Invasion of Italy
152-570: Winter Line Gothic Line 1945 Spring Offensive The Winter Line was a series of German and Italian military fortifications in Italy , constructed during World War II by Organisation Todt and commanded by Albert Kesselring . The series of three lines was designed to defend a western section of Italy, focused around the town of Monte Cassino , through which ran the important Highway 6 which led uninterrupted to Rome . The primary Gustav Line ran across Italy from just north of where
304-508: A book dated 1879 in a Naples bookshop that gave details of the construction of the abbey. In his memorandum to Freyberg, he concluded that regardless of whether the monastery was currently occupied by the Germans, it should be demolished to prevent its effective occupation. He also pointed out that with 150-foot (46 m) high walls made of masonry at least 10 feet (3.0 m) thick, there were no practical means for field engineers to deal with
456-488: A clothesline in the abbey courtyard; [and] machine gun emplacements 50 yards (46 m) from the abbey walls." U.S. II Corps commander Geoffrey Keyes flew over the monastery several times and reported to Fifth Army G-2 that he had not seen evidence of German troops in the abbey. When informed of others' claims of having seen enemy troops there, he stated, "They've been looking so long they're seeing things." US Army Artillery Pilot Spotter Hughes Rudd saw German positions at
608-575: A foothold in the mountains. On the right, the Moroccan-French troops made strategical initial progress against the German 5th Mountain Division , commanded by General Julius Ringel , gaining positions on the slopes of their key objective, Monte Cifalco. Forward units of the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division had also by-passed Monte Cifalco to capture Monte Belvedere and Colle Abate. General Juin
760-803: A half of launching the assault but German operations persisted in the area for months. Some authorities define the Bernhardt Line as crossing Italy from coast to coast following not just the western defensive positions described above but incorporating also the eastern defences of the Gustav Line. Other authorities use the Winter Line name interchangeably with the Gustav Line . Gothic Line [REDACTED] United Kingdom Invasion of Italy Winter Line Gothic Line 1945 Spring Offensive The Gothic Line ( German : Gotenstellung ; Italian : Linea Gotica )
912-474: A historic hilltop abbey founded in 529 by Benedict of Nursia , dominated the nearby town of Cassino and the entrances to the Liri and Rapido valleys. Lying in a protected historic zone, it had been left unoccupied by the Germans, although they manned some positions set into the slopes below the abbey's walls. Repeated artillery attacks on assaulting allied troops caused their leaders to incorrectly conclude that
1064-465: A logistical nightmare. Although they were out of the hills, the plains were waterlogged and the Eighth Army found themselves confronted, as they had the previous autumn, by a succession of swollen rivers running across their line of advance. Once again, the conditions prevented Eighth Army's armour from exploiting the breakthrough, and the infantry of British V Corps and I Canadian Corps (joined by
1216-557: A plan which was against his inclination and judgement and Harding was persuaded to change his mind. Operation Olive—as the new offensive was christened—called for Leese's Eighth Army to attack up the Adriatic coast toward Pesaro and Rimini and draw in the German reserves from the centre of the country. Clark's Fifth Army would then attack in the weakened central Apennines north of Florence toward Bologna with British XIII Corps on
1368-623: A quite new line. ... a position, in fact, north of the Anzio bridgehead". Kesselring refused the request. At the crucial moment von Senger was able to throw in the 71st Infantry Division whilst leaving the 15th Panzergrenadier Division (whom they had been due to relieve) in place. During the battle, there had been occasions when with more astute use of reserves, promising positions might have been turned into decisive moves. Some historians suggest this failure to capitalise on initial success could be put down to Clark's lack of experience. However, it
1520-485: A serious problem for the attacking Allied forces. On the night following the bombing, a company of the 1st Battalion, Royal Sussex Regiment (one of the British elements in the 4th Indian Division) serving in the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade attacked key point 593 from their position 70 yards (64 m) away on Snakeshead Ridge. The assault failed, with the company sustaining 50 percent casualties. The following night,
1672-679: A standstill on the route to Imola suffering 2,105 men killed and wounded — roughly the same as the whole of the rest of II Corps during the actual breaching of the Gothic Line. The fighting toward Imola had drawn German troops from the defence of Bologna, and Clark decided to switch his main thrust back toward the Bologna axis. U.S. II Corps pushed steadily through the Raticosa Pass and by 2 October, it had reached Monghidoro some 20 mi (32 km) from Bologna. However, as it had on
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#17327732403581824-502: A three-month re-fit in Egypt . Gradual progress was made against stiffening opposition as German 14th Army moved troops from the quieter sector opposite U.S. IV Corps. By 9 October, they were attacking the massive 1,500 feet (460 m) high sheer escarpment behind Livergnano which appeared insuperable. However, the weather cleared on the morning of 10 October to allow artillery and air support to be brought to bear. Nevertheless, it took until
1976-455: Is more likely that he just had too much to do, being responsible for both the Cassino and Anzio offensives. This view is supported by the inability of Major General Lucian Truscott , commanding the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division, as related below, to get hold of him for discussions at a vital juncture of the Anzio breakout at the time of the fourth Cassino battle. Whilst General Alexander, C-in-C of
2128-489: The 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade ). Like the Eighth Army, the Fifth Army was considered to be strong in armour and short on infantry considering the terrain they were attacking. In the front line facing Clark's forces were five divisions of Joachim Lemelsen 's German 14th Army (20th Luftwaffe Field Division, 16th SS Panzer Grenadier Division (16. Panzergrenadierdivision ), 65th and 362nd Infantry Divisions and
2280-476: The 1st Parachute Division , the dominating point of the ridge to the monastery. On 11 February, after a final unsuccessful 3-day assault on Monastery Hill and Cassino town, the Americans were withdrawn. U.S. II Corps, after two and a half weeks of battle, was worn out. The performance of the 34th Division in the mountains is considered to rank as one of the finest feats of arms carried out by any soldiers during
2432-410: The 20th Luftwaffe Field Division )—was caught and killed by partisans as he returned from a conference at corps headquarters. Construction of the defences was also hampered by the deliberately poor quality concrete provided by local Italian mills whilst captured partisans forced into the construction gangs supplemented the natural lethargy of forced labour with clever sabotage. Nevertheless, prior to
2584-560: The 4th Parachute Division ) and two divisions on the western end of von Vietinghoff's German 10th Army ( 356th and 715th Infantry Divisions ). By the end of the first week in September, the Luftwaffe Field Division and the 356th Infantry Division had been moved to the Adriatic front along with (from army reserve) the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division and the armoured reserve of 26th Panzer Division . The 14th Army
2736-549: The 85th Infantry Division ) to exploit XIII Corps success. Attacking on 17 September, supported by both American and British artillery, the infantry fought their way onto Monte Pratone, some 2–3 mi (3.2–4.8 km) east of the Il Giogo pass and a key position on the Gothic Line. Meanwhile, U.S. II Corps renewed their assault on Monte Altuzzo, dominating the east side of the Il Giogo Pass. The Altuzzo positions fell on
