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Army Air Forces Training Command

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225-656: The United States Army Air Forces during World War II had major subordinate Commands below the Air Staff level. These Commands were organized along functional missions. One such Command was the Flying Training Command (FTC). It began as Air Corps Flying Training Command on 23 January 1942, was redesignated Army Air Forces Flying Training Command (AAFTC) on 15 March 1942, and merged with Army Air Forces Technical Training Command to become Army Air Forces Training Command on 31 July 1943. Continuing service after

450-933: A segregated basis. A flight training center was set up at the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama . Despite the handicap—caused by the segregation policy—of not having an experienced training cadre as with other AAF units, the Tuskegee Airmen distinguished themselves in combat with the 332nd Fighter Group . The Tuskegee training program produced 673 black fighter pilots, 253 B-26 Marauder pilots, and 132 navigators. The vast majority of African-American airmen, however, did not fare as well. Mainly draftees , most did not fly or maintain aircraft. Their largely menial duties, indifferent or hostile leadership, and poor morale led to serious dissatisfaction and several violent incidents. Women served more successfully as part of

675-585: A "disturbing failure to follow through on orders". To streamline the AAF in preparation for war, with a goal of centralized planning and decentralized execution of operations, in October 1941 Arnold submitted to the WDGS essentially the same reorganization plan it had rejected a year before, this time crafted by Chief of Air Staff Brig. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz . When this plan was not given any consideration, Arnold reworded

900-617: A "fiasco" in the media, investigating boards in 1933–1934 recommended organizational and modernization changes that again set the Air Corps on the path to autonomy and eventual separation from the Army. A force of 2,320 aircraft was recommended by the Drum Board, and authorized by Congress in June 1936, but appropriations to build up the force were denied by the administration until 1939, when

1125-615: A "team player". The open insurgency between 1920 and 1935 of airmen foreseeing a need for an independent air force in order to develop fully the potential of airpower had cost the careers of two of its near-legendary lights, Foulois and Mitchell, and nearly cost the reputation of two others, Pratt and Henry H. Arnold . In terms of the principle of civilian control of the military in peacetime, their tactics and behavior were clearly inappropriate. The political struggle had temporarily alienated supporters in Congress, had been counterproductive of

1350-614: A 12-week course, but it expanded to 16 weeks in 1943. It also began as a uniform program for all officer candidates, but after 1943 the last phase of training was divided into specialized training for adjutants and personnel officers, as well as supply, mess, intelligence, guard company, and training officers. Later, it expanded to include physical training and technical officers. The Army Air Forces also commissioned some individuals with special qualifications directly from civilian life. These people required some military training, so Training Command also set up an Officer Training School (OTS) at

1575-515: A 36-week course for junior and mid-career officers that included military aviation theory. The Bombardment Section, under the direction of its chief, Major Harold L. George , became influential in the development of doctrine and its dissemination throughout the Air Corps. Nine of its instructors became known throughout the Air Corps as the " Bomber Mafia ", eight of whom (including George) went on to be generals during World War II. Conversely, pursuit tacticians, primarily Capt. Claire Chennault , Chief of

1800-476: A Chief of Air Staff and three deputies. This wartime structure remained essentially unchanged for the remainder of hostilities. In October 1944 Arnold, to begin a process of reorganization for reducing the structure, proposed to eliminate the AC/AS, Training and move his office into OC&R, changing it to Operations, Training and Requirements (OT&R) but the mergers were never effected. On 23 August 1945, after

2025-595: A Women's Army Auxiliary Corps for service with the Army of the United States. In September 1943 the WAAC was replaced by the Women's Army Corps (WAC). The measure permitted the enlistment of 150,000 women between the ages of twenty-one and forty-five, but the executive order which established the corps set an initial strength limit of 25,000. It was typical of the AAF, with its long-cherished ideas of independence, to desire

2250-538: A Zone of Interior "training and supply agency", but from the start AAF officers viewed this as a "paper" restriction negated by Arnold's place on both the Joint and Combined Chiefs, which gave him strategic planning authority for the AAF, a viewpoint that was formally sanctioned by the War Department in mid-1943 and endorsed by the president. The Circular No. 59 reorganization directed the AAF to operate under

2475-794: A base. As their numbers and utility declined, they were replaced by a series of 50 twin-engine and single-engine small transports and used for staff duties. Pilot training was conducted between 1927 and 1937 in the Consolidated PT-3 trainer, followed by the Stearman PT-13 and variants after 1937. By 1933 the Air Corps expanded to a tactical strength of 50 squadrons: 21 pursuit, 13 observation, 12 bombardment, and 4 attack. All were understrength in aircraft and men, particularly officers, which resulted in most being commanded by junior officers (commonly first lieutenants) instead of by majors as authorized. The last open-cockpit fighter used by

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2700-566: A blueprint. After war began, Congress enacted the First War Powers Act on 18 December 1941 endowing President Franklin D. Roosevelt with virtual carte blanche to reorganize the executive branch as he found necessary. Under it, on 28 February 1942, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9082 , based on Marshall's recommendation and the work of McNarney's committee. The EO changed Arnold's title to Commanding General, Army Air Forces effective 9 March 1942, making him co-equal with

2925-569: A bright spot. The first action to repair the damaged image of the Air Corps involved the movement of ten YB-10s from Bolling Field to Alaska, ostensibly for an airfield survey, but timed to coincide with the release of the Baker Board's report in July. The successful development of the B-10 and subsequent orders for more than 150 (including its B-12 variant) continued the hegemony of the bomber within

3150-419: A change of mood at the War Department, and of dubious legality. By November 1941, on the eve of U.S. entry into the war, the division of authority within the Army as a whole, caused by the activation of Army GHQ a year before, had led to a "battle of memos" between it and the WDGS over administering the AAF, prompting Marshall to state that he had "the poorest command post in the Army" when defense commands showed

3375-457: A complex division of administrative control performed by a policy staff, an operating staff, and the support commands (formerly "field activities" of the OCAC). The former field activities operated under a "bureau" structure, with both policy and operating functions vested in staff-type officers who often exercised command and policy authority without responsibility for results, a system held over from

3600-609: A controversial move, the AAF Technical Training Command began leasing resort hotels and apartment buildings for large-scale training sites (accommodation for 90,000 existed in Miami Beach alone). The leases were negotiated for the AAF by the Corps of Engineers, often to the economic detriment of hotel owners in rental rates, wear and tear clauses, and short-notice to terminate leases. In December 1943,

3825-429: A deleterious effect on operational training and threatened to overwhelm the capacity of the old Air Corps groups to provide experienced cadres or to absorb graduates of the expanded training program to replace those transferred. Since 1939 the overall level of experience among the combat groups had fallen to such an extent that when the demand for replacements in combat was factored in, the entire operational training system

4050-720: A general autonomy within the War Department (similar to that of the Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy ) until the end of the war, while its commanders would cease lobbying for independence. Marshall, a strong proponent of airpower, understood that the Air Force would likely achieve its independence following the war. Soon after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, in recognition of importance of

4275-659: A group of General Staff officers, recommended in 1923 that the Air Service be augmented by an offensive force of bombardment and pursuit units under the command of Army general headquarters in time of war, and many of its recommendations became Army regulations. The War Department desired to implement the Lassiter Board's recommendations, but the administration of President Calvin Coolidge chose instead to economize by radically cutting military budgets, particularly

4500-510: A lack of legally specified duties and responsibilities, the new position of Assistant Secretary of War for Air , held by F. Trubee Davison from July 1926 to March 1933, proved of little help in promoting autonomy for the air arm. The Air Corps Act gave authorization to carry out a five-year expansion program. However, a lack of appropriations caused the beginning of the program to be delayed until 1 July 1927. Patrick proposed an increase to 63 tactical squadrons (from an existing 32) to maintain

4725-580: A long-range capability for these new single-engined fighters was not undertaken until combat losses of bombers forced the issue. Notable fighters developed during the late 1930s and early 1940s were the Bell P-39 Airacobra (first flown April 1938), Curtiss P-40 Warhawk (October 1938), Lockheed P-38 Lightning (January 1939), North American P-51 Mustang (October 1940), and Republic P-47 Thunderbolt (May 1941). Technological development of fighters occurred so rapidly that by December 1941 both

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4950-698: A major reorganization and consolidation on 29 March 1943. The four main directorates and seventeen subordinate directorates (the "operating staff") were abolished as an unnecessary level of authority, and execution of policies was removed from the staffs to be assigned solely to field organizations along functional lines. The policy functions of the directorates were reorganized and consolidated into offices regrouped along conventional military lines under six assistant chiefs of air staff (AC/AS): Personnel; Intelligence; Operations, Commitments, and Requirements (OC&R); Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution (MM&D); Plans; and Training. Command of Headquarters AAF resided in

5175-454: A military force trained to defeat the enemy forces threatening the United States. When the Air Corps began to lay its plans for expansion in the fall of 1938, one of its major tasks was the provision of facilities for the additional thousands of men to be trained in (1) basic military courtesies, customs and traditions, to include classification of personnel for advanced training. (2) Flying and flight crew operations of military aircraft, and (3)

5400-645: A modification of the Joint Action statement on coastal defense issued in 1926, was not endorsed by the Joint Army-Navy Board and never had authority other than a personal agreement between the two heads of service. Though the Navy repudiated the statement when Pratt retired in 1934, the Air Corps clung to the mission, and provided itself with the basis for development of long-range bombers and creating new doctrine to employ them. The formulation of theories of strategic bombing gave new impetus to

5625-430: A month's preparatory training at Scott Field , Illinois, before they went to Chanute for specialized training. In 1940 the War Department authorized the establishment of Air Corps enlisted replacement centers for the initial training of recruits. The Air Corps established the first of these centers at Jefferson Barracks , Missouri, in the summer of 1940, though formal activation did not occur until 21 February 1941. Since

5850-570: A multiplicity of branches and organizations, reduced the WDGS greatly in size, and proportionally increased the representation of the air forces members on it to 50%. In addition to dissolving both Army General Headquarters and the chiefs of the combat arms , and assigning their training functions to the Army Ground Forces, War Department Circular 59 reorganized the Army Air Forces, disbanding both Air Force Combat Command and

