157-834: The Rhodesia Information Centre ( RIC ), also known as the Rhodesian Information Centre , the Rhodesia Information Service , the Flame Lily Centre and the Zimbabwe Information Centre , represented the Rhodesian government in Australia from 1966 to 1980. As Australia did not recognise Rhodesia's independence, it operated on an unofficial basis. Rhodesia's quasi-diplomatic presence in Australia
314-489: A Unilateral Declaration of Independence (commonly referred to as UDI) that was illegal under British law, with the colony becoming Rhodesia . The Rhodesian government's decision to declare independence sought to maintain white rule, with the ruling Rhodesian Front party opposing a transition to majority rule as had recently happened in the neighbouring British colonies of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland . The British government did not recognise Rhodesia's independence, and
471-668: A separate Rhodesian monarch was not recognised internationally. A Rhodesian Information Office was established in Washington, D.C., following UDI and another opened in Paris during 1968; neither was recognised as a diplomatic mission by the host country and the office in Paris was limited to promoting tourism and cultural exchanges. Small Rhodesian representative offices operated semi-clandestinely at various times in Athens , Brussels , Kinshasa , Libreville , Madrid , Munich and Rome ;
628-491: A strategic hamlets policy of the kind used in Malaya and Vietnam to restrict the influence of insurgents over the population of rural areas. Local people were forced to relocate to protected villages (PVs) which were strictly controlled and guarded by the government against rebel atrocities. The protected villages were compared by the guerrillas to concentration camps . Some contemporary accounts claim that this interference in
785-522: A Chinese military facility in Nanjing crossed into Rhodesia from Zambia, having been issued vague instructions to sabotage important installations and kill white farmers. Five were arrested by the Rhodesian security forces almost immediately. Another seven initially evaded capture and planned to destroy an electric pylon near Sinoia . Their explosive charges failed to detonate and were discovered by
942-533: A business in New South Wales , with the state government being aware from the outset that it was operated by the Rhodesian government. The director of the centre, Denzil Bradley, claimed in 1972 that its role was to disseminate "factual information about Rhodesia throughout Australia". In reality, the RIC was a de facto diplomatic mission that represented the Rhodesian government in Australia. This made it
1099-729: A clandestine trade network. From 1968 until 1970, there was virtually no further dialogue between Rhodesia and the UK. In a referendum in 1969, white voters approved a new constitution and the establishment of a republic, thereby severing Rhodesia's last links with the British Crown, duly declared in March 1970. This changed immediately after the election of Edward Heath , who reopened negotiations. Smith remained optimistic that Heath would do his utmost to remedy Anglo-Rhodesian relations, although disappointed that he continued to adhere publicly to
1256-540: A collection of official documents published in 2017, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade historian Matthew Jordan stated that the government's failure to act against the Rhodesia Information Centre in 1972 after its illegal activities had been revealed demonstrated its "residual sympathy" for the white Rhodesians. He also judged that Chipp's response to the revelations "was symptomatic of
1413-645: A common interest in maintaining security ties in southern Africa, Salazar expressed a great deal of anger at Britain's refusal to support Portugal during the Indian annexation of Goa in 1961, admonishing Smith not to trust the British government. A Rhodesian Trade Office was opened in Lisbon in order to co-ordinate breaking the anticipated sanctions in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence later that year, which encouraged Smith not to compromise. In its turn,
1570-454: A copy of the draft bill in October, Peacock judged that it was "too dragnet in its approach" and directed that it be redrafted to better protect freedom of speech. This deferment became indefinite. While the opposition Labor Party would have provided enough votes for the legislation to pass parliament, Fraser was not willing to expose himself and his government to a major backbench revolt over
1727-599: A degree of economic expansion and industrialisation almost unrivaled in sub-Saharan Africa. Its natural abundance of mineral wealth—including large deposits of chromium and manganese—contributed to the high rate of conventional economic growth. However, most colonies in Africa, even those rich in natural resources, experienced difficulty in achieving similar rates of development due to a shortage of technical and managerial skills. Small, rotating cadres of colonial civil servants who possessed little incentive to invest their skills in
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#17327727916511884-512: A diversified economy with a strong manufacturing sector and iron and steel industries, and circumvent the normal British protectionist policy of supporting domestic industry in the metropole while discouraging industry in the colonies abroad. As the white population increased, so did capital imports, especially in the wake of the Second World War. This trend, too, stood in sharp contrast to most other colonial territories, which suffered
2041-476: A huge block of territory that the company ruled until the early 1920s. In 1923, the company's charter was revoked, and Southern Rhodesia attained self-government and established a legislature . Between 1953 and 1963, Southern Rhodesia was joined with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland . The rapid decolonisation of Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s alarmed
2198-442: A major capital deficit due to revenues simply being repatriated to the metropole, leaving little capital to be invested locally. The considerable investment made by white Rhodesians in the economy financed the development of Southern Rhodesia's export industries as well as the infrastructure necessary to integrate it further with international markets. In August 1953, Southern Rhodesia merged with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland ,
2355-537: A meeting would violate government policy against contact with the Rhodesian regime and could embarrass the government. It recommended that the department write to Cresswell-George declining the meeting. The Department of Trade and Industry believed that McEwen's letter had committed it to meet with Cresswell-George, and the latter visited the department's offices on 2 December 1966. The Department of Trade and Industry officers who met with Cresswell-George stressed that they did not accept his claim to represent Rhodesia and that
2512-465: A more integrated political structure in theory, although not without qualification and equivocation. A greater degree of social and political equality, they argued, was acceptable once more black citizens had obtained higher educational and vocational standards. The second faction in the white community was wholly unwilling to concede the principle, much less the practice, of equality to the black population. Both groups remained opposed to majority rule in
2669-573: A number of black Rhodesians who were accused of collaboration with the security forces. Nkomo's party, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) announced that year that it had formed a military wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and "the decision to start bringing in arms and ammunition and to send young men away for sabotage training" had already been implemented. As early as 1960, ZAPU's predecessor,
2826-513: A page on the activities of the Rhodesia-Australia Association's branches in each Australian state. One issue of The Rhodesian Commentary claimed that it had a mailing list of 5,500, but this likely included libraries, politicians and other recipients who were sent unsolicited copies. The Rhodesian Information Centre's activities were illegal. They violated several United Nations Security Council resolutions that banned
2983-453: A parliamentary debate on racism and violence in May 1972 the federal opposition leader Gough Whitlam criticised the government for not closing the centre. Minister for Customs and Excise Don Chipp believed that the affair was the result of overly strict regulations on importing works from Rhodesia as he considered some of the material found to have violated the ban to be inoffensive. He gained
3140-540: A rebellion by English "kith and kin", or white Rhodesians of predominantly British descent and origin, many of whom still possessed sympathies and family ties to the United Kingdom. Wilson's refusal to consider a military option further encouraged Smith to proceed with his plans. Talks quickly broke down, and final efforts in October to achieve a settlement floundered; the Smith government remained unwilling to accept
