6th that PVA troops were moving into Chinnamp’o and south across the Taedong estuary by ferry to the Hwanghae peninsula. Agents on the same day verified the presence of PVA troops in Pyongyang and reported that KPA regulars were joining North Korean guerrillas to the east and right rear of the Eighth Army. To escape the trouble these reports portended, Walker instructed his forward units to withdraw on 8 December to
10650-441: The 8–10,000 tons of supplies and equipment that now lay abandoned and broken up or burning inside Pyongyang. More time also could have prevented such oversights as leaving at least 15 operable M46 Patton tanks on flatcars in the railroad yards in the southwestern part of the city. Fifth Air Force planes struck these overlooked tanks on 6 December, but differing pilot claims left obscure the amount of damage done. Although Chinnamp’o
10863-521: The British 27th Commonwealth Brigade and 29th Independent Infantry Brigade were intact. The ROK 6th Infantry Division could be employed as a division, but its regiments were tattered; about half the ROK 7th and 8th Infantry Divisions had reassembled but were far less able than their strengths indicated; and both the 2nd Infantry Division and Turkish Brigade needed substantial refurbishing before they could again function as units. Of his reserves,
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#173280099294511076-581: The Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) crossed the Yalu and entered the war on the side of the north. UN forces retreated from North Korea in December, following the PVA's first and second offensive . Communist forces captured Seoul again in January 1951 before losing it to a UN counter-offensive two months later. After an abortive Chinese spring offensive , UN forces retook territory roughly up to
11289-705: The Chinese Civil War, while US forces remained stationed in South Korea. By spring 1950, he believed that the strategic situation had changed: PLA forces under Mao Zedong had secured final victory, US forces had withdrawn from Korea, and the Soviets had detonated their first nuclear bomb , breaking the US monopoly. As the US had not directly intervened to stop the communists in China, Stalin calculated they would be even less willing to fight in Korea, which had less strategic significance. The Soviets had cracked
11502-718: The Chinese PLA during the war. North Korea also provided the Chinese Communists in Manchuria with a safe refuge for non-combatants and communications with the rest of China. The North Korean contributions to the Chinese Communist victory were not forgotten after the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. As a token of gratitude, between 50,000 and 70,000 Korean veterans who served in
11715-477: The Chinese already arrayed against the Eighth Army would compel it to take a series of steps to the rear. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed that X Corps’ concentration at Hamhung would produce the effect MacArthur anticipated. In their judgment, the Chinese already had demonstrated a proficiency for moving strong forces through difficult mountains, and the concentration of the X Corps on the east coast combined with
11928-712: The Chosin Reservoir had to be retrieved before anything else could be done. Following their victory in the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River, the PVA did not pursue the US Eighth Army's 20 miles (32 km) withdrawal from the Ch’ongch’on to the Sukch’on - Sunch’on - Songch’on line. Only light PVA patrolling occurred along the new line on 1 December, mostly at its eastern end where there had been no deep withdrawal
12141-424: The Eighth Army above the city. In view of the latter possibility, Walker elected to withdraw before the thrust materialized. Pyongyang was to be abandoned. Walker's use of relatively slight intelligence information in deciding to withdraw below Pyongyang reflected the general attitude of the Eighth Army. According to some accounts, Walker's forces had become afflicted with "bugout fever," a term usually used to describe
12354-471: The Eighth Army and X Corps combined could man this line; indeed, he expected Walker to make an ardent effort to hold it. Through correspondence and interviews, MacArthur meanwhile had responded publicly to charges appearing in a substantial segment of the press that he was responsible for the reverse his forces were suffering at the hands of the Chinese. In defense of his strategy and tactics, he insisted that his command could not have fought more efficiently given
12567-457: The Eighth Army and pass to Walker's command, and thereafter that the UN Command withdraw through successive positions, if necessary to the Pusan area. On 7 December in Tokyo, Generals MacArthur, Collins and George Stratemeyer , Admirals C. Turner Joy and Arthur Dewey Struble and Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd , the commander of all United States Marine Corps forces in the Pacific, considered
12780-456: The Eighth Army front if his forces were to hold Line B . Whether he had time enough to do so was questionable. Additional evidence of an imminent PVA/KPA offensive had appeared as Ridgway reconnoitered the front, and the coming New Year holiday was now a logical date on which to expect the opening assault. Unit dispositions along the line had changed little since Walker succeeded in manning it. The 8213th Army Unit patrolled Kanghwa Island at
12993-554: The Eighth Army front. Walker, on the other hand, believed the preservation of the Eighth Army required a deep withdrawal. Walker attempted to forestall any order to defend Seoul, insisting that tying his forces to the city would only allow the PVA to encircle Eighth Army and force a slow, costly evacuation through Inchon. He favored pulling back to Pusan, where once before he had broken the KPA offensive and where now, if reinforced by X Corps, Eighth Army might hold out indefinitely. MacArthur's G-3, General Wright, meanwhile recommended Pusan as
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#173280099294513206-450: The Eighth Army in jeopardy. Nor had the ROK shown any increased stability even after strenuous efforts to improve it. If, as he suspected, the ROK units now along the eastern two-thirds of Line B failed to stand against an attack, his positions north of Seoul could not be held and the then necessary withdrawal would have to be made over an obstacle, the Han River. In Walker's mind these two dangers, of another sudden ROK collapse and of making
13419-422: The Eighth Army probably would be forced south at least as far as Seoul. Turning his reasoning in support of a request for ground reinforcements "of the greatest magnitude," he emphasized on 3 December that his present strength would allow him at most to prolong his resistance to the PVA by making successive withdrawals or by taking up "beachhead bastion positions" and that a failure to receive reinforcements portended
13632-409: The Eighth Army with instructions that his message, translated as necessary, be read by all officers and by as many enlisted men as possible. "You will have my utmost," he advised his new command. "I shall expect yours." On reaching the main Eighth Army headquarters at Taegu late on 26 December, Ridgway was displeased at finding the bulk of his staff so far to the rear. His immediate step was to get to
13845-434: The Eighth Army, MacArthur told Ridgway, was an eventual tactical success that would clear and secure South Korea. A battlefield success of any substance in the meantime would help Washington answer what MacArthur called the "mission vacuum," meaning the question raised by the Chinese intervention of whether UNC forces could or should stay in Korea. When Ridgway asked near the close of the meeting whether MacArthur would object to
14058-493: The Haeju-Kumhwa line and Line A toward sectors along the western third of Line B . The withdrawal was uncontested except for minor encounters with KPA troops on IX Corps’ east flank, but thousands of refugees moving with and trailing the two Corps had to be turned off the main roads lest they block the withdrawal routes. By 23 December both Corps occupied stable positions in their new sectors. I Corps, with two divisions and
14271-490: The Haeju-Sin’gye-Ich’on line and to extend that line east to Kumhwa . The west flank would again be anchored on the sea, and Walker's forces would be able to present a front instead of a flank to the KPA units reported gathering on the east. What now worried Walker most were the whereabouts and intentions of the PVA he previously had suspected were maneuvering into attack position just beyond his east flank. Because his forces at no time since 30 November had captured or even sighted
14484-512: The Han east of the city. The Bridgehead Line would be deep enough to keep the Han bridges below Seoul free of PVA/KPA artillery fire. The position therefore would be suitable for covering a general withdrawal below Seoul that might accompany or follow the occupation of the Bridgehead Line . Milburn and Coulter each were to place a division on the Bridgehead Line if the expected PVA/KPA attack forced them to vacate their Line B positions. Ridgway at first restricted any I and IX Corps withdrawal from
14697-402: The I or IX Corps sector. While reinforcing the ROK sector of the front, Ridgway also deepened the defense of Seoul. After conferences with Milburn and General Coulter on the 27th, he instructed them to organize a bridgehead above Seoul along a line curving from the north bank of the Han west of Seoul through a point just below Uijongbu at the junction of Routes 33 and 3 to the north and back to