6075-794: A new school was opened in February 1943 at Avenger Field , Sweetwater, Texas , and training at Houston soon phased out. On 5 August 1943, the WAFS and the women of Cochran's WFTD school were united as the WASP. Cochran was named Director of Women Pilots, and Nancy Love continued in the WASP as executive of the Ferrying Division of the Air Transport Command . Classes entered the WASP program at monthly intervals. A total of 18 classes completed training: 8 in 1943 and 10 in 1944. Of

6300-427: A nine-hour course. All men were tested during the recruit training and indoctrination period to determine their eligibility for assignment to meet the enlarged technical training goals. A soldier's qualification card (WD AGO Form 20), which occupied a central place in the scheme of classifying and assigning enlisted men, was filled out partly at the AAF reception center prior to entering training and more fully later at

6525-523: A perception of resistance and even obstruction then by the bureaucracy in the War Department General Staff (WDGS), much of which was attributable to lack of funds, the Air Corps later made great strides in the 1930s, both organizationally and in doctrine. A strategy stressing precision bombing of industrial targets by heavily armed, long-range bombers emerged, formulated by the men who would become its leaders. A major step toward

6750-574: A plan that would have included the purchase of 144 four-engine bombers but approval was reversed in July when the moratorium against the long-range bomber program was imposed by the Joint Board. The purchase of 67 B-17s (five squadrons) in FY 1940 as an increment of the Woodring program, using carryover funds, was cancelled by Craig. The moratorium also resulted from the enmity of the Navy incurred by

6975-519: A profusion of pursuit, observation, and bomber aircraft during its 15-year history. The advent of the new generation of monoplanes and the emergence of strategic bombardment doctrine led to many designs in the mid and late 1930s that were still in use when the United States entered World War II . Among the key technology items developed were oxygen and cabin pressurization systems, engine superchargers (systems essential for high-altitude combat), advanced radio communication systems, such as VHF radios, and

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7200-471: A proposal for creation of an air staff, unification of the air arm under one commander, and equality with the ground and supply forces. Arnold's proposal was immediately opposed by the General Staff in all respects, rehashing its traditional doctrinal argument that, in the event of war, the Air Corps would have no mission independent of support of the ground forces. Marshall implemented a compromise that

7425-516: A revision of the doctrinal guide for the Air Corps, training regulation TR 440-15 Employment of the Air Forces of the Army . A year earlier MacArthur had changed TR 440-15 to clarify "the Air Corps's place in the scheme of national defense and ... (to do away with) ... misconceptions and interbranch prejudices." The General Staff characterized its latest revision as a "compromise" with airpower advocates, to mitigate public criticism of

7650-434: A ruling that it could foresee no use for a long-range bomber in future conflict. As a direct result, the last planned order of long-range bombers (67 B-17s) was cancelled by Craig and a moratorium on further development of them was put into effect by restricting R&D funding to medium and light bombers. This policy would last less than a year, as it went against not only the trends of technological development, but against

7875-589: A separate air force came in March 1935, when the command of all combat air units within the Continental United States (CONUS) was centralized under a single organization called the "General Headquarters Air Force" . Since 1920, control of aviation units had resided with commanders of the corps areas (a peacetime ground forces administrative echelon), following the model established by commanding General John J. Pershing during World War I. In 1924,

8100-490: A separate women's corps completely independent of the women serving with other branches of the Army. WAACs went through indoctrination training at Fort Des Moines, Iowa under Army Service Forces (ASF) auspices. Once completed, they began to arrive at Army Air Force stations in September. The influx of 27,000 recruits did not pose a major training problem for the AAF. There was no need for elaborate technical training because

8325-473: A standard of combat proficiency had barely surpassed the total originally authorized by the first expansion program in 1940. The extant training establishment, in essence a "self-training" system, was inadequate in assets, organization, and pedagogy to train units wholesale. Individual training of freshly minted pilots occupied an inordinate amount of the available time to the detriment of unit proficiency. The ever-increasing numbers of new groups being formed had

8550-479: A subordinate element of Army General Headquarters, which would be activated to control all Army units in case of war mobilization. In anticipation of military intervention in Cuba in 1933, the headquarters had been created on 1 October but not staffed. The Drum Board of 1933 had first endorsed the concept, but as a means of reintegrating the Air Corps into control by the General Staff, in effect reining it in. Among

8775-496: A subpost, took care of advanced flying training. In July 1939 the full course of flying instruction was shortened in length from a year to nine months—three for each phase. The number of primary contract schools expanded to 41 by the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and to 60 at various times in 1943. To the flying cadets, the Contract Flying Schools (CFS) were just another training assignment—although

9000-458: A temporary, nonstandard, headquarters in August 1944. This provisional fighter wing was set up to separate control of its P-38 groups from its P-51 groups. This headquarters was referred to as "XV Fighter Command (Provisional)". Eight air divisions served as an additional layer of command and control for the vast organization, capable of acting independently if the need arose. Inclusive within

9225-437: A thirteenth aircraft for stress testing, with deliveries made from January to August 1937. The cost of the aircraft disturbed Secretary of War Harry Woodring , who denied requests for further purchases, so that although the air arm embraced strategic bombing as its primary doctrine after the creation of GHQ Air Force, by 1938 there were still only thirteen strategic bombers on hand. On 18 March 1938 Secretary Woodring implemented

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9450-454: The 3rd Attack Wing in 1932, protecting the southern border , at which time the 1st became the 1st Pursuit Wing. The three wings became the foundation of General Headquarters Air Force upon its activation in 1935. The Air Corps adopted a new color scheme for painting its aircraft in 1927, heretofore painted olive drab . The wings and tails of aircraft were painted chrome yellow , with the words "U.S. ARMY" displayed in large black lettering on

9675-399: The Air Transport Command made deliveries of almost 270,000 aircraft worldwide while losing only 1,013 in the process. The operation of the stateside depots was done largely by more than 300,000 civilian maintenance employees, many of them women, freeing a like number of Air Forces mechanics for overseas duty. In all facets of the service, more than 420,000 civilian personnel were employed by

9900-638: The Army Air Forces Technical Training Command on 31 July 1943. Constituted and established on 23 January 1942. Its mission was to train pilots, flying specialists, and combat crews. Re-designated on or about 15 March 1942, after the Army Air Forces became an autonomous arm of the United States Army . During its lifetime, the command struggled with the challenge of a massive wartime expansion of

10125-475: The Army Service Forces , but the AAF increasingly exerted influence on the curricula of these courses in anticipation of future independence. African-Americans comprised approximately six per cent of this force (145,242 personnel in June 1944). In 1940, pressured by Eleanor Roosevelt and some Northern members of Congress , General Arnold agreed to accept blacks for pilot training, albeit on

10350-607: The Curtiss P-1 Hawk (1926–1930) and Boeing P-12 (1929–1935) families, and before the 1934 introduction of the all-metal monoplane, most front-line bombers were canvas-and-wood variants of the radial engined Keystone LB-6 (60 LB-5A, LB-6 and LB-7 bombers) and B-3A (127 B-3A, B-4A, B-5, and B-6A bombers) designs. Between 1927 and 1934, the Curtiss O-1 Falcon was the most numerous of the 19 different types and series of observation craft and its A-3 variant

10575-630: The Materiel Division . Of the new law and organization, however, Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate in the official history of the United States Army Air Forces concluded that: The bill which was finally enacted purported to be a compromise, but it leaned heavily on the Morrow recommendations. The Air Corps Act of 2 July 1926 effected no fundamental innovation. The change in designation meant no change in status:

10800-486: The Miami Beach Training Center , Florida to provide six weeks of military instruction. Most OTS students were 30 years old or more, with the bulk of them in their 30s or 40s. They came from all walks of life, but most were teachers , businessmen, or professionals such as attorneys and accountants. Also, the value of World War I veterans ("Retreads") who had obtained professional degrees between

11025-656: The Norden bombsight . As a further consequence of the Air Mail scandal, the Baker Board reviewed the performance of Air Corps aircraft and recognized that civilian aircraft were far superior to planes developed solely to Air Corps specifications. Following up on its recommendation, the Air Corps purchased and tested a Douglas DC-2 as the XC-32, which subsequently became the flying headquarters of Gen. Andrews. The DC-2 so exceeded Air Corps specifications that 17 were purchased under

11250-567: The Quartermaster Corps and then by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers , because of a lack of familiarity with Air Corps requirements. The outbreak of war in Europe and the resulting need for a wide variety of facilities for both operations and training within the Continental United States necessitated comprehensive changes of policy, first in September 1941 by giving the responsibility for acquisition and development of bases directly to

11475-690: The United States Air Force , James Robinson Risner and Charles E. Yeager . Air crew needs resulted in the successful training of 43,000 bombardiers , 49,000 navigators , and 309,000 flexible gunners, many of whom also specialized in other aspects of air crew duties. 7,800 men qualified as B-29 flight engineers and 1,000 more as radar operators in night fighters , all of whom received commissions. Almost 1.4 million men received technical training as aircraft mechanics, electronics specialists, and other technicians. Non-aircraft related support services were provided by airmen trained by

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11700-481: The tables of organization . Administratively it organized the forces into four geographical districts (which later became the first four numbered air forces) that paralleled the four field army headquarters created in 1933. The General Staff perceived its creation as a means of lessening Air Corps autonomy, not increasing it, however, and GHQ Air Force was a "coordinate component" equal to the Air Corps, not subject to its control. The organizations reported separately to

11925-430: The " Prop and Wings " as its branch insignia through its disestablishment in 1947. Patrick became Chief of the Air Corps and Brig. Gen. James E. Fechet continued as his first assistant chief. On 17 July 1926, two lieutenant colonels were promoted to brigadier general for four-year terms as assistant chiefs of Air Corps: Frank P. Lahm , to command the new Air Corps Training Center , and William E. Gillmore, in command of

12150-430: The 13 centers were inactivated, while others moved to technical training centers such as Amarillo Field , Texas, that had previously not had replacement training centers. As lessons from combat theaters found their way into the training program, more attention was paid to camouflage, individual security, defense against air attack, scouting and patrolling, and recognition of American aircraft--subjects combined in 1944 into

12375-508: The 25,000 women who applied for flight training, 1,830 were accepted, and of those, 1,074 received their wings. Entrance requirements remained essentially the same as those for the WAFS, except the age requirement was dropped from 21 to 18, and the flight experience was set at only 200 hours. That requirement was later dropped to 35 hours, and the 200-horsepower rating requirement was eventually eliminated. United States Army Air Forces The United States Army Air Forces ( USAAF or AAF )