3297-414: A republic on 2 March 1970. Under the new constitution, a president served as ceremonial head of state, with the prime minister nominally reporting to him. Some in Rhodesian government had hoped in vain that the declaration of a republic would finally prompt other nations to grant recognition. The years following Rhodesia's UDI saw an unfolding series of economic, military, and political pressures placed on
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#17327727916513454-399: A significant proportion of Southern Rhodesia's white population. In an effort to delay the transition to black majority rule , the predominantly white Southern Rhodesian government issued its own Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom on 11 November 1965. The new nation, identified simply as Rhodesia, initially sought recognition as an autonomous realm within
3611-583: A strong commitment to racial equality . He believed that action against the white minority governments in Rhodesia and South Africa should be a priority for his government's foreign policies on both ethical and geopolitical grounds. Opinion within the coalition government's elected members was split on this issue, with some openly supporting the continuation of white minority rule in Rhodesia. Further steps were taken internationally during 1977 to disrupt Rhodesia's diplomatic activities. The French government forced
3768-713: A timetable for independence could be set. In 1964, growing white dissatisfaction with the ongoing negotiations played a major role in the ousting of Winston Field as Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia . Field was succeeded by Ian Smith , chairman of the conservative Rhodesian Front Party and an outspoken critic of any immediate transition to majority rule. Smith, the colony's first Rhodesian-born leader, soon came to personify resistance to liberals in British government and those agitating for change at home. In September 1964, Smith visited Lisbon , where Portuguese prime minister António de Oliveira Salazar promised him "maximum support" if he should declare independence. Aside from
3925-662: A transition to majority rule. Under this agreement, the country reverted to the status of a British colony until a free and fair election was held in February 1980. White minority rule ended in April 1980, with Rhodesia becoming the independent state of Zimbabwe . The Zimbabwean government decided that month to shut down the RIC. It was renamed the Zimbabwe Information Centre for the last weeks of its existence, and closed on 31 May 1980. A Zimbabwean high commission
4082-583: A vast underground network of informants and supporters in northeastern Rhodesia. As a result of the erosion of Portuguese authority in Mozambique's border provinces due to the Mozambican War of Independence , ZANLA was also able to establish external sanctuaries there. It was also in the process of cultivating a military alliance with the leading black nationalist movement in Mozambique, the Front for
4239-592: The Post and Telegraphs Act to allow the Postmaster-General to withdraw services to the RIC. He also claimed in November 1973, ahead of the 1973 New South Wales state election , that Askin supported the Rhodesian regime and had failed to cooperate with efforts to close the centre. Askin rejected this claim, noting that his government had cancelled the RIC's business name and lacked the legal authority to close
4396-581: The Attorney-General of New South Wales ' consent was needed to register an organisation of that name given that it implied a connection with the Rhodesian government. As part of this case the Whitlam government provided a certificate confirming that it did not recognise the Rhodesian government or people who claimed to represent it. The RIC lodged an appeal, in part on the basis that a reasonable person would not believe that its name indicated that it
4553-473: The British colony of Southern Rhodesia , and in 1980 it became modern day Zimbabwe . Southern Rhodesia had been self-governing since achieving responsible government in 1923. A landlocked nation, Rhodesia was bordered by Botswana ( Bechuanaland : British protectorate until 1966) to the southwest, Mozambique ( Portuguese province until 1975) to the east, South Africa to the south, and Zambia to
4710-454: The Cabinet's agreement for the regulations to be reviewed so that they would be enforced "with common sense" in the future. The Department of Foreign Affairs was unhappy with this outcome, as it believed that relaxing the regulations would reinforce the international perception that Australia was not serious about enforcing sanctions against Rhodesia. Bowen concurred, and told Chipp that easing
4867-566: The Commonwealth of Nations , but reconstituted itself as a republic in 1970. Following the declaration of independence in 1965, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution that called upon all states not to grant recognition to Rhodesia. Two African nationalist parties, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), launched an armed insurgency against
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5024-945: The Governor of Southern Rhodesia , to formally notify him of the UDI, Gibbs condemned it as an act of treason. After Smith formally announced the UDI on the radio, Governor Gibbs used his reserve power to dismiss Smith and his entire cabinet from office, on orders from the Colonial Office in Whitehall . However, Gibbs was unable to take any concrete actions to bring about a return to lawful colonial government. Rhodesian ministers simply ignored his notices, contending that UDI had made his office obsolete. Even so, Gibbs continued to occupy his official residence , Government House, in Salisbury until 1970, when he finally left Rhodesia, following
5181-588: The New South Wales Parliament in 2003, that he had been a diplomat with the Rhodesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was seconded to an information role during his posting to Sydney. One of the RIC's roles was distributing a periodical entitled The Rhodesian Commentary in Australia and New Zealand. This largely comprised material written in Rhodesia which was favourable to the Rhodesian government. All editions also included
5338-766: The Rhodesian Information Office in Paris to close in January 1977. On 27 May 1977, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 409 whose provisions banned the transfer of funds from the Rhodesian government to offices or agents operating on its behalf in other countries. This aimed to hinder the Rhodesian information offices in Australia, South Africa and the United States. The Carter Administration took steps to cut off funding from Rhodesia to
5495-539: The United Nations Security Council urged United Nations member countries to not recognise the Rhodesian regime or provide it with any assistance. The United Nations encouraged voluntary trade sanctions against Rhodesia from November 1965, and these began to become mandatory from December 1966. No country ever formally recognised Rhodesia as an independent state, with all regarding UDI as illegal. The lack of international recognition greatly constrained Rhodesia's ability to operate diplomatic missions in other countries. Only
5652-480: The secretary of the Rhodesian Ministry of External Affairs and the Rhodesian representatives to South Africa and Portugal (all three men were Australian citizens) and abstaining from several United Nations General Assembly resolutions that called for strong action to be taken against Rhodesia. Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s the Australian government remained unenthusiastic about further extensions to
5809-468: The "five principles" – unimpeded progress to majority rule, assurance against any future legislation decidedly detrimental to black interests, "improvement in the political status" of local Africans, an end to official racial discrimination , and a political settlement that could be "acceptable to the whole population". Harold Wilson and his incoming Labour government took an even harder line on demanding that these points be legitimately addressed before
5966-594: The Askin Government, the Whitlam government leaked this correspondence to the media. Askin was offended by the leak and argued that he did not need to act on Whitlam's request. Nevertheless, in March 1973 his government lodged an application with the Supreme Court of New South Wales seeking permission to cancel the centre's business name. This application was granted in June 1973, with the court finding that
6123-576: The Australian Government is concerned, the centre is a private office and neither the office not its personnel have any official status whatsoever", and the government did "not correspond with the office or acknowledge any correspondence from it". The United Nations Sanctions Committee did not take any further steps. In March 1972, a small group known as the Alternate Rhodesia Information Centre, which
