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Bombing of Tokyo (10 March 1945)

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236-859: On the night of 9/10 March 1945, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) conducted a devastating firebombing raid on Tokyo , the Japanese capital city. This attack was code-named Operation Meetinghouse by the USAAF and is known as the Tokyo Great Air Raid ( 東京大空襲 , Tōkyō dai-kūshū ) in Japan. Bombs dropped from 279 Boeing B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers burned out much of eastern Tokyo. More than 90,000 and possibly over 100,000 Japanese people were killed, mostly civilians, and one million were left homeless, making it

472-933: A segregated basis. A flight training center was set up at the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama . Despite the handicap—caused by the segregation policy—of not having an experienced training cadre as with other AAF units, the Tuskegee Airmen distinguished themselves in combat with the 332nd Fighter Group . The Tuskegee training program produced 673 black fighter pilots, 253 B-26 Marauder pilots, and 132 navigators. The vast majority of African-American airmen, however, did not fare as well. Mainly draftees , most did not fly or maintain aircraft. Their largely menial duties, indifferent or hostile leadership, and poor morale led to serious dissatisfaction and several violent incidents. Women served more successfully as part of

708-585: A "disturbing failure to follow through on orders". To streamline the AAF in preparation for war, with a goal of centralized planning and decentralized execution of operations, in October 1941 Arnold submitted to the WDGS essentially the same reorganization plan it had rejected a year before, this time crafted by Chief of Air Staff Brig. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz . When this plan was not given any consideration, Arnold reworded

944-476: A Chief of Air Staff and three deputies. This wartime structure remained essentially unchanged for the remainder of hostilities. In October 1944 Arnold, to begin a process of reorganization for reducing the structure, proposed to eliminate the AC/AS, Training and move his office into OC&R, changing it to Operations, Training and Requirements (OT&R) but the mergers were never effected. On 23 August 1945, after

1180-538: A Zone of Interior "training and supply agency", but from the start AAF officers viewed this as a "paper" restriction negated by Arnold's place on both the Joint and Combined Chiefs, which gave him strategic planning authority for the AAF, a viewpoint that was formally sanctioned by the War Department in mid-1943 and endorsed by the president. The Circular No. 59 reorganization directed the AAF to operate under

1416-566: A blueprint. After war began, Congress enacted the First War Powers Act on 18 December 1941 endowing President Franklin D. Roosevelt with virtual carte blanche to reorganize the executive branch as he found necessary. Under it, on 28 February 1942, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9082 , based on Marshall's recommendation and the work of McNarney's committee. The EO changed Arnold's title to Commanding General, Army Air Forces effective 9 March 1942, making him co-equal with

1652-470: A change of mood at the War Department, and of dubious legality. By November 1941, on the eve of U.S. entry into the war, the division of authority within the Army as a whole, caused by the activation of Army GHQ a year before, had led to a "battle of memos" between it and the WDGS over administering the AAF, prompting Marshall to state that he had "the poorest command post in the Army" when defense commands showed

1888-457: A complex division of administrative control performed by a policy staff, an operating staff, and the support commands (formerly "field activities" of the OCAC). The former field activities operated under a "bureau" structure, with both policy and operating functions vested in staff-type officers who often exercised command and policy authority without responsibility for results, a system held over from

2124-609: A controversial move, the AAF Technical Training Command began leasing resort hotels and apartment buildings for large-scale training sites (accommodation for 90,000 existed in Miami Beach alone). The leases were negotiated for the AAF by the Corps of Engineers, often to the economic detriment of hotel owners in rental rates, wear and tear clauses, and short-notice to terminate leases. In December 1943,

2360-429: A deleterious effect on operational training and threatened to overwhelm the capacity of the old Air Corps groups to provide experienced cadres or to absorb graduates of the expanded training program to replace those transferred. Since 1939 the overall level of experience among the combat groups had fallen to such an extent that when the demand for replacements in combat was factored in, the entire operational training system

2596-416: A few feet and roads were rapidly cut by the fires. Crowds of civilians often panicked as they rushed towards the perceived safety of canals, with those who fell being crushed to death. The majority of those killed in the raid died while trying to evacuate. In many cases entire families were killed. One of the most deadly incidents occurred when the full bomb load of a B-29 landed in a crowd of civilians crossing

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2832-516: A free hand in selecting officers for his organization. Many came from his former command at Wright Field, Ohio , including the leading expert on the B-29, Colonel Leonard F. Harman, who became his deputy. For his assistant chief of staff for operations (A-3), he secured Brigadier General LaVerne G. Saunders , who had been awarded the Navy Cross while in command of the 11th Bombardment Group during

3068-664: A general autonomy within the War Department (similar to that of the Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy ) until the end of the war, while its commanders would cease lobbying for independence. Marshall, a strong proponent of airpower, understood that the Air Force would likely achieve its independence following the war. Soon after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, in recognition of importance of

3304-403: A greater distance, they each carried 5 short tons (4.5 t) of bombs. The attack force began departing its bases at 5:35 pm local time on 9   March. It took two and three quarter hours for all of the 325 B-29s which were dispatched to take off. Turbulence was encountered on the flight to Japan, but the weather over Tokyo was good. There was little cloud cover, and visibility was good for

3540-639: A hostile foreign power, but as early as September 1939, Colonel Carl Spaatz had suggested that it might be used to bomb Japan from bases in Siberia , Luzon or the Aleutian Islands . The Air Corps' first war plan, AWPD-1 , issued in September 1941, called for B-29s to bomb Germany from bases in Great Britain and Egypt by 1944. Early war plans did not contemplate bombing Japan until after

3776-698: A major reorganization and consolidation on 29 March 1943. The four main directorates and seventeen subordinate directorates (the "operating staff") were abolished as an unnecessary level of authority, and execution of policies was removed from the staffs to be assigned solely to field organizations along functional lines. The policy functions of the directorates were reorganized and consolidated into offices regrouped along conventional military lines under six assistant chiefs of air staff (AC/AS): Personnel; Intelligence; Operations, Commitments, and Requirements (OC&R); Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution (MM&D); Plans; and Training. Command of Headquarters AAF resided in

4012-442: A million people left the city in the following weeks, with more than 90 percent being accommodated in nearby prefectures . Due to the extent of the damage and the exodus from Tokyo, no attempt was made to restore services to large sections of the city. Estimates of the number of people killed in the bombing of Tokyo on 10 March differ. After the raid, 79,466 bodies were recovered and recorded. Many other bodies were not recovered, and

4248-570: A multiplicity of branches and organizations, reduced the WDGS greatly in size, and proportionally increased the representation of the air forces members on it to 50%. In addition to dissolving both Army General Headquarters and the chiefs of the combat arms , and assigning their training functions to the Army Ground Forces, War Department Circular 59 reorganized the Army Air Forces, disbanding both Air Force Combat Command and