12600-670: The 332d and three of its squadrons—the 99th, 100th and 301st—earned Distinguished Unit Citations . The Women Airforce Service Pilots of World War II were pioneers, the first licensed women pilots in the United States to fly military aircraft for a military service. The WASP was formed in August 1943 from two earlier, relatively independent programs for women pilots: Women's Auxiliary Ferrying Squadron (WAFS) and Women's Flying Training Detachment (WFTD). As early as 1939, Jackie Cochran had suggested recruiting and training women to fly military aircraft. On 7 October 1942, shortly after

12825-502: The 99th were formed into the 332d Fighter Group . As the war progressed the 332d's squadrons established an enviable combat record. On 11 July 1944, P-51 Mustangs from the 332d Fighter Group shot down 18 enemy fighters while flying escort for a large bomber formation. On 24 March 1945, while escorting B-17 Flying Fortresses during a raid on a tank factory in Berlin , the 332d's pilots downed three German jet fighters. For their actions,

13050-616: The AAF came into being in June 1941. Three other long-range bombers began development during this period, though only mock-ups were produced before World War II: the B-29 (study begun in 1938), the Consolidated B-32 Dominator (June 1940), and the Convair B-36 Peacemaker (April 1941). In a special message to Congress on 12 January 1939, President Roosevelt advised that the threat of a new war made

13275-605: The AAF created a reserve pool that held qualified pilot candidates until they could be called to active duty, rather than losing them in the draft. By 1944, this pool became surplus, and 24,000 were sent to the Army Ground Forces for retraining as infantry , and 6,000 to the Army Service Forces . Pilot standards were changed to reduce the minimum age from 20 to 18, and eliminated the educational requirement of at least two years of college. Two fighter pilot beneficiaries of this change went on to become brigadier generals in

13500-447: The AAF early opened to women virtually its entire roster of job specialties and schools. On 20 November 1943 WACs were declared eligible to attend any noncombat training course attended by AAF men, provided that the training would in a station commander's opinion increase an individual's job efficiency or would enable her to be utilized in some higher skill for which she had unusual aptitude or civilian background. The job training of women

13725-502: The AAF for the first time in its history, and then in April 1942 by delegation of the enormous task by Headquarters AAF to its user field commands and numbered air forces. In addition to the construction of new permanent bases and the building of numerous bombing and gunnery ranges, the AAF utilized civilian pilot schools, training courses conducted at college and factory sites, and officer training detachments at colleges. In early 1942, in

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13950-468: The AAF reached a war-time peak of 783 airfields in the Continental United States. At the end of the war, the AAF was using almost 20 million acres of land, an area as large as Massachusetts , Connecticut , Vermont , and New Hampshire combined. By the end of World War II, the USAAF had created 16 numbered air forces ( First through Fifteenth and Twentieth ) distributed worldwide to prosecute

14175-471: The AAF to use WACs with special skills found in only a very few women, like those who were skilled as chemists, cartographers, geodetic computers, topographers, sanitary inspectors, and even dog-trainers. But as might be expected, a high percentage—-about 50 percent—-of the WACs held administrative or office jobs. These clerks, typists, and stenographers were doing what they had been doing in civilian life. Until

14400-590: The AAF. The huge increases in aircraft inventory resulted in a similar increase in personnel, expanding sixteen-fold in less than three years following its formation, and changed the personnel policies under which the Air Service and Air Corps had operated since the National Defense Act of 1920. No longer could pilots represent 90% of commissioned officers. The need for large numbers of specialists in administration and technical services resulted in

14625-529: The Air Corps expanded from 15 to 30 groups by the end of the year. On 7 December 1941 the number of activated combat groups had reached 67, with 49 still within the Continental United States. Of the CONUS groups (the "strategic reserve"), 21 were engaged in operational training or still being organized and were unsuitable for deployment. Of the 67 combat groups, 26 were classified as bombardment: 13 Heavy Bomb groups ( B-17 Flying Fortress and B-24 Liberator ), and

14850-557: The Air Corps found entirely inadequate, naming Arnold as acting "Deputy Chief of Staff for Air" but rejecting all organizational points of his proposal. GHQ Air Force instead was assigned to the control of Army General Headquarters, although the latter was a training and not an operational component, when it was activated in November 1940. A division of the GHQ Air Force into four geographical air defense districts on 19 October 1940

15075-457: The Air Corps had obtained a mission in coastal defense that justified both the creation of a centralized strike force and the development of four-engined bombers, and over the resistance of the General Staff lobbied for another mission, strategic bombardment, with which it could persuasively argue for independence from the Army. The cost of the General Staff's resistance in terms of preparedness had been severe, however. Its policies had resulted in

15300-480: The Air Corps in October 1940 saw fifteen new general officer billets created. By the end of World War II, 320 generals were authorized for service within the wartime AAF. The Air Corps operated 156 installations at the beginning of 1941. An airbase expansion program had been underway since 1939, attempting to keep pace with the increase in personnel, units, and aircraft, using existing municipal and private facilities where possible, but it had been mismanaged, first by

15525-410: The Air Corps increased in number, so did higher command echelons. The 2nd Wing , activated in 1922 as part of the Air Service, remained the only wing organization in the new Air Corps until 1929, when it was redesignated the 2nd Bombardment Wing in anticipation of the activation of the 1st Bombardment Wing , providing a bombardment wing on each coast. The 1st Bomb Wing was activated in 1931, followed by

15750-490: The Air Corps mission remain tied to that of the land forces. Airpower advocates achieved a centralized control of air units under an air commander, while the WDGS divided authority within the air arm and assured a continuing policy of support of ground operations as its primary role. GHQ Air Force organized combat groups administratively into a strike force of three wings deployed to the Atlantic , Pacific, and Gulf coasts but

15975-486: The Air Corps on 12 May 1938 when it widely publicized the interception of the Italian ocean liner Rex by three B-17s while it was 610 nautical miles (1,100 km) off-shore of New York City. Possibly under pressure from the Navy, Craig placed a limit of 100 nautical miles (190 km) on all future off-shore flights by the Army. The services together issued a revised Joint Action statement in November reasserting that

16200-597: The Air Corps still had only 800 first-line combat aircraft and 76 bases, including 21 major installations and depots. American fighter aircraft were inferior to the British Spitfire and Hurricane , and German Messerschmitt Bf 110 and 109 . Ralph Ingersoll wrote in late 1940 after visiting Britain that the "best American fighter planes already delivered to the British are used by them either as advanced trainers—or for fighting equally obsolete Italian planes in

16425-626: The Air Corps that resulted in a feasibility study for a 35-ton 4-engined bomber (the Boeing XB-15 ). While it was later found to be unsuitable for combat because the power of existing engines was inadequate for its weight, the XB-15 led to the design of the smaller Model 299, later to become the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress , whose first flight was at the end of July 1935. By that time the Air Corps had two projects in place for

16650-549: The Air Corps was still a combatant branch of the Army with less prestige than the Infantry. The position of the air arm within the Department of War remained essentially the same as before, that is, the flying units were under the operational control of the various ground forces corps area commands and not the Air Corps, which remained responsible for procurement and maintenance of aircraft, supply, and training. Because of

16875-492: The Air Corps years. The concept of an "operating staff", or directorates, was modeled on the RAF system that had been much admired by the observer groups sent over in 1941, and resulted from a desire to place experts in various aspects of military aviation into key positions of implementation. However functions often overlapped, communication and coordination between the divisions failed or was ignored, policy prerogatives were usurped by

17100-458: The Air Corps". A lawyer and a banker, Lovett had prior experience with the aviation industry that translated into realistic production goals and harmony in integrating the plans of the AAF with those of the Army as a whole. Lovett initially believed that President Roosevelt's demand following the attack on Pearl Harbor for 60,000 airplanes in 1942 and 125,000 in 1943 was grossly ambitious. However, working closely with General Arnold and engaging

17325-596: The Air Corps, General Headquarters Air Force, and the ground forces' corps area commanders and thus became the first air organization of the U.S. Army to control its own installations and support personnel. The peak size of the AAF during World War II was over 2.4 million men and women in service and nearly 80,000 aircraft by 1944, and 783 domestic bases in December 1943. By " V-E Day ", the Army Air Forces had 1.25 million men stationed overseas and operated from more than 1,600 airfields worldwide. The Army Air Forces

17550-448: The Air Corps, schools received a flat fee of $ 1,170 for each graduate and $ 18 per flying hour for students eliminated from training. Trainers used were primarily Fairchild PT-19s , PT-17 Stearmans and Ryan PT-22s , although a wide variety of other types could be found at the airfields. At one time or another during World War II, 64 contract schools conducted primary training, with a maximum of 56 schools operating at any one time. During

17775-533: The Air Corps, the Boeing P-26 Peashooter , came into service in 1933 and bridged the gap between the biplane and more modern fighters. The Air Corps was called upon in early 1934 to deliver mail in the wake of the Air Mail scandal , involving the postmaster general and heads of the airlines. Despite an embarrassing performance that resulted from numerous crashes and 13 fatalities and was deemed

18000-606: The Air Corps, which had been the statutory military aviation branch since 1926 and the GHQ Air Force, which had been activated in 1935 to quiet the demands of airmen for an independent Air Force similar to the Royal Air Force which had already been established in the United Kingdom . Although other nations already had separate air forces independent of their army or navy (such as the Royal Air Force and

18225-444: The Air Corps, while 82 per cent of enlisted members assigned to AAF units and bases had the Air Corps as their combat arm branch. While officially the air arm was the Army Air Forces , the term Air Corps persisted colloquially among the public as well as veteran airmen; in addition, the singular Air Force often crept into popular and even official use, reflected by the designation Air Force Combat Command in 1941–42. This misnomer

18450-469: The Air Corps. The separation of the Air Corps from control of its combat units caused problems of unity of command that became more acute as the Air Corps enlarged in preparation for World War II. This was resolved by the creation of the Army Air Forces (AAF), making both organizations subordinate to the new higher echelon. On 20 June 1941 , the Army Air Corps' existence as the primary air arm of

18675-624: The Army , on 15 April 1940. In the fall of 1937, the Army War College 's course on the use of airpower reiterated the General Staff position and taught that airpower was of limited value when employed independently. Using attaché reports from both Spain and Ethiopia , and endorsed by a senior Air Corps instructor, Col. Byron Q. Jones , the course declared that the Flying Fortress concept had "died in Spain", and that airpower