2888-600: The Axis "underbelly". This would have required the U.S. Fifth Army under Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark to commit most of his Anzio forces to the drive east from Cisterna , and to execute the envelopment envisioned in the original planning for the Anzio landing (i.e., flank the German 10th Army , and sever its northbound line of retreat from Cassino). Instead, fearing that the British Eighth Army , under Lieutenant-General Sir Oliver Leese , might beat him to
3040-503: The Brazilian Expeditionary Force ); in the centre was U.S. II Corps , under Major General Geoffrey Keyes , (with the U.S. 34th , 85th , 88th and 91st Infantry Divisions supported by three tank battalions under command); and on the right British XIII Corps , under Lieutenant-General Sidney Kirkman , (composed of the British 1st Infantry and 6th Armoured Divisions , the 8th Indian Infantry Division and
3192-495: The British Eighth Army and the U.S. Fifth Army against the German 10th Army (10. Armee ) and German 14th Army (14. Armee ). Rimini , a city which had been hit by previous air raids, had 1,470,000 rounds fired against it by allied land forces. According to Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese , commander of the British Eighth Army: "The battle of Rimini was one of the hardest battles of Eighth Army. The fighting
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#17327732403583344-720: The Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the 15th Army Group (later retitled the Allied Armies in Italy ), were followed by an advance northward on two fronts, one on each side of the central mountain range forming the "spine" of Italy. On the western front, the American Fifth Army , commanded by Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark , which had suffered many casualties during the main landing at Salerno (codenamed Operation Avalanche ) in September, moved from
3496-563: The Fragheto massacre on 7 April. By September 1944, German generals were no longer able to move freely in the area behind their main lines because of partisan activity. Generalleutnant Frido von Senger und Etterlin —commanding XIV Panzer Corps ( XIV Panzerkorps )—later wrote that he had taken to travelling in a little Volkswagen "(displaying) no general's insignia of rank—no peaked cap, no gold or red flags...". One of his colleagues who ignored this caution— Wilhelm Crisolli (commanding
3648-979: The Garigliano River flows into the Tyrrhenian Sea in the west, through the Apennine Mountains to the mouth of the Sangro River on the Adriatic coast in the east. The two subsidiary lines, the Bernhardt Line and the Hitler Line , ran much shorter distances from the Tyrrehnian Sea to just northeast of Cassino where they would merge into the Gustav Line. Relative to the Gustav Line, the Hitler Line stood to
3800-638: The Italian Campaign of World War II . The objective was to break through the Winter Line and facilitate an advance towards Rome . In the beginning of 1944, the western half of the Winter Line was anchored by German forces holding the Rapido - Gari , Liri , and Garigliano valleys and several surrounding peaks and ridges. Together, these features formed the Gustav Line . Monte Cassino ,
3952-593: The " Green Line " ( Grüne Linie ) in June 1944. Using more than 15,000 slave labourers , the Germans created more than 2,000 well-fortified machine gun nests , casemates , bunkers , observation posts and artillery fighting positions to repel any attempt to breach the Gothic Line. Initially, this line was breached during Operation Olive (also sometimes known as the Battle of Rimini ), but Kesselring's forces were consistently able to retire in good order. This continued to be
4104-593: The 2nd New Zealand Division) had to grind their way forward while von Vietinghoff withdrew his forces behind the next river beyond the Marecchia, the Uso, a few miles beyond Rimini. The positions on the Uso were forced on 26 September, and Eighth Army reached the next river, the Fiumicino, on 29 September. Four days of heavy rain forced a halt, and by this time V Corps was fought out and required major reorganization. Since
4256-652: The 370th received reinforcements from other units ( 365th and 371st ), to ensure the Fifth Army left wing sector at the Ligurian Sea . On Fifth Army's far right wing, on the right of the British XIII Corps front, 8th Indian Infantry Division fighting across trackless ground had captured the heights of Femina Morta and British 6th Armoured Division had taken the San Godenzo Pass on Route 67 to Forlì , both on 18 September. At this stage, with
4408-511: The 8th Army to capture Orsogna however put an end to the Allied plans of a strong drive up the eastern coast. Rain, flooded rivers, and high casualties, as well as the departure of General Montgomery, all put a halt to Allied plans until the spring of 1944. The Gustav Line thus fulfilled the wishes of Field Marshal Kesselring , the commander of German forces in Italy, of keeping the Allies south of
4560-528: The AAI, chose (for perfectly logical co-ordination arguments) to have Cassino and Anzio under a single army commander and splitting the Gustav Line front between the U.S. Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army, now commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese , Kesselring chose to create a separate 14th Army under General Eberhard von Mackensen to fight at Anzio whilst leaving the Gustav Line in
4712-558: The Abbey. Kippenberger of the New Zealand Corps HQ believed that the monastery was probably being used as the Germans' main vantage point for artillery spotting because of its strategic location, but there was no clear evidence. From a military point of view, whether the monastery was being used as an observation point was immaterial. If not occupied today, it might be tomorrow and it did not appear it would be difficult for
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4864-601: The Adriatic and by 25 October were closing on the Ronco river, some 10 mi (16 km) beyond the Savio, behind which the Germans had withdrawn. By the end of the month, the advance had reached Forlì, halfway between Rimini and Bologna. Cutting the German Armies' lateral communications remained a key objective. Indeed, later Kesselring was to say that if in mid-October the front south of Bologna could not be held, then all
5016-473: The Adriatic coast behind LXVI Corps. In addition, Kesselring had in his Army Group Reserve the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division ( 90. Panzergrenadierdivision ) and 26th Panzer Division ( 26. Panzerdivision ). The British Eighth Army crossed the Metauro river and launched its attack against the Gothic Line outposts on 25 August. As Polish II Corps, on the coast and I Canadian Corps, on the coastal plain on
5168-434: The Adriatic coast, the weather had broken and rain and low cloud prevented air support while the roads back to the ever more distant supply dumps near Florence became morasses. On 5 October, U.S. II Corps renewed its offensive along a 14-mile (23 km) front straddling Route 65 to Bologna. They were supported on their right flank by British XIII Corps including British 78th Infantry Division , newly returned to Italy after
5320-552: The Adriatic front would not be available for at least a day. Now, the weather intervened: torrential rain turned the rivers into torrents and halted air support operations. Once again movement ground to a crawl, and the German defenders had the opportunity to reorganise and reinforce their positions on the Marano river, and the salient to the Lombardy plain closed. Once more, the Eighth Army was confronted by an organised line of defence,
5472-400: The Allies' attack, Kesselring had declared himself satisfied with the work done, especially on the Adriatic side where he "...contemplated an assault on the left wing....with a certain confidence". The Italian Front was seen by the Allies to be of secondary importance to the offensives through France , and this was underlined by the withdrawal during the summer of 1944 of seven divisions from
5624-705: The Ausa river and into the Lombardy Plain and 3rd Greek Mountain Brigade entered Rimini on the morning of 21 September as the Germans withdrew from their positions on the Rimini Line behind the Ausa to new positions on the Marecchia. However, Kesselring's defence had won him time until the onset of the autumn rains. Progress for the Eighth Army became very slow with mud slides caused by the torrential rain making it difficult to keep roads and tracks open, creating
