The Albatros D.III was a biplane fighter aircraft used by the Imperial German Army Air Service ( Luftstreitkräfte ) during World War I . A modified licensed version was built by Oeffag for the Austro-Hungarian Air Service ( Luftfahrtruppen ). The D.III was flown by many top German aces, including Wilhelm Frankl , Erich Löwenhardt , Manfred von Richthofen , Karl Emil Schäfer , Ernst Udet , and Kurt Wolff , and Austro-Hungarians like Godwin von Brumowski . It was the preeminent fighter during the period of German aerial dominance known as " Bloody April " 1917.
116-645: 1915 1916 1917 1918 Associated articles Bloody April was the (largely successful) British air support operation during the Battle of Arras in April 1917 , during which particularly heavy casualties were suffered by the Royal Flying Corps at the hands of the German Luftstreitkräfte . The tactical, technological, and training differences between the two sides ensured
232-516: A hurricane bombardment lasting five minutes, following a relatively quiet night. When the time came, it was snowing heavily; Allied troops advancing across no man's land were hindered by large drifts. It was still dark and visibility on the battlefield was very poor. A westerly wind was at the Allied soldiers' backs blowing "a squall of sleet and snow into the faces of the Germans". The combination of
348-525: A sesquiplane wing arrangement broadly similar to the French Nieuport 11 . The upper wingspan was extended, while the lower wing was redesigned with reduced chord and a single main spar. V-shaped interplane struts replaced the previous parallel struts. For this reason, British aircrews commonly referred to the D.III as the "V-strutter." After a Typenprüfung (official type test) on 26 September 1916, Albatros received an order for 400 D.III aircraft,
464-425: A defence in depth. In theory, an attacker would be allowed to make initial gains, thus stretching their lines of communication. Reserves held close to the battlefield would be committed once the initial advance had bogged down, before enemy reinforcements could be brought up. The defenders would thus be able to counter-attack and regain any lost territory. In this sector, Falkenhausen kept his reserve troops too far from
580-615: A defensive strategy on the Western Front for that year. This impasse reinforced the French and British commanders' belief that to end the stalemate they needed a breakthrough; while this desire may have been the main impetus behind the offensive, the timing and location were influenced by political and tactical considerations. The mid-war years were momentous times. Governing politicians in Paris and London were under great pressure from
696-410: A greater number of objectives, when artillery covering fire was available for the depth of the intended advance, fresh platoons should "leap-frog" through the leading platoons to the next objective. The new organisations and equipment gave the infantry platoon the capacity for fire and manoeuvre, even in the absence of adequate artillery support. To bring uniformity in adoption of the methods laid down in
812-523: A light railway system. Most tunnels were lit by electricity, accommodated telephone cables and some had trams and water supplies. Caverns were dug into the sides for brigade and battalion HQs, first aid posts and store-rooms. The subways were found to be a most efficient way to relieve troops in the line, form up for the attack and then to evacuate wounded. Some of the tunnels were continued into Russian saps with exits in mine craters in no man's land and new mines were laid. Galleries were dug to be opened after
928-545: A line of relief divisions ( Ablösungsdivisionen ), with the reinforcements from Verdun, which began to arrive in greater numbers in September. In his analysis of the battle, Loßberg opposed the granting of discretion to front trench garrisons to retire, as he believed that manoeuvre would not evade Allied artillery fire, which could blanket the forward area and invited French or British infantry to occupy vacant areas. Loßberg considered that spontaneous withdrawals would disrupt
1044-472: A massive attack (the Nivelle Offensive ) about 80 kilometres (50 mi) to the south. The Royal Flying Corps (RFC) supported British operations by offering close air support , aerial reconnaissance and strategic bombing of German targets. The RFC's commanding officer , Hugh Trenchard believed in the offensive use of air power and pushed for operations over German-controlled territory. It
1160-469: A methodical attack if the lost ground was essential to the retention of the main position. Such methods required large numbers of reserve divisions ready to move to the battlefront. The reserve was obtained by creating 22 divisions by internal reorganisation of the army, bringing divisions from the eastern front and by shortening the Western Front, in Operation Alberich . By the spring of 1917,
1276-658: A quiet front, typical of most of the war in the west, except for attacks on the Hindenburg Line and around Lens, culminating in the Canadian Battle of Hill 70 (15–25 August). At the beginning of 1917, the British and French were still searching for a way to achieve a strategic breakthrough on the Western Front. The previous year had been marked by the costly success of the Anglo-French offensive astride
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#17327805121161392-464: A reverse slope, in front of artillery observation posts, which were kept far enough back to retain observation over the outpost zone. Behind the main line of resistance was a Grosskampfzone (battle zone), a second defensive area 1,500–2,500 yd (0.85–1.42 mi; 1.4–2.3 km) deep, on ground hidden from enemy observation, as far as possible while in view of German artillery observers. A rückwärtige Kampfzone (rear battle zone) further back
1508-633: A victory to avoid civil unrest but the British were wary of proceeding, given the rapidly changing tactical situation. In a meeting with Lloyd George, French commander-in-chief General Robert Nivelle persuaded the British Prime Minister, that if the British launched a diversionary assault to draw German troops away from the Aisne sector, the French offensive could succeed. It was agreed in the London Convention of 16 January, that
1624-646: A year before a suitable army could be raised, trained and transported to France. The French, Russians and British had intended to launch a joint spring offensive in 1917 but this strategy foundered in February when the Russians admitted that they could not meet their commitments. The spring offensive was reduced from attacks on the Eastern and Western fronts to a French assault along the Aisne River . In March,