18900-496: The Army General Headquarters had the power to detach units from AFCC at will by creating task forces, the WDGS still controlled the AAF budget and finances, and the AAF had no jurisdiction over units of the Army Service Forces providing "housekeeping services" as support nor of air units, bases, and personnel located outside the continental United States. Arnold and Marshall agreed that the AAF would enjoy

19125-486: The Army until 1947, when it was legally abolished by legislation establishing the Department of the Air Force . The Air Corps was renamed by the United States Congress largely as a compromise between the advocates of a separate air arm and those of the traditionalist Army high command who viewed the aviation arm as an auxiliary branch to support the ground forces. Although its members worked to promote

19350-484: The Army's. The Lampert Committee of the House of Representatives in December 1925 proposed a unified air force independent of the Army and Navy, plus a department of defense to coordinate the three armed services. However another board, headed by Dwight Morrow , was appointed in September 1925 by Coolidge ostensibly to study the "best means of developing and applying aircraft in national defense" but in reality to minimize

19575-539: The B-17 while belatedly recognizing that coordinated air-ground support had been long neglected, decided that it would order only two-engined "light" bombers in fiscal years 1939 through 1941. It also rejected further advancement of Project A, the development program for a very long range bomber. In collaboration with the Navy, the Joint Board (whose senior member was Army Chief of Staff Gen. Malin Craig ) on 29 June 1938 issued

19800-527: The BTC. This form was kept current throughout their career by the addition of pertinent information; it followed him wherever he went until he died in the service or was discharged, at which time the form was forwarded to the Adjutant General for permanent filing. The AAF used a series of test batteries and interviews to ascertain the job experience and mental equipment of recruits. An important phase of

20025-481: The Chief of Staff, the Air Corps as the service element of the air arm, and GHQAF as the tactical element. However, all GHQ Air Force's members, along with members of units stationed overseas and under the control of local ground commanders, remained part of the Air Corps. This dual status and division of authority hampered the development of Air Corps for the next six years, as it had the Air Service during World War I, and

20250-557: The General Staff planned for a wartime activation of an Army general headquarters (GHQ), similar to the American Expeditionary Forces model of World War I , with a GHQ Air Force as a subordinate component. Both were created in 1933 when a small conflict with Cuba seemed possible following a coup d'état but was not activated. The activation of GHQ Air Force represented a compromise between strategic airpower advocates and ground force commanders who demanded that

20475-558: The General Staff. The War Plans Division of the Army reacted to the recommendations of the Baker Board by insisting that men and modern equipment for seven army divisions be procured before any increase in the Air Corps was begun, and opposed any immediate attempt to bring the Air Corps up to the 1,800 plane-strength first authorized in 1926, for fear of antagonizing the Navy. President Roosevelt approved an open-ended program to increase strength to 2,320 aircraft (albeit without any proviso for funding) in August 1934, and Secretary Dern approved

20700-543: The German Luftwaffe ), the AAF remained a part of the Army until a defense reorganization in the post-war period resulted in the passage by the United States Congress of the National Security Act of 1947 with the creation of an independent United States Air Force in September 1947. In its expansion and conduct of the war, the AAF became more than just an arm of the greater organization. By

20925-789: The Joint Action Statement, but the newest revision parroted the anti-autonomy conclusions of the Drum and Baker Boards, and reasserted its long-held position (and that of the Secretary Dern) that auxiliary support of the ground forces was the primary mission of the Air Corps. TR 440-15 did acknowledge some doctrinal principles asserted by the ACTS (including the necessity of destroying an enemy's air forces and concentrating air forces against primary objectives) and recognized that future wars would probably entail some missions "beyond

21150-513: The Low Countries in May 1940, Roosevelt asked Congress for a supplemental appropriation of nearly a billion dollars, a production program of 50,000 aircraft a year, and a military air force of 50,000 aircraft (of which 36,500 would be Army). Accelerated programs followed in the Air Corps that repeatedly revised expansion goals, resulting in plans for 84 combat groups, 7,799 combat aircraft, and

21375-527: The Middle East. That is all they are good for." RAF crews he interviewed said that by spring 1941 a fighter engaging Germans had to have the capability to reach 400 mph in speed, fight at 30,000–35,000 feet, be simple to take off, provide armor for the pilot, and carry 12 machine guns or six cannons, all attributes lacking in American aircraft. Following the successful German invasion of France and

21600-564: The Military Affairs Committee of the Congress rejected all bills set forth before it on both sides of the issue. They fashioned a compromise in which the findings of the Morrow Board were enacted as law, while providing the air arm a "five-year plan" for expansion and development. Maj. Gen. Mason Patrick , the Chief of Air Service, had proposed that it be made a semi-independent service within the War Department along

21825-509: The Morrow Board's recommendations, the act created an additional Assistant Secretary of War to "help foster military aeronautics", and established an air section in each division of the General Staff for a period of three years. Two additional brigadier generals would serve as assistant chiefs of the Air Corps. Previous provisions of the National Defense Act of 1920 that all flying units be commanded only by rated personnel and that flight pay be awarded were continued. The Air Corps also retained

22050-538: The Numbered Air Forces (First, Second, Third, Fourth Air Force) at bases controlled by Operational Training Units (OTUs). By the end of 1943, however, when the formation of new combat groups (except for B-29 units) was virtually completed and the demand for replacement pilots (to replace casualties) in the deployed combat groups was high, Replacement Training Units (RTU) replaced the OTUs. RTUs were also under

22275-543: The Office of Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC), eliminating all its training and organizational functions, which removed an entire layer of authority. Taking their former functions were eleven numbered air forces (later raised to sixteen) and six support commands (which became eight in January 1943). The circular also restated the mission of the AAF, in theory removing from it responsibility for strategic planning and making it only

22500-671: The P-39 and P-40 were approaching obsolescence, even though both had been in production less than 18 months. Bombers developed during this period were the Douglas A-20 Havoc (first flown October 1938), North American B-25 Mitchell (January 1939), Consolidated B-24 Liberator (December 1939), and Martin B-26 Marauder (November 1940). Except for the B-24, P-47, and P-51, all of these had production deliveries that began before

22725-647: The Training Command advanced two and four-engine flight schools. Air Transport Command operated a night and instrument training school at St. Joseph Army Air Field , Missouri. The school at Homestead Army Airfield , Florida was a four-engine transport school. Reno Army Air Base , Nevada specialized on training C-47 and C-46 pilots for China-India operations, flying "The Hump" across the Himalayan Mountains. Although Homestead and Reno conducted full transport crew training, graduation of students

22950-474: The U.S. Army changed to that of solely being the training and logistics elements of the then-new United States Army Air Forces , which embraced the formerly-named General Headquarters Air Force under the new Air Force Combat Command organization for front-line combat operations; this new element, along with the Air Corps, comprised the USAAF. The Air Corps ceased to have an administrative structure after 9 March 1942, but as "the permanent statutory organization of

23175-631: The United States . The AAF was a component of the United States Army , which on 2 March 1942 was divided functionally by executive order into three autonomous forces: the Army Ground Forces , the United States Army Services of Supply (which in 1943 became the Army Service Forces ), and the Army Air Forces. Each of these forces had a commanding general who reported directly to the Army Chief of Staff . The AAF administered all parts of military aviation formerly distributed among

23400-545: The WAACs and WACs as AAF personnel, more than 1,000 as Women Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs), and 6,500 as nurses in the Army Air Forces, including 500 flight nurses. 7,601 "Air WACs" served overseas in April 1945, and women performed in more than 200 job categories. The Air Corps Act of July 1926 increased the number of general officers authorized in the Army's air arm from two to four. The activation of GHQAF in March 1935 doubled that number to eight and pre-war expansion of

23625-523: The WAFS was formed, General Arnold inaugurated a flight training program to produce 500 women ferry pilots. He appointed Cochran as the director of flying training, and by October 1942, 40 women had been accepted and sent for training at Howard Hughes Airport in Houston, Texas . The unit was called the WFTD, or among the women it was known as the "Woofteddies". When facilities at Houston proved too limited,

23850-589: The War Department, 14 four-engine planes were delivered to the air force up to the outbreak of World War II in September 1939." A major step toward creation of a separate air force occurred on 1 March 1935 with the activation of a centralized, air force-level command headed by an aviator answering directly to the Army Chief of Staff . Called the General Headquarters Air Force , the organization had existed in Army planning since 1924 as

24075-577: The West Coast training center faced the extraordinary requirement to avoid sites near the internment camps for Japanese-Americans. During World War II, the training of its officers and enlisted men was one of the chief functions of the United States Army Air Forces, consuming a great deal of money, people, equipment, and time. Such training encompassed both flying personnel along with the ground support personnel needed to have

24300-440: The acquisition of obsolete aircraft as first-line equipment, stifled design development in the private sector of better types, retarded the development of radar and ordnance, and handicapped training, doctrine, and offensive organization by reneging on commitments to acquire the B-17. "From October 1935 until 30 June 1939, the Air Corps requested 206 B-17's and 11 B-15's. Yet because of cancellations and reductions of these requests by

24525-501: The activation of GHQ Air Force in December 1934. GHQ Air Force took control of all combat air units in the United States from the jurisdiction of corps area commanders, where it had resided since 1920, and organized them operationally into a strike force of three wings. The GHQ Air Force remained small in comparison to European air forces. On its first day of existence, the command consisted of 60 bombers, 42 attack aircraft, 146 pursuits, and 24 transports, amounting to 40% of strength in

24750-422: The air arm, and the principal component of the Army Air Forces," the overwhelming majority of personnel assigned to the AAF were members of the Air Corps. Public Law 69-446, 2 July 1926 The U.S. Army Air Service had a brief but turbulent history. Created during World War I by executive order of President Woodrow Wilson after America entered the war in April 1917 as the increasing use of airplanes and

24975-430: The air forces and to avoid binding legislation from Congress, the War Department revised the army regulation governing the organization of Army aviation, AR 95–5. Arnold assumed the title of Chief of the Army Air Forces , creating an echelon of command over all military aviation components for the first time and ending the dual status of the Air Corps and GHQ Air Force, which was renamed Air Force Combat Command (AFCC) in