6280-463: The Australian Government's half-hearted commitment to the long-term objective of overturning the white minority regime in Salisbury". The Australian Labor Party Whitlam government was determined to take a strong stance against Rhodesia. Its priorities included strongly enforcing the United Nations sanctions, banning visits by Rhodesian sports teams that had been racially selected and closing
6437-535: The Australian Minister for Trade and Industry John McEwen to propose that the government invite a delegation of Rhodesian officials to Australia for trade talks. In his reply, McEwen agreed for Cresswell-George to meet with staff from the Department of Trade and Industry to discuss the proposal. The Department of Foreign Affairs told the Department of Trade and Industry in late November that such
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6594-404: The Australian government directed the Department of Foreign Affairs to investigate the possible violation of customs regulations. Customs officers also raided the centre. The Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Customs and Excise found that the material stolen from the RIC demonstrated that it was run by the Rhodesian government. The Department of Foreign Affairs recommended that
6751-483: The Australian government refused to deal directly with it. Messages received from the Rhodesian government did not receive a response. Despite its overall stance against Rhodesia, the Liberal Party of Australia - Country Party coalition government that was in power at the federal level in Australia until December 1972 provided some diplomatic support for the regime. This included issuing Australian passports to
6908-407: The Australian government was not considering recognising the country. Cresswell-George explained the goals and composition of the proposed delegation, which was to have included a senior government officer and two business people. In response, the Australian officers indicated that while Rhodesian business people could visit Australia individually or as a group to investigate future trade opportunities,
7065-739: The British government continued referring to the country as Southern Rhodesia. This situation continued throughout the UDI period. The shortened name was used by many people including the British government in the House of Commons. Until after the Second World War , the landlocked British possession of Southern Rhodesia was not developed as an indigenous African territory, but rather as a unique state that reflected its multiracial character. This situation certainly made it very different from other lands that existed under colonial rule, as many Europeans had arrived to make permanent homes, populating
7222-405: The British government, rather than seriously undermine the Rhodesian security forces. Because Rhodesian exports were generally competitive and had previously been entitled to preferential treatment on the British market, the former colony did not recognise the need for escalating the pace of diversification before independence. Following the UDI, however, Rhodesia began to demonstrate that it had
7379-546: The British principles as they stood, implying instead that Rhodesia was already legally entitled to independence—a claim that was overwhelmingly endorsed by the predominantly white electorate in a referendum . Emboldened by the results of this referendum and the subsequent general election, the Rhodesian government threatened to declare independence without British consent. Harold Wilson countered by warning that such an irregular procedure would be considered treasonous , although he specifically rejected using armed force to quell
7536-568: The High Court considered the matter in August 1975. It endorsed a consent order proposing that the case not proceed after being told that the RIC's details had been included in the 1975 directory and would also appear in a 1975–76 directory. The government was ordered to pay the centre's costs. The RIC's office was petrol bombed again in March 1975. Approximately $ 1,500 worth of damage was caused in this incident. The Rhodesian diplomatic presence
7693-503: The Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). On December 21, a group of ZANLA insurgents under Rex Nhongo crossed into Rhodesia from Mozambique and raided an isolated commercial farm . In the successive months, this attack was followed by a succession of raids on white farmers throughout the northeastern districts of the country and resulted in several casualties among the security forces. The propaganda value of these raids, coupled with
7850-532: The Member for Tangney Peter Richardson argued that closing the centre would violate freedom of speech and give the United Nations excessive influence over Australian domestic policies. He also stated that the Rhodesian government was "less menacing to our national interests than Soviet Russia and China". Richardson's decision in September 1977 to leave politics was, in part, a protest against Fraser's stance towards
8007-941: The National Democratic Party (NDP), had established informal contacts with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia , and discussed the possibility of obtaining military training in Eastern Europe for its members. In July 1962, Nkomo visited Moscow and discussed plans for a ZAPU-led armed uprising in Rhodesia. He made formal requests for Soviet funding and arms for ZIPRA, explaining that "for these purposes ZAPU needs arms, explosives, revolvers...the party also needs money to bribe persons who guard important installations, to carry out sabotage". The Soviets agreed to supply ZAPU with limited funds beginning in 1963, and increased its level of financial support after UDI. In 1963, ZIPRA also made its first formal request to
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#17327727916518164-624: The Portuguese, Rhodesians, and South Africans as the spearhead of a communist thrust into southern Africa. ZAPU's attempts to implement its armed struggle were hamstrung by a factional split within the party between 1962 and 1963. A number of ZAPU dissidents rejected Nkomo's authority and formed their own organisation, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), with Ndabangingi Sithole as its president and Robert Mugabe as its general secretary. By August 1964, ZANU
8321-411: The RIC could be in breach of Security Council Resolution 253 , and sought information about it. This resolution had been enacted in May 1968, and tightened the restrictions on trade and government to government contact with Rhodesia. The Australian government's response in May 1971 noted that the RIC had been established before Security Council Resolution 253 was adopted. It was also stated that "so far as
8478-479: The RIC. At the end of September The National Times reported that 40 of the 126 government members of parliament and senators were opposed to legislating to close the centre. On 20 September, Peacock gave a commitment in Parliament any legislation introduced to close the RIC would not "infringe on the liberty of individual Australians freely to express their opinions with respect to Rhodesia". After he received
8635-588: The RIC. The Alternate Rhodesia Information Centre was prominent in pressuring the Whitlam government to take action against the RIC, and developed links with groups representing university students including the leaders of the National Union of Students . Whitlam wrote to the Liberal Party Premier of New South Wales Robert Askin on 7 December 1972 to request that the RIC's business name be deregistered. As part of its efforts to destabilise
8792-616: The Rhodesia Information Centre that would represent the black majority in Rhodesia. This application was rejected. In March 1973 Holland said that she had proof that the RIC maintained dossiers on Rhodesians in Australia. The Alternate Rhodesia Information Centre was renamed the Free Zimbabwe Centre by August 1973. On 18 April 1973, Postmaster-General Lionel Bowen instructed the Postmaster-General's Department to cease all mail, telephone and telegram services to
8949-564: The Rhodesian Information Office in Washington, D.C., in line with this resolution during August 1977, but it remained open until 1979 after receiving donations from American citizens. Fraser and his cabinet believed that they needed to comply with Resolution 409 and force the RIC to close. It was thought that Australia would become diplomatically isolated if the centre was allowed to remain open, and Fraser's advocacy at Commonwealth meetings would be compromised. In making
9106-576: The Rhodesian Trade Office in Lisbon functioned as a de facto embassy and caused tension with London, which objected to Rhodesia conducting its own foreign policy. As land-locked Rhodesia bordered the Portuguese colony of Mozambique , Salazar's promise of "maximum support" from Portugal in breaking the anticipated sanctions gave Smith more grounds for self-confidence in his talks with London. Smith ruled out acceptance for all five of