1740-662: A year. The casualties in the air campaigns through the remainder of the war were never so one-sided again. In fact, this was essentially the last time that the Germans possessed real air superiority for the rest of the war – although the degree of allied dominance in the air certainly varied, the final all-out efforts of September 1918 causing even greater Allied losses. Battle of Arras (1917) [REDACTED] United Kingdom and Empire : Other engagements Associated articles Flanking operations Associated articles 1915 1916 1917 1918 Associated articles The Battle of Arras , also known as
1856-584: The 12th (Eastern) Division attacking Observation Ridge, north of the Arras–Cambrai road. After reaching this objective, they were to push on towards Feuchy, the second and third German positions. At the same time, elements of the 3rd Division began an assault south of the road, with the Devil's Wood, Tilloy-lès-Mofflaines and the Bois des Boeufs as their initial objectives. The ultimate objective of these assaults
1972-494: The 56th (1/1st London) Division were able to force the Germans out of the village, although the Monchyriegel was not fully in British hands until a few days later. The British were able to consolidate these gains and push forward towards Monchy-le-Preux , although they suffered many casualties in fighting near the village. One reason for the success of the offensive in this sector was the failure of Falkenhausen to employ
2088-450: The 6th Army arranged the infantry at Arras for the rigid defence of the front-line, supported by methodical counter-attacks ( Gegenangriffe ), by the "relief" divisions ( Ablösungsdivisionen ) on the second or third day. Five Ablösungsdivisionen were placed behind Douai , 15 mi (24 km) away from the front line. The new Hindenburg line ended at Telegraph Hill between Neuville-Vitasse and Tilloy lez Mofflaines, from whence
2204-538: The Battle of Neuve Chapelle and the Battle of the Somme but had encountered two technical problems. The first was accurately synchronising the movement of the troops to the fall of the barrage: for Arras, this was overcome by rehearsal and strict scheduling. The second was the barrage falling erratically as the barrels of heavy guns wore swiftly but at differing rates during fire: for Arras, the rate of wear of each gun barrel
2320-787: The Canadian Corps of the First Army in the north fought the Battle of Vimy Ridge , capturing the ridge. The Third Army in the centre advanced astride the Scarpe River and in the south, the Fifth Army attacked the Hindenburg Line ( Siegfriedstellung ) but made few gains. The British armies then conducted smaller attacks to consolidate the new positions. Although these battles were generally successful in achieving limited aims, they came at considerable cost. When
2436-578: The First Army (General Henry Horne ) in the north and the plan was devised by Allenby. The British used the lessons of the Somme and Verdun the previous year and planned to attack on an 11 mi (18 km) front, from Vimy Ridge in the north to Neuville-Vitasse , 4 mi (6.4 km) south of the Scarpe river. The preliminary bombardment was planned to last about a week except for a much longer and heavier barrage at Vimy Ridge. In December 1916,
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#17327805121162552-558: The Fokker Scourge period. and had been working up with the first mass-produced twin-gunned German fighters, the Albatros D.I and D.II , comprising a total of nearly 350 aircraft between the two types. Paradoxically, the one sided nature of the casualty lists during Bloody April was partly a result of German numerical inferiority. The German air forces mostly confined themselves to operating over friendly territory, thus reducing
2668-736: The Polish-Soviet War of 1919–20 in two fighter escadrilles (Nos. 7 and 13). Due to rare air encounters, they were primarily employed in ground-attack duties. The Poles thought so highly of the D.III that they sent a letter of commendation to the Oeffag factory. They remained in service until 1923. Poland also had 26 original Albatros D.III, mostly captured from former occupants, but they were withdrawn from use in December 1919 due to structural weaknesses. The new Czechoslovak Air Force also obtained and operated several Oeffag machines after
2784-652: The River Somme , while the French had been unable to take the initiative because of intense German pressure at Verdun until after August 1916. The battles consumed enormous quantities of resources while achieving virtually no strategic gains on the battlefield. The cost to Germany of containing the Anglo-French attacks had been enormous and given that the material preponderance of the Entente and its allies could only be expected to increase in 1917, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff decided on
2900-525: The S.E.5 was working up to operational status in France, intended to use both the synchronized Vickers gun, and an overwing-mount Lewis machine gun firing above the propeller arc for a twin-gun offensive punch. The Bristol F2A also made its debut with No. 48 Squadron during April, but lost heavily on its first patrol, with four out of six shot down in an encounter with five Albatros D.IIIs of Jasta 11 , led by Manfred von Richthofen (popularly known as
3016-580: The SPAD S.VII and Sopwith Triplane could compete on more or less equal terms with the Albatros; but these were few in number and spread along the front. All four of the aforementioned Allied designs depended on just one synchronized Vickers machine gun apiece, given cooling louvers on the cooling jackets for aviation use, for their armament on their airframe. The new generation of Allied fighters were not yet ready for service, although No. 56 Squadron RFC with
3132-657: The Second Battle of Arras , was a British offensive on the Western Front during the First World War . From 9 April to 16 May 1917, British troops attacked German defences near the French city of Arras on the Western Front. The British achieved the longest advance since trench warfare had begun, surpassing the record set by the French Sixth Army on 1 July 1916. The British advance slowed in
3248-595: The Swiss border . The Allied objective from early 1915 was to break through the German defences into the open ground beyond and engage the numerically inferior German Army ( Westheer ) in a war of movement . The British attack at Arras was part of the Anglo-French Nivelle Offensive , the main part of which was the Second Battle of the Aisne 50 mi (80 km) to the south. The aim of