5776-645: The Axis troops on its sector to the north beyond the Highway 12 towards Gallicano ; and the Brazilian 6th RCT, which took Massarosa , Camaiore and other small towns on its own way north. By the end of the month, the Brazilian unit had conquered Monte Prano and controlled the Serchio valley region without suffering any major casualties. In October, it also took Fornaci with its munitions factory, and Barga ; while
5928-565: The British 56th Division captured Croce. With progress slow at Gemmano, Leese decided to renew the attack on Coriano. After a paralyzing bombardment from 700 artillery pieces and bombers, the Canadian 5th Armoured Division and the British 1st Armoured Division launched their attack on the night of 12 September. The Coriano positions were finally taken on 14 September. Once again, the way was open to Rimini. Kesselring's forces had taken heavy losses, and three divisions of reinforcements ordered to
6080-469: The Coriano ridge positions by driving westwards toward Croce and Gemmano to reach the Marano valley which curved behind the Coriano positions to the coast some 2 mi (3.2 km) north of Riccione. The Battle of Gemmano has been nicknamed by some historians as the "Cassino of the Adriatic". After 11 assaults between 4 and 13 September (first by British 56th Division and then British 46th Division), it
6232-573: The Gari to form the Garigliano River, which continued on to the sea. With its heavily fortified mountain defences, difficult river crossings, and valley heads flooded by the Germans, Cassino formed a linchpin of the Gustav Line, the most formidable line of the defensive positions making up the Winter Line. In spite of its potential excellence as an observation post, because of the fourteen-century-old Benedictine abbey's historical significance,
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6384-484: The German 10th Army units downstream to pull back towards Bologna. Paradoxically, in one sense, this helped Kesselring because it shortened the front he had to defend and shortened the distance between his two armies, providing him with greater flexibility to switch units between the two fronts. Continuing their push up Route 9, on 21 October British V Corps crossed the Savio river which runs north eastward through Cesena to
6536-509: The German commander in Italy, Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring , ordered German units not to include it in their defensive positions and informed the Vatican and the Allies accordingly in December 1943. Nevertheless, some Allied reconnaissance aircraft maintained they observed German troops inside the monastery. While this remains unconfirmed, it is clear that once the monastery
6688-518: The German defences to open up the route to the northeast through the "Ljubljana Gap" into Austria and Hungary . Whilst this would threaten Germany from the rear, Churchill was more concerned to forestall the Russians advancing into central Europe. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff had strongly opposed this strategy as diluting the Allied focus in France. However, following the Allied successes in France during
6840-583: The German defenders to detect Allied movement and direct highly accurate artillery fire, preventing any northward advance. Running across the Allied line was the fast-flowing Rapido River , which rose in the central Apennine Mountains , flowed through Cassino (joining the Gari River , which was erroneously identified as the Rapido ) and across the entrance to the Liri valley. There, the Liri River joined
6992-536: The German defenders were driven from their positions. The capture of Monte Cassino resulted in 55,000 Allied casualties, with German losses estimated at around 20,000 killed and wounded. The battle has been described as a Pyrrhic victory . The Allied landings in Italy in September 1943 by two Allied armies, following shortly after the Allied landings in Sicily in July, commanded by General Sir Harold Alexander ,
7144-487: The German positions east of Bologna "were automatically gone." Alexander and Clark had decided therefore to make a last push for Bologna before winter gripped the front. On 16 October, the U.S. Fifth Army had gathered itself for one last effort to take Bologna. The Allies were short of artillery ammunition because of a global reduction in Allied ammunition production in anticipation of the final defeat of Germany. The Fifth Army's batteries were rationed to such an extent that
7296-557: The Germans' determination to continue fighting. Nevertheless, it was fortunate for the Allies that at this stage of the war the Italian partisan forces had become highly effective in disrupting the German preparations in the high mountains. On 2 April 1944, partisans belonging to the Eighth Garibaldi Brigade managed to occupy Sant'Agata Feltria ; their ambush of a German detachment sent to round up partisans led to
7448-486: The Gothic Line to cut Route 9 (and therefore Kesselring's lateral communications) at Faenza . The transfer of 356th Infantry Division to the Adriatic weakened the defences around the Il Giogo pass which was already potentially an area of weakness, being on the boundary between 10th and 14th Armies. During the last week in August, U.S. II Corps and British XIII Corps started to move into the mountains to take up positions for
7600-482: The Gustav Line crossed the main route north to Rome at strategically crucial Highway 6. It followed the Liri valley and was anchored around the mountains behind the town of Cassino . Above it stood the ancient Benedictine sanctuary of Monte Cassino , which dominated the valley entrance, and Monte Cassino, which gave the defenders clear observation of potential attackers advancing towards the valley mouth. The U.S. 5th Army
7752-551: The Gustav Line defences were attacked on four occasions by Allied troops. On 16 May, soldiers from the Polish II Corps launched one of the final assaults on the German defensive position as part of a twenty-division assault along a thirty-two-kilometre front. On 18 May, a Polish flag and the British flag were raised over the ruins. Following this Allied victory, the German Senger Line collapsed on 25 May, and
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#17327732403587904-469: The II Giogo Pass by attacking both the peaks of Monticello and Monte Altuzzo using the 91st Infantry Division in a bold attempt to bounce the Germans off the positions, but this failed. Progress at the II Giogo Pass was slow, but on II Corps' right British XIII Corps were making better progress. Clark grasped this opportunity to divert part of II Corps reserve (the 337th Infantry Regiment , part of
8056-584: The Italian Peninsula and barred the way to Rome for the two Allied armies in Italy: the U.S. Fifth Army in the west and the British Eighth Army in the east. The Allies' grand strategy in the autumn of 1943 was for the Eighth Army to advance through the Sangro River defences, then hook south at Avezzano and enter Rome from the rear while the Fifth Army approached from the south. The center of
8208-537: The Italian capital of Rome , Clark diverted a large part of his Anzio force in that direction in an attempt to ensure that he and the Fifth Army would have the honour of liberating the city. As a result, most of Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring 's forces slipped the noose and fell back north fighting delaying actions, notably in late June on the Trasimene Line (running from just south of Ancona on
8360-503: The Liri valley. Freyberg had informed his superiors that he estimated that the offensive had a 50 percent chance of success, given the circumstances. Allied officers increasingly focused on the abbey of Monte Cassino, which was believed to be used as a German artillery observation point. The abbey was presumed to have prevented the breach of the 'Gustav Line'. The British press and C. L. Sulzberger of The New York Times wrote about German observation posts and artillery positions inside
8512-417: The Marecchia valley running across the Eighth Army line of advance and running to the sea at Rimini. During the night of 19/20 September, Brigadier Richard W. Goodbody , commanding the 2nd Armoured Brigade , ordered (with many doubts) the 2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen's Bays) to attack Pt 153 at 10.50. The German antitank gunners, using the renowned 88mm guns , had a field day. All but three Sherman tanks of