9263-589: The Rhodesian capital, Salisbury , preferring to conduct diplomatic activities through "accredited representatives". This allowed the South African and Portuguese governments to maintain they were continuing to respect British sovereignty while also accepting the practical authority of the Smith administration. Initially, the Rhodesian state retained its pledged loyalty to Queen Elizabeth II , recognising her as Queen of Rhodesia. When Smith and Deputy Prime Minister Clifford Dupont visited Sir Humphrey Gibbs ,
9420-426: The Rhodesian government's main way of engaging with Australians. The information the centre provided was mainly propaganda for the Rhodesian regime. It lobbied members of the federal and state parliaments and advised Australian businesses about how they could evade the sanctions that had been placed on the country. It also handled queries about visas and migration to Rhodesia. The Zimbabwe African National Union , one of
9577-422: The Rhodesian regime from engaging in diplomatic activity, as well as regulations made under Australian customs law that prohibited the importation of materials from Rhodesia. Writing in 1972, the commentator and then-opposition Australian Labor Party staffer Richard V. Hall judged that the centre's attempts to influence Australian politicians and journalists had been "extensive but inept", with media coverage of
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#17327727916519734-553: The Rhodesian regime in Australia being almost entirely negative. A 1977 editorial in The Canberra Times stated that the RIC was "relatively innocuous and mostly ineffective". The Liberal Party of Australia-Country Party coalition government tolerated the RIC. This formed part of the limited diplomatic support it provided to the Rhodesian government. The centre attracted little controversy in Australia in its first years of operations. In late 1966 Cresswell-George wrote to
9891-686: The South African and Portuguese governments were willing to permit Rhodesian diplomats to be stationed in their country. Rhodesian diplomatic missions were maintained in Lisbon , Lourenço Marques in Mozambique , Cape Town and Pretoria . The Rhodesian High Commission in London that had preceded UDI operated until 1969. The British government required the High Commission to limit its activities to providing consular assistance for Rhodesians in
10048-534: The Soviet Union for military training. The Soviets began training ZIPRA militants in guerrilla warfare in early 1964. Nkomo's public endorsement of a violent strategy confirmed white politicians' opposition to ZAPU and fed their negative attitudes towards black nationalists at large. In response to the formation of ZIPRA, the Rhodesian government banned ZAPU, driving that party's supporters underground. It also passed draconian security legislation restricting
10205-483: The UK. A significant majority of white Rhodesian residents were either British immigrants or of British ancestry, and many held a special affection for the British Empire. However, the UK's refusal to grant them independence on their terms further confirmed their opposition to a political settlement on British terms, and fed their negative attitudes towards British interference in Rhodesian politics at large. In
10362-781: The UN further iterated that these sanctions were mandatory, and member states were explicitly barred from purchasing Rhodesian export goods, namely tobacco, chromium, copper, asbestos, sugar, and beef. The British government, having already adopted extensive sanctions of its own, dispatched a Royal Navy squadron to monitor oil deliveries in the port of Beira in Mozambique, from which a strategic pipeline ran to Umtali in Rhodesia. The warships were to deter "by force, if necessary, vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for (Southern) Rhodesia". Some Western nations, such as Switzerland, and West Germany , which were not UN member states, continued to conduct business openly with Rhodesia –
10519-593: The UN sanctions. In 1971, the Byrd Amendment was passed in the United States, permitting American firms to go on importing Rhodesian chromium and nickel products as normal. Despite the poor showing of sanctions, Rhodesia found it nearly impossible to obtain diplomatic recognition abroad. In 1970, the United States declared it would not recognise UDI "under [any] circumstances". South Africa and Portugal, Rhodesia's largest trading partners, also refused to extend diplomatic recognition, and did not open embassies in
10676-530: The United Kingdom's direct sphere of influence for some time, and the facade of continued British rule was rendered a constitutional fiction by UDI. In light of these circumstances, Wilson quickly realised his ability to assert direct leverage over the incumbent Rhodesian government was limited. On 12 October 1965, the United Nations General Assembly had noted the repeated threats of the Rhodesian authorities "to declare unilaterally
10833-412: The United Kingdom, and banned it from public relations activities as well as promoting trade and migration. The Rhodesian High Commission in Rhodesia House was directed to close by the British government following the 1969 Rhodesian constitutional referendum , in which white Rhodesians endorsed a proposal for the country to become a republic after the Rhodesian attempt to recognise Queen Elizabeth II as
10990-416: The United Kingdom, with a President acting as ceremonial head of state, while a Prime Minister headed the Cabinet as head of government. The official name of the country, according to the constitution adopted concurrently with the UDI in November 1965, was Rhodesia. This was not the case under British law , however, which considered the territory's legal name to be Southern Rhodesia , the name given to
11147-546: The ZANLA leadership criticised ZIPRA's continued fixation with winning a major conventional engagement, arguing that the failed incursions demonstrated the futility of engaging the Rhodesian military in the type of pitched battles in which it held an indisputable advantage. ZIPRA's failure to obtain support from the locals was also noted, and ZANLA began implementing a long-term covert politicisation programme to cultivate civilian support throughout its future area of operations. By December 1972, ZANLA had cached arms and established
11304-461: The ZANLA to acquire more sophisticated weaponry, thereby increasing the military pressure that the guerrillas were able to place on Rhodesia. Until 1972, containing the guerrillas was little more than a police action. Even as late as August 1975 when Rhodesian government and black nationalist leaders met at Victoria Falls for negotiations brokered by South Africa and Zambia, the talks never got beyond
11461-401: The absence of a "Northern" Rhodesia, the continued use of "Southern" was superfluous. It passed legislation to become simply Rhodesia, but the British government refused to approve this on the grounds that the country's name was defined by British legislation, so could not be altered by the colonial government. Salisbury went on using the shortened name in an official manner nevertheless, while
11618-497: The centre be closed, but the government decided to not take any action. The Minister for Foreign Affairs Nigel Bowen stated on 11 April 1972 that the government did not have the legal authority to close the centre. Richard V. Hall attributed this decision to the influence of the "Rhodesia Lobby" and an editorial in The Age stated that the government's lack of action "showed clearly – all too clearly – where its sympathies lay". During
11775-457: The centre in 1972 indicated that most of its funding came from the Rhodesian Ministry of Information via a Swiss bank account . At this time its director was a Rhodesian who had taken out Australian citizenship, the deputy director was South African and it had one other full-time staff member and an unspecified number of casual employees. Greg Aplin , the director of the RIC from 1977 to 1980, stated in his inaugural speech after being elected to
11932-538: The centre, including by locking their post office box and deregistering The Rhodesian Commentary as a newspaper. Denzil Bradley initiated legal action in response, and Bowen's directive was overturned by the High Court of Australia on 10 September 1973 in the case Bradley v Commonwealth . The High Court found that Bowen had exceeded his powers under the Post and Telegraph Act and its regulations, and ordered that
12089-528: The centre. The Australian Labor Party Caucus approved draft legislation on 6 March 1974 to close the RIC. This legislation was not introduced into Parliament, however, due to competing priorities and frequent disruptions to the parliamentary schedule. The government attempted to remove the centre's listing from Sydney telephone directories in December 1974, but a High Court justice issued an injunction prohibiting this action in February 1975. The full bench of
12246-406: The centre. The Age and The Review published several stories about these revelations. The director of the RIC "emphatically denied" that it had smuggled publicity material into Australia or been involved in intelligence-gathering activities. The South African Ambassador , John Mills, also issued a statement denying that his staff had done anything improper. In response to the media coverage,