3364-541: The Western Front , with the twin- lMG 08 machine gun -armed Albatros D.II and D.III outclassing the fighters charged with protecting the vulnerable B.E.2c , F.E.2b and Sopwith 1½ Strutter two-seater reconnaissance and bomber machines. The Allies' fighter squadrons were equipped with obsolete " pushers " such as the Airco DH.2 and F.E.8 – and other outclassed types such as the Nieuport 17 and Sopwith Pup . Only
3480-506: The 138, 149, or 168 kW (185, 200, or 225 hp) Austro-Daimler engines respectively. The Austro-Daimlers provided improved performance over the Mercedes D.IIIa engine. For cold weather operations, Oeffag aircraft featured a winter cowling which fully enclosed the cylinder heads. Austrian pilots often removed the propeller spinner from early production aircraft, since it was prone to falling off in flight. Beginning with aircraft 112 of
3596-589: The 1st Brigade were to be used in the attack on the Third Army front, eight with XVIII Corps and sixteen each in VII Corps and VI Corps. When the blue line had been reached, four of the VII Corps tanks were to join VI Corps for its attack on the brown line. The black line (first objective) was not to be attacked by tanks, which were to begin the drive to the front line at zero hour and rendezvous with infantry at
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3712-599: The Allies until the battle had begun. Just before the battle, Falkenhausen had written that parts of the front line might be lost but the five Ablösungsdivisionen could be brought forward to relieve the front divisions on the evening of the second day. On 6 April, General Karl von Nagel, the 6th Army Chief of Staff, accepted that some of the front divisions might need to be relieved on the first evening of battle but that any penetrations would be repulsed with local immediate counter-attacks ( Gegenangriffe in der Stellung ) by
3828-509: The Arras offensive with up-to-date aerial photographs, reconnaissance information, effective contact patrolling during British advances and harassing bombing raids. In particular the artillery spotting aircraft rendered valuable reconnaissance to the British artillery, who were able to maintain their superiority throughout the battle. In spite of their ascendancy in air combat, the German fighter squadrons continued to be used defensively, flying for
3944-630: The Arras-Cambrai Road and northwards to the Souchez River. Although the Canadian Corps had taken Vimy Ridge, difficulties in securing the south-eastern flank had left the position vulnerable. To rectify this, British and Canadian troops launched an attack towards Arleux on 28 April. The village was captured by Canadian troops with relative ease but the British troops advancing on Gavrelle met stiffer resistance. The village
4060-651: The British suffered a casualty rate nearly four times as great as their opponents. The losses were so disastrous that it threatened to undermine the morale of entire squadrons . The RFC contributed to the success, limited as it finally proved, of the British Army during the five-week series of battles. In April 1917 the British Army began an offensive at Arras, planned in conjunction with the French High Command, who were simultaneously embarking on
4176-416: The British to change their plans if the British detected a thinning of the front line. The Germans were inhibited by the extent of British air reconnaissance, which observed new field works and promptly directed artillery fire on them. The 6th Army failed to redeploy its artillery, which remained in lines easy to see and bombard. Work on defences was also divided between maintaining the front line, strengthening
4292-545: The French assault on the Aisne would begin in mid-April and that the British would make a diversionary attack in the Arras sector approximately one week prior. Three of the armies of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig ) were in the Arras sector, the Fifth Army (General Hubert Gough ) in the south, the Third Army (General Edmund Allenby ) in the centre and
4408-543: The French offensive was to break through the German defences in forty-eight hours. At Arras the Canadians were to capture Vimy Ridge , dominating the Douai Plain to the east, advance towards Cambrai and divert German reserves from the French front. The British effort was an assault on a relatively broad front between Vimy in the north-west and Bullecourt to the south-east. After a long preparatory bombardment,
4524-611: The German army in the west ( Westheer ), withdrew to the Hindenburg line in Operation Alberich, negating the tactical assumptions underlying the plans for the French offensive. Until French troops advanced into the former Noyon Salient during the Battles of Arras, they encountered no German troops in the assault sector and French doubts over the wisdom of the offensive increased. The French government desperately needed
4640-468: The German army in the west had a strategic reserve of 40 divisions. Experience of the German 1st Army in the Somme Battles , ( Erfahrungen der I Armee in der Sommeschlacht ) was published on 30 January 1917 by Ludendorff but new defensive methods were controversial. During the Battle of the Somme in 1916 Colonel Fritz von Loßberg (Chief of Staff of the 1st Army ) had been able to establish
4756-594: The German miners by the Autumn of 1916, which virtually ended the German underground threat. The British turned to digging 12 subways about 25 ft (7.6 m) down, to the front line, the longest tunnel being 1,883 yd (1.070 mi; 1.722 km) long of the 10,500 yd (6.0 mi; 9.6 km) dug. In one sector, four Tunnelling companies of 500 men each, worked around-the-clock in 18-hour shifts for two months to dig 12 mi (20 km) of subways for foot traffic, tramways with rails for hand-drawn trolleys and
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4872-470: The Germans to retreat further to the east. The British launched another attack using regiments from the 4th Division near the Scarpe on 3 May. Neither effort made a significant advance and the attack was called off the following day after incurring many casualties. The British learned important lessons about the need for close liaison between tanks, infantry and artillery, which they used in the Battle of Cambrai, 1917 . Albatros D.III Development of
4988-553: The Johannisthal factory. In fact, the real cause lay in the sesquiplane arrangement taken from the Nieuport. While the lower wing had sufficient strength in static tests, it was subsequently determined that the main spar was located too far aft, causing the wing to twist under aerodynamic loads. Pilots were therefore advised not to perform steep or prolonged dives in the D.III. This design flaw persisted despite attempts to rectify