4484-406: A new aircraft. This was compounded by efforts to fast track its introduction into service. These included engine malfunctions, jammed gears and dead power plants. The engines in particular had a large number of defects. The front and rear rows of the engine cylinders were located too close together for efficient cooling; there was insufficient lubrication of the upper cylinders; the reduction drive

4720-580: A perception of resistance and even obstruction then by the bureaucracy in the War Department General Staff (WDGS), much of which was attributable to lack of funds, the Air Corps later made great strides in the 1930s, both organizationally and in doctrine. A strategy stressing precision bombing of industrial targets by heavily armed, long-range bombers emerged, formulated by the men who would become its leaders. A major step toward

4956-512: A propaganda campaign focused on restoring confidence in the country's air and civil defense measures. These measures were generally unsuccessful. Few steps were taken to improve Tokyo's defenses after the raid. The majority of the 10th Air Division's senior officers were sacked or reassigned as punishment for the unit's failure on 10 March. Only 20 aircraft were sent to Tokyo to reinforce the 10th Air Division, and these were transferred elsewhere two weeks later when no further attacks were made against

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5192-471: A proposal for creation of an air staff, unification of the air arm under one commander, and equality with the ground and supply forces. Arnold's proposal was immediately opposed by the General Staff in all respects, rehashing its traditional doctrinal argument that, in the event of war, the Air Corps would have no mission independent of support of the ground forces. Marshall implemented a compromise that

5428-548: A quarter of all buildings in Tokyo at the time. This destruction rendered 1,008,005 survivors homeless. Most buildings in the Asakusa, Fukagawa, Honjo, Jōtō and Shitaya wards were destroyed, and seven other districts of the city experienced the loss of around half their buildings. Parts of another 14 wards suffered damage. Overall, 15.8 square miles (41 km) of Tokyo was burned out. The number of people killed and area destroyed

5664-503: A raid was in progress was issued at 12:15 am, just after the B-29s began dropping bombs on Tokyo. The 10th Air Division sortied all of its available night interceptors, and the 1st Anti-Aircraft Division's searchlight and anti-aircraft units went into action. As expected by LeMay, the defense of Tokyo was not effective. Many American units encountered considerable anti-aircraft fire, but it was generally aimed at altitudes either above or below

5900-650: A range of mechanical problems which affected the B-29s. These failures led to the head of the Command being relieved in January 1945. Major General Curtis LeMay , the commander of XX Bomber Command, replaced General Haywood S. Hansell . Arnold and the Twentieth Air Force's headquarters regarded the campaign against Japan up to that time as unsuccessful, and LeMay understood that he would also be relieved if he failed to deliver results. He believed that changing

6136-589: A separate air force came in March 1935, when the command of all combat air units within the Continental United States (CONUS) was centralized under a single organization called the "General Headquarters Air Force" . Since 1920, control of aviation units had resided with commanders of the corps areas (a peacetime ground forces administrative echelon), following the model established by commanding General John J. Pershing during World War I. In 1924,

6372-625: A short range, and fire control equipment for the anti-aircraft batteries was unsophisticated. As of March 1945, most of the 10th Air Division's 210 combat aircraft were day fighters, with the 53rd Air Regiment operating 25 or 26 night fighters. The regiment was experiencing difficulties converting to the night fighter role, which included an overly intensive training program that exhausted its pilots. Tokyo's civil defenses were also lacking. The city's fire department comprised around 8,000 firemen spread between 287 fire stations, but they had little modern firefighting equipment. The firefighting tactics used by

6608-491: A specific area, with the bombers attacking within a short timeframe, and the strong winds present over Tokyo. Few concerns were raised in the United States during the war about the morality of the 10 March attack on Tokyo or the firebombing of other Japanese cities. These tactics were supported by the majority of decision-makers and American civilians. Historian Michael Howard has observed that these attitudes reflected

6844-473: A standard of combat proficiency had barely surpassed the total originally authorized by the first expansion program in 1940. The extant training establishment, in essence a "self-training" system, was inadequate in assets, organization, and pedagogy to train units wholesale. Individual training of freshly minted pilots occupied an inordinate amount of the available time to the detriment of unit proficiency. The ever-increasing numbers of new groups being formed had

7080-458: A temporary, nonstandard, headquarters in August 1944. This provisional fighter wing was set up to separate control of its P-38 groups from its P-51 groups. This headquarters was referred to as "XV Fighter Command (Provisional)". Eight air divisions served as an additional layer of command and control for the vast organization, capable of acting independently if the need arose. Inclusive within

7316-538: A ten-ton bomb load. The COA had been created in December 1942, and its membership included officers from the Army and Navy, along with distinguished civilians consultants such as Edward M. Earle , Thomas W. Lamont , Clark H. Minor and Elihu Root Jr. In a report delivered on 11 November 1943, they identified six priority economic targets: merchant shipping, steel production, urban industrial areas, aircraft plants, ball bearings, and electronics. Particular vulnerable were

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7552-443: Is not possible to know exactly how many died. Most of the bodies which were recovered were buried in mass graves without being identified. Many bodies of people who had died while attempting to shelter in rivers were swept into the sea and never recovered. Attempts to collect bodies ceased 25 days after the raid. The raid also caused widespread destruction. Police records show that 267,171 buildings were destroyed, which represented

7788-479: The 1923 Great Kantō earthquake . The United States' intelligence services were aware of how vulnerable the region remained to fire, with the Office of Strategic Services rating it as containing the most combustible districts in Tokyo. The orders for the raid issued to the B-29 crews stated that the main purpose of the attack was to destroy the many small factories located within the target area, but also noted that it

8024-471: The Air Transport Command made deliveries of almost 270,000 aircraft worldwide while losing only 1,013 in the process. The operation of the stateside depots was done largely by more than 300,000 civilian maintenance employees, many of them women, freeing a like number of Air Forces mechanics for overseas duty. In all facets of the service, more than 420,000 civilian personnel were employed by

8260-707: The Army Ground Forces , the United States Army Services of Supply (which in 1943 became the Army Service Forces ), and the Army Air Forces. Each of these forces had a commanding general who reported directly to the Army Chief of Staff . The AAF administered all parts of military aviation formerly distributed among the Air Corps, General Headquarters Air Force, and the ground forces' corps area commanders and thus became

8496-456: The Army Service Forces , but the AAF increasingly exerted influence on the curricula of these courses in anticipation of future independence. African-Americans comprised approximately six per cent of this force (145,242 personnel in June 1944). In 1940, pressured by Eleanor Roosevelt and some Northern members of Congress , General Arnold agreed to accept blacks for pilot training, albeit on

8732-748: The Boeing B-29 Superfortress and the Consolidated B-32 Dominator . These were known as very long range (VLR) bombers. On 17 May 1941, Boeing was ordered to commence the manufacture of the B-29 when ready. Boeing devoted its plants in Renton, Washington and Wichita, Kansas to B-29 production; assemblies would later also be built by the Bell Aircraft Corporation in Marietta, Georgia , and