8664-466: The Poles' left, advanced towards Pesaro the coastal plain narrowed and it was planned that the Polish Corps, weakened by losses and lack of replacements, would go into Army reserve and the front on the coastal plain would become the responsibility of the Canadian Corps alone. The Germans were taken by surprise, to the extent that both von Vietinghoff, and the parachute division's commander— Generalmajor Richard Heidrich —were away on leave. They were in
8816-439: The Rimini Line. Meanwhile, with Croce and beyond it Montescudo secured, the left wing of the Eighth Army advanced to the Marano river and the frontier of San Marino . The Germans had occupied neutral San Marino over a week previously to take advantage of the heights on which the city-state stood. By 19 September, the city was isolated and fell to the Allies with relatively little cost. 3 miles (4.8 km) beyond San Marino lay
8968-424: The Rome area in time for the attack on Anzio (codenamed Operation Shingle) where the U.S. VI Corps ( British 1st and U.S. 3rd Infantry Divisions , the 504th Parachute Regimental Combat Team , U.S. Army Rangers and British Commandos , Combat Command 'B' of the U.S. 1st Armored Division , along with supporting units), under Major General John P. Lucas , was due to make an amphibious landing on 22 January. It
9120-455: The Royal Sussex Regiment was ordered to attack in battalion strength. There was a calamitous start. Artillery could not be used in direct support targeting point 593 because of the proximity and risk of shelling friendly troops. It was therefore planned to shell point 575, which had been providing supporting fire to the defenders of point 593. The topography of the land meant that shells fired at 575 had to pass very low over Snakeshead Ridge, and in
9272-444: The Snake's Head were taken by surprise, while the New Zealand Corps was two days away from being ready to launch their main assault. Pope Pius XII was silent after the bombing; however, his Cardinal Secretary of State , Luigi Maglione , bluntly stated to the senior U.S. diplomat to the Vatican, Harold Tittmann , that the bombing was "a colossal blunder … a piece of a gross stupidity". From every investigation that followed since
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#17327732403589424-411: The U.S. 34th Division, said, "I don't know, but I don't believe the enemy is in the convent. All the fire has been from the slopes of the hill below the wall". Finally, Clark, "who did not want the monastery bombed", pinned down the Commander-in-Chief Allied Armies in Italy, Alexander, to take the responsibility: "I said, 'You give me a direct order and we'll do it,' and he did." The bombing mission in
9576-413: The U.S. Fifth Army to take part in the landings in southern France, Operation Dragoon . By 5 August, the strength of the Fifth Army had fallen from 249,000 to 153,000, and they had only 18 divisions to confront the combined German 10th and 14th Armies ′ strength of 14 divisions plus four to seven reserve divisions. Nevertheless, Winston Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff were keen to break through
9728-428: The abbey was being used by the Germans as an observation post, at the very least. Fears escalated, along with casualties, and despite evidence, it was marked for destruction. On 15 February 1944, Allied bombers dropped 1,400 tonnes of high explosives, causing widespread damage. Fallschirmjäger forces occupied the area and established defensive positions amid the ruins. Between 17 January and 18 May, Monte Cassino and
9880-400: The abbey, but their claims were not substantiated. The commander in chief of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker , accompanied by Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers (deputy to General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson , the Supreme Allied Commander of the Mediterranean Theater ), personally observed during a fly-over "a radio mast ... German uniforms hanging on
10032-419: The abbey; when he was later seen wandering the ruins, the German paratroopers thought he was a ghost. After 3 April, he was not seen again. It is now known that the Germans had an agreement not to use the abbey for military purposes. Following its destruction, paratroopers of the German 1st Parachute Division then occupied the ruins of the abbey and turned it into a fortress and observation post, which became
10184-456: The addition of the British 4th Infantry Division 's artillery. West of the Canadians was British V Corps with the British 46th Infantry Division manning the right of the corps front line and 4th Indian Infantry Division its left. In reserve were the British 56th Infantry and 1st Armoured Divisions and the British 7th Armoured and 25th Tank Brigades . Further to the rear was the British 4th Division, waiting to be called forward to join
10336-446: The air raid had not been coordinated with ground commands, and an immediate infantry follow-up failed to materialise. Its timing had been driven by the Air Force, which viewed it as a separate operation, considering the availability of good weather and requirements on other fronts and theatres without reference to ground forces. The brigade commanders of the 4th Indian division were having a morning planning meeting and were surprised to see
10488-412: The approach to the river was still hazardous due to uncleared mines and booby traps, and the highly technical business of an opposed river crossing lacked the necessary planning and rehearsal. Although a battalion of the 143rd Infantry Regiment was able to get across the Gari on the south side of San Angelo and two companies of the 141st Infantry Regiment on the north side, they were isolated for most of
10640-406: The attack. On the night of 17 February, the main assault took place. The 4/ 6th Rajputana Rifles would take on the assault on Point 593 along Snakeshead Ridge with the depleted Royal Sussex Regiment held in reserve. 1/ 9th Gurkha Rifles were to attack Point 444. In the meantime, the 1/2nd Gurkha Rifles were to sweep across the slopes and ravines in a direct assault on the monastery. This latter
10792-444: The battle began without the attackers being fully prepared. Furthermore, Corps HQ did not fully appreciate the difficulty in getting the 4th Indian Infantry Division into place in the mountains and supplying them on the ridges and valleys north of Cassino. This was evidenced in the writings of Maj. Gen. Howard Kippenberger , commander of New Zealand's 2nd Division, after the war: Poor Dimoline (acting commander of 4th Indian Division)
10944-420: The bombers go overhead. Many of the troops had only taken over their positions from II Corps two days previously, and besides the difficulties in the mountains, preparations in the valley had also been held up by difficulties in supplying the newly installed troops with sufficient material for a full-scale assault because of incessantly foul weather, flooding, and waterlogged ground. As a result, Indian troops on
11096-475: The case up to March 1945, with the Gothic Line being breached but with no decisive breakthrough; this would not take place until April 1945 during the final Allied offensive of the Italian Campaign. Operation Olive has been described as the biggest battle of materials ever fought in Italy. Over 1,200,000 men participated in the battle. The battle took the form of a pincer manoeuvre , carried out by
11248-399: The centre, where most of his forces were already concentrated. It was the shortest route to his objective, the plains of Lombardy , and could be mounted quickly. He mounted a deception operation to convince the Germans that the main blow would come on the Adriatic front. On 4 August, Alexander met Lieutenant-General Leese, the British Eighth Army commander, to find that Leese did not favour
11400-429: The cliff-like abbey walls, with the monks observing German and American patrols exchanging fire. However, attempts to take Monte Cassino were broken by overwhelming machine gun fire from the slopes below the monastery. Despite their fierce fighting, the 34th Division never managed to take the final redoubts on Hill 593 (known to the Germans as Calvary Mount), held by the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Parachute Regiment , part of
11552-484: The coast ( 5th and 56th Infantry Divisions ). The British 46th Infantry Division was to attack on the night of 19 January across the Garigliano below its junction with the Liri in support of the main attack by U.S. II Corps , under Major General Geoffrey Keyes , on their right. The main central thrust by the U.S. II Corps would commence on 20 January with the U.S. 36th Infantry Division making an assault across