5104-554: The Lewis-gun and rifle-grenade sections, in two waves or in artillery formation , which covered an area 100 yd (91 m) wide and 50 yd (46 m) deep, with the four sections in a diamond pattern, the rifle section ahead, rifle grenade and bombing sections to the sides and the Lewis gun section behind, until resistance was met. German defenders were to be suppressed by fire from the Lewis-gun and rifle-grenade sections, while
5220-475: The RFC deployed 25 squadrons , totalling 365 aircraft, about one-third of which were fighters (or " scouts " as they were called at the time). There were initially only five German Jastas (fighter squadrons) in the region, but this rose to eight as the battle progressed (some 80 or so operational fighter aircraft in total). Since late 1916, the Germans had held the upper hand in the contest for air supremacy on
5336-468: The Red Baron). The new R.E.8 two-seaters, which were eventually to prove less vulnerable than the B.E.2e, also suffered heavy casualties in their early sorties. During April 1917, the British lost 245 aircraft, 211 aircrew killed or missing and 108 as prisoners of war . The German Air Services recorded the loss of 66 aircraft during the same period. As a comparison, in the five months of the Battle of
5452-481: The Somme of 1916 the RFC had suffered 576 casualties. Under Richthofen's leadership, Jasta 11 scored 89 victories during April, over a third of the British losses. In casualties suffered, the month marked the nadir of the RFC's fortunes. However, despite the losses inflicted, the German Air Service failed to stop the RFC carrying out its prime objectives. The RFC continued to support the army throughout
5568-548: The Western Front. The Canadian troops could see the Germans in retreat across the Douai Plain away from the ridge. There was nevertheless an inflexibility to the plan which prevented the leading troops from continuing the advance and on 10 April the Germans began to stop the gaps with reserves. After the territorial gains of the first two days, a lull followed as British guns, ammunition and transport links were moved forward. Battalions of pioneers built temporary roads across
5684-522: The absence of rations caused by the difficulties of preparing and moving hot food under bombardment. Some went without food altogether for two or three consecutive days. By the eve of battle, the front-line trenches had ceased to exist and their barbed wire defences were blown to pieces. The official history of the 2nd Bavarian Reserve Regiment describes the front line as "consisting no longer of trenches but of advanced nests of men scattered about". The 262nd Reserve Regiment history writes that its trench system
5800-741: The air over Arras was essential for reconnaissance and the British carried out many aerial patrols. RFC aircraft carried out artillery spotting, photography of trench systems and bombing. Aerial observation was hazardous work as, for best results, the aircraft had to fly at slow speeds and low altitude over the German defences. It became even more dangerous with the arrival of the Red Baron, Manfred von Richthofen in March 1917. The presence of Jasta 11 led to sharply increased losses of Allied pilots and April 1917, became known as Bloody April . A German infantry officer later wrote, ...during these days, there
5916-608: The area around Arleux at the end of April, the British determined to launch another attack east from Monchy to try to break through the Boiry Riegel and reach the Wotanstellung , another German defensive position in the Douai Plain. This was scheduled to coincide with the Australian attack at Bullecourt to present the Germans with a two–pronged assault. British commanders hoped that success in this venture would force
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#17327805121166032-480: The attack for communication or cable trenches, the work being done by the 172nd, 176th, 182nd and 185th Tunnelling companies (Lieutenant-Colonel G. C. Williams, Controller of Mines First Army). Although the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) entered the battle with inferior aircraft to the Luftstreitkräfte , this did not deter their commander, General Trenchard , from adopting an offensive posture. Dominance of
6148-463: The attackers. As the attackers tried to capture the Widas and dig in near the German second line, Sturmbattalions and Sturmregimenter of the counter-attack divisions would advance from the rückwärtige Kampfzone into the battle zone, in an immediate counter-attack ( Gegenstoß aus der Tiefe ). If the immediate counter-attack failed, counter-attack divisions would take their time to prepare
6264-410: The battle officially ended on 16 May, the British had made significant advances but had been unable to achieve a breakthrough . New tactics and the equipment to exploit them had been used, showing that the British had absorbed the lessons of the Battle of the Somme and could mount set-piece attacks against field fortifications. After the Second Battle of Bullecourt (3–17 May), the Arras sector became
6380-526: The battle reached General Ludendorff during his 52nd birthday celebrations at his headquarters in Kreuznach who wrote, "I had looked forward to the expected offensive with confidence and was now deeply depressed". He telephoned each of his commanders and "gained the impression that the principles laid down by OHL were sound but the whole art of leadership lies in applying them correctly". (A later court of inquiry found that Falkenhausen had indeed misunderstood
6496-459: The battle zone. Sceptics wanted the tactic of fighting in the front line to continue, with authority devolved no further than battalion, to maintain organizational coherence in anticipation of a methodical counter-attack ( Gegenangriff ) by the relief divisions after 24–48 hours. Ludendorff was sufficiently impressed by Loßberg's memorandum to add it to the new Manual of Infantry Training for War . General Ludwig von Falkenhausen , commander of
6612-409: The battlefield which had been made untenable by Allied artillery fire, as the prelude to Gegenstoß in der Stellung (immediate counter-attack within the position). Such a decentralised battle by large numbers of small infantry detachments would present the attacker with unforeseen obstructions. Resistance from troops equipped with automatic weapons, supported by observed artillery fire, would increase
6728-406: The black line two hours later. The tanks were reserved for the most difficult objectives beyond the black line in groups of up to ten vehicles. Four tanks were to attack Neuville Vitasse, four against Telegraph Hill, four against The Harp and another four against Tilloy lez Mofflaines and two were to drive down the slope from Roclincourt west of Bois de la Maison Blanche. Once the blue line had fallen,