8968-587: The China-Burma-India Theater (CBI) were invited to comment, and they opined that the plan was too optimistic about the logistical challenges involved. On request, the CBI Theater commander, Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell submitted an alternative plan drafted by his air commander, Major General George E. Stratemeyer , codenamed "Twilight", that called for more time, a smaller effort, and reduced logistical support. Under this plan,

9204-536: The Eighth Air Force . The British Bomber Command focused on destroying German cities from early 1942 until the end of the war, and incendiaries represented 21 percent of the tonnage of bombs its aircraft dropped. Area bombing of German cities by Allied forces resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians and massive firestorms in cities such as Hamburg and Dresden. Japanese forces conducted area bombing attacks on Chinese cities throughout

9440-585: The Glenn L. Martin Company in Omaha, Nebraska . A major recruiting and training program was required. Many of the workers were recruited from the surrounding areas, and had no experience in aircraft manufacturing. As they became more skilled, the man-hours required to build a B-29 was reduced from 150,000 to 20,000. The $ 3 billion cost of design and production (equivalent to $ 51 billion today), far exceeded

9676-475: The Guadalcanal campaign . The Second Air Force provided four airfields for training in the vicinity of Salina, Kansas , not far from Boeing's Wichita plant where most of the early model B-29s were made, and the 58th Bombardment Wing moved its headquarters to Smoky Hill Army Air Field near Salina on 15 September. The wing was initially under the direct control of USAAF headquarters, but on 11 October it

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9912-590: The Mariana Islands . but it was not considered likely that they would be available before 1945. The air staff planners began incorporating the Marianas into their plans as a potential base for the B-29s in September 1943. This was formally approved at Sextant. By January 1944, there was consideration of advancing the Central Pacific timetable by bypassing Truk and heading directly for Palau after

10148-473: The Mariana Islands . These islands were close enough to Japan for the B-29s to conduct a sustained bombing campaign against Tokyo and most other Japanese cities. The first Superfortress flight over Tokyo took place on 1   November, when a reconnaissance aircraft photographed industrial facilities and urban areas in the western districts of the city. The remainder of Tokyo was photographed in subsequent reconnaissance flights, and these images were used to plan

10384-567: The Quartermaster Corps and then by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers , because of a lack of familiarity with Air Corps requirements. The outbreak of war in Europe and the resulting need for a wide variety of facilities for both operations and training within the Continental United States necessitated comprehensive changes of policy, first in September 1941 by giving the responsibility for acquisition and development of bases directly to

10620-690: The United States Air Force , James Robinson Risner and Charles E. Yeager . Air crew needs resulted in the successful training of 43,000 bombardiers , 49,000 navigators , and 309,000 flexible gunners, many of whom also specialized in other aspects of air crew duties. 7,800 men qualified as B-29 flight engineers and 1,000 more as radar operators in night fighters , all of whom received commissions. Almost 1.4 million men received technical training as aircraft mechanics, electronics specialists, and other technicians. Non-aircraft related support services were provided by airmen trained by

10856-565: The subsoil was removed, with hoes , and was carried away in wicker baskets on shoulder poles by men and boys. The subsoil was rolled flat using huge concrete rollers hauled by up to 300 workers. A layer of pebbles taken from nearby streams was laid down using wheelbarrows. Saunders landed the first B-29 at Guanghan on 24 April, where he was met by officials including Wolfe, Chennault and Zhang. All four airfields were completed by 10 May 1944. In addition to raids on Japan from bases in China,

11092-485: The $ 1.9 billion cost of the Manhattan Project , made the B-29 program the most expensive of the war. With its 141-foot (43 m) wingspan, the B-29 was one of the largest aircraft of World War II . It sported state-of-the-art technology, which included a pressurized cabin , dual-wheel tricycle landing gear , and an analog electromechanical computer -controlled fire-control system that allowed

11328-547: The 10 March raid and other attacks on urban areas. The overall plan for the strategic bombing campaign against Japan specified that it would commence with precision bombing raids against key industrial facilities, and later include firebombing attacks on cities. The first target directive issued to the XXI Bomber Command by its parent unit, the Twentieth Air Force , on 11 November, 1944 specified that

11564-735: The 444th Bombardment Group until Dudhkundi was ready in July. The total cost of constructing the airbases was estimated at $ 20 million (equivalent to $ 346.16 million in 2023). Lieutenant Colonel Henry A. Byroade was appointed the project engineer responsible for construction of the B-29 airfields in China. He personally reconoitered the Chengdu area in November 1943, and in his report on 8 December he selected four B-29 airbase sites, Xinjin , Guanghan , Qionglai and Pengshan , where existing runways could be strengthened and lengthened to accommodate

11800-537: The AAF created a reserve pool that held qualified pilot candidates until they could be called to active duty, rather than losing them in the draft. By 1944, this pool became surplus, and 24,000 were sent to the Army Ground Forces for retraining as infantry , and 6,000 to the Army Service Forces . Pilot standards were changed to reduce the minimum age from 20 to 18, and eliminated the educational requirement of at least two years of college. Two fighter pilot beneficiaries of this change went on to become brigadier generals in

12036-502: The AAF for the first time in its history, and then in April 1942 by delegation of the enormous task by Headquarters AAF to its user field commands and numbered air forces. In addition to the construction of new permanent bases and the building of numerous bombing and gunnery ranges, the AAF utilized civilian pilot schools, training courses conducted at college and factory sites, and officer training detachments at colleges. In early 1942, in

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12272-416: The AAF reached a war-time peak of 783 airfields in the Continental United States. At the end of the war, the AAF was using almost 20 million acres of land, an area as large as Massachusetts , Connecticut , Vermont , and New Hampshire combined. By the end of World War II, the USAAF had created 16 numbered air forces ( First through Fifteenth and Twentieth ) distributed worldwide to prosecute

12508-590: The AAF. The huge increases in aircraft inventory resulted in a similar increase in personnel, expanding sixteen-fold in less than three years following its formation, and changed the personnel policies under which the Air Service and Air Corps had operated since the National Defense Act of 1920. No longer could pilots represent 90% of commissioned officers. The need for large numbers of specialists in administration and technical services resulted in

12744-529: The Air Corps expanded from 15 to 30 groups by the end of the year. On 7 December 1941 the number of activated combat groups had reached 67, with 49 still within the Continental United States. Of the CONUS groups (the "strategic reserve"), 21 were engaged in operational training or still being organized and were unsuitable for deployment. Of the 67 combat groups, 26 were classified as bombardment: 13 Heavy Bomb groups ( B-17 Flying Fortress and B-24 Liberator ), and