25200-473: The air forces, commands and divisions were administrative headquarters called wings to control groups (operational units; see section below). As the number of groups increased, the number of wings needed to control them multiplied, with 91 ultimately activated, 69 of which were still active at the end of the war. As part of the Air Service and Air Corps, wings had been composite organizations, that is, composed of groups with different types of missions. Most of

25425-625: The air forces. Throughout 1942, the need for combat crew personnel far exceeded the current and contemplated production of the command's flying training schools. The rate of expansion of housing and training facilities, instructors, as well as the procurement of aircraft and other equipment, though at a breakneck pace, constrained the rate of increase of production. Facilities were used to their maximum capacity as quickly as they could be stood up. Some schools were expanded while they were still under construction. New airfields had to be located in areas with sufficient flying space free of other air traffic, and

25650-481: The annual addition to the force of 30,000 new pilots and 100,000 technical personnel. The accelerated expansion programs resulted in a force of 156 airfields and 152,125 personnel at the time of the creation of the Army Air Forces. In its expansion during World War II, the AAF became the world's most powerful air force. From the Air Corps of 1939, with 20,000 men and 2,400 planes, to the nearly autonomous AAF of 1944, with almost 2.4 million personnel and 80,000 aircraft,

25875-651: The argument for an independent air force. Strategic or long-range bombardment was intended to destroy an enemy's industry and war-making potential, and only an independent service would have a free hand to do so. But despite what it perceived as "obstruction" from the War Department, much of which was attributable to a shortage of funds, the Air Corps made great strides during the 1930s. A doctrine emerged that stressed precision bombing of industrial targets by heavily armed long-range aircraft. This doctrine resulted because of several factors. The Air Corps Tactical School moved in July 1931 to Maxwell Field , Alabama , where it taught

26100-403: The blame on him for the Air Corps' failures, he was investigated by a congressional subcommittee alleging corruption in aircraft procurement. The matter resulted in an impasse between committee chairman William N. Rogers and Secretary of War George Dern before being sent to the Army's Inspector General, who ruled largely in favor of Foulois. Rogers continued to severely criticize Foulois through

26325-423: The cadet would train as a navigator, bombardier, or pilot. The education and training stages were 9 weeks each. Each 9 week stage was divided into two 4.5 week (63 day) halves: a lower half and an upper half . The lower half was made up of students just beginning the stage and the upper half was made up of the students who were half-finished. The more experienced cadets would (hopefully) help the new cadets get through

26550-471: The capacity of the American automotive industry brought about an effort that produced almost 100,000 aircraft in 1944. The AAF reached its wartime inventory peak of nearly 80,000 aircraft in July 1944, 41% of them first line combat aircraft, before trimming back to 73,000 at the end of the year following a large reduction in the number of trainers needed. The logistical demands of this armada were met by

26775-430: The capitulation of Japan, realignment took place with the complete elimination of OC&R. The now five assistant chiefs of air staff were designated AC/AS-1 through -5 corresponding to Personnel, Intelligence, Operations and Training, Materiel and Supply, and Plans. Most personnel of the Army Air Forces were drawn from the Air Corps. In May 1945, 88 per cent of officers serving in the Army Air Forces were commissioned in

27000-466: The choice to two of the three assistant chiefs, Henry Conger Pratt and Oscar Westover . Pratt appeared to have the superior credentials, but he had been in charge of aircraft procurement during the Foulois years and was looked upon warily by Dern as possibly being another Mitchell or Foulois. Westover was chosen because he was the philosophical opposite of the two insurgent airmen in all respects, being

27225-491: The classification of recruits was the interview which uncovered such civilian experiences as skills derived from employment or hobbies and the extent and type of schooling. The objective was to establish a relationship between civilian occupational experiences and a job specialty that would be most useful to the AAF. After the interview a classifier reviewed the recruit's papers and made a recommended assignment to an MOS. By 1938, high school diplomas or direct, qualifying experience

27450-534: The command of Capt Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. , the 99th remained at Tuskegee and received additional training to prepare for combat. In April 1943 the unit deployed to French Morocco in North Africa . Eventually enough graduates were available to comprise four fighter squadrons: the 100th, 301st, and 302d, all of which had also begun at Tuskegee before completing their training in Michigan. These squadrons, and

27675-518: The commanders of GHQ Air Force and the Air Corps, Major Generals Frank M. Andrews and Oscar Westover respectively, clashed philosophically over the direction in which the air arm was moving, exacerbating the difficulties. The expected activation of Army General Headquarters prompted Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall to request a reorganization study from Chief of the Air Corps Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold resulting on 5 October 1940 in

27900-514: The commanding generals of the new Army Ground Forces and Services of Supply , the other two components of the Army of the United States . The War Department issued Circular No. 59 on 2 March that carried out the executive order, intended (as with the creation of the Air Service in World War I) as a wartime expedient to expire six months after the end of the war. The three components replaced

28125-449: The concept of air power and an autonomous air force in the years between the world wars , its primary purpose by Army policy remained support of ground forces rather than independent operations. On 1 March 1935, still struggling with the issue of a separate air arm, the Army activated the General Headquarters Air Force for centralized control of aviation combat units within the continental United States, separate from but coordinate with

28350-563: The concept one step further in March 1930 by recommending that the types instead be light and heavy , the latter capable of long range carrying a heavy bomb load that could also be used during daylight. The Air Corps in January 1931 "got its foot in the door" for developing a mission for which only it would have capability, while at the same time creating a need for technological advancement of its equipment. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William V. Pratt wanted approval of his proposition that all naval aviation including land-based aircraft

28575-700: The conduct of all aspects of the air war in every part of the world, determining air policy and issuing orders without transmitting them through the Army Chief of Staff. This "contrast between theory and fact is...fundamental to an understanding of the AAF." The roots of the Army Air Forces arose in the formulation of theories of strategic bombing at the Air Corps Tactical School that gave new impetus to arguments for an independent air force, beginning with those espoused by Brig. Gen. Billy Mitchell that led to his later court-martial . Despite

28800-553: The construction of a single large airfield outside of the city to house all flying training. The United States Congress funded the new field's construction but not the purchase of the land, so the city of San Antonio borrowed the $ 546,000 needed to purchase the site selected for what became Randolph Field . By the fall of 1931, construction was essentially completed, so the Air Corps Training Center at Duncan Field, San Antonio, Texas adjacent to Kelly Field and

29025-400: The continuing movement within the Air Corps for independence, cooperated to resist it. On 11 September 1935, the Joint Board, at the behest of the Navy and with the concurrence of MacArthur, issued a new "Joint Action Statement" that once again asserted the limited role of the Air Corps as an auxiliary to the "mobile Army" in all its missions, including coastal defense. The edict was issued with

29250-602: The course of the war, the schools graduated approximately 250,000 student pilots. All of the CFS's were inactivated by the end of the war. During World War II civilian flying schools, under government contract, provided a considerable part of the flying training effort undertaken by the United States Army Air Forces . In 1941 the Air Corps directed Flying Training Command to establish a glider training program. Contract schools opened soon after. Students learned to perform maintenance and, in an emergency, to rebuild wrecked gliders. This

29475-558: The creation of the Air Service Command on 17 October 1941 to provide service units and maintain 250 depots in the United States; the elevation of the Materiel Division to full command status on 9 March 1942 to develop and procure aircraft, equipment, and parts; and the merger of these commands into the Air Technical Service Command on 31 August 1944. In addition to carrying personnel and cargo,

29700-634: The creation of the Army Air Forces, caused an immediate reassessment of U.S. defense strategy and policy. The need for an offensive strategy to defeat the Axis Powers required further enlargement and modernization of all the military services, including the new AAF. In addition, the invasion produced a new Lend lease partner in Russia, creating even greater demands on an already struggling American aircraft production. An offensive strategy required several types of urgent and sustained effort. In addition to

29925-594: The designation C-33 to equip the first permanent transport unit, the 10th Transport Group, activated in June 1937 at Patterson Field in Ohio . In 1939 the Air Corps recognized that it might soon require large numbers of modern air transports for use in war and purchased 35 DC-2/ DC-3 hybrids, designated the C-39. After the fall of France, the Air Corps in September 1940 ordered 200 untried and unproven Curtiss C-46 Commandos from Curtiss-Wright and 545 Douglas C-47 Skytrains ,

30150-448: The development and manufacture of aircraft in massive numbers, the Army Air Forces had to establish a global logistics network to supply, maintain, and repair the huge force; recruit and train personnel; and sustain the health, welfare, and morale of its troops. The process was driven by the pace of aircraft production, not the training program, and was ably aided by the direction of Lovett, who for all practical purposes became "Secretary of

30375-532: The development of longer-ranged bombers, Project A for a bomber with a ferry range of 5,000 miles (8,000 km), and Project D, for one of a range of up to 10,000 miles (16,000 km). In June 1936 the Air Corps requested 11 B-15s and 50 B-17s for reinforcing hemispheric defense forces in Hawaii, Alaska, and Panama. The request was rejected on the basis that there were no strategic requirements for aircraft of such capabilities. The Army and Navy, both cognizant of

30600-424: The development of the Air Corps in the short run, and had hardened the opposition of an already antagonistic General Staff. But through their mistakes and repeated rebuffs, the airmen had learned what they were lacking: proof for the argument that the Air Corps could perform a unique mission—strategic bombardment—and the real threat of another world war would soon reverse their fortunes. In March 1928, commenting on

30825-469: The direct control of Headquarters Army Air Forces. At the end of 1942 and again in the spring of 1943 the AAF listed nine support commands before it began a process of consolidation that streamlined the number to five at the end of the war. These commands were: "In 1943 the AAF met a new personnel problem, to which it applied an original solution: to interview, rehabilitate, and reassign men returning from overseas. [To do this], an AAF Redistribution Center

31050-620: The directorates, and they became overburdened with detail, all contributing to the diversion of the directorates from their original purpose. The system of directorates in particular handicapped the developing operational training program (see Combat units below), preventing establishment of an OTU command and having a tendency to micromanage because of the lack of centralized control. Four main directorates—Military Requirements, Technical Services, Personnel, and Management Control—were created, each with multiple sub-directorates, and eventually more than thirty offices were authorized to issue orders in

31275-447: The dormant struggle for an independent United States Air Force. Marshall had come to the view that the air forces needed a "simpler system" and a unified command. Working with Arnold and Robert A. Lovett , recently appointed to the long-vacant position of Assistant Secretary of War for Air, he reached a consensus that quasi-autonomy for the air forces was preferable to immediate separation. On 20 June 1941, to grant additional autonomy to