14910-436: The Imjin River valley. The latter withdrawal would set Walker's rightmost units along the Yesong valley in fair position to delay a PVA strike through it and would eliminate concern for the Eighth Army's left flank, which, after the initial withdrawal below Pyongyang, would open on the large Hwanghae peninsula southwest of Kyomip’o. In withdrawing south of Pyongyang, US IX Corps , now with the US 24th Infantry Division attached,
15123-431: The KPA Corps followed suit, occupying positions just above the 38th Parallel in the central sector, principally between Yonch’on in the Wonsan-Seoul corridor and Hwach’on, due north of Ch’unch’on. It also seemed that earlier reports of reconstituted KPA units joining the II Corps were correct. Several renewed KPA divisions apparently had assembled immediately behind the II Corps to make a total strength of 65,000 plausible for
15336-608: The KPA II and V Corps opened as Ridgway reached Korea, supported Tarkenton's prediction of a strong secondary effort in the east. 14 miles (23 km) northeast of Ch’unch’on, two KPA regiments coming from the Hwach’on Reservoir area hit the ROK 8th Division at the right of ROK III Corps and gouged 1 mile (1.6 km) deep salient before the ROK contained the attack. Out of the Inje area, 25 miles (40 km) northeast of Ch’unch’on,
15549-428: The KPA troops directly opposite the Eighth Army's central sector as of 23 December. As late as 17 December Walker was still completely out of contact with PVA forces and by the 23rd had encountered only a few, these in the I and IX Corps sectors in the west. General Partridge, who had shifted the emphasis of Fifth Air Force operations to armed reconnaissance and interdiction about the time Walker had given up Pyongyang,
15762-612: The Marines were to move from Masan to an east coast assembly in the Yongch’on-Kyongju-P’ohangdong area and prepare to occupy blocking positions wherever needed to the north. The 3rd Division was to reassemble in the west. As soon as Soule finished reorganizing and reequipping his forces he was to move them into the Pyongtaek-Ansong area 40 miles (64 km) south of Seoul and prepare them for operations in either
15975-484: The North. On 28 June, Rhee ordered the massacre of suspected political opponents in his own country. In five days, the ROK, which had 95,000 troops on 25 June, was down to less than 22,000 troops. In early July, when US forces arrived, what was left of the ROK was placed under US operational command of the United Nations Command . The Truman administration was unprepared for the invasion. Korea
16188-573: The PLA were sent back along with their weapons, and they later played a significant role in the initial invasion of South Korea. China promised to support the North Koreans in the event of a war against South Korea. By 1948, a North Korea-backed insurgency had broken out in the southern half of the peninsula. This was exacerbated by the undeclared border war between the Koreas, which saw division-level engagements and thousands of deaths on both sides. The ROK
16401-433: The PVA were moving into the region east of Songch’on and that either they or North Korean guerrillas infesting that area had established blocking positions below the Pyongyang - Wonsan road from Songch’on eastward 25 miles (40 km) miles to Yangdok . They could be trying to secure a portion of the lateral route in advance of a drive toward either or both coasts, and should the drive go west into Pyongyang, they could trap
16614-529: The PVA would be unopposed, and if the PVA moved through the open area in strength, they possibly could occupy all of South Korea with little or no difficulty. Walker anyway granted the PVA this capability and against the possibility of such a sweep took steps on 6 December to deploy troops across the entire peninsula. He planned no static defense. His concept of fighting a delaying action without becoming heavily engaged remained unchanged except that he now would delay from pre-selected lines stretching coast to coast. As
16827-493: The Pyongyang area to protect his supply routes and installations. In preparation for the coming withdrawal south of the city, the airborne troops also were to keep civilians from moving over four pontoon bridges spanning the Taedong River , two inside Pyongyang and another pair 3 miles (4.8 km) east of the city, and to take whatever other precautions were necessary to insure an uninterrupted flow of military traffic over
17040-545: The ROK 7th Infantry Division; the division headquarters, division artillery and 18th Regiment of the ROK Capital Division; and some 4,300 refugees. On 10 and 11 December the convoy from Songjin anchored at Hungnam only long enough to unload the Capital Division's headquarters and artillery for employment in the perimeter and to take aboard an advance party of the ROK I Corps headquarters before proceeding to its new destination. On 9 December, Almond alerted his forces for
17253-505: The ROK had 98,000 soldiers (65,000 combat, 33,000 support), no tanks (they had been requested from the U.S. military, but requests were denied), and a 22-plane air force comprising 12 liaison-type and 10 AT-6 advanced-trainer airplanes. Large U.S. garrisons and air forces were in Japan, but only 200–300 U.S. troops were in Korea. At dawn on 25 June 1950, the KPA crossed the 38th parallel behind artillery fire. It justified its assault with
17466-532: The ROK. The final stage would involve destroying South Korean government remnants and capturing the rest of South Korea, including the ports. On 7 June 1950, Kim called for a Korea-wide election on 5–8 August 1950 and a consultative conference in Haeju on 15–17 June. On 11 June, the North sent three diplomats to the South as a peace overture, which Rhee rejected outright. On 21 June, Kim revised his war plan to involve
17679-529: The ROKA launched a three-pronged assault on the insurgents in South Cholla and Taegu . By March 1950, the ROKA claimed 5,621 guerrillas killed or captured and 1,066 small arms seized. This operation crippled the insurgency. Soon after, North Korea made final attempts to keep the uprising active, sending battalion-sized units of infiltrators under the commands of Kim Sang-ho and Kim Moo-hyon. The first battalion
17892-708: The Republic of Korea. On 27 June President Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces to help. On 4 July the Soviet deputy foreign minister accused the U.S. of starting armed intervention on behalf of South Korea. UN retreat from North Korea Successful UN withdrawal [REDACTED] United Nations [REDACTED] Eighth Army [REDACTED] Republic of Korea Army [REDACTED] Fifth Air Force [REDACTED] X Corps [REDACTED] Korean People's Army [REDACTED] People's Volunteer Army The UN Forces retreat from North Korea
18105-419: The Seoul area. By 20 December ROK I Corps had been sea lifted in increments out of northeastern Korea, landed at Pusan and near Samch’ok close to the east coast anchor of Line B , and transferred to Eighth Army control. Walker immediately committed ROK I Corps to defend the eastern end of the army line. By the 23rd ROK I Corps, with two divisions, occupied scattered positions blocking several mountain tracks and
18318-426: The South Korean interior intensified; persistent operations, paired with worsening weather, denied the guerrillas sanctuary and wore away their fighting strength. North Korea responded by sending more troops to link up with insurgents and build more partisan cadres; North Korean infiltrators had reached 3,000 soldiers in 12 units by the start of 1950, but all were destroyed or scattered by the ROKA. On 1 October 1949,
18531-474: The South from 5,000 to 1,000. However, Kim Il Sung believed widespread uprisings had weakened the South Korean military and that a North Korean invasion would be welcomed by much of the South Korean population. Kim began seeking Stalin's support for an invasion in March 1949, traveling to Moscow to persuade him. Stalin initially did not think the time was right for a war in Korea. PLA forces were still embroiled in
18744-435: The South, armed by the U.S. military with mostly small arms, but no heavy weaponry. Several generals, such as Lee Kwon-mu , were PLA veterans born to ethnic Koreans in China. While older histories of the conflict often referred to these ethnic Korean PLA veterans as being sent from northern Korea to fight in the Chinese Civil War before being sent back, recent Chinese archival sources studied by Kim Donggill indicate that this
18957-706: The South. The ROK was being trained by the US Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). On the eve of the war, KMAG commander General William Lynn Roberts voiced utmost confidence in the ROK and boasted that any North Korean invasion would merely provide "target practice". For his part, Syngman Rhee repeatedly expressed his desire to conquer the North, including when US diplomat John Foster Dulles visited Korea on 18 June. Though some South Korean and US intelligence officers predicted an attack, similar predictions had been made before and nothing had happened. The Central Intelligence Agency noted