12980-501: The Air Corps found entirely inadequate, naming Arnold as acting "Deputy Chief of Staff for Air" but rejecting all organizational points of his proposal. GHQ Air Force instead was assigned to the control of Army General Headquarters, although the latter was a training and not an operational component, when it was activated in November 1940. A division of the GHQ Air Force into four geographical air defense districts on 19 October 1940

13216-480: The Air Corps in October 1940 saw fifteen new general officer billets created. By the end of World War II, 320 generals were authorized for service within the wartime AAF. The Air Corps operated 156 installations at the beginning of 1941. An airbase expansion program had been underway since 1939, attempting to keep pace with the increase in personnel, units, and aircraft, using existing municipal and private facilities where possible, but it had been mismanaged, first by

13452-490: The Air Corps mission remain tied to that of the land forces. Airpower advocates achieved a centralized control of air units under an air commander, while the WDGS divided authority within the air arm and assured a continuing policy of support of ground operations as its primary role. GHQ Air Force organized combat groups administratively into a strike force of three wings deployed to the Atlantic , Pacific, and Gulf coasts but

13688-597: The Air Corps still had only 800 first-line combat aircraft and 76 bases, including 21 major installations and depots. American fighter aircraft were inferior to the British Spitfire and Hurricane , and German Messerschmitt Bf 110 and 109 . Ralph Ingersoll wrote in late 1940 after visiting Britain that the "best American fighter planes already delivered to the British are used by them either as advanced trainers—or for fighting equally obsolete Italian planes in

13924-492: The Air Corps years. The concept of an "operating staff", or directorates, was modeled on the RAF system that had been much admired by the observer groups sent over in 1941, and resulted from a desire to place experts in various aspects of military aviation into key positions of implementation. However functions often overlapped, communication and coordination between the divisions failed or was ignored, policy prerogatives were usurped by

14160-458: The Air Corps". A lawyer and a banker, Lovett had prior experience with the aviation industry that translated into realistic production goals and harmony in integrating the plans of the AAF with those of the Army as a whole. Lovett initially believed that President Roosevelt's demand following the attack on Pearl Harbor for 60,000 airplanes in 1942 and 125,000 in 1943 was grossly ambitious. However, working closely with General Arnold and engaging

14396-606: The Air Corps, which had been the statutory military aviation branch since 1926 and the GHQ Air Force, which had been activated in 1935 to quiet the demands of airmen for an independent Air Force similar to the Royal Air Force which had already been established in the United Kingdom . Although other nations already had separate air forces independent of their army or navy (such as the Royal Air Force and

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14632-508: The Air Corps, while 82 per cent of enlisted members assigned to AAF units and bases had the Air Corps as their combat arm branch. While officially the air arm was the Army Air Forces , the term Air Corps persisted colloquially among the public as well as veteran airmen; in addition, the singular Air Force often crept into popular and even official use, reflected by the designation Air Force Combat Command in 1941–42. This misnomer

14868-513: The Air Staff for Plans, was appointed the chief of staff of the Twentieth Air Force. As the air member of the JWPC, he was familiar with plans for the deployment and use of the B-29. He held his first staff meeting on 12 April. He was the de facto commander of the Twentieth Air Force, especially after Arnold suffered a heart attack on 10 May 1944. The table of organization and equipment for

15104-498: The Air Staff wanted to wait to use the incendiaries until a large-scale program of firebombing could be mounted, to overwhelm the Japanese city defenses. Several raids were conducted to test the effectiveness of firebombing against Japanese cities. A small incendiary attack was made against Tokyo on the night of 29/30 November 1944, but caused little damage. Incendiaries were also used as part of several other raids. On 18 December, 84 XX Bomber Command B-29s conducted an incendiary raid on

15340-521: The American airmen reported only 76 sightings of Japanese fighters and 40 attacks by them over the course of the raid. Several Japanese pilots were killed when their aircraft ran out of fuel and crashed. Five of the downed B-29s managed to ditch in the sea, and their crews were rescued by United States Navy submarines. American casualties were 96 airmen killed or missing, and 6   wounded or injured. The surviving B-29s arrived back at their bases in

15576-470: The Americans to change to low altitude bombing tactics. The military forces assigned to protect Tokyo were insufficient to stop a major raid. The Eastern District Army's Kanto Air Defense Sector was responsible for the air defense of the Tokyo region, and was accorded the highest priority for aircraft and anti-aircraft guns . The 1st Anti-Aircraft Division controlled the anti-aircraft guns stationed in

15812-496: The Army General Headquarters had the power to detach units from AFCC at will by creating task forces, the WDGS still controlled the AAF budget and finances, and the AAF had no jurisdiction over units of the Army Service Forces providing "housekeeping services" as support nor of air units, bases, and personnel located outside the continental United States. Arnold and Marshall agreed that the AAF would enjoy

16048-412: The B-29 groups was authorized on 13 January 1944. Each aircraft had a crew of eleven. Five were officers: the pilot-commander, co-pilot, two navigator-bombardiers, and the flight engineer. The other six were enlisted personnel: an engine mechanic, electrical specialist, power-plant specialist, central fire-control specialist, radio operator, and radar operator. Each squadron had seven aircraft, and each of

16284-503: The B-29 plant in Wichita on 11 January 1944 and had his name written on the 175th aircraft, and told the workers that he wanted it delivered by 1 March 1944. The aircraft, Superfortress 42-6365 General H. H. Arnold Special , was delivered on 24 February 1944. Changes disrupted the delivery of key parts. Because so many modifications had been made while aircraft were being built, it had become standard practice to fly new B-29s direct from

16520-410: The B-29's bases. As well as the recruitment of senior staff, Wolfe was authorized to procure twenty-five pilots and twenty-five navigators with experience of long over-water flights in four-engine aircraft. The training of the crews of the 58th Bombardment Wing was rendered difficult by the shortage of B-29s. The first prototype XB-29 was turned over to the USAAF shortly after the 58th Bombardment Wing

16756-404: The B-29. In view of this, the number of crews to be trained was reduced to 240, and the date of completion of their training was postponed from 1 February to 1 March. By February 1944, the entire XX Bomber Command had only flown 9,000 hours in B-29s, and few of these were above 20,000 feet (6,100 m) due to issues with the power plant. Ninety-seven B-29s had been delivered, but two of them had

16992-473: The B-29s ready. Meyers chose Colonel Clarence S. Irvine as his deputy. Boeing provided 600 workers, although this slowed work on the production lines. The deficiencies of each aircraft were cataloged and spare parts were obtained. Work was carried out in appalling Kansas winter conditions, with snowstorms and outdoor temperatures between −2 and 20 °F (−19 and −7 °C). By 15 April, 150 aircraft were combat ready. The B-29's 141-foot (43 m) wing span

17228-519: The B-29s themselves, assisted by the B-24s of Fourteenth Air Force's 308th Bombardment Group . Arnold approved the plan on 12 October. On 10 November 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent a message to Prime Minister Winston Churchill , asking him to render assistance with the construction of bases in India and one to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek asking him to provide labor and materials for