31500-859: The emergence of Nazi Germany as a potential threat to the United States , the Air Corps proposed a period of expansion to train 4,500 pilots over a two-year period. On 8 July 1940, the Air Corps reorganized its re-designated its training centers to manage the growing number of flying schools. In addition to the American Air Cadets, Cadets from the British Royal Air Force and Free French Air Force were trained in flying skills. CFTC also operated aircrew schools for Navigators , Bombardiers and flexible aerial gunners . Radio operators were centrally trained at Scott Field , Illinois. Other aircrew positions, such as B-29 flight engineers and RADAR operators were also trained later in

31725-571: The end of World War II, the Army Air Forces had become virtually an independent service. By regulation and executive order, it was a subordinate agency of the United States Department of War (as were the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces) tasked only with organizing, training, and equipping combat units and limited in responsibility to the continental United States. In reality, Headquarters AAF controlled

31950-459: The end of the war there was an increase in the number of women on technical assignments, when it became difficult to obtain enlisted men in the top intelligence brackets required by some of the work. At the peak of WAC enrollment, in January 1945, more than 200 different job categories were filled by enlisted women, while WAC officers held more than 60 different types of jobs in addition to that of company officer. A flexible system of assignment enabled

32175-555: The establishment of an Officer Candidate School in Miami Beach, Florida , and the direct commissioning of thousands of professionals. Even so, 193,000 new pilots entered the AAF during World War II, while 124,000 other candidates failed at some point during training or were killed in accidents. The requirements for new pilots resulted in a massive expansion of the Aviation Cadet program, which had so many volunteers that

32400-682: The famous iconic " Why We Fight " series, as an animated map graphic of equal prominence to that of the Army and Navy. The Air Corps at the direction of President Roosevelt began a rapid expansion from the spring of 1939 forward, partly from the Civilian Pilot Training Program created at the end of 1938, with the goal of providing an adequate air force for defense of the Western Hemisphere. An initial "25-group program", announced in April 1939, called for 50,000 men. However, when war broke out in September 1939

32625-576: The first African-Americans to become military pilots received their wings at Tuskegee Field , Alabama . For many this event marked 25 years of determined effort to include blacks in military aviation. As early as 1917, Walter White , Director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), had called for the inclusion of blacks in the Air Corps only to be told that "no colored squadrons were being formed at

32850-546: The flight instructors were civilian contractors, the cadets still experienced the discipline and drudgery of military life. The CFS's were assigned to the various Flying Training Commands, and each had a designated USAAF Flying Training Detachment assigned for supervision and liaison with the command. According to the contract, the government supplied students with training aircraft, flying clothes, textbooks, and equipment. Schools furnished instructors, training sites and facilities, aircraft maintenance, quarters, and mess halls. From

33075-524: The following two decades, the amount of military training provided to new enlisted personnel undergoing technical instruction varied with their unit commanders, who had sole responsibility for the program. In 1935 efforts to change this arrangement began, but the real change occurred in 1939 when the Army proposed that each component arm and service set up their own enlisted replacement centers. Army Air Corps policy had been to furnish initial basic training for recruits at established stations, followed by about

33300-410: The force array. In the first half of 1942 the Army Air Forces expanded rapidly as the necessity of a much larger air force than planned was immediately realized. Authorization for the total number of combat groups required to fight the war nearly doubled in February to 115. In July it jumped to 224, and a month later to 273. When the U.S. entered the war, however, the number of groups actually trained to

33525-673: The forerunner of the more than 10,000 C-47s and related variants that served in World War II. Even with the doctrine of strategic bombardment as its priority, the Air Corps belatedly sought to modernize its tactical combat force under GHQ Air Force, bringing into service the Northrop A-17 and Douglas B-18 Bolo in 1936, the Seversky P-35 in 1937, and the Curtiss P-36 in 1938. All of these aircraft were obsolete by

33750-503: The geopolitical realities of coming war. In August 1939 the Army's research and development program for 1941 was modified with the addition of nearly five million dollars to buy five long-range bombers for experimental purposes, resulting on 10 November 1939 in the request by Arnold of the developmental program that would create the Boeing B-29 Superfortress , which was approved on 2 December. Between 1930 and 1938

33975-584: The ground forces by March 1942. In the spring of 1941, the success in Europe of air operations conducted under centralized control (as exemplified by the British Royal Air Force and the German Wehrmacht 's military air arm, the Luftwaffe ) made clear that the splintering of authority in the American air forces, characterized as " hydra -headed" by one congressman, had caused a disturbing lack of clear channels of command. Less than five months after

34200-566: The initial staff for Jefferson Barracks, and it, in turn, provided cadres to staff the replacement training centers at Keesler and Sheppard. These installations did the same for subsequent replacement training centers. The curriculum of indoctrination training lasted six weeks. It consisted of: By the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor , the Air Corps had 21,000 recruits at the three replacement training centers. The subsequently phenomenal growth of technical school quotas made these three centers inadequate to supply recruits for technical training, so

34425-419: The intent of again shoving an upstart Air Corps back into its place. However, the bomber advocates interpreted its language differently, concluding that the Air Corps could conduct long-range reconnaissance, attack approaching fleets, reinforce distant bases, and attack enemy air bases, all in furthering its mission to prevent an air attack on America. A month later (15 October 1935), the General Staff released

34650-466: The jurisdiction of one of the four numbered air forces. Men designated as replacements were sent to an RTU group where they received a similar though shorter course than that given in an OTU. As they completed the required phases of training, individuals and crews were drawn from the RTU and given deployment orders overseas to their assigned group in the combat areas. Generally OTU-RTU training responsibility

34875-461: The lack of survivability in combat of his unit's Keystone LB-7 and Martin NBS-1 bombers, Lt. Col. Hugh J. Knerr , commander of the 2nd Bombardment Group at Langley Field , Virginia , recommended that the Air Corps adopt two types of all-metal monoplane bombers, a short-range day bomber and a long-range night bomber. Instructors at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), also then at Langley, took

35100-458: The late 1930s, flying training in the Air Service and Air Corps remained quite small after the rapid demobilization with the end of World War I . In 1922 all flying training was consolidated in Texas , considered to be an ideal location because of climate and other factors. Brooks Field became the center for primary training and Kelly Field, San Antonio, TX for advanced training. However, it

35325-560: The lines of the Marine Corps within the Navy Department, but this was rejected; only the cosmetic name change was accepted. The legislation changed the name of the Air Service to the Air Corps, (in the words of one analyst) "thereby strengthening the conception of military aviation as an offensive, striking arm rather than an auxiliary service." The Air Corps Act (44 Stat. 780) became law on 2 July 1926. In accordance with

35550-422: The majority of women, in contrast to the seventeen- and eighteen- year-old boys being inducted, had a usable skill before they enlisted, often in the highly prized clerical field. The AAF proposed and pioneered in a time-saving policy of avoiding unnecessary training for women already qualified. AAF policy did not prevent specialist training for women who would benefit by it or were highly qualified for it; in fact,

35775-450: The mantle of the radical airmen, and Westover soon found himself on "the wrong side of history" as far as the future of the Air Corps was concerned. Lines of authority were also blurred as GHQ Air Force controlled only combat flying units within the continental United States. The Air Corps was responsible for training, aircraft development, doctrine, and supply, while the ground forces corps area commanders still controlled installations and

36000-574: The military has provided an initial period of basic military training, a course of instruction intended to transform the raw recruit into an airman. Only after completion of basic training are recruits, in theory, advanced to instruction in the technical specialties to which they are assigned. Upon entry into the Army Air Service in the 1920s, each man received some basic training. The mechanic school at Kelly Field , Texas (later Chanute Field , Illinois) emphasized technical training, and for

36225-529: The military uses of aviation were readily apparent as the war continued to its climax, the U.S. Army Air Service gained permanent legislative authority in 1920 as a combatant arm of the line of the United States Army . There followed a six-year struggle between adherents of airpower and the supporters of the traditional military services about the value of an independent Air Force, intensified by struggles for funds caused by skimpy budgets, as much an impetus for independence as any other factor. The Lassiter Board,

36450-408: The mission of the Air Corps in coastal defense was only for supporting the Navy if called upon to do so, while simultaneously authorizing for the Navy the long-range shore-based coastal patrol mission denied the Air Corps. Westover, who stridently opposed cancellation of the Woodring program, was killed in an air crash on 21 September 1938 and was succeeded by Arnold. The Air Corps tested and employed

36675-538: The most numerous of the attack planes that fulfilled the observation/close support role designated by the General Staff as the primary mission of the Air Corps. Transport aircraft used during the first ten years of the Air Corps were of largely trimotor design, such as the Atlantic-Fokker C-2 and the Ford C-3 , and were procured in such small numbers (66 total) that they were doled out one airplane to

36900-490: The name of the commanding general. Among the headquarters directorates were Technical Services, Air Defense, Base Services, Ground-Air Support, Management Control, Military Equipment, Military Requirements , and Procurement & Distribution. A "strong and growing dissatisfaction" with the organization led to an attempt by Lovett in September 1942 to make the system work by bringing the Directorate of Management Control and several traditional offices that had been moved to

37125-402: The new organization. The AAF gained the formal "Air Staff" long opposed by the General Staff, and a single air commander, but still did not have equal status with the Army ground forces, and air units continued to report through two chains of command. The commanding general of AFCC gained control of his stations and court martial authority over his personnel, but under the new field manual FM-5

37350-410: The next decade: an all-metal low wing monoplane, closed cockpits, rotating gun turrets, retractable landing gear, internal bomb bay, high-lift devices and full engine cowlings. The B-10 proved to be so superior that as its 14 operational test models were delivered in 1934 they were fed into the Air Corps mail operation, and despite some glitches caused by pilot unfamiliarity with the innovations, were

37575-414: The number of basic training centers expanded to 12 (plus one provisional center) by the spring of 1943. This included new dedicated BTC facilities set up at Greensboro , North Carolina, Miami Beach and St. Petersburg , Florida, and Atlantic City , New Jersey. By mid-1943, the basic training mission declined in size because requirements for technical training centers were being met. Consequently, some of