19170-739: The Soviet Union would not move against US forces in Korea. The Truman administration believed it could intervene in Korea without undermining its commitments elsewhere. On 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of South Korea with Resolution 82 . The Soviet Union, a veto-wielding power , had boycotted Council meetings since January 1950, protesting Taiwan 's occupation of China's permanent seat . The Security Council, on 27 June 1950, published Resolution 83 recommending member states provide military assistance to
19383-543: The Taedong River. But only the 1st Cavalry Division reported any noteworthy deep patrolling, on 6 December when two battalions sortied northeast up the Yesong valley and into Kokson , where they fought a minor skirmish with KPA troops, and on 7 December when two companies made another, but uneventful, visit to the town. Most of Walker's information continued to come from agents and aerial observers. The latter reported on
19596-479: The Turks had collected bit by bit at several locations, mostly at Pyongyang. On 2 December, after General Yazıcı had recovered some 3500 of his original 5000 men, Walker ordered the brigade to Kaesong , 15 miles (24 km) north of Munsan-ni, to complete refurbishing under Keiser's supervision as more of its members were located and returned. Walker held the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team and its attachments in
19809-828: The UK, and the US decided that "in due course, Korea shall become free and independent". At the Tehran Conference in 1943 and the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Soviet Union promised to join its allies in the Pacific War within three months of the victory in Europe . Germany officially surrendered on 8 May 1945, and the USSR declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria on 8 August 1945, two days after
20022-611: The UN Command was now the guiding consideration and that they concurred in the consolidation of MacArthur's forces into beachheads. Beachhead sites that in varying degrees could facilitate a withdrawal from Korea were Hungnam and Wonsan for X Corps and Inchon and Pusan for the Eighth Army. Collins, while touring Korea between 4 and 6 December, heard Walker and Almond on the best beachheads and on how best to handle their respective commands. Almond believed that he could hold Hungnam indefinitely and wanted to stay there out of certainty that by doing so he could divert substantial Chinese strength from
20235-402: The UN attack as a reconnaissance in force, nor was it. It was, rather, a general offensive whose objective was the northern border of Korea. On the morning of 23 December Walker left Seoul by jeep to visit units above Uijongbu , 10 miles (16 km) north, his jeep started past two 2 + 1 ⁄ 2 -ton trucks halted on the opposite side of the road headed south. Almost at the same moment,
20448-435: The US 3rd Division relieved the remaining 7th Division units on the perimeter and Almond moved his command post aboard USS Mount McKinley . By 23 December the US 3rd Division withdrew to their last phase lines and the next day the evacuation was completed and the port facilities of Hungnam destroyed. In addition to the UN forces, over 98,100 Korean civilians had been evacuated from Hungnam, Wonsan and Songjin. In announcing
20661-683: The US in 1949. With the end of the war with Japan , the Chinese Civil War resumed in earnest between the Communists and the Nationalist -led government. While the Communists were struggling for supremacy in Manchuria, they were supported by the North Korean government with matériel and manpower. According to Chinese sources, the North Koreans donated 2,000 railway cars worth of supplies while thousands of Koreans served in
20874-631: The USAMGIK declared martial law . Citing the inability of the Joint Commission to make progress, the US government decided to hold an election under UN auspices to create an independent Korea. The Soviet authorities and Korean communists refused to cooperate on the grounds it would not be fair, and many South Korean politicians boycotted it. The 1948 South Korean general election was held in May. The resultant South Korean government promulgated
21087-447: The Wonsan-Seoul corridor. The British 29th Brigade was assembled in I Corps reserve along Route 1 just outside Seoul. IX Corps lay across the Wonsan-Seoul corridor along the 38th parallel, the ROK 6th Division astride Route 33 at the left, the 24th Division across Route 3 at the right. In Corps' reserve, the British 27th Brigade was assembled near the junction of Routes 33 and 3 at Uijongbu. The 1st Cavalry Division, also in reserve, retained
21300-466: The X Corps, but he wanted both commands to step back. Walker was to make whatever withdrawals were necessary to escape being enveloped. Almond was to maintain contact with the PVA but also was to pull X Corps back and concentrate it in the Hamhung - Hungnam coastal area. MacArthur next asked Almond what X Corps could do to help the Eighth Army. Almond pointed out that the isolated Marine and Army troops at
21513-420: The area to that end. The Truman administration still refrained from committing troops on the ground, because advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone. The Truman administration was uncertain whether the attack was a ploy by the Soviet Union, or just a test of US resolve. The decision to commit ground troops became viable when a communiqué was received on 27 June indicating
21726-484: The area". As Rusk's comments indicate, the US doubted whether the Soviets would agree. Joseph Stalin , however, maintained his wartime policy of cooperation, and on 16 August, the Red Army halted at the 38th parallel for three weeks to await the arrival of US forces. On 7 September 1945, General Douglas MacArthur issued Proclamation No. 1 to the people of Korea, announcing US military control over Korea south of
21939-505: The army and air force supply points in the city had been emptied and the port of Chinnamp’o cleared. To provide time for the removal he ordered a half step to the rear, sending his forces south toward a semicircular line still 20 miles (32 km) above Pyongyang. While service troops rushed to evacuate supplies and equipment from the North Korean capital and port, line units reached the temporary line late on 3 December with no PVA interference beyond being harassed by North Korean guerrillas on
22152-510: The army forward command post. At dawn on 27 December he flew to Seoul, where the handful of staff officers he found deepened his resolve to remedy the headquarters arrangement. He planned not only to redistribute his staff, but also to move the forward command post to a more central location from where he could reach all Corps and divisions in minimum time. Following a staff conference and meetings with American Ambassador John J. Muccio and South Korean President Syngman Rhee in Seoul, Ridgway began
22365-513: The attackers, was Christmas Day. Walker's largest hope of holding Seoul for any length of time in these circumstances rested on the arrival of the remainder of X Corps from northeastern Korea. Once he had Almond's forces in hand, Walker planned to insert them in the Ch’unch’on sector now held by the untried ROK III Corps. This move would place American units along the Ch’unch’on-Seoul axis, one of
22578-405: The best beachhead for both the Eighth Army and X Corps on that grounds that should UN forces be compelled to leave Korea, they should leave the distinct impression of having delayed the enemy as long and as well as possible. Wright also pointed out that defending successive lines into the southeastern tip of the peninsula would afford UN air forces the greatest opportunity to hurt the PVA; further, if
22791-476: The border, starting in May 1949. Border clashes between South and North continued on 4 August 1949, when thousands of North Korean troops attacked South Korean troops occupying territory north of the 38th parallel. The 2nd and 18th ROK Infantry Regiments repulsed attacks in Kuksa-bong, and KPA troops were "completely routed". Border incidents decreased by the start of 1950. Meanwhile, counterinsurgencies in
23004-704: The border, these guerrillas launched an offensive in September aimed at undermining the South Korean government and preparing the country for the KPA's arrival in force. This offensive failed. However, the guerrillas were now entrenched in the Taebaek-san region of the North Gyeongsang Province and the border areas of the Gangwon Province . While the insurgency was ongoing, the ROKA and KPA engaged in battalion-sized battles along
23217-487: The choice of the 38th parallel, Rusk observed, "Even though it was further north than could be realistically reached by U. S. [ sic ] forces in the event of Soviet disagreement ... we felt it important to include the capital of Korea in the area of responsibility of American troops". He noted that he was "faced with the scarcity of U.S. forces immediately available and time and space factors which would make it difficult to reach very far north before Soviet troops could enter
23430-435: The city was on fire by 07:30 on 5 December when the rearguards destroyed the last bridges over the Taedong and set off final demolitions in the section of Pyongyang below the river. Colonel Stebbins, Walker's G-4 who supervised the removal of materiel from Chinnamp’o and Pyongyang, would have preferred a slower move by 72 or even 48 hours. Given that additional time, Stebbins believed, the service troops could have removed most of