17464-453: The B-29s used to navigate were more effective after dusk, it was also decided to conduct the attack at night. This led to a decision to direct the aircraft to attack individually rather than in formations as it was not possible for the B-29s to keep station at night. Flying individually would also lead to reductions in fuel consumption as the pilots would not need to constantly adjust their engines to remain in formation. These fuel savings allowed

17700-450: The B-29s were available for action compared to the average serviceability rate of 60 percent. Other ground crew loaded the aircraft with bombs and fuel. A total of 346 B-29s were readied. The 73rd Bombardment Wing contributed 169 B-29s and the 313th Bombardment Wing 121; both units were based on Saipan . At the time of the raid the 314th Bombardment Wing was arriving at Guam in the Marianas, and able to provide only 56 B-29s. The B-29s in

17936-589: The B-29s. In addition, there were five airstrips for fighters. At the Sextant Conference in Cairo, Roosevelt promised the Chiang that the United States would fully reimburse China for labor and materials expended on Matterhorn. The Chinese estimated that the airbases would cost two to three billion Chinese yuan , around $ 100 to $ 150 million (equivalent to $ 1,400 to $ 2,100 million in 2023), at least at

18172-623: The Chinese city of Hankou which caused extensive damage. That day, the Twentieth Air Force directed XXI Bomber Command to dispatch 100 B-29s on a firebombing raid against Nagoya . An initial attack took place on 22 December which was directed at an aircraft factory and involved 78 bombers using precision bombing tactics. Few of the incendiaries landed in the target area. On 3   January, 97 Superfortresses were dispatched to firebomb Nagoya. This attack started some fires, which were soon brought under control by firefighters. The success in countering

18408-522: The Far East. In November 1944, American bombers began raiding Japan from the Mariana Islands . The XX Bomber Command abandoned the logistically difficult and increasingly vulnerable bases in China in January 1945, and concentrated its resources on rail and port facilities in Indochina, Thailand, and Burma. This signaled the end of Matterhorn. The 58th Bombardment Wing , the only operational wing of

18644-557: The General Staff planned for a wartime activation of an Army general headquarters (GHQ), similar to the American Expeditionary Forces model of World War I , with a GHQ Air Force as a subordinate component. Both were created in 1933 when a small conflict with Cuba seemed possible following a coup d'état but was not activated. The activation of GHQ Air Force represented a compromise between strategic airpower advocates and ground force commanders who demanded that

18880-617: The German Luftwaffe ), the AAF remained a part of the Army until a defense reorganization in the post-war period resulted in the passage by the United States Congress of the National Security Act of 1947 with the creation of an independent United States Air Force in September 1947. In its expansion and conduct of the war, the AAF became more than just an arm of the greater organization. By

19116-471: The Japanese Government's official broadcaster Radio Tokyo reported the attack it was labeled "slaughter bombing". Other radio broadcasts focused on B-29 losses and the claimed desire of Japanese civilians to continue the war. American newspaper reports focused on the physical damage to Tokyo, made little reference to casualties and did not include estimates of the death toll. This resulted from

19352-529: The Japanese and United States Governments. As of 2011, the Tokyo Memorial Hall honored 105,400 people killed in the raid, the number of people whose ashes are interred in the building or were claimed by their family. As many bodies were not recovered, the number of fatalities is higher than this number. The large population movements out of and into Tokyo in the period before the raid, deaths of entire communities and destruction of records mean that it

19588-429: The Japanese aviation industry remained the primary target, the directive placed a stronger emphasis on firebombing raids against Japanese cities. The directive also called for a large-scale trial incendiary raid as soon as possible. This attack was made against Tokyo on 25 February. A total of 231 B-29s were dispatched, of which 172 arrived over the city; this was XXI Bomber Command's largest raid up to that time. The attack

19824-679: The Japanese had cut the Burma Road in 1942, the only line of communications with China was over " the Hump ", as the air ferry route to China over the Himalayas was called. All the fuel, ammunition and supplies used by American forces in China had to be flown in. To control the B29s, the Joint Chiefs of Staff created the Twentieth Air Force under the command of General Henry H. Arnold ,

20060-541: The Japanese railroad facilities at Bangkok . Ten days later, sixty-eight Superfortresses took off from the bases around Chengdu to bomb Imperial Iron and Steel Works in Yawata on Kyūshū . The Bombing of Yawata was the first air raid on the Japanese home islands since the Doolittle raid of April 1942, and it marked the beginning of the strategic bombardment campaign against Japan . Other targets included Singapore and

20296-529: The Kototoi Bridge over the Sumida River causing hundreds of people to be burned to death. Few places in the targeted area provided safety. Many of those who attempted to evacuate to the large parks which had been created as refuges against fires following the 1923 Great Kantō earthquake were killed when the conflagration moved across these open spaces. Similarly, thousands of people who gathered in

20532-513: The Low Countries in May 1940, Roosevelt asked Congress for a supplemental appropriation of nearly a billion dollars, a production program of 50,000 aircraft a year, and a military air force of 50,000 aircraft (of which 36,500 would be Army). Accelerated programs followed in the Air Corps that repeatedly revised expansion goals, resulting in plans for 84 combat groups, 7,799 combat aircraft, and

20768-686: The Mariana Islands between 6:10 and 11:27 am local time on 10 March. Many of the bombers were streaked with ashes from the fires. Widespread fires rapidly developed across northeastern Tokyo. Within 30 minutes of the start of the raid the situation was beyond the fire department's control. An hour into the raid the fire department abandoned its efforts to stop the conflagration. Instead, the firemen focused on guiding people to safety and rescuing those trapped in burning buildings. Over 125 firemen and 500 civil guards who had been assigned to help them were killed, and 96 fire engines destroyed. Driven by

21004-495: The Marianas were not yet ready. To control the B-29s, the 58th Bombardment Wing was activated at Marietta Army Air Field , near Bell's B-29 plant, on 1 June 1943, and Wolfe had assumed command on 21 June. Although he had an experience in engineering and development in the United States and the Philippines, and an excellent knowledge of the B-29, he had no upper echelon command or operational experience. He did however have

21240-471: The Middle East. That is all they are good for." RAF crews he interviewed said that by spring 1941 a fighter engaging Germans had to have the capability to reach 400 mph in speed, fight at 30,000–35,000 feet, be simple to take off, provide armor for the pilot, and carry 12 machine guns or six cannons, all attributes lacking in American aircraft. Following the successful German invasion of France and

21476-488: The Office of Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC), eliminating all its training and organizational functions, which removed an entire layer of authority. Taking their former functions were eleven numbered air forces (later raised to sixteen) and six support commands (which became eight in January 1943). The circular also restated the mission of the AAF, in theory removing from it responsibility for strategic planning and making it only