37800-523: The opening chapter of the Air Corps manual be a doctrinal statement developed by the G-3 that "left little doubt" that the General Staff's intention was "to develop and employ aviation in support of ground forces." The Air Corps Board, on the orders of Arnold, developed a secret study for "defense of the Monroe Doctrine " that recommended development of long-range, high altitude, high-speed aircraft for bombardment and reconnaissance to accomplish that defense. The War Department, seeking to stifle procurement of

38025-410: The operating staff, including the Air Judge Advocate and Budget Officer, back under the policy staff umbrella. When this adjustment failed to resolve the problems, the system was scrapped and all functions combined into a single restructured air staff. The hierarchical "command" principle, in which a single commander has direct final accountability but delegates authority to staff, was adopted AAF-wide in

38250-625: The operational command was designated by the Roman numeral of its parent numbered air force. For instance, the Eighth Air Force listed the VIII Bomber Command and the VIII Fighter Command as subordinate operational commands. Roman numbered commands within numbered air forces also included "support", "base", and other services commands to support the operational units, such as the VIII Air Force Service and VIII Air Force Composite Commands also part of Eighth Air Force during its history. The Tenth and Fourteenth Air Forces did not field subordinate commands during World War II. Fifteenth Air Force organized

38475-429: The personnel manning them. An example of the difficulties this arrangement imposed on commanders was that while the commander of GHQ Air Force was responsible for the discipline of his command, he had no court martial authority over his personnel, which was retained by the corps area commander. Base commanders of Air Corps installations reported to as many as four different higher echelons. The issue of control of bases

38700-402: The political impact of the pending court-martial of Billy Mitchell (and to preempt the findings of the Lampert Committee). It declared that no threat of air attack was likely to exist to the United States, rejected the idea of a department of defense and a separate department of air, and recommended minor reforms that included renaming the air service to allow it "more prestige". In early 1926

38925-415: The present time." Finally, on 21 March 1941, the Air Corps activated the 99th Pursuit Squadron , which became the first squadron of what became the renowned Tuskegee Airmen . After the first class of five pilots graduated, it took until July 1942 for enough black airmen to complete flight training for the squadron to reach full strength. Even then, the Army was not ready to send black pilots overseas. Under

39150-459: The primary defenses against interception. In both 1932 and 1933, large-scale maneuvers found fighters unable to climb to altitude quickly enough to intercept attacking B-9 and B-10 prototypes, a failure so complete that Westover, following the 1933 maneuvers, actually proposed elimination of pursuits altogether. 1933 was a pivotal year in the advancement of aviation technology in which the all-metal airplane came of age, "practically overnight" in

39375-401: The primary schools at Brooks and March moved to the new installation. Advanced training remained at Kelly because experience showed that Randolph Field would become quite congested with only primary and basic training located there. Following the expansion, the number of pilots in training declined until only 184 graduated in 1937, compared to an average of 257 per year prior to 1931. But with

39600-415: The probability of war became apparent. Instead, the Air Corps inventory actually declined to 855 total aircraft in 1936, a year after the creation of GHQ Air Force, which by itself was recommended to have a strength of 980. The most serious fallout from the Air Mail fiasco was the retirement under fire of Major General Benjamin Foulois as Chief of Air Corps. Soon after the Roosevelt administration placed

39825-421: The program of the Lassiter Board already in effect, but Chief of Staff Gen. John Hines rejected the recommendation in favor of a plan drawn up by ground force Brig. Gen. Hugh Drum that proposed 52 squadrons. The act authorized expansion to 1,800 airplanes, 1,650 officers, and 15,000 enlisted men, to be reached in regular increments over a five-year period. None of the goals was reached by July 1932. Neither of

40050-400: The proposal the following month which, in the face of Marshall's dissatisfaction with Army GHQ, the War Plans Division accepted. Just before Pearl Harbor, Marshall recalled an Air Corps officer, Brig. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney , from an observer group in England and appointed him to chair a "War Department Reorganization Committee" within the War Plans Division, using Arnold's and Spaatz's plan as

40275-408: The qualifications were somewhat lower than those for combat duty. However, as the number of routes and scope of Air Transport Command increased, the Air Transportation Division of ATC in time had to rely on military personnel. To provide training for use of its own planes and for the special requirements of its far-flung operations, the division began operating an OTU in 1942, drawing on the graduates of

40500-466: The recommendations of the Baker Board , established in the wake of the Air Mail scandal, was that the proposals of the Drum Board be adopted: an increase in strength to 2,320 aircraft and establishment of GHQ Air Force as a permanent peacetime tactical organization, both to ameliorate the pressures for a separate air force and to exploit emerging capabilities in airpower. In the absence of a general headquarters (i.e. peacetime), GHQ Air Force would report to

40725-517: The recommendations of the Baker Board inadequate for American defense and requested approval of a "minimum 3,000-plane increase" for the Air Corps. On 3 April 1939, Congress allocated the $ 300 million requested by Roosevelt for expansion of the Air Corps, half of which was dedicated to purchasing planes to raise the inventory from 2,500 to 5,500 airplanes, and the other half for new personnel, training facilities, and bases. Orders for B-17s, which had been held in abeyance since June 1938, resumed in

40950-442: The rejection of Arnold's reorganization proposal, a joint U.S.-British strategic planning agreement ( ABC-1 ) refuted the General Staff's argument that the Air Corps had no wartime mission except to support ground forces. A struggle with the General Staff over control of air defense of the United States had been won by airmen and vested in four command units called "numbered air forces", but the bureaucratic conflict threatened to renew

41175-475: The relatively modest increases in airplanes or officers was accomplished until 1938 because adequate funds were never appropriated and the coming of the Great Depression forced reductions in pay and modernization across the board in the Army. Organizationally the Air Corps doubled from seven to fifteen groups , but the expansion was meaningless because all were seriously understrength in aircraft and pilots. ( Origin of first seven groups shown here ) As units of

41400-420: The rest Medium and Light groups ( B-25 Mitchell , B-26 Marauder , and A-20 Havoc ). The balance of the force included 26 Pursuit groups (renamed fighter group in May 1942), 9 Observation (renamed Reconnaissance ) groups, and 6 Transport (renamed Troop Carrier or Combat Cargo ) groups. After the operational deployment of the B-29 Superfortress bomber, Very Heavy Bombardment units were added to

41625-447: The road ahead for most AAF enlistees led toward some specialized technical training, the replacement centers were placed under the jurisdiction of the Air Corps Technical Training Command . That fall the Technical Training Command activated two more basic training centers at Keesler Field , Mississippi, and Sheppard Field , Texas, where the command already had mechanic schools. A group of officers and enlisted men from Scott Field became

41850-400: The role of the Army Air Forces, Arnold was given a seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff , the planning staff that served as the focal point of American strategic planning during the war, in order that the United States would have an air representative in staff talks with their British counterparts on the Combined Chiefs . In effect the head of the AAF gained equality with Marshall. While this step

42075-405: The same time, the General Staff ordered studies from all the service branches to develop drafts for the coming field manuals. The Air Corps Board, a function of the ACTS, submitted a draft in September 1938 that included descriptions of independent air operations, strategic air attacks, and air action against naval forces, all of which the General Staff rejected in March 1939. Instead, it ordered that

42300-477: The school's Pursuit Section, found their influence waning because of repeated performance failures of pursuit aviation. Finally, the doctrine represented the Air Corps' attempt to develop autonomy from the General Staff, which enforced subordination of the air arm by limiting it to support of ground forces and defense of United States territory. New bomber types under development clearly outperformed new pursuit types, particularly in speed and altitude, then considered

42525-415: The section before they were promoted to the next stage. Graduates of advanced training schools were commissioned as Second Lieutenants and awarded their "Wings" (Pilot, Bombardier, Navigator, Gunner). After completion of individual training, pilots were given eight to twelve weeks of training as a team in new combat groups using the same aircraft they would use in combat. This training was provided by one of

42750-460: The sphere of influence of the Ground Forces" (strategic bombardment), but it did not attach any importance to prioritization of targets, weakening its effectiveness as doctrine. The Air Corps in general assented to the changes, as it did to other compromises of the period, as acceptable for the moment. TR 440-15 remained the doctrinal position of the Air Corps until it was superseded by the first Air Corps Field Manual, FM 1–5 Employment of Aviation of

42975-444: The summer of 1935, threatening future Air Corps appropriations, and despite public support by Dern for the embattled chief, the administration was close to firing Foulois for his perceived attitude as a radical airman and his public criticisms of the administration during the controversy. He retired in December 1935 for the good of the service. The Roosevelt administration began a search for his replacement in September 1935, narrowing

43200-444: The technical training necessary for the even larger numbers of men to be taught to service and maintain aircraft and aircraft equipment. The United States has traditionally fought its wars with a citizen military mobilized and trained after the emergency arises. Its members on their induction into the military face an abrupt transition to a life and pattern of behavior altogether foreign to their previous experience. For their assistance

43425-421: The three preflight and classification centers of the Flying Training Commands (Eastern, Central or Western) for further classification as a flying air cadet for, bombardier, navigator or flexible gunner training. Training for non-rated offers was needed to relieve flying officers of their nonflying duties during the wartime expansion of the Air Corps and the Army Air Forces. The Officer Candidate School began as

43650-452: The time they came into service, and the outbreak of war in Europe spurred development of more capable types. By October 1940, over a year before the United States was drawn into the war, every piston-driven single-seat fighter eventually used by the USAAF during World War II was in flight test except the P-47. However, the press of the enormous tasks confronting the Air Corps and the primacy of strategic bombing doctrine meant that development of

43875-427: The undersurface of the lower wings. Tail rudders were painted with a vertical dark blue band at the rudder hinge and 13 alternating red-and-white horizontal stripes trailing. The painting of fuselages olive drab was changed to blue in the early 1930s, and this motif continued until late 1937, when all new aircraft (now all-metal) were left unpainted except for national markings. Most pursuit fighters before 1935 were of

44100-409: The war as training requirements presented themselves. This included the first jet pilots in 1945. Each of the geographically aligned flying training commands followed the same methodology for training Air Cadets. Training came in five stages. The Initial classification stage lasted 1 to 2 weeks and processed the cadet and issued him his equipment. This was the stage where it would be decided whether

44325-474: The war, it was redesignated Air Training Command on 1 July 1946. During the consolidation of Air Force Major Commands in the retrenchment of the 1990s, Air Training Command assumed control of Air University and became Air Education and Training Command on 1 July 1993—today's Air Education and Training Command (AETC), which celebrated its 75th anniversary 23 January 2017. see the Lineage and honors statement for AETC. Army Air Forces Flying Training Command's mission