23643-554: The claim ROK troops attacked first and that the KPA were aiming to arrest and execute the "bandit traitor Syngman Rhee". Fighting began on the strategic Ongjin Peninsula in the west. There were initial South Korean claims that the 17th Regiment had counterattacked at Haeju; some scholars argue the claimed counterattack was instead the instigating attack, and therefore that the South Koreans may have fired first. However,
23856-638: The codes used by the US to communicate with their embassy in Moscow , and reading dispatches convinced Stalin that Korea did not have the importance to the US that would warrant a nuclear confrontation. Stalin began a more aggressive strategy in Asia based on these developments, including promising economic and military aid to China through the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance . In April 1950, Stalin permitted Kim to attack
24069-412: The communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, ethnic Korean units in the PLA were sent to North Korea. In the fall of 1949, two PLA divisions composed mainly of Korean-Chinese troops (the 164th and 166th ) entered North Korea, followed by smaller units throughout the rest of 1949. The reinforcement of the KPA with PLA veterans continued into 1950, with the 156th Division and several other units of
24282-435: The completion of X Corps’ withdrawal from Hungnam in a communique on 26 December, MacArthur took occasion to appraise UN operations from the time his command had resumed its advance on 24 November and, once again, to remark on the restrictions that had been placed on him. He blamed the incorrect assessment of Chinese strength, movements, and intentions before the resumption on the failure of "political intelligence... to penetrate
24495-473: The country. The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was founded in 1919 in Nationalist China . It failed to achieve international recognition, failed to unite the nationalist groups, and had a fractious relationship with its US-based founding president, Syngman Rhee . From 1919 to 1925 and beyond, Korean communists led internal and external warfare against the Japanese. In China,
24708-475: The crossings. On 3 December, after receiving more reports of sizable PVA movements and concentrations east and northeast of the Eighth Army position, Walker anticipated not only a westward PVA push into Pyongyang but also a deeper thrust southwest through the Yesong valley and across the Eighth Army withdrawal routes in the vicinity of Sin’gye. Induced to haste by this possibility, he ordered his line units to drop 15 miles (24 km) behind Pyongyang beginning on
24921-409: The day before. Walker nevertheless believed that the PVA would soon close the gap, resume their frontal assaults, and again send forces against his east flank. Walker now estimated the PVA opposing him to number at least six armies with eighteen divisions and 165,000 men. Of his own forward units, only the US 1st Cavalry Division , 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions , the ROK 1st Infantry Division and
25134-415: The day following MacArthur's visit Walker established two more lettered lines. Line C followed the lower bank of the Han River just below Seoul, curved northeast to Hongch’on , 30 miles (48 km) below Hwach’on, then reached almost due east to the coast at Wonpo-ri , 15 miles (24 km) behind Yangyang. Line D, next south, ran from a west coast anchor 44 miles (71 km) below Seoul northeast through
25347-544: The deeper southwestward thrust out of the Inje area, KPA forces conceivably could sever the Eighth Army's main lines of communication. Ridgway's first tactical move was to counter this threat from the northeast. On 27 December Ridgway ordered part of the 2nd Infantry Division north from Ch’ungju into the projected path of the KPA. McClure was to move a regimental combat team 25 miles (40 km) north to Wonju, from where it could oppose any KPA attempt to advance south over Route 29 or west along Route 20 and where it could protect
25560-529: The defense of Italy and Greece, and the country was first on the list of the National Security Council 's post-North Korea invasion list of "chief danger spots". Truman believed if aggression went unchecked, a chain reaction would start that would marginalize the UN and encourage communist aggression elsewhere. The UN Security Council approved the use of force to help the South Koreans, and the US immediately began using air and naval forces in
25773-409: The direction of Ch’unch’on and Inje or from the east toward Hoengsong and Wonju. Almond subsequently could expect to occupy a sector of the front. In the meantime, he was to develop Route 29 southeastward from Wonju through Chech’on, Tanyang , Yongju and Andong as the main X Corps supply route. On 31 December Ridgway placed the 1st Marine and 3rd Divisions in army reserve. When fully refurbished,
25986-407: The east coast road. Regardless of his success in stretching forces across the peninsula, Walker lacked confidence in the line he had built. His defenses were shallow and there were gaps. He mainly mistrusted the ROK forces along the eastern two-thirds of the line. He doubted that they would hold longer than momentarily against a strong PVA/KPA attack, and, should they give way, his forces above Seoul in
26199-424: The east flank. Walker meanwhile pushed reserves eastward onto Route 33, the next Pyongyang-Seoul road inland from Route 1, to protect his east flank and to guarantee an additional withdrawal route below Pyongyang. He deployed the 24th Infantry Division at Yul-li ( 38°52′16″N 126°15′25″E / 38.871°N 126.257°E / 38.871; 126.257 ), 25 miles (40 km) southeast of Pyongyang, and
26412-509: The economic and military aid promised by the Soviets. Kathryn Weathersby cites Soviet documents which said Kim secured Mao's support. Along with Mark O'Neill, she says this accelerated Kim's war preparations. Chen Jian argues Mao never seriously challenged Kim's plans and Kim had every reason to inform Stalin that he had obtained Mao's support. Citing more recent scholarship, Zhao Suisheng contends Mao did not approve of Kim's war proposal and requested verification from Stalin, who did so via
26625-413: The estimate for moving one of Almond's current divisions from its southern assembly area to the battle zone was eight to ten days. Once forward, X Corps was to operate with the initial mission of destroying any PVA/KPA penetration of the ROK front above it and of protecting IX Corps’ east flank. Ridgway gave Almond detailed instructions on the 30th. Having learned that the 7th Division would be ready ahead of
26838-562: The estimate of enemy strength above Walker's central positions to 180,000. Furthermore, Walker judged, these troops could be reinforced by any units of the PVA XIII Army Group remaining in the Pyongyang area within four to eight days and by the PVA/KPA units currently operating in the X Corps sector within six to ten days. To Walker, the apparent concentration and disposition of PVA/KPA forces opposite his central front clearly suggested offensive preparations in which KPA II Corps
27051-479: The evacuation of Wonsan had begun on 3 December. In a week's time, without interference from PVA/KPA forces, the US 3rd Infantry Division task force and a Marine Corps shore party group totaling some 3,800 troops loaded themselves, 1,100 vehicles, 10,000 tons of other cargo, and 7,000 refugees aboard transport ships and LSTs provided by Admiral Doyle's Task Force 90 . One LST sailed north on the 9th to Hungnam, where its Marine shore party passengers were to take part in
27264-492: The eventual destruction of his command. The response to MacArthur's estimate was as gloomy as his predictions. Prompted by earlier dismal reports to visit the Far East for a firsthand appraisal, Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins informed MacArthur on 4 December that no reinforcement in strength, at least in the near future, was possible. The remaining Joint Chiefs meanwhile replied from Washington that preservation of
27477-647: The extreme west in the I Corps sector. Next east, the Turkish Brigade overlooked the Han River estuary from the upper end of the Kimpo peninsula. Above the Han, the 25th Infantry Division, to which the Turks and Rangers were attached, straddled Route 1 along the lower bank of the Imjin River, and the ROK 1st Division defended the Corps' right from positions along the Imjin reaching northeast almost to Route 33 in
27690-459: The former Fourth Field Army arriving in February; the PLA 156th Division was reorganized as the KPA 7th Division. By mid-1950, between 50,000 and 70,000 former PLA troops had entered North Korea, forming a significant part of the KPA's strength on the eve of the war's beginning. The combat veterans and equipment from China, the tanks, artillery, and aircraft supplied by the Soviets, and rigorous training increased North Korea's military superiority over
27903-460: The forthcoming sealift. The remaining ships steamed for Pusan on the 9th and 10th. On 8 December 1950 Almond received MacArthur's order to evacuate X Corps through Hungnam. The Task Force 90 ships dispatched to Songjin on 5 December to pick up the tail-end troops of ROK I Corps meanwhile had reached their destination and by noon on 9 December had taken aboard the ROK 3rd Infantry Division (less the 26th Regiment, which withdrew to Hungnam as rearguard for
28116-661: The four ROK divisions operating against guerrillas in central and southern Korea were too untrained to be trustworthy on the line. His only other reserves were the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team and its attached Filipino and Thai battalions then guarding forward army supply installations; the Netherlands Battalion , which had just completed its processing at the UN Reception Center; and an infantry battalion from France , which had just disembarked at Pusan . By Walker's comparison of forces,