11704-576: The coast, Leese had Polish II Corps with 5th Kresowa Division in the front line and the 3rd Carpathian Division in reserve. To the left of the Poles was Canadian I Corps which had the Canadian 1st Infantry Division (with the British 21st Tank Brigade under command) in the front line and the Canadian 5th Armoured Division in reserve. For the opening phase the corps artillery was strengthened with
11856-514: The coastal plain, V Corps made an armoured thrust to dislodge the Coriano Ridge defences and reach the Marano river. This was to open the gate to the plain beyond which could be rapidly exploited by the tanks of British 1st Armoured Division, poised for this purpose. However, after two days of gruesome fighting with heavy losses on both sides, the Allies were obliged to call off their assault and reassess their strategy. Leese decided to outflank
12008-549: The coordinated attack on the Gustav Line some three days earlier. The first assault was made on 17 January. Near the coast, the British X Corps (56th and 5th Divisions) forced a crossing of the Garigliano (followed some two days later by the British 46th Division on their right) causing General Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin , commander of the German XIV Panzer Corps , and responsible for the Gustav defences on
12160-480: The corps. The left flank of the Eighth Army front was guarded by British X Corps employing the 10th Indian Infantry Division and two armoured car regiments, 12th and 27th Lancers . Prior to the attack the I Canadian Corps' front was covered by patrolling Polish cavalry units and V Corps by patrolling elements of the Italian Liberation Corps. In army reserve, also waiting to be called forward,
12312-463: The defence. It took the Allies from mid-November 1943 to June 1944 to fight through all the various elements of the Winter Line, including the well-known battles at Monte Cassino and Anzio . The offensive on the Bernhardt Line was launched on December 1, 1943, as part of Operation Raincoat . British and American troops took the terrain around Monte Camino and the Mignano Gap within a week and
12464-522: The east coast, past the southern shores of Lake Trasimeno near Perugia and on to the west coast south of Grosseto ) and in July on the Arno Line (running from the west coast along the line of the Arno River and into the Apennine Mountains north of Arezzo ). This gave time to consolidate the Gothic Line, a 10 miles (16 km) deep belt of fortifications extending from south of La Spezia (on
12616-441: The east the German defensive line had been breached on the Adriatic front and Ortona was captured by the 1st Canadian Division , the advance had ground to a halt with the onset of winter blizzards at the end of December, making close air support and movement in the jagged terrain impossible. The route to Rome from the east using Route 5 was thus excluded as a viable option, leaving the routes from Naples to Rome, Highways 6 and 7, as
12768-513: The end of 15 October before the escarpment was secured. On the right of U.S. II Corps British XIII Corps was experiencing equally determined fighting on terrain just as difficult. By the second half of October, it was becoming increasingly clear to Alexander that despite the dogged fighting in the waterlogged plain of Romagna and the streaming mountains of the central Apennines, with the autumn well advanced and exhaustion and combat losses increasingly affecting his forces' capabilities, no breakthrough
12920-425: The end of May and early June and wished for the Eighth Army to win the battle on its own. He suggested a surprise attack along the Adriatic coast. Although Harding did not share Leese's view and Eighth Army planning staff had already rejected the idea of an Adriatic offensive (because it would be difficult to bring the necessary concentration of forces to bear), General Alexander was not prepared to force Leese to adopt
13072-512: The enemy to bring reserves into it during an attack or for troops to take shelter there if driven from positions outside. It was impossible to ask troops to storm a hill surmounted by an intact building such as this, capable of sheltering several hundred infantry in perfect security from shellfire and ready at the critical moment to emerge and counter-attack. ... Undamaged it was a perfect shelter but with its narrow windows and level profiles an unsatisfactory fighting position. Smashed by bombing it
13224-446: The evening of 22 January, the 141st Infantry Regiment had virtually ceased to exist; only 40 men made it back to the Allied lines. Rick Atkinson described the intense German resistance: Artillery and Nebelwerfer drumfire methodically searched both bridgeheads , while machine guns opened on every sound ... GIs inched forward, feeling for trip wires and listening to German gun crews reload ... to stand or even to kneel
13376-540: The event that some fell among the gathering assault companies. After reorganising, the attack went in at midnight. The fighting was brutal and often hand-to-hand, but the determined defence held and the Royal Sussex battalion was beaten off, once again sustaining over 50 percent casualties. Over the two nights, the Royal Sussex Regiment lost 12 out of 15 officers and 162 out of 313 men who took part in
13528-480: The event, it is certain that the only people killed in the monastery by the bombing were 230 Italian civilians seeking refuge in the abbey. There is no evidence that the bombs dropped on the Monte Cassino monastery that day killed any German troops. However, given the imprecision of bombing in those days (it was estimated that only 10 percent of the bombs from the heavy bombers, bombing from a high altitude, hit
13680-496: The following year. Also, while they remained held in the mountains, the armies continued to have an over-preponderance of armour relative to infantry. Battle of Monte Cassino Invasion of Italy Winter Line Gothic Line 1945 Spring Offensive The Battle of Monte Cassino , also known as the Battle for Rome , was a series of four military assaults by the Allies against German forces in Italy during
13832-495: The front. It was not until 28 August—when he saw a captured copy of Leese's order of the day to his army prior to the attack—that Kesselring realised that a major offensive was in progress, and three divisions of reinforcements were ordered from Bologna to the Adriatic front, still needing at least two days to get into position. By 30 August, the Canadian and British Corps had reached the Green I main defensive positions running along
13984-623: The idea of another direct attack on Cassino. On 11 February 1944, the acting commander of the 4th Indian Division, Brigadier General Dimoline (usually the Commander Royal Artillery in 4th Indian), requested a bombing raid. Tuker reiterated his case again from a hospital bed in Caserta , where he was suffering a severe attack of a recurrent rheumatoid arthritis . Freyberg transmitted his request on 12 February for fighter bombers armed with 1,000 lb bombs. The request, however,
14136-582: The line of the Conca river . Fierce resistance from the Corps′ 1st Parachute Division—commanded by Heidrich (supported by intense artillery fire from the Coriano ridge in the hills on the Canadians' left)—brought their advance to a halt. Meanwhile, British V Corps was finding progress in the more difficult hill terrain with its poor roads tough going. On 3–4 September, while the Canadians once again attacked along
14288-434: The main assault on the main Gothic Line defences. Some fierce resistance was met from outposts but at the end of the first week in September, once reorganisation had taken place following the withdrawal of three divisions to reinforce the pressured Adriatic front, the Germans withdrew to the main Gothic Line defences. After an artillery bombardment, the Fifth Army's main assault began at dusk on 12 September. Keyes tried to flank
14440-400: The main base of Naples up the Italian "boot," and on the eastern front, the British Eighth Army , commanded by General Sir Bernard Montgomery , advanced up the Adriatic coast . Despite the opinion of lower commanders, Kesselring held to Hitler's direction to hold as much of Italy for as long as possible and so laid a defensive across Italy below Rome. The progress of Clark's Fifth Army