44550-420: The war, plus a general air force within the continental United States to support the whole and provide air defense. The latter was formally organized as the Continental Air Forces and activated on 15 December 1944, although it did not formally take jurisdiction of its component air forces until the end of the war in Europe. Half of the numbered air forces were created de novo as the service expanded during

44775-461: The war-time Army Air Forces. The AAF was willing to experiment with its allotment from the unpopular Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAACs) and became an early and determined supporter of full military status for women in the Army ( Women's Army Corps or WACs). WACs serving in the AAF became such an accepted and valuable part of the service they earned the distinction of being commonly (but unofficially) known as "Air WACs". Nearly 40,000 women served in

45000-511: The war. Some grew out of earlier commands as the service expanded in size and hierarchy (for example, the V Air Support Command became the Ninth Air Force in April 1942), and higher echelons such as United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF) in Europe and U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific became necessary to control the whole. Within numbered air forces, operational commands were created to divide administrative control of units by function (eg fighters and bombers). The numbering of

45225-567: The wars was utilized in administrative roles such as Station Adjutants and Group Ground Commanders and underwent OTS training. The majority were slated for administrative or instructional duties in the Army Air Forces, but there were others such as airline pilots who became Air Transport Command ferry pilots, under the wartime-era Service Pilot rating. Beginning in the winter of 1942, Medical, Dental, and Sanitary Corps officers also attended Officer Training School in courses separate from those for other officers. Public Law 554 on 15 May 1942 created

45450-404: The wings of World War II, however, were composed of groups with like functions (denoted as bombardment , fighter , reconnaissance , training , antisubmarine , troop carrier , and replacement ). The six support commands organized between March 1941 and April 1942 to support and supply the numbered air forces remained on the same chain of command echelon as the numbered air forces, under

45675-482: The words of one historian, because of the availability of the first practical variable-pitch propeller . Coupled with "best weight" design of airframes, the controllable pitch propeller resulted in an immediate doubling of speeds and operating ranges without decreasing aircraft weights or increasing engine horsepower, exemplified by the civil Douglas DC-1 transport and the military Martin B-10 bomber. The B-10 featured innovations that became standard internationally for

45900-421: Was a relatively simple operation, considering that the primary glider consisted of little more than a shell, equipped with radio, wheels, and brakes. By late 1944 Training Command ended all glider instruction, both flying and technical. Rather than create a separate glider force, the Army Air Forces had decided it would be more profitable to train its troop carrier pilots to also operate gliders. On 7 March 1942,

46125-431: Was a remarkable expansion. Robert A. Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, together with Arnold, presided over an increase greater than for either the ground Army or the Navy, while at the same time dispatching combat air forces to the battlefronts. "The Evolution of the Department of the Air Force" – Air Force Historical Studies Office The German invasion of the Soviet Union , occurring only two days after

46350-483: Was also used on official recruiting posters (see image above) and was important in promoting the idea of an "Air Force" as an independent service. Jimmy Stewart , a Hollywood movie star serving as an AAF pilot, used the terms "Air Corps" and "Air Forces" interchangeably in the narration of the 1942 recruiting short " Winning Your Wings " . The term "Air Force" also appeared prominently in Frank Capra 's 1945 War Department indoctrination film " War Comes to America " , of

46575-414: Was ameliorated in 1936 when GHQAF bases were exempted from corps area authority on recommendation of the Inspector General's Department, but in November 1940 it was restored again to Corps Area control when Army General Headquarters was activated. In January 1936, the Air Corps contracted with Boeing for thirteen Y1B-17 Flying Fortress prototypes, enough to equip one squadron for operational testing and

46800-449: Was by definition tied to carrier-based fleet operations. Pratt reached an agreement with new Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur that the Air Corps would assume responsibility for coastal defense (traditionally a primary function of the Army but a secondary, wartime function of the Navy) beyond the range of the Army's Coast Artillery guns, ending the Navy's apparent duplication of effort in coastal air operations. The agreement, intended as

47025-461: Was concurrent with the creation of air forces to defend Hawaii and the Panama Canal . The air districts were converted in March 1941 into numbered air forces with a subordinate organization of 54 groups. The likelihood of U.S. participation in World War II prompted the most radical reorganization of the aviation branch in its history, developing a structure that both unified command of all air elements and gave it total autonomy and equality with

47250-401: Was conducting the flying program for new Army pilot candidates and air cadets. The program was divided in to stages including primary, advanced and specific classification such as pursuit, twin engine and multi-engine. These phases were prelude to Operational or Replacement training or crew training. AAFTC was created as a result of the merger of the Army Air Forces Flying Training Command and

47475-457: Was created in June 1941 to provide the air arm greater autonomy in which to expand more efficiently, to provide a structure for the additional command echelons required by a vastly increased force, and to end an increasingly divisive administrative battle within the Army over control of aviation doctrine and organization that had been ongoing since the creation of an aviation section within the U.S. Army Signal Corps in 1914. The AAF succeeded both

47700-467: Was discovered that facilities in the San Antonio area were insufficient to accommodate the number of cadets entering primary training. Hence, in violation of the principle of geographic concentration, primary pilot training was also performed at March Field , California , from 1927 to 1931. Another problem for the training center was the growth of the city of San Antonio , which created hazards for training. Consequently, in June 1927 plans were created for

47925-407: Was established on 7 August 1943, and given command status on 1 June 1944. as the AAF Personnel Distribution Command. This organization was ordered discontinued, effective 30 June 1946." The primary combat unit of the Army Air Forces for both administrative and tactical purposes was the group , an organization of three or four flying squadrons and attached or organic ground support elements, which

48150-434: Was never officially recognized by the United States Navy , and was bitterly disputed behind the scenes at every opportunity, it nevertheless succeeded as a pragmatic foundation for the future separation of the Air Force. Under the revision of AR 95–5, the Army Air Forces consisted of three major components: Headquarters AAF, Air Force Combat Command, and the Air Corps. Yet the reforms were incomplete, subject to reversal with

48375-560: Was not overcome until the necessity of expanding the force occurred with the onset of World War II. The commanding general of GHQ Air Force, Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews , clashed philosophically with Westover over the direction in which the air arm was heading, adding to the difficulties, with Andrews in favor of autonomy and Westover not only espousing subordination to the Army chain of command but aggressively enforcing his prohibitions of any commentary opposed to current policy. Andrews, by virtue of being out from Westover's control, had picked up

48600-493: Was on an individual, rather than crew, basis. A specialized fighter transition school for the ATC Ferrying Division was established at Palm Springs Army Airfield , California in November 1943, however it was moved in the spring of 1944 to Brownsville Army Airfield , Texas. Beginning in 1939, the Army contracted with nine civilian flying schools to provide primary flying training, while Randolph handled basic training, now completely separate from primary. Kelly Field, with Brooks as

48825-405: Was renamed from the earlier United States Army Air Service on 2 July 1926, and was part of the larger United States Army . The Air Corps became the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) on 20 June 1941, giving it greater autonomy from the Army's middle-level command structure. During World War II , although not an administrative echelon, the Air Corps (AC) remained as one of the combat arms of

49050-465: Was required for entry in the Air Corps Technical School at Chanute Field, IL, but by World War II, the requirement was dropped to accommodate the vast numbers of personnel required to operate a vast Air Force. Once the trainee was evaluated, tested and a recommended MOS assigned, after graduation they were assigned to various Advanced Technical Schools for specialization training. Recruits who were classified as possible flying personnel were sent to one of

49275-406: Was set up as follows: Ferrying and transport pilot training for C-54s and other four-engine transports was managed separately by Air Corps Ferrying Command (later Air Transport Command ). Initially the command trained its own crews by recruiting directly from civilian life a large number of flyers, many of the civilians were subsequently commissioned as non-combat service pilots, a rating for which

49500-464: Was small in comparison to European air forces. Lines of authority were difficult, at best, since GHQ Air Force controlled only operations of its combat units while the Air Corps was still responsible for doctrine, acquisition of aircraft, and training. Corps area commanders continued to exercise control over airfields and administration of personnel, and in the overseas departments, operational control of units as well. Between March 1935 and September 1938,

49725-907: Was so completely integrated with the entire AAF training program that virtually no separate statistics are available as a basis for comparing the record of the women with male trainees. Obviously, this policy meant that the WACs had to be as well qualified as men to enroll in and graduate from a training course. It is known only that approximately 2,000 women completed courses in AAF technical schools, including those for Link-trainer instructors, airplane mechanics, sheet-metal workers, weather forecasters, weather observers, electrical specialists of several kinds, teletype operators, control-tower specialists, cryptographers, radio mechanics, parachute riggers, bombsight-maintenance specialists, clerks, photo-laboratory technicians, and photo-interpreters. The AAF showed no reluctance in opening up its noncombat jobs to women, even jobs which required "unwomanly" mechanical skills. Toward

49950-404: Was the major land-based aerial warfare service component of the United States Army and de facto aerial warfare service branch of the United States during and immediately after World War II (1941–1947). It was created on 20 June 1941 as successor to the previous United States Army Air Corps and is the direct predecessor of the United States Air Force , today one of the six armed forces of

50175-404: Was the rough equivalent of a regiment of the Army Ground Forces . The Army Air Forces fielded a total of 318 combat groups at some point during World War II, with an operational force of 243 combat groups in 1945. The Air Service and its successor the Air Corps had established 15 permanent combat groups between 1919 and 1937. With the buildup of the combat force beginning 1 February 1940,

50400-542: Was threatened. United States Army Air Corps The United States Army Air Corps ( USAAC ) was the aerial warfare service component of the United States Army between 1926 and 1941. After World War I , as early aviation became an increasingly important part of modern warfare, a philosophical rift developed between more traditional ground-based army personnel and those who felt that aircraft were being underutilized and that air operations were being stifled for political reasons unrelated to their effectiveness. The USAAC

50625-416: Was useful mainly as "long range artillery." Air Corps officers in the G-3 Department of the General Staff pointed out that Jones' conclusions were inconsistent with the revised TR 440-15, but their views were dismissed by Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Stanley Embick with the comment: "No doctrine is sacrosanct, and of all military doctrines, that of the Air Corps should be the last to be so regarded." At

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