28329-491: The front and that a fourth was approaching it. The greatest enemy strength seemed to be massed opposite the Eighth Army's west-central sector, an indication that the main attack would come through the Wonsan-Seoul corridor over Routes 33 and 3. A strong secondary attack farther east also seemed probable, either southwest over the Ch’unch’on-Seoul axis or south through Ch’unch’on and Wonju via Route 29, in an attempt to outflank I and IX Corps above Seoul. Two recent attacks by units of
28542-570: The front was X Corps. Other resources present or scheduled to arrive in Korea by the end of the year were exceedingly few. The US 2nd Infantry Division, still not fully recovered from its late November losses, but now reinforced by the Netherlands and French battalions, was centrally located at Ch’ungju. In the west, the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, with the Thai battalion attached, was assembled at Suwon south of Seoul. Outside these forces,
28755-472: The government and between 2,976 and 3,392 deaths. By May 1949, both uprisings had been crushed. Insurgency reignited in the spring of 1949 when attacks by guerrillas in the mountainous regions (buttressed by army defectors and North Korean agents) increased. Insurgent activity peaked in late 1949 as the ROKA engaged so-called People's Guerrilla Units. Organized and armed by the North Korean government, and backed by 2,400 KPA commandos who had infiltrated through
28968-580: The government in the South, under the condition that Mao would agree to send reinforcements if needed. For Kim, this was the fulfillment of his goal to unite Korea. Stalin made it clear Soviet forces would not openly engage in combat, to avoid a direct war with the US Kim met with Mao in May 1950 and differing historical interpretations of the meeting have been put forward. According to Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgeng, Mao agreed to support Kim despite concerns of American intervention, as China desperately needed
29181-582: The government. At 02:00 on 28 June the ROK blew up the Hangang Bridge across the Han River in an attempt to stop the KPA. The bridge was detonated while 4,000 refugees were crossing it, and hundreds were killed. Destroying the bridge trapped many ROK units north of the river. In spite of such desperate measures, Seoul fell that same day. Some South Korean National Assemblymen remained in Seoul when it fell, and 48 subsequently pledged allegiance to
29394-415: The higher mountains and coastal slopes to the east. Since time was critical, Ridgway on 28 December pressed Almond and the commander of the 2nd Logistical Command, General Garvin, to quicken the readiness preparations of the 1st Marine, 3rd and 7th Divisions. The Marines, now reattached to X Corps, and the 7th Division were fully assembled but were still refurbishing and the 3rd Division, last to leave Hungnam,
29607-780: The influence of China over Korea in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), ushering in the short-lived Korean Empire . A decade later, after defeating Imperial Russia in the Russo-Japanese War , Japan made the Korean Empire its protectorate with the Eulsa Treaty in 1905, then annexed it with the Japan–Korea Treaty of 1910 . The Korean Empire fell, and Korea was directly ruled by Japan between 1910–45. Many Korean nationalists fled
29820-516: The injured Eighth Army could not now set a successful, static defense. Considering delaying action to be the only course open, a course in which he should not risk becoming heavily engaged and in which he should anticipate moving out of Korea, Walker began to select delaying lines behind him. He intended to move south from one to the next well before his forces could be fixed, flanked, or enveloped. Though Eighth Army remained out of contact on 2 December, Walker received agent and aerial observer reports that
30033-813: The insurgent war and border clashes. The first socialist uprising occurred without direct North Korean participation, though the guerrillas still professed support for the northern government. Beginning in April 1948 on Jeju Island , the campaign saw arrests and repression by the South Korean government in the fight against the South Korean Labor Party, resulting in 30,000 violent deaths, among them 14,373 civilians, of whom ~2,000 were killed by rebels and ~12,000 by ROK security forces. The Yeosu–Suncheon rebellion overlapped with it, as several thousand army defectors waving red flags massacred right-leaning families. This resulted in another brutal suppression by
30246-432: The intelligence briefings he received. Confronted during one of the first briefings with a map whose main feature was "a big red goose egg... with ‘174,000’ scrawled in the middle of it," Ridgway said "Here the enemy was leaning right up against us, but we did not know his strength, and we did not have his location pinpointed." He attributed such imprecision directly to the Eighth Army's tendency to "look over its shoulder." As
30459-499: The invasion force, the North had 114 fighters, 78 bombers, 105 T-34-85 tanks, and some 30,000 soldiers stationed in reserve in North Korea. Although each navy consisted of only several small warships, the North and South Korean navies fought in the war as seaborne artillery for their armies. In contrast, the South Korean population was estimated at 20 million, but its army was unprepared and ill-equipped. As of 25 June 1950,
30672-813: The iron curtain" and on the limitations placed on field intelligence activities, in particular his not being allowed to conduct aerial reconnaissance beyond the borders of Korea. So handicapped, his advance, which he later termed a "reconnaissance-in-force," was the "proper, indeed the sole, expedient," and "was the final test of Chinese intentions." In both the advance and the redeployment south, he concluded, "no command ever fought more gallantly or efficiently under unparalleled conditions of restraint and handicap, and no command could have acquitted itself to better advantage under prescribed missions and delimitations involving unprecedented risk and jeopardy. But while MacArthur earlier had proclaimed that only by advancing could he determine PVA/KPA strength, he had not designed or designated
30885-571: The last ships under way on the favorable tide at 17:00. The last three ships pulled away from the docks near that hour. Demolition crews set off their last explosives, and shortly afterward the last men ashore drove an amphibious truck out to a waiting ship. Some 2,000 tons of supplies and a few items of port equipment had had to be destroyed for lack of time to remove them. The men and materiel sea-lifted from Chinnamp’o were landed either at Inchon (port personnel, rations, and petroleum products) or Pusan (patients, prisoners, and remaining supplies). Most of
31098-485: The likelihood of further materiel losses. The trace of the new army position vaguely resembled a question mark. I and IX Corps defenses between Kyomip'o and Yul-li formed the upper arc, IX Corps positions on the east flank from Yul-li southeastward to Sin'gye shaped the shank, and clumps of army reserves below Sin'gye supplied several dots. The figure traced was appropriate since Walker now had been out of meaningful contact with PVA forces for five days, had no clear idea of
31311-409: The line units, the only notable materiel losses since the PVA opened their offensive had been 1,400 tons of ammunition stored at Sinanju and 500 tons at Kunu-ri . But now Walker's forces were about to give up the locale of the Eighth Army's main forward stockpiles, and although the smaller stores at Chinnamp’o might be evacuated, it was less likely that the larger quantities brought into Pyongyang over
31524-428: The location or movement of the main PVA body, and could only speculate on what the PVA commander could or intended to do next. In an attempt to fill the intelligence gap deriving from the withdrawals and the PVA slowness to follow, Walker on the 5th ordered I Corps commander General Frank W. Milburn and IX Corps commander General John B. Coulter to send strong reconnaissance patrols, including tanks, north as far as
31737-531: The main Hyesanjin- Pukch’ong withdrawal route about midway between the terminal towns. But the 7th Division came south without enemy contact. They demolished bridges and cratered the road behind them as far as the ROK position and in continuing their withdrawal prepared similar demolitions to be exploded by the ROK bringing up the rear. The 7th Division forces, after completing their withdrawal, put up defenses north and northeast of Hamhung adjacent to those of
31950-415: The main body of the PVA XIII Army Group had moved any farther south than Pyongyang. But on the basis of repeated reports from agents and air observers that PVA troops and supplies were moving southeastward from Pyongyang, by the 23rd he considered it possible that three or four Chinese armies with about 150,000 troops were bunched within a day's march of the Eighth Army's central front. This possibility brought