21712-474: The Sextant Conference also approved attacks on the oil refineries in the Dutch East Indies by B-29s based in India, staging through Ceylon, with a target date of 20 July 1944. Although the southeast corner of Ceylon would have been the best location from a tactical point of view, being closest to Palembang, it was rejected due to the poor communications with that part of the island. The British extend

21948-475: The Superfortresses to carry twice their usual bomb load. USAAF intelligence had determined that the Japanese had only two night fighter units, and these were believed to pose little threat. As a result, LeMay decided to remove all of the B-29s' guns other than those at the rear of the aircraft to reduce the weight of the aircraft and further boost the weight of bombs they could carry. While LeMay made

22184-512: The USAAF's B-29s until the end of the war. There has been a long-running debate over the morality of the 10 March firebombing of Tokyo. The raid is often cited as a key example in criticism of the Allies' strategic bombing campaigns . Many historians and commentators argue that it was not acceptable for the USAAF to deliberately target civilians, and other historians believe that the USAAF had no choice but to change to area bombing tactics given that

22420-506: The United States during and immediately after World War II (1941–1947). It was created on 20 June 1941 as successor to the previous United States Army Air Corps and is the direct predecessor of the United States Air Force , today one of the six armed forces of the United States . The AAF was a component of the United States Army , which on 2 March 1942 was divided functionally by executive order into three autonomous forces:

22656-480: The United States. Stillwell gave them priority for shipping, and they set out on a convoy that sailed on 15 December. Traveling via North Africa, they reached India in February 1944, but their unit equipment did not begin to arrive until 15 April, and was not complete until 30 June. With its arrival, Madsen had 6,000 engineers and 27,000 Indian civilians under contract from India's Central Public Works Department on

22892-545: The WAACs and WACs as AAF personnel, more than 1,000 as Women Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs), and 6,500 as nurses in the Army Air Forces, including 500 flight nurses. 7,601 "Air WACs" served overseas in April 1945, and women performed in more than 200 job categories. The Air Corps Act of July 1926 increased the number of general officers authorized in the Army's air arm from two to four. The activation of GHQAF in March 1935 doubled that number to eight and pre-war expansion of

23128-691: The XX Bomber Command, left India to join the XXI Bomber Command in the Marianas between February and April 1945. On 29 January 1940, the United States Army Air Corps issued a request to five major aircraft manufacturers to submit designs for a four-engine bomber with a range of 2,000 miles (3,200 km). These designs were evaluated, and on 6 September orders were placed for two experimental models each from Boeing and Consolidated Aircraft , which became

23364-796: The ability of the Chinese army to oppose. He therefore issued a directive on 15 February that placed the XX Bomber Command under his own direct command and control. Command and control of the B-29s was subject to further debate among the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To avoid the B-29s being misused on the battlefields when they would be much more useful against the Japanese home islands, the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet , Admiral Ernest J. King , suggested that an air force be created under Arnold's command. Arnold would be responsible for its administration and logistical support, and would control it as

23600-430: The air forces and to avoid binding legislation from Congress, the War Department revised the army regulation governing the organization of Army aviation, AR 95–5. Arnold assumed the title of Chief of the Army Air Forces , creating an echelon of command over all military aviation components for the first time and ending the dual status of the Air Corps and GHQ Air Force, which was renamed Air Force Combat Command (AFCC) in

23836-473: The air forces, commands and divisions were administrative headquarters called wings to control groups (operational units; see section below). As the number of groups increased, the number of wings needed to control them multiplied, with 91 ultimately activated, 69 of which were still active at the end of the war. As part of the Air Service and Air Corps, wings had been composite organizations, that is, composed of groups with different types of missions. Most of

24072-490: The airfield at China Bay to accommodate 56 B-29s. The Matterhorn plan called for 20,000 troops and 200,000 short tons (180,000 t) of cargo to be shipped from the United States to CBI between 1 January and 30 June 1944, followed by 20,000 short tons (18,000 t) of fuel per month starting in April 1944. This would not have been a major undertaking for the European Theater of Operations , but movement to CBI

24308-424: The airmen involved and the extensive damage shown in photographs taken by reconnaissance aircraft on 10 March. Arnold sent LeMay a congratulatory message which stated that "this mission shows your crews have the guts for anything". The aircrew who conducted the attack were also pleased with its results. A post-strike assessment by XXI Bomber Command attributed the scale of damage to the firebombing being concentrated on

24544-481: The annual addition to the force of 30,000 new pilots and 100,000 technical personnel. The accelerated expansion programs resulted in a force of 156 airfields and 152,125 personnel at the time of the creation of the Army Air Forces. In its expansion during World War II, the AAF became the world's most powerful air force. From the Air Corps of 1939, with 20,000 men and 2,400 planes, to the nearly autonomous AAF of 1944, with almost 2.4 million personnel and 80,000 aircraft,

24780-400: The attack on Tokyo. At a meeting on 7   March, LeMay agreed to conduct an intense series of raids against targets on the island of Honshu between 9   and 22 March as part of the preparations for the invasion of Okinawa on 1   April. LeMay decided to adopt radically different tactics for this campaign. Analysis by XXI Bomber Command staff of the 25 February raid concluded that

25016-482: The ball bearing industry, which relied on six major plants, and the steel industry, which was dependent on a small number of coke plants located on Kyushu and in Manchuria and Korea—all within range of B-29s based at Chengdu. The analysts assessed the capacity of the Japanese steel industry at 13,690,000 short tons (12,420,000 t) per year, which was very close to the real figure, but erroneously thought that it

25252-410: The bomb struck the ground, a fuse ignited a charge which first sprayed napalm from the weapon, and then ignited it. Prior to March 1945, stockpiles of incendiary bombs were built up in the Mariana Islands. These were accumulated on the basis of XXI Bomber Command plans which specified that the B-29s would each carry 4 short tons (3.6 t) of the weapons on 40 percent of their monthly sorties. Arnold and

25488-557: The bomber crews seeking to visually identify their targets. This proved difficult to achieve in practice. During the last 20 months of the war in Europe, non-visual attacks accounted for about half of the American strategic bombing campaign against Germany. These included major area bombing raids on Berlin and Dresden , as well as attacks on several towns and cities conducted as part of Operation Clarion . The American attacks on Germany mainly used high-explosive bombs, with incendiary bombs accounting for only 14 percent of those dropped by

25724-428: The bombers and reduced in intensity over time as gun positions were overwhelmed by fires. Nevertheless, the Japanese gunners shot down 12 B-29s. A further 42 were damaged, of which two had to be written off. The Japanese fighters were ineffective; their pilots received no guidance from radar stations and the efforts of the anti-aircraft gunners and fighter units were not coordinated. No B-29s were shot down by fighters, and