12403-673: The centre. An article in The Canberra Times stated that the Fraser government's efforts to close the centre were "moving with the slowness of the most lethargic sloth" and claimed that the centre was a red herring that was distracting attention away from the large number of Australians who were fighting with the Rhodesian Security Forces. The Rhodesian government that was elected agreed in December 1979 to
12560-553: The collapse of Portuguese rule in Mozambique in 1974–1975, it was no longer viable for the Smith regime to sustain white minority rule indefinitely. By this time, even South Africa's Vorster had come to this view. While Vorster was unwilling to make concessions to his own country's black people, he concluded that white minority rule was not sustainable in a country where black people outnumbered white people 22:1. In 1976, there were 270,000 Rhodesians of European descent and six million Africans. International business groups involved in
12717-506: The competent organs of their State". By the early 1970s the Department of Foreign Affairs was encouraging the government to more strongly enforce sanctions against Rhodesia. The department favoured taking steps to close the RIC, but did not pursue this as the Attorney-General's Department opposed doing so. In April 1971 the United Nations Sanctions Committee raised concerns with the Australian government that
12874-426: The country (e.g. Lonrho ) transferred their support from the Rhodesian government to black nationalist parties. Business leaders and politicians feted Nkomo on his visits to Europe. ZANU also attracted business supporters who saw the course that future events were likely to take. Funding and arms support provided by supporters, particularly from the Soviet Union and its allies in the latter 1970s, allowed both ZIPRA and
13031-624: The country in 1898 during the British South Africa Company 's administration of the Rhodesias , and retained by the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia after the end of company rule in 1923. This naming dispute dated back to October 1964, when Northern Rhodesia became independent from the UK and concurrently changed its name to Zambia . The Southern Rhodesian colonial government in Salisbury felt that in
13188-464: The country that eventually brought about majority rule, a totality of these factors rather than any one the reason for introducing change. In 2005, a conference at the London School of Economics that discussed Rhodesia's independence concluded that UDI was sparked by an existing racial conflict complicated by Cold War intrigues. Critics of UDI maintained that Ian Smith intended to safeguard
13345-419: The country. It collaborated with a far-right organisation and a pro-Rhodesia community organisation. These activities, and the centre's presence in Australia, violated United Nations Security Council resolutions, including some that specifically targeted it and the other Rhodesian diplomatic posts. The RIC had little impact, with Australian media coverage of the Rhodesian regime being almost entirely negative and
13502-667: The decision to close the centre, the Cabinet noted that doing so would impose some constraints on freedom of expression. Andrew Peacock , the Minister for Foreign Affairs, announced in Parliament on 24 May 1977 that the government was considering legislating to enforce Resolution 409 if it was adopted. On 6 June the Australian government formally notified the United Nations via a letter to the Secretary-General that it intended "to introduce legislation designed to give effect to
13659-546: The declaration of a republic. He had effectively been superseded before then; the Smith government stated that if the Queen did not appoint a Governor-General, it would name Dupont as " Officer Administering the Government ". Smith had intended to have Dupont named Governor-General, but Queen Elizabeth II would not even consider this advice. With few exceptions, the international community backed Whitehall's assertion that Gibbs
13816-567: The export of wheat to Rhodesia on humanitarian grounds. It claimed that the wheat was needed by Rhodesia's black population, despite their staple food being maize. The Rhodesian government did not have a diplomatic presence in Australia prior to UDI. In 1966 it established the Rhodesian Information Service in Melbourne . The service's first director was T.A. Cresswell-George, an Australian citizen. An information office
13973-444: The federation was dissolved at the end of December 1963. Although prepared to grant formal independence to Southern Rhodesia (now Rhodesia), the British government had adopted a policy of no independence before majority rule (NIBMR), dictating that colonies with a significant, politically active population of European settlers would not receive independence except under conditions of majority rule . White Rhodesians balked at
14130-467: The first constitution for the new Colony of Southern Rhodesia came into force. Under this constitution, Southern Rhodesia was given the right to elect its own thirty-member legislature , premier , and cabinet—although the British Crown retained a formal veto over measures affecting natives and dominated foreign policy. Over the course of the next three decades, Southern Rhodesia experienced
14287-507: The five principles of independence, and the British government argued it would settle for nothing less. On 11 November 1965 the Cabinet of Rhodesia issued a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). The UDI was immediately denounced as an "act of rebellion against the Crown" in the United Kingdom, and Wilson promised that the illegal action would be short-lived. However, given its self-governing status Rhodesia had no longer been within
14444-559: The government also legislate to close the RIC, but this amendment was defeated. The Fraser government considered legislating the closure of the centre again in April 1979 ahead of an assessment by the United Nations Security Committee of countries' compliance with enforcing sanctions against Rhodesia. At this time an election in Rhodesia was imminent, and the Cabinet was intending to take its outcomes into consideration when deciding how it would go about closing
14601-728: The government and the increasingly militant black nationalists. After their public campaigns were initially suppressed, many black nationalists believed that negotiation was completely incapable of meeting their aspirations. Petrol bombings by politicised radicals became increasingly common, with the Zimbabwe Review observing in 1961, "for the first time home-made petrol bombs were used by freedom fighters in Salisbury against settler establishments." Between January and September 1962, nationalists detonated 33 bombs and were implicated in 28 acts of arson, and 27 acts of sabotage against communications infrastructure. The nationalists also murdered
14758-437: The government pay the RIC's legal costs. During this period the centre's office at Crows Nest was petrol bombed on 7 July 1973. The furniture and fittings were badly damaged. In August 1973 Sekai Holland and six other members of the Free Zimbabwe Centre were arrested after they occupied the RIC's offices in protest against its continuing operations. Whitlam stated in September 1973 that the government would consider amending
14915-545: The government upon UDI, sparking the Rhodesian Bush War . Growing war weariness, diplomatic pressure, and an extensive trade embargo imposed by the United Nations prompted Rhodesian prime minister Ian Smith to concede to majority rule in 1978. However, elections and a multiracial provisional government , with Smith succeeded by moderate Abel Muzorewa , failed to appease international critics or halt
15072-570: The government would not recognise them as an official delegation or provide any forms of assistance. The federal and New South Wales governments' tolerance of the RIC was not in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 277 , which was adopted in 1970 and called on UN member states to "ensure that any act performed by officials and institutions of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia shall not be accorded any recognition, official or otherwise, including judicial notice, by
15229-399: The government's opposition to white minority rule in Rhodesia hardening over time. While the centre was initially tolerated by the Australian government, its operations became controversial from the early 1970s. The RIC's role in disseminating propaganda was revealed in March 1972, but the government of the day chose to not take any substantive action in response. The Whitlam government that
15386-432: The governments of these countries were aware of the offices but did not formally recognise them. The Australian government never recognised Rhodesia's independence and opposed white minority rule in the country, but was initially reluctant to take concrete steps against the regime. This reluctance was motivated by support for the white Rhodesian cause among sections of the Australian population. Many Australians felt that