32163-552: The mission assigned to it while under army control of blocking the Ch’unch’on-Seoul road. Now attached to the cavalry division were the Filipino battalion and the Greek Expeditionary Force , an infantry battalion that had reached Korea on 8 December. Near the 38th Parallel above Ch’unch’on, ROK III Corps defended a wide sector with the ROK 2nd, 5th and 8th Divisions on line and the ROK 7th Division in reserve. In
32376-440: The more likely PVA/KPA approaches in an attack to seize Seoul. Whether X Corps would be available soon enough depended first on how closely Walker had estimated the opening date of the threatening PVA/KPA offensive and second on how long it would take Almond to get his forces out of northeastern Korea and to refurbish them for employment under the Eighth Army. Following the earlier decision to concentrate X Corps forces at Hungnam,
32589-411: The morning of the 4th, to a line curving eastward from Kyomip’o on the lower bank of the Taedong to a point short of Koksan in a subsidiary valley of the upper Yesong River. Walker warned them to be ready to withdraw another 50 miles (80 km) on the west and 20 miles (32 km) on the east to a line running from Haeju on the coast north-eastward through Sin'gye, then eastward through Ich'on in
32802-429: The most heavily bombed countries in history, and virtually all of Korea's major cities were destroyed. No peace treaty has been signed, making the war a frozen conflict . In South Korea, the war is usually referred to as the "625 War" ( 6·25 전쟁 ; 六二五戰爭 ), the "625 Upheaval" ( 6·25 동란 ; 六二五動亂 ; yugio dongnan ), or simply "625", reflecting the date of its commencement on 25 June. In North Korea,
33015-517: The mouth of the Yesong River, almost 40 miles (64 km) behind Haeju, northeastward through Sibyon-ni, southeast through Ch'orwon and Hwach'on , then eastward to Yangyang on the Sea of Japan . This line, later designated Line A , was roughly 150 miles (240 km) long and at its most northerly point reached just 20 miles (32 km) above the 38th Parallel. Walker ordered five ROK Divisions,
33228-486: The narrow ROK II Corps sector next east, a single division, the ROK 3rd, continued to block Route 24 running southwestward through the Hongch’on River valley. ROK I Corps defended a gaping line at the Eighth Army right, with the ROK 9th Division in the high mountains at the Corps' left and the ROK Capital Division across the slopes and coastal road at the eastern anchor of the front. Ridgway's main reserve for strengthening
33441-553: The nationalist National Revolutionary Army and the communist People's Liberation Army (PLA) helped organize Korean refugees against the Japanese military, which had also occupied parts of China. The Nationalist-backed Koreans, led by Yi Pom-Sok , fought in the Burma campaign (1941-45). The communists, led by, among others, Kim Il Sung , fought the Japanese in Korea and Manchuria . At the Cairo Conference in 1943, China,
33654-509: The news and to ask for Ridgway. Near midnight on 22 December Collins notified Ridgway that he was the new commander of the Eighth Army, and hurried preparations on the 23rd put Ridgway in the air en route to Tokyo that night. Ridgway reached Tokyo's Haneda Airport shortly before midnight on 25 December. On the morning of 26 December Ridgway met with MacArthur whose instructions resembled those given to Walker: hold as far north as possible and hold Seoul as long as possible. The most to be expected of
33867-466: The next blow. Between 8 and 14 December Walker caught a southeastward shift of the KPA II Corps , the bulk of which previously had been concentrated in and operating as a guerrilla force out of the mountains between Koksan and Inchon. Apparently having retaken regular status, the Corps paralleled the Eighth Army's southeastern withdrawals below Pyongyang. As Walker's forces spread out along Line B ,
34080-417: The northeast intersected. McClure complied on the 30th, sending the 23rd Infantry toward Hongch’on to join the ROK 23rd Regiment, 7th Division. Before the 23rd Infantry Regiment could complete its move above Wonju, the KPA force reported by ROK III Corps to number between 700 and 1,200 men, blocked Route 29 6 miles (9.7 km) below Hongch’on. The 23rd's advance became a clearing operation, made in concert with
34293-466: The northeast sector, including the coastal road. But the nearest ROK I Corps troops were still 100 miles (160 km) up the coast at Songjin , the rearmost another 40 miles (64 km) north in Kilchu . To assist the ROK withdrawal, Almond arranged on the 5th through Admiral James H. Doyle to send five ships to Songjin to pick up the tail-end ROK 3rd Infantry Division . The ROK I Corps headquarters and
34506-411: The northeast, the defensive weakness in the three ROK Corps sectors left open the likelihood of stronger, more effective PVA/KPA penetrations. Against this possibility, Ridgway planned to reinforce this portion of the front, much as Walker had decided earlier, by setting X Corps in the Ch’unch’on sector now held by ROK III Corps and by placing the bulk of his ROK forces along a narrower, more solid front in
34719-419: The only available unit was the ROK 11th Division currently operating against guerrillas in various locations to the south. The 2nd Battalion of Canada's Princess Patricia's Light Infantry had reached Korea in mid-December but was at Miryang in the southeast for eight weeks of training before entering battle. Similarly, the 16th New Zealand Field Regiment , actually an artillery battalion, due to reach Korea on
34932-472: The operation was conducted under the auspices of the UN. It has been sometimes referred to in the English-speaking world as "The Forgotten War" or "The Unknown War" because of the lack of public attention it received during and afterward, relative to the global scale of World War II, which preceded it, and the subsequent angst of the Vietnam War , which succeeded it. Imperial Japan diminished
35145-407: The other two divisions, he directed Almond to move one of its regiments the next day to Chech’on, 20 miles (32 km) below Wonju, where Route 60 and a mountain road coming from the east and northeast joined Route 29. When Almond could get the remainder of the division forward, he was to assemble the 7th near the 2nd so that both divisions could be deployed quickly against any PVA/KPA penetration from
35358-493: The partially restored ROK II Corps at Sin’gye in the Yesong River valley another 30 miles (48 km) to the southeast. South and east of Sin’gye, units of the ROK 2nd and 5th Infantry Divisions previously had occupied Sibyon-ni ( 38°18′32″N 126°41′42″E / 38.309°N 126.695°E / 38.309; 126.695 ) and Yonch’on on Route 33, P’och’on on Route 3, and Ch’unch’on on Route 17 in
35571-581: The past several weeks could be completely removed on such short notice. The improbability of clearing the Pyongyang stocks was increased by the necessity to give priority on locomotives to trains carrying casualties and service units, by heavy demands on trucks for troop movements as well as for hauling materiel from supply point to railroad yard, and by the problems of loading and switching trains in congested yards that earlier had been severely damaged by UN air bombardment. With almost no PVA contact, Walker's forces moved south of Pyongyang within 24 hours. Much of
35784-756: The port. Nearer Pusan, the Davidson Line curved northeastward 68 miles (109 km) from a south coast anchor at Masan ; next southeast, the Raider Line stretched 48 miles (77 km) from the south coast resort town of Chinhae ; and just outside the port, the Pusan Line arched 28 miles (45 km) from the mouth of the Naktong. Walker instructed 2nd Logistical Command commander General Garvin to fortify these lines using Korean labor and all other means and manpower available within his command. On
35997-450: The predicted further withdrawals of the Eighth Army would only widen the opening through which the Chinese could move. They again urged MacArthur to consolidate Eighth Army and X Corps sufficiently to prevent large enemy forces from passing between the two commands or outflanking either of them. But MacArthur defended his view of a Pyongyang-Wonsan line, pointing out that he and Walker already had agreed that Pyongyang could not be held and that
36210-464: The present front to his own personal order. But on reconsidering the high estimate of PVA strength opposite the two Corps, the tendency of some ROK units to break under pressure, and the demonstrated PVA preference for night attacks, he realized that this restriction could create a costly delay should Milburn and Coulter be unable to contact him promptly. He therefore authorized the two Corps commanders to withdraw on their own at any time they agreed that it
36423-423: The president's instructions to MacArthur on 6 December. On 7 December MacArthur had radioed a warning to both Walker and Almond of the next day's order for successive withdrawals, the defense of Seoul short of becoming entrapped, and the assignment of X Corps to the Eighth Army. So guided, Walker on the 8th laid out Line B , which duplicated Line A eastward from Hwach’on but in the opposite direction fell off to
36636-423: The principal reason for withdrawing had been, was, and would continue to be the constant threat of envelopment from the east. In order to protect Hamhung and Hungnam while the 1st Marine Division and Army units withdrew from the Chosin Reservoir, in early December Almond was concentrating his forces there. Meanwhile, at Wonsan a 3rd Infantry Division task force and United States Marine Corps shore party group