6844-655: The caves had room for 11,500 men, one in the Ronville system housing 4,000 men. The 8 ft × 6 ft (2.4 m × 1.8 m) Crinchon sewer followed the ditch of the old fortifications and tunnels were dug from the cellars to the sewer. Two long tunnels were excavated from the Crinchon sewer, one through the St Sauveur and one through the Ronville system, allowing the 24,500 troops safely sheltered from German bombardment to move forward underground, avoiding
6960-459: The center of the upper wing, where it tended to scald the pilot if punctured. From the 290th D.III onward, the radiator was offset to the right on production machines while others were soon moved to the right as a field modification. Aircraft deployed in Palestine used two wing radiators, to cope with the warmer climate. More seriously, the new aircraft immediately began experiencing failures of
7076-487: The churned up battlefield; heavy artillery (and its ammunition) was manhandled into position in new gun pits; food for the men and feed for the draught horses was brought up and Casualty Clearing Stations were established in readiness for the inevitable counter-attacks. Allied commanders also faced a dilemma: whether to keep their exhausted divisions on the attack and run the risk of having insufficient manpower or replace them with fresh divisions and lose momentum. The news of
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#17327805121167192-402: The counter-attack reserves as they deployed and further deprive battalion and division commanders of the means to conduct an organised defence, which the dispersal of infantry over a wide area had already made difficult. Loßberg and others had severe doubts as to the ability of relief divisions to arrive on the battlefield in time to conduct an immediate counter-attack ( Gegenstoss ) from behind
7308-475: The crest of the ridge at about 13:00 on 10 April. Military historians have attributed the success of this attack to careful planning by Canadian Corps commander Julian Byng and his subordinate General Arthur Currie , constant training and the assignment of specific objectives to each platoon. By giving units specific goals, troops could continue the attack even if their officers were killed or communication broke down, thus bypassing two major problems of combat on
7424-433: The defence of positions suitable for artillery observation and communication with the rear, where an attacking force would "fight itself to a standstill and use up its resources while the defenders conserve[d] their strength" . Defending infantry would fight in areas, with the front divisions in an outpost zone up to 3,000 yd (1.7 mi; 2.7 km) deep behind listening posts, with the main line of resistance placed on
7540-416: The east on a 9 mi (14 km) front from Croisilles to Gavrelle, either side of the Scarpe. The 51st (Highland) Division attacked on the northern side in determined fighting on the western outskirts of Roeux Wood and the chemical works. On their left, the 37th Division , attacked the buildings west of Roeux Station and gained the line of their objectives on the western slopes of Greenland Hill, north of
7656-485: The end of attacks made by lines of infantry with a few detached specialists. The platoon was divided into a small headquarters and four sections, one with two trained grenade-throwers and assistants, the second with a Lewis gunner and nine assistants carrying 30 drums of ammunition, the third section comprised a sniper, scout and nine riflemen and the fourth section had nine men with four rifle-grenade launchers. The rifle and hand-grenade sections were to advance in front of
7772-707: The entrances; telephone cables, exchanges and testing-points used the tunnels, a hospital was installed and a tram ran from the sewer to the St Sauveur caves. The observation post for the VI Corps heavy artillery off the St Sauveur tunnel, had a telephone exchange with 750 circuits; much of the work in this area being done by the New Zealand Tunnelling Company . On the First Army front German sappers also conducted underground operations, seeking out Allied tunnels to assault and counter-mine , in which 41 New Zealand tunnellers were killed and 151 wounded. The British tunnellers had gained an advantage over
7888-600: The final minutes of the barrage. The principal danger to assaulting troops came from enemy artillery fire as they crossed no man's land , accounting for over half the casualties at the first day of the Somme. A further complication was the location of German artillery, hidden as it was behind the ridges. In response, specialist artillery units were created to attack German artillery. Their targets were provided by 1st Field Survey Company, Royal Engineers, who collated data obtained from flash spotting and sound ranging . (Flash spotting required Royal Flying Corps observers to record
8004-490: The front and they were too late for a useful counter-attack on either 10 or 11 April. At roughly the same time, in perhaps the most carefully crafted portion of the entire offensive, the Canadian Corps launched an assault on Vimy Ridge. Advancing behind a creeping barrage and making heavy use of machine guns – eighty to each brigade, including one Lewis gun in each platoon – the corps was able to advance through about 4,000 yd (3,700 m) of German defences and captured
8120-458: The front divisions. On 7 April, Nagel viewed the imminent British attack as a limited effort against Vimy ridge, preparatory to a bigger attack later, perhaps combined with the French attack expected in mid-April. Construction of positions to fulfil the new policy of area defence had been drastically curtailed by shortages of labour and the long winter, which affected the setting of concrete. The 6th Army commanders had also been reluctant to encourage
8236-584: The front line and one with XVIII Corps, four tunnelling companies, three entrenching battalions, eight RE labour battalions and 37 labour companies. Inside the old walls of Arras were the Grand Place and Petit Place, under which there were old cellars, which were emptied and refurbished for the accommodation of 13,000 men. Under the suburbs of St Sauveur and Ronville were many caves, some huge, which were rediscovered by accident in October 1916. When cleared out,
8352-459: The front straight from flying school; during the same period, 56 aircraft were crashed by inexperienced RFC pilots. To keep enemy action to a minimum during the assault, a creeping barrage was planned. This required gunners to create a curtain of high explosive and shrapnel shell explosions that crept across the battlefield in lines, about one hundred metres in advance of the assaulting troops. The Allies had previously used creeping barrages at