15543-565: The independence of Southern Rhodesia, in order to perpetuate minority rule", and called upon Wilson to use all means at his disposal (including military force) to prevent the Rhodesian Front from asserting independence. After UDI was proclaimed, UN officials branded the Rhodesian government as an "illegal racist minority regime" and called on member states to voluntarily sever economic ties with Rhodesia, recommending sanctions on petroleum products and military hardware. In December 1966,
15700-405: The insurgents as "gangsters" in his commentary. The use of weapons and explosives sourced from communist states by the black nationalists also disguised the racial dynamics of the conflict, allowing white Rhodesians to claim that they were targets of Soviet-directed communist agitators rather than a domestic political movement. Smith and his supporters perceived themselves as collective defenders of
15857-587: The issue. The political scientist Alexander Lee has described the defeat of the legislation as "a stunning victory" for "Rhodesia's Australian allies", and noted that it meant that Australia did not comply with Resolution 409. In August 1978, the Fraser government passed legislation to force an unofficial embassy set up in Canberra by the Croatian independence campaigner Mario Despoja to close. The Labor Party opposition attempted to amend this bill to require that
16014-423: The latter had adopted NIBMR as a formal policy - the very circumstance UDI was carried out to avoid, and which white Rhodesians had struggled to resist since the onset of decolonisation. Black nationalist parties reacted with outrage at UDI, with one ZANU official stating, "...for all those who cherish freedom and a meaningful life, UDI has set a collision course that cannot be altered. 11 November 1965 [has] marked
16171-571: The latter remained the Smith government's largest trading partner in Western Europe until 1973, when it was admitted to the UN. Japan remained the chief recipient of Rhodesian exports outside the African continent, and Iran also supplied oil to Rhodesia in violation of the embargo. Portugal served as a conduit for Rhodesian goods, which it exported through Mozambique with false certificates of origin . South Africa, too, refused to observe
16328-414: The lives of local residents induced many of them who had previously been neutral to support the guerrillas. Consular assistance Consular assistance is help and advice provided by the diplomatic agents of a country to citizens of that country who are living or traveling overseas. The diplomats may be honorary consuls , or members of the country's diplomatic service . Such assistance may take
16485-472: The local economy were insufficient to compensate for this disadvantage. Southern Rhodesia had negated the issue by importing a skilled workforce directly from abroad in the form of its disproportionately large European immigrant and expatriate population. For example, in 1951 over 90% of white Southern Rhodesians were engaged in what the British government classified as "skilled occupations", or professional and technical trades. This made it possible to establish
16642-421: The local populace, which immediately informed on their presence to Rhodesian officials. Within the month, the Rhodesian police and army had launched a counteroffensive codenamed Operation Nickel , killing forty-seven insurgents, capturing another twenty, and driving the survivors across the border into Botswana. An even larger ZIPRA column of over a hundred insurgents was intercepted in early 1968 and annihilated by
16799-499: The main forces fighting white rule within Rhodesia, alleged in 1978 that the RIC had recruited Australians to fight with the Rhodesian Security Forces . This was denied by the centre's director. The RIC had previously stated in 1977 that Australians who contacted it about enlisting in the Rhodesian Security Forces were told to communicate directly with the relevant organisation in Rhodesia. Documents stolen from
16956-494: The means of conducting the insurgency. ZIPRA favoured Soviet thinking, placing an emphasis on acquiring sophisticated weaponry in the hopes of winning a conventional battle like the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu . ZANLA placed greater emphasis on the politicisation of the local populace in the areas it operated, and favoured a more irregular style of warfare. In early April 1966, two groups of ZANLA insurgents recently trained at
17113-417: The most recent resolution directed against the maintenance of Rhodesian information offices and agencies abroad". The RIC Centre lobbied the public and government backbenchers to prevent its closure. Roy van der Spuy , the centre's director, argued that Australia was not bound to enforce United Nations resolutions, that the High Court had upheld the centre's legality and that closing the centre would violate
17270-460: The near future. However, once Rhodesia had been introduced as a topic for discussion in international bodies, extension of the status quo became a matter of concern to the British government, which perceived the scrutiny as a serious embarrassment to the United Kingdom. After the federation was dissolved in December 1963, the then British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home , insisted that preconditions on independence talks hinge on what he termed
17427-476: The new settlement, if approved, would also implement an immediate improvement in black political status, offer a means to terminate racial discrimination, and provide a solid guarantee against retrogressive constitutional amendments. Implementation of the proposed settlement hinged on popular acceptance, but the Rhodesian government consistently refused to submit it to a universal referendum. A twenty four-member commission headed by an eminent jurist, Lord Pearce ,
17584-619: The non-elected members of the National Country Party and the New South Wales branch of the Liberal Party also opposed the legislation, which put further pressure on the elected members. The Sydney Morning Herald reported on 18 August that "30 to 50 per cent" of government members of parliament opposed the legislation, with at least twelve being prepared to cross the floor and vote against it. For instance,
17741-463: The northwest. From 1965 to 1979, Rhodesia was one of two independent states on the African continent governed by a white minority of European descent and culture , the other being South Africa . In the late 19th century, the territory north of the Transvaal was chartered to the British South Africa Company , led by Cecil Rhodes . Rhodes and his Pioneer Column marched north in 1890, acquiring
17898-421: The operational level in Mozambique, the Portuguese could offer Rhodesia little decisive assistance. Portuguese military resources in Mozambique were preoccupied with FRELIMO and somewhat depleted by a decade of war, and little could be spared to assist a foreign ally. Rhodesia expected far more from South Africa, which possessed far greater military resources and infinitely more diplomatic influence abroad. After
18055-441: The original "five principles" proposed by Alec Douglas-Home, now foreign secretary . In November 1971, Douglas-Home renewed contacts with Salisbury and announced a proposed agreement that would be satisfactory to both sides – it recognised Rhodesia's 1969 constitution as the legal frame of government, while agreeing that gradual legislative representation was an acceptable formula for unhindered advance to majority rule. Nevertheless,
18212-543: The other two nations of common security interests based on the similarity of their restive internal situations. They saw strong parallels between their nation's position of being threatened by black nationalist insurgencies and the Portuguese predicament with FRELIMO in Mozambique, as well as to a lesser extent the insurgencies in South Africa and South West Africa . Under the auspices of the Alcora Exercise ,
18369-563: The potential to develop a greater degree of economic self-sufficiency . After the Rhodesian Front began introducing incentives accorded to domestic production, industrial output expanded dramatically. A rigid system of countermeasures enacted to combat sanctions succeeded in blunting their impact for at least a decade. Over the next nine years Rhodesian companies, spiting the freezing of their assets and blocking of overseas accounts , also perfected cunning techniques of sanctions evasion through both local and foreign subsidiaries, which operated on
18526-580: The premise of NIBMR; many felt they had a right to absolute political control, at least for the time being, despite their relatively small numbers. They were also disturbed by the chaos of the post-colonial political transitions occurring in other African nations at the time, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo . A vocal segment of the white populace was open to the concept of gradually incorporating black Rhodesians into civil society and