36849-479: The region between and below Hwach’on and Inje. This concentration, the expected arrival of KPA III Corps in the same area, and the probability that forces from PVA IX Army Group would move down into the same region from Hungnam represented, in Tarkenton's estimation, a sufficient force to exploit successfully the KPA gains already registered in the east. The preponderance of PVA/KPA forces above Seoul still pointed to
37062-494: The report that contained the Haeju claim contained errors and outright falsehoods. KPA forces attacked all along the 38th parallel within an hour. The KPA had a combined arms force including tanks supported by heavy artillery. The ROK had no tanks, anti-tank weapons, or heavy artillery. The South Koreans committed their forces in a piecemeal fashion, and these were routed in a few days. On 27 June, Rhee evacuated Seoul with some of
37275-443: The restrictions placed upon it by the policy of limiting hostilities to Korea. This criticism of administration policy rankled President Harry Truman , particularly because MacArthur voiced it publicly and frequently enough to lead "many people abroad to believe that our government would change its policy." Truman issued instructions on 5 December by which he intended to insure that information made public by an executive branch official
37488-444: The southward movement by the KPA but assessed this as a "defensive measure" and concluded an invasion was "unlikely". On 23 June UN observers inspected the border and did not detect that war was imminent. Chinese involvement was extensive from the beginning, building on previous collaboration between the Chinese and Korean communists during the Chinese Civil War. Throughout 1949 and 1950, the Soviets continued arming North Korea. After
37701-436: The southwest to trace the lower bank of the Imjin and Han Rivers , some 20 miles (32 km) behind the Yesong River. This line was at least 20 miles (32 km) shorter than Line A and matched the northernmost coast-to-coast line designated by MacArthur, and now became the line toward which Walker began to move his forces for the defense of Seoul. On 11 December MacArthur made his first visit to Korea since he had watched
37914-554: The start of the Home by Christmas Offensive on 24 November. He was now on the peninsula for a firsthand view of the Eighth Army and X Corps after their setbacks at the hands of the PVA and for personal conferences with Walker and Almond on the steps the two line commanders had taken or planned to take in carrying out the maneuvers and command change he had ordered three days before. When MacArthur reached Walker's headquarters (having first stopped in northeastern Korea to confer with Almond), he
38127-442: The still-weak US 2nd Infantry Division, which by then had stepped back from Munsan-ni to Yongdungp’o, a suburb of Seoul just below the Han, to move to the town of Ch’ungju , some 60 miles (97 km) southeast of Seoul. From there the division was to be ready to move against any PVA/KPA force breaking through ROK lines in central or eastern Korea and was to protect the flank of Walker's western forces in any withdrawal prompted by such
38340-438: The stock evacuated from Pyongyang was shipped to depots at Kaesong and around Seoul. Some was kept forward aboard the railcars on which it had been loaded to institute a mobile system of meeting day-to-day requirements of the line units. These daily needs, mostly rations and petroleum products, were to be issued from the cars at railheads whose locations could be changed as rapidly as the line units withdrew. This system would reduce
38553-409: The supplies and equipment on the ground around the port; the port service units themselves; and some thirty thousand refugees (most of them on the sailboats). Four American destroyers took station off Chinnamp’o, and aircraft from the British carrier HMS Theseus appeared overhead on the 5th to protect the final outloading. That morning the port commander received word from Colonel Stebbins to get
38766-483: The term " Chosŏn War" ( Chinese : 朝鮮戰爭 ; pinyin : Cháoxiǎn Zhànzhēng ) is sometimes used unofficially. The term " Hán (Korean) War" ( Chinese : 韓戰 ; pinyin : Hán Zhàn ) is most used in Taiwan (Republic of China), Hong Kong and Macau . In the US, the war was initially described by President Harry S. Truman as a " police action " as the US never formally declared war on its opponents, and
38979-471: The time being, he intended to correct deficiencies by working "on and through" his current Corps and division commanders. One deficiency he had noted was that many commanders conducted operations from command posts far behind the front. To correct this practice, he ordered "division commanders to be up with their forward battalions, and... corps commanders up with the regiment that was in the hottest action." He saw further weaknesses in leadership and staff work in
39192-507: The towns of Pyongtaek , Ansong , Changhowon-ni and Wonju to Wonpo-ri. These lines were to be occupied if and when enemy pressure forced the Eighth Army to give up Seoul, but before any deep withdrawal as far as the Naktong was required. Amid this contingency planning and through 22 December Walker gradually pulled his forward units south and pushed ROK forces north into positions generally along Line B . US I and IX Corps, withdrawing over Routes 1 and 33, bounded in three-day intervals through
39405-454: The two Corps withdrew; these forces would strike advancing PVA/KPA units and disrupt the follow-up before they themselves moved back to the bridgehead. Ridgway attached the 2nd Ranger Company to the 1st Cavalry Division in the west and the 4th Ranger Company to the 7th Division in the east. Since the 2nd Infantry Division was operating in the Wonju area where the surrounding mountains prohibited armor, he ordered McClure's 72nd Tank Battalion to
39618-574: The two of ROK II Corps and three others then in central and southern Korea to occupy the eastern half of the line and to start moving into position immediately. I and IX Corps, scheduled eventually to man the western portion of Line A , remained for the time being under orders to withdraw only as far as the Haeju-Kumhwa line. The apprehensions evident in Walker's appraisals and plans were apparent in Tokyo as well. MacArthur, although his main intention may have been to coax reinforcement, already had notified
39831-667: The various views generated during the week past and agreed on plans that embodied most of the recommendations of General Wright. MacArthur set these plans in effect on the 8th in CINCUNC (Commander in Chief, United Nations Command) Order Number 5. He listed nine lines to be defended by the Eighth Army, the southernmost based on the Naktong River in the general area of the old Pusan Perimeter . But he insisted that Walker not surrender Seoul until and unless an enemy maneuver unquestionably
40044-422: The village of Oro-ri ( 40°02′17″N 127°25′26″E / 40.038°N 127.424°E / 40.038; 127.424 ) on the Chosin Reservoir road 8 miles (13 km) northwest of Hamhung. By dark on the 5th the greater part of the 7th Infantry Division also reached the Hamhung-Hungnam area. To assist the 7th's evacuation of Hyesanjin , the attached ROK 26th Regiment had taken covering positions astride
40257-442: The war is officially referred to as the Fatherland Liberation War ( Choguk haebang chŏnjaeng ) or the " Chosŏn [Korean] War" ( 조선전쟁 ; Chosŏn chŏnjaeng ). In mainland China, the segment of the war after the intervention of the People's Volunteer Army is commonly and officially known as the "Resisting America and Assisting Korea War" ( Chinese : 抗美援朝战争 ; pinyin : Kàngměi Yuáncháo Zhànzhēng ), although
40470-430: The west for attachment to IX Corps, which might use it to punish any PVA/KPA advance on Seoul. Anticipating an opening PVA/KPA attack towards the capital on New Year's Day, Ridgway returned there on the afternoon of 31 December. According to Tarkenton's latest intelligence estimate, PVA/KPA forces were fully deployed. In the west, KPA I Corps straddled Route 1 at the Imjin with the PVA 50th Army concentrated just behind it;
40683-424: The west would be forced to follow suit. It was to meet this particular contingency that he had established Lines C and D on 12 December. On the 15th he extended his effort by dispatching the 1st Cavalry Division out along the connected Routes 2-18-17 northeast of Seoul as added protection against any strike at the capital city from the direction of Ch’unch’on. The same day, he began moving his army headquarters less
40896-422: Was "accurate and fully in accord with the policies of the United States Government." Specifically applicable to MacArthur, "Officials overseas, including military commanders, were to clear all but routine statements with their departments, and to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines or other publicity media in the United States." The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded
41109-434: Was able to see not only the Eighth Army plan for withdrawing to Line B but also Walker's plans in case the Eighth Army again was squeezed into the southeastern corner of the peninsula. Reviving an unused plan developed by the Eighth Army staff in September, Walker reestablished not only the Naktong River defenses but also three lines between the old perimeter and Pusan, each arching between the south coast and east coast around