8468-587: The front. [T]he worst carnage was amongst the new pilots – many of whom lasted just a day or two. German pilot training was, at that time, more thorough and less hurried than the British programmes. After the heavy losses and failures against the French over Verdun in 1916 and against the British at the Somme , they had reorganised their air forces into the Luftstreitkräfte by October 1916, which now included Jastas , specialist fighter units. These units were led by highly experienced pilots, some of them survivors of
8584-495: The further the advance progressed. A school was opened in January 1917 to teach infantry commanders the new methods. Given the growing Allied superiority in munitions and manpower, attackers might still penetrate to the second Artillerieschutzstellung (artillery protection line), leaving in their wake German garrisons isolated in resistance nests Widerstandsnester ( Widas ) still inflicting losses and disorganisation on
8700-576: The guns on high altitude. This created a new problem; the Schwarzlose operated via blowback and the weapon contained a cartridge oiler to prevent cases from sticking in the chamber while the extractor ripped their rims off. With guns mounted directly in front of the pilot, oil released during firing interfered with aim. Oeffag engineers noted the wing failures of the D.III and modified the lower wing to use thicker ribs and spar flanges. These changes, as well as other detail improvements, largely resolved
8816-433: The largest German production contract to date. Idflieg placed additional orders for 50 aircraft in February and March 1917. The D.III entered squadron service in December 1916, and was immediately acclaimed by German pilots for its maneuverability and rate of climb. Two faults with the new aircraft were soon identified. Like the later models of the D.II, early D.IIIs featured a Teves und Braun airfoil-shaped radiator in
8932-400: The location of telltale flashes made by guns whilst firing.) On Zero-Day, 9 April, over 80 per cent of German heavy guns in the sector were neutralised (that is, "unable to bring effective fire to bear, the crews being disabled or driven off") by counter-battery fire. Gas shells were also used against the draught horses of the batteries and to disrupt ammunition supply columns. Forty tanks of
9048-462: The lower wing ribs and leading edge, a defect shared with the Nieuport 17 . On 23 January 1917, a Jasta 6 pilot suffered a failure of the lower right wing spar. On the following day, Manfred von Richthofen suffered a crack in the lower wing of his new D.III. On 27 January, the Kogenluft ( Kommandierender General der Luftstreitkräfte ) issued an order grounding all D.IIIs pending resolution of
9164-545: The most part behind their own lines. Thus the Jastas established " air superiority ", but certainly not the air supremacy sometimes claimed. Within a couple of months the new technologically advanced generation of fighter (the SE.5 , Sopwith Camel , and SPAD S.XIII ) had entered service in numbers and quickly gained ascendancy over the over-worked Jastas . As the British fighter squadrons became once more able to adequately protect
9280-528: The next few days and the German defence recovered. The battle became a costly stalemate for both sides and by the end of the battle, the British Third Army and the First Army had suffered about 160,000 casualties and the German 6th Army about 125,000. For much of the war, the opposing armies on the Western Front were at stalemate, with a continuous line of trenches from the Belgian coast to
9396-489: The offensive, to keep the initiative and to break through in concert with the French at Aisne. From 16 April, it was apparent that the French part of the Nivelle Offensive on the Aisne had not achieved a breakthrough. Haig continued to attack at Arras, to divert troops from the French on the Aisne. At 04:45 on 23 April, following two days of poor visibility and freezing weather, VI Corps and VII Corps attacked to
9512-478: The organisation necessary to exploit it in battle. In a new manual published on 1 December 1916 by Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL, supreme command of the German army), Grundsätze für die Führung in der Abwehrschlacht im Stellungskrieg (Principles of Command for Defensive Battles in Positional Warfare), the policy of unyielding defence of ground, regardless of its tactical value, was replaced by
9628-752: The original system of four lines 75–150 yd (69–137 m) apart, ran north to the Neuville St Vaast – Bailleul-aux-Cornailles road. About 3 mi (4.8 km) behind were the Wancourt – Feuchy and to the north the Point du Jour lines, running from the Scarpe river north along the east slope of Vimy ridge. The new Wotan line, which extended the Hindenburg position, was built around 4 mi (6.4 km) further back and not entirely mapped by
9744-437: The pilot. The Schwarzlose proved to be somewhat less reliable than the 7.92 mm (.312 in) LMG 08/15 , mainly due to problems with the synchronization gear . The Schwarzlose also had a poor rate of fire until the 1916 model was provided with a modification developed by Ludwig Kral. At the request of pilots, the guns were relocated to the upper fuselage decking late in the series 253 production run. It helped to warm up
9860-458: The possibility of losing pilots to capture and increasing the amount of time they could stay in the air and choose when and how to engage in combat. The Battle of Arras began on 9 April 1917. The Allies launched a joint ground offensive, with the British attacking near Arras in Artois , northern France , while the French offensive was launched on the Aisne . In support of the British army,
9976-518: The press, the people and their parliaments to win the war. Hundreds of thousands of casualties had been suffered at the battles of Gallipoli , the Somme and Verdun , with little prospect of victory in sight. The British Prime Minister , H. H. Asquith , resigned in early December 1916 and was succeeded by David Lloyd George . In France, Prime Minister Aristide Briand , along with Minister of Defence Hubert Lyautey were politically diminished and resigned in March 1917, following disagreements over
10092-403: The principles of defence in depth.) Ludendorff immediately ordered reinforcements. On 11 April, he sacked Falkenhausen's chief of staff and replaced him with Loßberg. Loßberg went armed with vollmacht (the right to issue orders in the army commander's name) and within hours, Loßberg began to restructure the German defence. The British aimed to consolidate the gains made in the first days of