18683-454: The principle of freedom of speech. He noted that the Liberal Party's platform included commitments to protect individual liberties and freedom of speech. The closure of the RIC was strongly opposed by many government backbenchers when parliament resumed on 17 August 1977. Some were motivated by sympathy for Rhodesia, but a larger number believed that closing the centre would be an unjustifiable violation of civil liberties . A large proportion of
18840-458: The privileges of an entrenched colonial ruling class at the expense of the impoverished black population. Smith defended his actions by claiming that the black Rhodesian majority was too inexperienced at the time to participate in the complex administrative process of what was, by contemporary African standards, a reasonably industrialised state. At large, UDI further hardened the white population's attitudes towards majority rule and relations with
18997-523: The procedural phase. Rhodesian representatives made it clear they were prepared to fight an all out war to prevent majority rule. However, the situation changed dramatically after the end of Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique in 1975. Rhodesia now found itself almost entirely surrounded by hostile states and even South Africa, its only real ally, pressed for a settlement. Having let slip one chance after another of reaching an accommodation with more moderate black leaders, Rhodesia's whites seem to have made
19154-540: The regulations would help the Rhodesian regime disseminate propaganda in Australia. In July 1972 the government announced that it would not renew the Australian passports that had been issued to the head of the Rhodesian Ministry of External Affairs and the Rhodesian representatives in Portugal and South Africa on the grounds that they were working for a government that Australia did not recognise. As part of
19311-690: The right to assembly and granting the security forces broad powers to crack down on suspected political subversives. For the first time, the death sentence was also introduced for any act of politically inspired terrorism which involved arson or the use of explosives. The emergence of guerrilla warfare and acts of urban insurrection by the black nationalist parties in Rhodesia allowed racial politics to be elevated into an issue of law and order in white Rhodesian public discourse. To Smith and his government, black nationalists were stateless dissidents whose primary motives were not political, but crime and perpetuating lawlessness; for example, Smith preferred to describe
19468-573: The same terminology as it applied to the overt diplomatic posts in Portugal and South Africa. Other documents provided examples of how the RIC was attempting to influence politicians and journalists, including by offering free trips to Rhodesia, and indicated extensive collaboration with the far-right Australian League of Rights . The documents also demonstrated that the South African Embassy in Canberra had violated customs regulations by importing Rhodesian films and propaganda on behalf of
19625-707: The security forces, who tracked the insurgents to a nearby ranch on April 28. All seven were cornered and killed after a brief firefight; this event is considered to be the first engagement of the Rhodesian Bush War . The action at Sinoia has been commemorated by supporters of the guerrillas since as " Chimurenga Day ", and occupies a place of pride in ZANU hagiography. In August 1967, a large and better-equipped column of almost seventy ZIPRA insurgents infiltrated Rhodesia from Zambia, bolstered by recruits from an allied South African militant organisation, uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK). The insurgents failed to cultivate prior contacts with
19782-456: The security forces. A third ZIPRA incursion attempt in July 1969 met with similarly catastrophic results. Thereafter, ZIPRA abandoned the notion of attempting to infiltrate the country with large groups of insurgents equipped only with small arms; it limited itself to more irregular forms of warfare until it could stockpile enough heavy weaponry to mount a major conventional invasion. For its part,
19939-547: The success of ZANLA's politicisation campaign, denied intelligence to the security forces and furnished more recruits for the insurgents. In response, the Rhodesian security forces began coordinating operations in Mozambique with the Portuguese army to intercept ZANLA insurgents before they could cross the border. The practical alliances between ZIPRA and MK, and later ZANLA and FRELIMO, prompted Rhodesia to look increasingly towards South Africa and Portugal for active assistance. Rhodesian politicians frequently reminded officials in
20096-671: The three countries' bureaucracies began routinely sharing information and seeking common diplomatic positions. Lieutenant General Alan Fraser, a senior strategist in the South African Defence Force wrote in 1970, "there can be no doubt in any of our minds that we have a common enemy: we, i.e. Portugal, the RSA and Rhodesia. Unless we are to lay ourselves open to the possibility of defeat in detail, we must fight this enemy jointly—if not simultaneously." Nevertheless, aside from intelligence-sharing and some limited coordination on
20253-480: The towns as traders or settling to farm the most productive soils. In 1922, faced with the decision to join the Union of South Africa as a fifth province or accept nearly full internal autonomy, the electorate cast its vote against South African integration. In view of the outcome of the referendum, the territory was annexed by the United Kingdom on 12 September 1923. Shortly after annexation, on 1 October 1923,
20410-432: The trade sanctions and was not active in the Commonwealth's efforts to find a solution to the Rhodesian problem. Enforcement of trade sanctions was also uneven, and was undertaken through regulations rather than stricter measures such as legislation. While imports from Rhodesia to Australia ceased, the quantity of Australian goods exported to Rhodesia increased between 1965 and 1973. In 1970 the Australian government defended
20567-514: The traditional values of the British Empire against the twin threats of international communism, manifested through the Soviet Union's support for black nationalist militants, and the social and political decadence of the West. Often repeated appeals to the Christian heritage of their pioneer ancestors in "defending the free world " and sustaining "Western civilisation" reflected these beliefs. This
20724-696: The tragic choice of facing black nationalism over the barrel of a gun rather than the conference table. The downhill road toward a race war in Rhodesia is becoming increasingly slippery with blood. At this point, ZANU's alliance with FRELIMO and the porous border between Mozambique and eastern Rhodesia enabled large-scale training and infiltration of ZANU/ZANLA fighters. The governments of Zambia and Botswana were also emboldened sufficiently to allow resistance movement bases to be set up in their territories. Guerrillas began to launch operations deep inside Rhodesia, attacking roads, railways, economic targets and isolated security force positions, in 1976. The government adopted
20881-412: The turning point of the struggle for freedom in that land from a constitutional and political one to primarily a military struggle." It would, however, be several years before the nationalists adopted armed struggle as their primary strategy for obtaining political power. Violent tactics at this time were intended to create opportunities for external intervention , either by the international community or
21038-399: The two other British Central African territories, to form the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland – a loose association that placed defence and economic direction under a central government but left many domestic affairs under the control of its constituent territories. As it began to appear that decolonisation was inevitable and indigenous black populations were pressing heavily for change,
21195-471: The unicameral Legislative Assembly was predominantly white, with a small number of seats reserved for black representatives. Following the declaration of a republic in 1970, this was replaced by a bicameral Parliament , with a House of Assembly and a Senate . The bicameral system was retained in Zimbabwe after 1980. Aside from its racial franchise , Rhodesia observed a Westminster system inherited from
21352-440: The war. By December 1979 Muzorewa had secured an agreement with ZAPU and ZANU, allowing Rhodesia to briefly revert to colonial status pending new elections under British supervision. ZANU secured an electoral victory in 1980, and the country achieved internationally recognised independence in April 1980 as Zimbabwe . Rhodesia's largest cities were Salisbury (its capital city, now known as Harare) and Bulawayo . Prior to 1970,
21509-411: The white Rhodesians were ' kith and kin ' and were not concerned about the Rhodesian government's racist policies. It took lobbying from the British government for the Australian government to impose trade sanctions on Rhodesia in December 1965. The Australian Trade Commission in the Rhodesian capital of Salisbury was also closed. In line with its view that the Rhodesian government had no legal standing,