14592-413: The monastery), bombs did fall elsewhere and kill German and Allied troops alike, although that would have been unintended . Indeed, sixteen bombs hit the Fifth Army compound at Presenzano , 17 miles (27 km) from Monte Cassino, and exploded only yards away from the trailer where Clark was doing paperwork at his desk. On the day after the bombing, at first light, most of the civilians still alive fled
14744-595: The morning of 15 February 1944 involved 142 Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress heavy bombers, followed by 47 North American B-25 Mitchell and 40 Martin B-26 Marauder medium bombers. In all, they dropped 1,150 tonnes of high explosives and incendiary bombs on the abbey, reducing the entire summit of Monte Cassino to a smoking mass of rubble. Between bomb runs, the II Corps artillery pounded the mountain. Many Allied soldiers and war correspondents cheered as they observed
14896-481: The morning of 17 September, after five days of fighting. The capture of Altuzzo and Pratone as well as Monte Verruca between them caused the formidable Futa Pass defences to be outflanked, and Lemelsen was forced to pull back, leaving the pass to be taken after only light fighting on 22 September. On the left, IV Corps had fought their way to the main Gothic Line: notably the 370th Infantry Regiment , which pushed
15048-501: The mountains were rocky, strewn with boulders and cut by ravines and gullies. Digging foxholes on the rocky ground was out of the question and each feature was exposed to fire from surrounding high points. The ravines were no better since the gorse growing there, far from giving cover, had been sown with mines, booby-traps and hidden barbed wire by the defenders. The Germans had had three months to prepare their defensive positions using dynamite and to stockpile ammunition and stores. There
15200-483: The new assault, let alone take the rest and reorganisation they really needed after three months of attritional fighting north from Naples. However, because the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff would only make landing craft available until early February, as they were required for Operation Overlord , the Allied invasion of Northern France , Operation Shingle had to take place in late January with
15352-455: The northwest and the Bernhardt Line to the southeast of the primary defenses. Before being ultimately broken, the Gustav Line effectively slowed the Allied advance for months between December 1943 and June 1944. Major battles in the assault on the Winter Line at Monte Cassino and Anzio alone resulted in 98,000 Allied casualties and 60,000 Axis casualties. The Gustav Line stretched across
15504-524: The only possibilities; Highway 7 (the old Roman Appian Way ) followed along the west coast but south of Rome ran into the Pontine Marshes , which the Germans had flooded. Highway 6 (the Via Casilina ) ran through the Liri valley, dominated at its south entrance by the rugged mass of Monte Cassino above the town of Cassino . Excellent observation from the peaks of several hills allowed
15656-405: The overall battle plan and cancel or modify the central attack by the U.S. II Corps to make men available to force the issue in the south before the German reinforcements were able to get into position. As it happened, Fifth Army HQ failed to appreciate the frailty of the German position and the plan was unchanged. The two divisions from Rome arrived by 21 January and stabilised the German position in
15808-412: The place and that bombing with "blockbuster" bombs ("high capacity" bombs of 2,000 and 4,000 lb) would be the only solution since 1,000-pound bombs would be "next to useless". Tuker stated that he could only attack if the garrison was weakened by continuous bombing by air and artillery. Tuker's own opinion was that instead of continuing to batter against Cassino, attacks should be elsewhere where terrain
15960-404: The plan. He argued that the Allies had lost their specialist French mountain troops to Operation Dragoon and that the Eighth Army's strength lay in tactics combining infantry, armour and guns which could not be employed in the high mountains of the central Apennines. It has also been suggested that Leese disliked working in league with Clark after the Fifth Army's controversial move on Rome at
16112-437: The process of pulling back their forward units to the Green I fortifications of the Gothic Line proper and Kesselring was uncertain whether this was the start of a major offensive or just Eighth Army advancing to occupy vacated ground whilst the main Allied attack would come on the U.S. Fifth Army front towards Bologna. On 27 August, he was still expressing the view that the attack was a diversion and so would not commit reserves to
16264-551: The remaining 4 miles (6.4 km) were over difficult terrain and were reinforced by three of the best German divisions in Italy—the 29th Panzergrenadier Division, 90th Panzergrenadier Division and the 1st Parachute Division—which Kesselring had been able to withdraw from the Romagna as a result of his shortened front. By late October, the Brazilian 6th RCT had pushed the Axis forces through province of Lucca to Barga, where its advance
16416-552: The ridges on the far side of the Foglia river. Taking advantage of the Germans' lack of manpower, the Canadians punched through and by 3 September had advanced a further 15 mi (24 km) to the Green II line of defences running from the coast near Riccione . The Allies were close to breaking through to Rimini and the Romagna plain. However, LXXVI Panzer Corps on the German 10th Army's left wing had withdrawn in good order behind
16568-413: The right wing of the attack fanning toward the coast to create a pincer with the Eighth Army advance. This meant that as a preparatory move, the bulk of the Eighth Army had to be transferred from the centre of Italy to the Adriatic coast, taking two valuable weeks, while a new intelligence deception plan (Operation Ulster) was commenced to convince Kesselring that the main attack would be in the centre. On
16720-453: The ruins. Only about 40 people remained: the six monks who survived in the deep vaults of the abbey; their 79-year-old abbot, Gregorio Diamare ; three tenant farmer families; orphaned or abandoned children; the badly wounded; and the dying. After artillery barrages, renewed bombing, and attacks on the ridge by the 4th Indian Division, the monks decided to leave their ruined home with the others who could move at 07:30 on 17 February. The old abbot
16872-517: The slow progress on the Adriatic front, Clark decided that Bologna would be too far west along Route 9 to trap the German 10th Army. He decided therefore to make the main II Corps thrust further east towards Imola whilst XIII Corps would continue to push on the right toward Faenza. Although they were through the Gothic Line, Fifth Army—just like the Eighth Army before them—found the terrain beyond and its defenders even more difficult. Between 21 September and 3 October, U.S. 88th Division had fought its way to
17024-509: The so-called Winter Line. On the western side of the Apennines were two subsidiary lines, the Bernhardt Line in front of the main Gustav positions, and the Hitler Line some 8 kilometres (5 mi) to the rear. The Winter Line was fortified with gun pits, concrete bunkers, turreted machine-gun emplacements, barbed wire and minefields. It was the strongest of the German defensive lines south of Rome. About 15 German divisions were employed in
17176-448: The sole hands of General Heinrich von Vietinghoff 's 10th Army . The withdrawn American units were replaced by the newly formed New Zealand Corps ( 2nd New Zealand and 4th Indian Divisions ), commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Bernard Freyberg , from the Eighth Army on the Adriatic front. Freyberg, with U.S. VI Corps under heavy threat at Anzio, was under equal pressure to launch a relieving action at Cassino. Once again, therefore,
17328-458: The south western half of the line, some serious concern as to the ability of the German 94th Infantry Division to hold the line. Responding to Senger's concerns, Kesselring ordered the 29th and 90th Panzergrenadier Divisions from the Rome area to provide reinforcement. X Corps did not have the extra men, and the battle plan remained unchanged. However, there would certainly have been time to alter