41322-530: Was able to verify that PVA forces had moved south in strength from the Ch'ongch'on battlefields, but not how far. Until mid-December his fighter pilots and light bomber crews discovered and attacked large troop columns moving openly in daylight over main and secondary roads between the Ch’ongch’on and Pyongyang. But then, to escape Partridge's punishing attacks, the PVA reverted to their strict practices of concealment and camouflage and halted virtually all daytime movement. Walker, consequently, had no clear evidence that
41535-532: Was about to block the Eighth Army's further withdrawal to the south. Related to this stipulation, four lines lay above Seoul, the last of which, resting on the Imjin River in the west and extending eastward to the coast, was MacArthur's first delineation of positions across the entire peninsula. Here the peninsula was somewhat narrower than in the Pyongyang-Wonsan region and offered a road net that could accommodate supply movements. Earlier pessimistic reports to Washington notwithstanding, MacArthur apparently believed that
41748-417: Was administered by a US–Soviet Union Joint Commission , as agreed at the Moscow Conference , to grant independence after a five-year trusteeship. Waiting five years for independence was unpopular among Koreans, and riots broke out. To contain them, the USAMGIK banned strikes on 8 December and outlawed the PRK Revolutionary Government and People's Committees on 12 December. Following further civilian unrest,
41961-414: Was almost entirely trained and focused on counterinsurgency, rather than conventional warfare. They were equipped and advised by a force of a few hundred American officers, who were successful in helping the ROKA to subdue guerrillas and hold its own against North Korean military (Korean People's Army, KPA) forces along the 38th parallel. Approximately 8,000 South Korean soldiers and police officers died in
42174-420: Was an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula fought between North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea; DPRK) and South Korea (Republic of Korea; ROK) and their allies. North Korea was supported by the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union , while South Korea was supported by the United Nations Command (UNC) led by the United States . The conflict was thus the first major proxy war of
42387-436: Was evacuated by air from Yonpo Airfield on 15 December. The US 7th Infantry Division began loading on 14 December and most of the Division was on board by 16 December. On 17 December ROK I Corps was embarked and it landed at Samch'ok on 20 December passing to Eighth Army command. Also on 17 December an X Corps advance headquarters opened at Kyongju and Yonpo Airfield was abandoned as the perimeter shrank. From 18 to 20 December
42600-460: Was exposed after early morning of the 5th, evacuation of the port continued until evening without harassment from PVA forces. Pressed only by time and the wide range of the Yellow Sea tides, the port troops from 2 through 5 December loaded LSTs, transports of the Japanese merchant marine, a squadron of U.S. Navy troop and cargo transports, and at least 100 Korean sailboats. Aboard these craft went casualties, prisoners, and materiel sent from Pyongyang;
42813-507: Was necessary but could not reach him. No matter who gave the order, Ridgway insisted that a withdrawal to the Bridgehead Line be more than a mere move from one line to another; both Corps were to attack PVA/KPA forces who followed. The terrain could accommodate this tactic, especially in the Wonsan-Seoul corridor where the PVA/KPA would be obliged to use routes surrounded by higher ground. Ridgway expected Milburn and Coulter to leave strong forces of infantry and armor posted in this high ground as
43026-442: Was no US policy dealing with South Korea directly as a national interest, its proximity to Japan increased its importance. Said Kim: "The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led directly to President Truman's decision to intervene ... The essential point ... is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from considerations of U.S. policy toward Japan." Another consideration
43239-401: Was not included in the strategic Asian Defense Perimeter outlined by United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson . Military strategists were more concerned with the security of Europe against the Soviet Union than that of East Asia . The administration was worried a war in Korea could quickly escalate without American intervention. Diplomat John Foster Dulles stated: "To sit by while Korea
43452-770: Was not the case. Rather, the soldiers were indigenous to China, as part of China's longstanding ethnic Korean community, and were recruited to the PLA in the same way as any other Chinese citizen. According to the first official census in 1949, the population of North Korea numbered 9,620,000, and by mid-1950, North Korean forces numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 troops, organized into 10 infantry divisions, one tank division, and one air force division, with 210 fighter planes and 280 tanks, who captured scheduled objectives and territory, among them Kaesong, Chuncheon , Uijeongbu , and Ongjin. Their forces included 274 T-34-85 tanks, 200 artillery pieces, 110 attack bombers, 150 Yak fighter planes, and 35 reconnaissance aircraft. In addition to
43665-459: Was not yet three-quarters ashore. The ships carrying the remaining 3rd Division troops were in Pusan harbor, however, and following Ridgway's 29 December order that these ships be unloaded without delay, the balance of the 3rd Division was ashore and en route to the division's assembly area south of Kyongju by nightfall on 30 December. Since it was nevertheless obvious that X Corps as currently constituted could not move forward for some time, Ridgway on
43878-553: Was picked up by escorts in a following vehicle. At the 24th Division clearing station nearby, he was pronounced dead of multiple head injuries. In routine anticipation of casualties before Walker's death, MacArthur had obtained the agreement of the Army chief of staff that Walker's successor, if one was needed, should be Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway , then serving on the Department of the Army staff as deputy chief of staff for operations and administration. On receiving word of Walker's death, MacArthur telephoned Collins in Washington to report
44091-498: Was reduced to a single man over the course of engagements by the ROKA 8th Division . The second was annihilated by a two-battalion hammer-and-anvil maneuver by units of the ROKA 6th Division , resulting in a toll of 584 KPA guerrillas (480 killed, 104 captured) and 69 ROKA troops killed, plus 184 wounded. By the spring of 1950, guerrilla activity had mostly subsided; the border, too, was calm. By 1949, South Korean and US military actions had reduced indigenous communist guerrillas in
44304-426: Was screening the assembly of assault forces and supplies. Small KPA attacks below Yonch’on and from Hwach’on toward Ch’unch’on seemed designed to search out weaknesses in the Eighth Army line in those areas and indicated the possibility of a converging attack on Seoul south along Route 33 and southwest over the road from Ch’unch’on. A likely date for opening such an attack, because of a possible psychological advantage to
44517-429: Was the Soviet reaction if the US intervened. The Truman administration was fearful a Korean war was a diversionary assault that would escalate to a general war in Europe once the US committed in Korea. At the same time, "[t]here was no suggestion from anyone that the United Nations or the United States could back away from [the conflict]". Yugoslavia —a possible Soviet target because of the Tito-Stalin split —was vital to
44730-463: Was the withdrawal of United Nations (UN) forces from North Korea that took place from 2–25 December 1950. On 30 September Republic of Korea Army (ROK) forces crossed the 38th Parallel , the de facto border between North and South Korea on the east coast of the Korean peninsula and this was followed by a general UN offensive into North Korea to pursue the shattered North Korean Korean People's Army (KPA). Within one month UN forces were approaching
44943-448: Was to move on Route 33, occupy the right sector of the new army front, and reinforce the weak ROK II Corps in protecting the army east flank in the Yesong valley. US I Corps was to withdraw to the west sector of the new line over Route 1 and, while passing through Pyongyang, destroy any abandoned materiel found within the city. I Corps’ demolition assignment was likely to be sizable. Aside from organizational and individual equipment lost by
45156-466: Was to protect that area, load the supplies and equipment stockpiled there and then abandon the area. By nightfall on 4 December, 3rd Infantry Division commander General Robert H. Soule concentrated the bulk of his division in the Hamhung-Hungnam area. With the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment attached, he deployed on the 5th to defend a sector anchored below Yonpo Airfield southwest of Hungnam and arching northwest through Chigyong southwest of Hamhung to
45369-452: Was to rebuild his unit. But while Keiser's immediate and main task was to revive the 2nd Division, Walker wanted him also to reconnoiter as far as Hwach’on , more than 50 miles (80 km) east of Munsan-ni, in case it became necessary to employ 2nd Division troops in those areas guarded by ROK units of doubtful ability. Walker attached the Turkish Brigade to the 2nd Division. Hurt less by casualties than by disorganization and equipment losses,
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