21666-435: The years prior to UDI, white Rhodesians increasingly saw themselves as beleaguered and threatened, perpetually insecure and undermined by the metropole, unable to rely on anybody but themselves. The policy of "No independence before majority rule" transformed the white community's relationship with the UK and increased its suspicions of the British government's untrustworthiness and duplicity in colonial affairs, especially since
21823-500: Was a self-governing British colony in Africa which was dominated by the small white minority . In 1964, the population comprised approximately 220,000 Europeans and four million Africans. The black majority was largely excluded from power; for instance, 50 of the 65 seats in the parliament's lower house were reserved for whites. On 11 November 1965 the Southern Rhodesian government led by Prime Minister Ian Smith issued
21980-593: Was also opened in Sydney as a branch of the Rhodesian Information Service. The Rhodesian Information Service in Melbourne was closed in 1967, and replaced with the Rhodesian Information Centre (RIC) in Sydney. The centre was led by Keith Chalmers, a former Rhodesian diplomat. Chalmers had arrived in Australia in 1967 and was granted Australian citizenship in July 1969. The RIC was registered as
22137-480: Was appointed to study constitutional options open to the Rhodesian authorities as of April 1968, including on the topic of majority rule, but reopening negotiations with the British on a settlement was ruled out early on. The Waley Commission found that in practical as well as legal terms, "Europeans must surrender any belief in permanent European domination", pointing out that minority rule was not permanently sustainable. However, Waley also testified that majority rule
22294-473: Was banned by the Rhodesian government as well, which cited widespread acts of violent intimidation attributed to its members. ZANU's agenda was left-wing and pan-Africanist ; it demanded a one-party state with majority rule and the abolition of private property. Ethnic tensions also exacerbated the split: ZANU recruited almost solely from the Shona-speaking peoples of Rhodesia. Its chief support base
22451-602: Was established in Canberra during 1988. Rhodesia Rhodesia ( / r oʊ ˈ d iː ʒ ə / roh- DEE -zhə , / r oʊ ˈ d iː ʃ ə / roh- DEE -shə ; Shona : Rodizha ), officially from 1970 the Republic of Rhodesia , was an unrecognised state in Southern Africa from 1965 to 1979. During this fourteen-year period, Rhodesia served as the de facto successor state to
22608-661: Was hardly an unusual opinion among white minorities in Southern Africa at the time; a dossier compiled by United States intelligence officials on the topic found that: many [southern African] whites....believe that the current social and political ferment throughout the continent is communist inspired and managed; that it would be no problem without communist instigation. They point to materiel and training provided by communist countries to insurgency groups operating against white minority governments in southern Africa. They see foreign-based black liberation groups operating against
22765-544: Was in power from late 1972 to November 1975 unsuccessfully attempted to force the centre to close on several occasions, with the High Court ruling one of the attempts to have been illegal. In 1977 the Fraser government also attempted to close the RIC, but backed down in the face of a backbench revolt over the issue. The Zimbabwean government shut the centre in May 1980 after the end of white minority rule and later established an official embassy in Australia. Southern Rhodesia
22922-403: Was initially established in Melbourne during 1966 as the Rhodesian Information Service. This organisation closed the next year, and was replaced with the RIC in Sydney. The centre's activities included lobbying politicians, spreading propaganda supporting white minority rule in Rhodesia and advising Australian businesses on how they could evade the United Nations sanctions that had been imposed on
23079-463: Was led by the Rhodesian-born activist against the regime, Sekai Holland , passed on documents that had been stolen from the RIC to the Australian media. These documents appeared to show that the centre was operating as a de facto embassy and advising businesses about how to evade sanctions. For instance, the documents showed that the Rhodesian government referred to it as a "mission" , using
23236-688: Was linked to the Rhodesian government. The New South Wales Court of Appeal upheld the Supreme Court's decision in June 1974. Following this ruling the centre was re-registered as the Flame Lily Centre (named after the Rhodesian national flower ) and continued to operate as the Rhodesia Information Centre. A group of Australians led by Sekai Holland applied to the New South Wales Registrar of Business Names in December 1972 seeking to register another body to be called
23393-447: Was no oppression of the majority by the minority or of [any] minority by the majority." Rhodesian resolve stiffened following a failure to reach a new settlement, with more radical elements of the Rhodesian Front calling for a republican constitution. During a two-proposition referendum held in 1969, the proposal for severing all remaining ties to the British Crown passed by a majority of 61,130 votes to 14,327. Rhodesia declared itself
23550-492: Was no way that a nation could rightly claim to be governing a particular territory – if it was waging a war against that territory. Beadle argued that due to Britain's economic war against Rhodesia, she could not (at the same point) be described as governing Rhodesia. The ruling set the precedent that despite the UDI, the incumbent Smith government "could lawfully do anything its predecessors could lawfully have done". A Salisbury commission chaired by prominent lawyer W.R. Waley
23707-402: Was not desirable immediately. Talks aimed at easing the differences between Rhodesia and the United Kingdom were carried out aboard Royal Navy vessels once in December 1966 and again in October 1968. Both efforts failed to achieve agreement, although Harold Wilson added a sixth principle to the five he had previously enunciated: "it would be necessary to ensure that, regardless of race, there
23864-589: Was reduced during the mid-1970s. A Rhodesian tourist office in New York City was forced to close by the United States government during 1974. In 1975 the formal Rhodesian diplomatic missions in Portugal and Mozambique were also required to close by the host governments. Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser , who headed the Liberal-National Country Party coalition Fraser government that replaced the Whitlam government in November 1975, had
24021-506: Was resoundingly negative. As many as thirty black Rhodesian chiefs and politicians voiced their opposition, prompting Britain to withdraw from the proposals on the grounds of the commission's report. As early as 1960, minority rule in Southern Rhodesia was already being challenged by a rising tide of political violence led by black African nationalists such as Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole . A sustained period of civil unrest between 1960 and 1965 further polarised relations between
24178-515: Was somewhat more influenced by the principles of Maoism than ZAPU, and a sympathetic Chinese government soon agreed to furnish weapons and training for ZANU's own war effort. After UDI, ZANU formed its own military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). While ZANLA and ZIPRA both planned for an armed struggle against the Rhodesian government, their respective leadership disagreed on
24335-495: Was the Queen's only legitimate representative, and hence the only lawful authority in Rhodesia. In September 1968, the Appellate Division of the High Court of Rhodesia ruled that Ian Smith's administration had become the de jure government of the country, not merely the de facto one. To support his decision, Chief Justice Sir Hugh Beadle used several statements made by Hugo Grotius , who maintained that there
24492-686: Was the rural peasantry in the Mashonaland countryside. ZAPU did retain Shona members, even among its senior leadership following the split. However, thereafter it recruited predominantly from the Ndebele ethnic group. Due to ZAPU's close relationship with the Soviet Union, ZANU found itself ostracised by the Soviet bloc but soon found a new ally in the People's Republic of China . Its political ideology
24649-416: Was therefore tasked with ascertaining public opinion on the subject. In 1972, the commission began interviewing interest groups and sampling opinions – although concern was expressed over the widespread apathy encountered. According to the commission, whites were in favour of the settlement, and Rhodesians of Coloured or Asian ancestry generally pleased, while the black response to the settlement's terms
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