17480-416: The south. In one respect, however, the plan was working in that Kesselring's reserves had been drawn south. The three divisions of Lieutenant General McCreery's X Corps sustained some 4,000 casualties during the period of the first battle. The central thrust by the U.S. 36th Division, under Major General Fred L. Walker , commenced three hours after sunset on 20 January. The lack of time to prepare meant that
17632-423: The spectacle. Eaker and Devers watched; Juin was heard to remark, "no, they'll never get anywhere this way." Clark and Gruenther refused to be on the scene and stayed at their headquarters. That same afternoon and the next day, an aggressive follow-up of artillery and a raid by 59 fighter bombers wreaked further destruction. The German positions on Point 593 above and behind the monastery were untouched. Damningly,
17784-611: The start of Operation Olive, Eighth Army had suffered 14,000 casualties. As a result, British battalions had to be reduced from four to three rifle companies due to a severe shortage of manpower. Facing the Eighth Army LXXVI Panzer Corps had suffered 16,000 casualties. As the Eighth Army paused at the end of September to reorganise Leese was reassigned to command the Allied land forces in South-East Asia and Lieutenant-General Richard L. McCreery
17936-442: The state of preparation of the Gothic Line: he feared the Allies would use amphibious landings to outflank its defences. To downgrade its importance in the eyes of both friend and foe, he ordered the name, with its historic connotations, changed, reasoning that if the Allies managed to break through they would not be able to use the more impressive name to magnify their victory claims. In response to this order, Kesselring renamed it
18088-509: The strategy of fighting retreat had been for the sole purpose of providing time to prepare the Gustav line where the Germans intended to stand firm. The intelligence assessment of Allied prospects was therefore over-optimistic. The Fifth Army had only reached the Gustav Line on 15 January, having taken six weeks of heavy fighting to advance the last seven miles (11 km) through the Bernhardt Line positions, during which time they had sustained 16,000 casualties. They hardly had time to prepare
18240-541: The summer, the U.S. Chiefs relented, and there was complete agreement amongst the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Second Quebec Conference on 12 September. The original plan of General Sir Harold Alexander , the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Allied Armies in Italy (AAI)—as formulated by his Chief of Staff , Lieutenant-General Sir John Harding —was to storm the Gothic Line in
18392-496: The swollen Gari river five miles (8.0 km) downstream of Cassino. Simultaneously, the French Expeditionary Corps (CEF) led by General Alphonse Juin would continue its "right hook" move towards Monte Cairo , the hinge to the Gustav and Hitler defensive lines . In truth, Clark did not believe there was much chance of an early breakthrough, but he felt that the attacks would draw German reserves away from
18544-408: The task of crossing the river would be easier in that the Rapido upstream of Cassino was fordable, the flooding made movement on the approaches each side very difficult. In particular, armour could only move on paths laid with steel matting and it took eight days of bloody fighting across the waterlogged ground for 34th Division to push back General Franek's German 44th Infantry Division to establish
18696-415: The task of the U.S. 34th Division (joined temporarily by the 142nd Infantry Regiment of the 36th Division, which had been held in reserve and unused during the Rapido crossing) to fight southward along the linked hilltops towards the intersecting ridge on the south end of which was Monastery Hill. They could then break through down into the Liri valley behind the Gustav Line defences. It was very tough going:
18848-435: The time and at no time was Allied armour able to get across the river, leaving them highly vulnerable to counter-attacking tanks and self-propelled guns of Generalleutnant Eberhard Rodt 's 15th Panzergrenadier Division . The southern group was forced back across the river by mid-morning of 21 January. Keyes pressed Walker to renew the attack immediately. Once again, the two regiments attacked but with no more success against
19000-506: The total rounds fired in the last week of October were less than the amount fired during one eight-hour period on 2 October. Nevertheless, U.S. II Corps and British XIII Corps pounded away for the next 11 days. Little progress was made in the centre along the main road to Bologna. On the right, there was better progress, and on 20 October the U.S. 88th Division seized Monte Grande, only 4 mi (6.4 km) from Route 9, and three days later British 78th Division stormed Monte Spaduro. However,
19152-452: The two squadrons that took part in the attack were destroyed. The Bays lost 24 tanks and, more important, 64 highly skilled tank crewmen. Fortunately for the 9th Queen's Royal Lancers , who had been ordered to pass through the Bays, their attack was postponed after strong representations had been made to higher HQ. On the right the I Canadian Corps on 20 September broke the German positions on
19304-414: The war. The next attack was launched on 24 January. The U.S. II Corps, with 34th Infantry Division under Major General Charles W. Ryder spearheading the attack and French colonial troops on its right flank, launched an assault across the flooded Rapido valley north of Cassino and into the mountains behind with the intention of then wheeling to the left and attacking Monte Cassino from high ground. Whilst
19456-568: The war. In return they sustained losses of about 80 per cent in the Infantry battalions, some 2,200 casualties. At the height of the battle in the first days of February von Senger und Etterlin had moved the 90th Division from the Garigliano front to the north of Cassino and had been so alarmed at the rate of attrition, he had "mustered all the weight of my authority to request that the Battle of Cassino should be broken off and that we should occupy
19608-450: The well dug-in 15th Panzergrenadier Division: the 143rd Infantry Regiment got the equivalent of two battalions across, but, once again, there was no armoured support, and they were devastated when daylight came the next day. The 141st Infantry Regiment also crossed in two battalion strength and, despite the lack of armoured support, managed to advance 1 kilometre (0.62 mi). However, with the coming of daylight, they too were cut down and by
19760-719: The west coast) to the Foglia Valley , through the natural defensive wall of the Apennines (which ran unbroken nearly from coast to coast, 50 miles (80 km) deep and with high crests and peaks rising to 7,000 feet (2,100 m)), to the Adriatic Sea between Pesaro and Ravenna , on the east coast. The emplacements included numerous concrete-reinforced gun pits and trenches and 2,376 machine-gun nests with interlocking fire, 479 anti-tank, mortar and assault gun positions, 120,000 metres (130,000 yd) of barbed wire and many miles of anti-tank ditches. This last redoubt proved
19912-413: Was a German and Italian defensive line of the Italian Campaign of World War II . It formed Field Marshal Albert Kesselring 's last major line of defence along the summits of the northern part of the Apennine Mountains during the fighting retreat of the Axis forces in Italy against the Allied Armies in Italy , commanded by General Sir Harold Alexander . Adolf Hitler had concerns about
20064-461: Was a jagged heap of broken masonry and debris open to effective fire from guns, mortars and strafing planes as well as being a death trap if bombed again. On the whole I thought it would be more useful to the Germans if we left it unbombed. Major General Francis Tuker , whose 4th Indian Division would have the task of attacking Monastery Hill, had made his own appraisal of the situation. In the absence of detailed intelligence at Fifth Army HQ, he found
20216-465: Was across appalling terrain, but it was hoped that the Gurkhas, so expert in mountain terrain, would succeed. This proved a faint hope. Once again, the fighting was brutal, but no progress was made and casualties were heavy. The Rajputanas lost 196 officers and men, the 1/9th Gurkhas 149 and the 1/2nd Gurkhas 96. It became clear that the attack had failed and on 18 February Dimoline and Freyberg called off