10208-488: The problem in the D.III and succeeding Albatros D.V. Apart from its structural deficiencies, the D.III was considered pleasant and easy to fly, if somewhat heavy on the controls. The sesquiplane arrangement offered improved climb, maneuverability, and downward visibility compared to the preceding D.II. Like most contemporary aircraft, the D.III was prone to spinning, but recovery was straightforward. Albatros built approximately 500 D.III aircraft at its Johannisthal factory. In
10324-447: The prospective Nivelle Offensive . The United States was close to declaring war on Germany; American public opinion was growing increasingly incensed by U-boat attacks upon civilian shipping, which had begun with the sinking of RMS Lusitania in 1915 and culminated in the torpedoing of seven American merchantmen in early 1917. The United States Congress declared war on Imperial Germany on 6 April 1917 but it would be more than
10440-457: The prototype D.III started in late July or early August 1916. The date of the maiden flight is unknown, but is believed to have occurred in late August or early September. Following the successful Albatros D.I and D.II series, the D.III utilized the same semi- monocoque , plywood -skinned fuselage . However, at the request of the Idflieg (Inspectorate of Flying Troops), the D.III adopted
10556-466: The railway station, an obvious target for bombardment. The St Sauveur tunnel followed the line of the road to Cambrai and had five shafts in no man's land but the German retirement to the Hindenburg Line forestalled the use of the Ronville tunnels, when the German front line was withdrawn 1,000 yd (910 m) and there was no time to extend the diggings. The subterranean workings were lit by electricity and supplied by piped water, with gas-proof doors at
10672-481: The railway. On the left of the main attack, the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division made rapid progress against Gavrelle and secured the village. To the south of the Scarpe and east of Monchy-le-Preux the 29th Division gained the western slopes of Infantry Hill. The Cojeul river marked a divisional boundary within VI Corps. Guémappe on the north side of the river was the objective of the 15th (Scottish) Division, attacking east from Wancourt towards Vis-en-Artois. The objective
10788-435: The revised manuals and others produced over the winter, Haig established a BEF Training Directorate in January 1917, to issue manuals and oversee training. SS 143 and its companion manuals provided British infantry with "off-the-peg" tactics, devised from the experience of the Somme and from French Army operations, to go with new equipment made available by increasing British and Allied war production and better understanding of
10904-528: The riflemen and hand-grenade sections moved forward, preferably by infiltrating around the flanks of the resistance, to overwhelm the defenders from the rear. The changes in equipment, organisation and formation were elaborated in SS 144 The Normal Formation For the Attack of February 1917, which recommended that the leading troops should push on to the final objective, when only one or two were involved but that for
11020-410: The sentries to recapture sentry-posts by immediate counter-attack. Defensive procedures in the battle zone were similar but with bigger units. The front trench system was the sentry line for the battle zone garrison, which was allowed to move away from concentrations of enemy fire and then counter-attack to recover the battle and outpost zones; such withdrawals were envisaged as occurring on small parts of
11136-442: The series 153 production run, Oeffag introduced a new rounded nose that eliminated the spinner. Remarkably, German wind-tunnel tests showed that the simple rounded nose improved propeller efficiency and raised the top speed by 14 km/h (8.7 mph). All Oeffag variants were armed with two 8 mm (.315 in) Schwarzlose machine guns . In most aircraft, the guns were buried in the fuselage, where they were inaccessible to
11252-401: The slower reconnaissance and artillery observation machines, RFC losses fell and German losses rose. The RFC learned from their mistakes, instituting new policies on the improvement of training and tactical organisation. By mid-1917 better aircraft designs were reaching the front. By the late summer of 1917 the British achieved a greater measure of air superiority than they had held for almost
11368-627: The spring of 1917, D.III production shifted to Albatros' subsidiary, Ostdeutsche Albatros Werke (OAW), to permit Albatros to concentrate on development and production of the D.V . Between April and August 1917, Idflieg issued five separate orders for a total of 840 D.IIIs. The OAW variant underwent its Typenprüfung in June 1917. Production commenced at the Schneidemühl factory in June and continued through December 1917. OAW aircraft were distinguishable by their larger, rounded rudders. Peak service
11484-498: The structural problems that had plagued German versions of the D.III. In service, the Oeffag aircraft proved to be popular, robust, and effective. Oeffag built approximately 526 D.III aircraft between May 1917 and the Armistice (586 in total according to other publications). After the Armistice, in early 1919 Poland bought 38 series 253 aircraft from the factory, ten more were rebuilt from wartime leftovers. Poland operated them in
11600-460: The tanks still running were to drive to rally points. The preliminary bombardment of Vimy Ridge started on 20 March; and the bombardment of the rest of the sector on 4 April. Limited to a front of only 24 mi (39 km), the bombardment used 2,689,000 shells, over a million more than had been used on the Somme. German casualties were not heavy but the men became exhausted by the endless task of keeping open dug-out entrances and demoralised by
11716-451: The third line and the new Wotanstellung ( Drocourt–Quéant switch line ) further back. After the Allied conference at Chantilly, Haig issued instructions for army commanders on 17 November 1916, with a general plan for offensive operations in the spring of 1917. The Chief engineer of the Third Army, Major-General E. R. Kenyon, composed a list of requirements by 19 November, for which he had 16 Army Troops companies, five with each corps in