25960-482: The bombers would be based in the Calcutta area and only staged through Chinese bases for missions. Keeping the ground crews in India would reduce the logistical footprint in China. Stilwell cautioned that the likely Japanese response to any success by the bombers would be a ground offensive to capture the airfields. It was estimated that the first raids on Japan could be mounted as early as April 1944. In April 1943,

26196-476: The bombing of Japan from China by B-29s, I regret exceedingly to have to inform you that there has been a holdup in production of engines. It looks now as if it will be impossible to get the required number of B-29s together in China to start bombing before the first of March, and with the possibility of not getting them there before the first of April. At this writing I expect to have 150 B-29s in China by March 1st, of which 100 can be used against Japan. He visited

26432-590: The campaign, which was forecast to be in March 1945. Preparations for firebombing raids against Japan began well before March 1945. In 1943, the USAAF tested the effectiveness of incendiary bombs on adjoining German and Japanese -style domestic building complexes at the Dugway Proving Ground . These trials demonstrated that M69 incendiaries were particularly effective at starting uncontrollable fires. These weapons were dropped from B-29s in clusters , and used napalm as their incendiary filler. After

26668-471: The capacity of the American automotive industry brought about an effort that produced almost 100,000 aircraft in 1944. The AAF reached its wartime inventory peak of nearly 80,000 aircraft in July 1944, 41% of them first line combat aircraft, before trimming back to 73,000 at the end of the year following a large reduction in the number of trainers needed. The logistical demands of this armada were met by

26904-552: The capital. From April, the Japanese reduced their attempts to intercept Allied air raids to preserve aircraft to contest the expected invasion of Japan . The 1st Anti-Aircraft Division remained active until the end of the war in August 1945. The Japanese military never developed adequate defenses against night air raids, with the night fighter force remaining ineffective and many cities not being protected by anti-aircraft guns. Between April and mid-May XXI Bomber Command mainly focused on attacking airfields in southern Japan in support of

27140-430: The capitulation of Japan, realignment took place with the complete elimination of OC&R. The now five assistant chiefs of air staff were designated AC/AS-1 through -5 corresponding to Personnel, Intelligence, Operations and Training, Materiel and Supply, and Plans. Most personnel of the Army Air Forces were drawn from the Air Corps. In May 1945, 88 per cent of officers serving in the Army Air Forces were commissioned in

27376-597: The capture of the Marshalls, but senior army and navy officers in the Pacific doubted the utility of basing B-29s in the Marianas due to the limited harbor facilities there. A study by the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) assessed the Mariana Islands as the best location for the deployment of the B-29s, but in view of the fact that they would not be captured until later in the year, recommended that

27612-418: The central fire control system installed, and it had not been fully tested. The late delivery of the aircraft seriously dislocated the crew training program, and many of the crews lacked sufficient training in high-altitude formation flying, gunnery, and visual and radar bombing. Arnold had hoped that the B-29s would be ready by January 1944, but on 12 October 1943 he notified Roosevelt: In connection with

27848-603: The central region of Honshu, including Tokyo. It was made up of eight regiments with a total of 780 anti-aircraft guns, as well as a regiment equipped with searchlights . American military intelligence estimated that 331 heavy and 307 light anti-aircraft guns were allocated to Tokyo's defenses at the time of the raid. A network of picket boats , radar stations and lookout posts was responsible for detecting incoming raids. Due to shortages of radar and other fire control equipment, Japanese anti-aircraft gunners found it difficult to target aircraft operating at night. The radar stations had

28084-910: The chief of the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF), in Washington, DC . The role of the China Burma India Theater (CBI) commander, Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell , was restricted to the provision of logistical support and the defense of the bases. The B-29s force in CBI was the XX Bomber Command , under the command of Brigadier General Kenneth B. Wolfe . The B-29s required airbases with runways that were longer and stronger than those of smaller bombers. Five airfields in Bengal in India were upgraded to take them. Supplying fuel by rail would have placed too much strain on

28320-499: The cities. The number of people killed in Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe were much lower than those in 10 March attack on Tokyo with fewer than 10,000 fatalities in each operation. The lower casualties were, in part, the result of better preparations by the Japanese authorities which had resulted from a realization that they had greatly under-estimated the threat posed by firebombing. The Japanese government initially attempted to suppress news of

28556-430: The city in an attempt to stop the spread of fire; over 200,000 houses were destroyed as part of this effort. Rubble was often not cleared from the firebreaks, which provided a source of fuel. The Japanese Government also encouraged children and civilians with non-essential jobs to evacuate Tokyo , and 1.7 million had departed by March 1945. However, many other civilians had moved into Tokyo from impoverished rural areas over

28792-435: The city shortly before midnight on 9   March. They carried extra fuel, additional radios and XXI Bomber Command's best radio operators instead of bombs, and circled Tokyo at an altitude of 25,000 feet (7,600 m) throughout the raid. This tactic proved unsuccessful, and was later judged to have been unnecessary. The attack on Tokyo commenced at 12:08 am local time on 10 March. Pathfinder bombers simultaneously approached

29028-622: The city's director of health estimated that 83,600 people were killed and another 40,918 wounded. The Tokyo fire department put the casualties at 97,000 killed and 125,000 wounded, and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department believed that 124,711 people had been killed or wounded. After the war, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey estimated the casualties as 87,793 killed and 40,918 injured. The survey also stated that

29264-495: The commander of the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF), General Henry H. Arnold , set up a special B-29 project under Brigadier General Kenneth B. Wolfe . Wolfe became responsible for preparing, organizing and training B-29 units for combat. By September, he had prepared a plan for operations based on Twilight called "Matterhorn"; soon after the Twilight plan was renamed "Drake". The difference between Matterhorn and Drake

29500-518: The commanders of GHQ Air Force and the Air Corps, Major Generals Frank M. Andrews and Oscar Westover respectively, clashed philosophically over the direction in which the air arm was moving, exacerbating the difficulties. The expected activation of Army General Headquarters prompted Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall to request a reorganization study from Chief of the Air Corps Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold resulting on 5 October 1940 in

29736-573: The commanding generals of the new Army Ground Forces and Services of Supply , the other two components of the Army of the United States . The War Department issued Circular No. 59 on 2 March that carried out the executive order, intended (as with the creation of the Air Service in World War I) as a wartime expedient to expire six months after the end of the war. The three components replaced

29972-700: The conduct of all aspects of the air war in every part of the world, determining air policy and issuing orders without transmitting them through the Army Chief of Staff. This "contrast between theory and fact is...fundamental to an understanding of the AAF." The roots of the Army Air Forces arose in the formulation of theories of strategic bombing at the Air Corps Tactical School that gave new impetus to arguments for an independent air force, beginning with those espoused by Brig. Gen. Billy Mitchell that led to his later court-martial . Despite