20368-504: Was comparable to El Alamein , Mareth , and the Gustav Line (Monte-Cassino) ." After the nearly concurrent breakthroughs at Cassino and Anzio in spring 1944, the 11 nations representing the Allies in Italy finally had a chance to trap the Germans in a pincer movement and to realize some of the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill 's strategic goals for the long, costly campaign against
20520-610: Was convinced that Cassino could be bypassed and the German defences unhinged by this northerly route but his request for reserves to maintain the momentum of his advance was refused and the one available reserve regiment (from 36th Division) was sent to reinforce 34th Division. By 31 January the French had ground to a halt with Monte Cifalco, which had a clear view of the French and U.S. flanks and supply lines, still in German hands. The two Moroccan-French divisions sustained 2,500 casualties in their struggles around Colle Belvedere. It became
20672-403: Was destroyed, it was occupied by the Germans and proved better cover for their emplacements and troops than an intact structure would have offered. The plan of the Fifth Army commander, Lieutenant General Clark, was for the British X Corps , under Lieutenant General Richard McCreery , on the left of a thirty-kilometre (20 mi) front, to attack on 17 January 1944, across the Garigliano near
20824-458: Was going to occur before the winter weather returned. On the Adriatic front, the British Eighth Army's advance resumed on its left wing through the Apennine foothills toward Forlì on Route 9. On 5 October the 10th Indian Infantry Division —switched from British X Corps to British V Corps—had crossed the Fiumicino river high in the hills and turned the German defensive line on the river forcing
20976-504: Was greatly expanded by air force planners and probably supported by Eaker and Devers, who sought to use the opportunity to showcase the abilities of U.S. Army air power to support ground operations. Clark and his chief of staff, Major General Alfred Gruenther , remained unconvinced of the "military necessity". When handing over the U.S. II Corps position to the New Zealand Corps, Brigadier General J.A. Butler, deputy commander of
21128-544: Was halted. In early November, the buildup to full strength of the 1st Brazilian Division and some reinforcement of the U.S. 92nd Division had not nearly compensated the U.S. Fifth Army for the formations diverted to France. The situation in the British Eighth Army was even worse: Replacement cadres were being diverted to northern Europe and I Canadian Corps was ordered to prepare to ship to the Netherlands in February of
21280-473: Was having a dreadful time getting his division into position. I never really appreciated the difficulties until I went over the ground after the war. Freyberg's plan was a continuation of the first battle: an attack from the north along the mountain ridges and an attack from the southeast along the railway line, and to capture the railway station across the Rapido less than 1 mile (1.6 km) south of Cassino town. Success would squeeze out Cassino town and open up
21432-474: Was held up in front of these positions through the winter of 1943-44. They attempted to flank the position by the landings at Anzio but bogged down quickly there. A bloody and protracted battle was waged over the monastery, known as the Battle of Monte Cassino . The eastern end of the line was held by the coastal town of Ortona , captured by Canadian forces in the fierce Battle of Ortona in December 1943 which became known as "the little Stalingrad." Failure by
21584-448: Was hindered by challenging terrain, adverse weather conditions, and well-prepared German defenses. The Germans were fighting from a series of prepared positions in a manner designed to inflict maximum damage, then pulling back while buying time for the construction of the Winter Line defensive positions south of the Italian capital of Rome . The original estimates that Rome would fall by October 1943 proved far too optimistic. Although in
21736-527: Was hoped that the Anzio landing, with the benefit of surprise and a rapid move inland to the Alban Hills , which command both routes 6 and 7, would so threaten the Gustav defenders' rear and supply lines that it might just unsettle the German commanders and cause them to withdraw from the Gustav Line to positions north of Rome. Whilst this would have been consistent with the German tactics of the previous three months, Allied intelligence had not understood that
21888-516: Was in the process of relieving 5th Mountain Division . The 10th Army had a further five divisions in 51st Mountain Corps covering 80 mi (130 km) of front line on the right of LXVI Panzer Corps and a further two divisions— 162nd Infantry Division ( 162. (Turkoman) Infanterie-Division ) and 98th Infantry Division ( 98. Infanterie-Division ) (replaced by 29th Panzer Grenadier Division ( 29. Panzergrenadierdivision ) from 25 August)—covering
22040-582: Was leading the group down the mule path towards the Liri valley, reciting the rosary. After they arrived at a German first-aid station, some of the badly wounded who had been carried by the monks were taken away in a military ambulance. After meeting with a German officer, the monks were driven to the monastery of Sant'Anselmo all'Aventino . On 18 February, the abbot met the commander of the XIV Panzer Corps, Lieutenant-General Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin . One monk, Carlomanno Pellagalli, returned to
22192-439: Was more favourable and so isolating the area and thus forcing the Germans to retreat but, if the attack was to be against Cassino,then all German positions on the Cassino massif including Point 593- not just the abbey - should be attacked and the ground attack should immediately follow it. Initially Freyberg had accepted Tuker's suggestion for the attack but with Tuker absent from 2 February he started to have doubts and fell back on
22344-437: Was moved from commanding British X Corps to take over the army command. Clark's U.S. Fifth Army comprised three corps: U.S. IV Corps , under Major General Willis D. Crittenberger , on the left formed by the U.S. 1st Armored Division , the 6th South African Armoured Division and two Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs) , one of the U.S. 92nd Infantry Division the other the Brazilian 6th RCT (the first land forces contingent of
22496-425: Was no natural shelter, and the weather was wet and freezing cold. By early February, American infantry had captured a strategic point near the hamlet of San Onofrio, less than 1 mile (1.6 km) from the abbey and by 7 February a battalion had reached Point 445, a round-topped hill immediately below the monastery and no more than 400 yards (370 m) away. An American squad managed a reconnaissance right up against
22648-557: Was not of the same quality as the 10th Army: it had been badly mauled in the retreat from Anzio and some of its replacements had been hastily and inadequately trained. Clark's plan was for II Corps to strike along the road from Florence to Firenzuola and Imola through the Il Giogo pass to outflank the formidable defences of the Futa pass (on the main Florence–Bologna road) while on their right British XIII Corps would advance through
22800-407: Was the 2nd New Zealand Division . Facing the Eighth Army was the German 10th Army's LXXVI Panzer Corps ( LXXVI Panzerkorps ). Initially, this had only three divisions: 1st Parachute Division facing the Poles, 71st Infantry Division ( 71. Infanterie-Division ) inland on the parachute division's right and 278th Division ( 278. Infanterie-Division ) on the Corps right flank in the hills which
22952-512: Was the turn of Indian 4th Division who after a heavy bombardment made the 12th attack at 03:00 on 15 September and finally carried and secured the German defensive positions. In the meantime, to the north, on the other side of the Conca valley a similarly bloody engagement was being ground out at Croce. The German 98th Division held their positions with great tenacity, and it took five days of constant fighting, often door to door and hand to hand before
23104-410: Was to die ... On average, soldiers wounded on the Rapido received "definitive treatment" nine hours and forty-one minutes after they were hit, a medical study later found ..." The assault had been a costly failure, with the 36th Division losing 2,100 men killed, wounded and missing in 48 hours. As a result, the army's conduct of this battle became the subject of a Congressional inquiry after
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