11832-545: The training manual SS 135 replaced SS 109 of 8 May 1916 and marked a significant step in the evolution of the BEF into a homogeneous force, well adapted to its role on the Western Front. The duties of army, corps and divisions in planning attacks were standardised. Armies were to devise the plan and the principles of the artillery component. Corps were to allot tasks to divisions, which would then select objectives and devise infantry plans subject to corps approval. Artillery planning
11948-399: The unusual bombardment and poor visibility meant many German troops were caught unawares and taken prisoner, still half-dressed, clambering out of the deep dugouts of the first two lines of trenches. Others were captured without their boots, trying to escape but stuck in the knee-deep mud of the communication trenches. The main British assault of the first day was directly east of Arras, with
12064-524: The wing failure problem. On 19 February, after Albatros introduced a reinforced lower wing, the Kogenluft rescinded the grounding order. New production D.IIIs were completed with the strengthened wing while operational D.IIIs were withdrawn to Armee-Flugparks for modifications, forcing Jastas to use the Albatros D.II and Halberstadt D.II during the interim. At the time, the continued wing failures were attributed to poor workmanship and materials at
12180-405: Was "lost in a crater field". To add to the misery, for the last ten hours of bombardment, gas shells were added. Zero-Hour had originally been planned for the morning of 8 April (Easter Sunday) but it was postponed 24 hours at the request of the French, despite reasonably good weather in the assault sector. Zero-Day was rescheduled for 9 April with Zero-Hour at 05:30. The assault was preceded by
12296-487: Was a whole series of dogfights, which almost invariably ended in defeat for the British since it was Richthofen's squadron they were up against. Often five or six planes in succession would be chased away or shot down in flames. The average flying life of a RFC pilot in Arras in April was 18 hours and from 4 to 8 April, the RFC lost 75 aircraft and 105 aircrew. The casualties created a pilot shortage and replacements were sent to
12412-429: Was calculated and calibrated accordingly. While there was a risk of friendly fire, the creeping barrage forced the Germans to remain in their shelters, allowing Allied soldiers to advance without fear of machine gun fire. The new instantaneous No. 106 Fuze had been adapted from a French design for high-explosive shells so that they detonated on the slightest impact, vaporising barbed wire. Poison gas shells were used for
12528-454: Was commanded by the higher ground on the south bank and it was not until the 50th (Northumbrian) Division captured the rise on the south side of the Cojeul that the village was taken. Several determined German counter-attacks were made and by the morning of 24 April, the British held Guémappe, Gavrelle and the high ground overlooking Fontaine-lès-Croisilles and Cherisy; the fighting around Roeux
12644-462: Was controlled by corps with consultation of divisions by the corps General Officer Commanding, Royal Artillery (GOCRA) which became the title of the officer at each level of command who devised the bombardment plan, which was coordinated with neighbouring corps artillery commanders by the army GOCRA. Specific parts of the bombardment were nominated by divisions, using their local knowledge and the results of air reconnaissance. The corps artillery commander
12760-514: Was expected the large numbers of aircraft assembled over the frontlines in the spring of 1917 would fulfil this purpose. However, the aircraft were, for the most part, inferior to German fighter aircraft . Crucially, British pilot training was not only poorly organised and inconsistent, it had to be drastically abbreviated to keep squadrons suffering heavy casualties up to strength. This was self-perpetuating, as it resulted in most new pilots lacking sufficient practical flight experience before reaching
12876-880: Was in November 1917, with 446 aircraft on the Western Front. The D.III did not disappear with the end of production, however. It remained in frontline service well into 1918. As of 31 August 1918, 54 D.III aircraft remained on the Western Front. In the autumn of 1916, Oesterreichische Flugzeugfabrik AG (Oeffag) obtained a licence to build the D.III at Wiener-Neustadt . Deliveries commenced in May 1917. The aircraft were officially designated as Albatros D.III (Oeffag) , but were known as Oeffag Albatros D.III in Austro-Hungary, and just Oeffag D.III in Poland. The Oeffag aircraft were built in three main versions (series 53.2, 153, 253) using
12992-474: Was indecisive. The principal objective of the attack was to tie down German reserves to assist the French offensive against the plateau north of the Aisne traversed by the Chemin des Dames. Haig reported, With a view to economising my troops, my objectives were shallow and for a like reason and also in order to give the appearance of an attack on a more imposing scale, demonstrations were continued southwards to
13108-475: Was secured by early evening but when a German counter-attack forced a brief retreat, elements of the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division were brought up as reinforcements and the village was held. Subsequent attacks on 29 April failed to capture more ground. The attacks achieved the limited objective of securing the Canadian position on Vimy Ridge but casualties were high and the result was disappointing. After securing
13224-429: Was the Monchyriegel , a trench running between Wancourt and Feuchy and an important component of the German defences. Most of these objectives, including Feuchy village, had been achieved by the evening of 10 April though the Germans were still in control of large sections of the trenches between Wancourt and Feuchy, particularly in the area of the fortified village of Neuville-Vitasse. The following day, troops from
13340-422: Was to be occupied by the reserve battalion of each regiment. Allgemeines über Stellungsbau (Principles of Field Fortification) was published by OHL in January 1917 and by April an outpost zone ( Vorpostenfeld ) held by sentries, had been built along the Western Front. Sentries could retreat to larger positions ( Gruppennester ) held by Stosstrupps (five men and an NCO per Trupp ), who would join
13456-441: Was to co-ordinate counter-battery fire and the howitzer bombardment for zero hour. Corps controlled the creeping barrage but divisions were given authority over extra batteries added to the barrage, which could be switched to other targets by the divisional commander and brigade commanders. SS 135 provided the basis for the operational technique of the BEF for the rest of 1917. The training manual SS 143 of February 1917 marked
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