30208-624: The construction of five advanced bases in China, which the United States would pay for under Reverse Lend-Lease . Although Drake still had its advocates, Matterhorn was formally approved by Roosevelt and Churchill at the Sextant Conference in Cairo on 7 December. The British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff had authorized a Central Pacific drive that included the capture of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands , Truk , Palau and

30444-424: The content of USAAF communiques and reports rather than censorship . The attack considerably damaged the morale of Japanese civilians, with it and the other firebombing raids in March convincing most that the war situation was worse than their government had admitted. The Japanese Government responded with a combination of repression, including heavy penalties for people accused of disloyalty or spreading rumors, and

30680-558: The country. There were on average only seven days of clear skies each month, and an intense jet stream made it difficult to aim bombs from high altitudes. Due to these constraints, LeMay decided to focus XXI Bomber Command's attacks on Japanese cities. While he made this decision on his own initiative, the general directions issued to LeMay permitted such operations. On 5   March XXI Bomber Command's personnel were advised that no further major attacks would be scheduled until 9   March. During this period LeMay's staff finalized plans for

30916-625: The creation of the Air Service Command on 17 October 1941 to provide service units and maintain 250 depots in the United States; the elevation of the Materiel Division to full command status on 9 March 1942 to develop and procure aircraft, equipment, and parts; and the merger of these commands into the Air Technical Service Command on 31 August 1944. In addition to carrying personnel and cargo,

31152-634: The creation of the Army Air Forces, caused an immediate reassessment of U.S. defense strategy and policy. The need for an offensive strategy to defeat the Axis Powers required further enlargement and modernization of all the military services, including the new AAF. In addition, the invasion produced a new Lend lease partner in Russia, creating even greater demands on an already struggling American aircraft production. An offensive strategy required several types of urgent and sustained effort. In addition to

31388-399: The decision to shift to firebombing. The operation during the early hours of 10 March was the first major firebombing raid against a Japanese city. The USAAF units employed significantly different tactics from those used in precision raids, including bombing by night with the aircraft flying at low altitudes. The extensive destruction caused by the raid led to these tactics becoming standard for

31624-464: The defense commands, little action was taken on the scattered reports which came in from the boats. At around midnight on 9   March a small number of B-29s were detected near Katsuura , but were thought to be conducting reconnaissance flights. Subsequent sightings of B-29s flying at low levels were not taken seriously, and the Japanese radar stations focused on searching for American aircraft operating at their usual high altitudes. The first alarm that

31860-448: The development and manufacture of aircraft in massive numbers, the Army Air Forces had to establish a global logistics network to supply, maintain, and repair the huge force; recruit and train personnel; and sustain the health, welfare, and morale of its troops. The process was driven by the pace of aircraft production, not the training program, and was ably aided by the direction of Lovett, who for all practical purposes became "Secretary of

32096-469: The direct control of Headquarters Army Air Forces. At the end of 1942 and again in the spring of 1943 the AAF listed nine support commands before it began a process of consolidation that streamlined the number to five at the end of the war. These commands were: "In 1943 the AAF met a new personnel problem, to which it applied an original solution: to interview, rehabilitate, and reassign men returning from overseas. [To do this], an AAF Redistribution Center

32332-620: The directorates, and they became overburdened with detail, all contributing to the diversion of the directorates from their original purpose. The system of directorates in particular handicapped the developing operational training program (see Combat units below), preventing establishment of an OTU command and having a tendency to micromanage because of the lack of centralized control. Four main directorates—Military Requirements, Technical Services, Personnel, and Management Control—were created, each with multiple sub-directorates, and eventually more than thirty offices were authorized to issue orders in

32568-425: The division's flying regiments (the 53rd Air Regiment) was also converted to a specialized night fighter unit. On the night of 3/4 March, the Japanese military intercepted American radio signals which indicated that the XXI Bomber Command was conducting a major night flying exercise. This was interpreted to mean that the force was preparing to start large-scale night raids on Japan. However, the Japanese did not expect

32804-447: The dormant struggle for an independent United States Air Force. Marshall had come to the view that the air forces needed a "simpler system" and a unified command. Working with Arnold and Robert A. Lovett , recently appointed to the long-vacant position of Assistant Secretary of War for Air, he reached a consensus that quasi-autonomy for the air forces was preferable to immediate separation. On 20 June 1941, to grant additional autonomy to

33040-491: The effort was through the port of Calcutta , which was estimated to be able to handle the additional 596,000 short tons (541,000 t) per month. From there, supplies would be flown to China in Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers converted to Consolidated C-87 Liberator Express transport aircraft. After the Japanese had cut the Burma Road in March 1942, the only line of communications with China

33276-627: The emphasis from precision bombing to area bombing was the most promising option to turn the XXI Bomber Command's performance around. USAAF planners began assessing the feasibility of a firebombing campaign against Japanese cities in 1943. Japan's main industrial facilities were vulnerable to such attacks as they were concentrated in several large cities, and a high proportion of production took place in homes and small factories in urban areas. The planners estimated that incendiary bomb attacks on Japan's six largest cities could cause physical damage to almost 40 percent of industrial facilities and result in

33512-571: The end of World War II, the Army Air Forces had become virtually an independent service. By regulation and executive order, it was a subordinate agency of the United States Department of War (as were the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces) tasked only with organizing, training, and equipping combat units and limited in responsibility to the continental United States. In reality, Headquarters AAF controlled

33748-412: The end of the period in which XXI Bomber Command primarily conducted such raids. Civilian casualties during these operations had been relatively low; for instance, all the raids against Tokyo prior to 10 March caused 1,292 deaths in the city. In early March, LeMay judged that further precision bombing of Japanese industrial targets was unlikely to be successful due to the prevailing weather conditions over

33984-555: The establishment of an Officer Candidate School in Miami Beach, Florida , and the direct commissioning of thousands of professionals. Even so, 193,000 new pilots entered the AAF during World War II, while 124,000 other candidates failed at some point during training or were killed in accidents. The requirements for new pilots resulted in a massive expansion of the Aviation Cadet program, which had so many volunteers that

34220-456: The executive agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who would determine its deployment and missions. The Joint Chiefs approved the establishment of the Twentieth Air Force on 4 April 1944. This gave the USAAF equal status with the ground and naval forces in Asia and the Pacific for the first time. Stilwell's role as commander of CBI would be restricted to providing logistical support and the defense of

34456-450: The extensive scale of the destruction in an attempt to motivate anger against the United States. Stories about the attack were on the front page of all Japanese newspapers on 11 March. Reporting focused on the perceived immorality of the attack and the number of B-29s which had been destroyed. Subsequent newspaper reports made little reference to the scale of casualties, and the few photos which were published showed little physical damage. When

34692-487: The extent of the 10 March raid, but later used it for propaganda purposes. A communique issued by the Imperial Headquarters on 10 March stated that only "various places within the city were set afire". However, rumors of the devastation rapidly spread across the country. In a break from the usual practice of downplaying the damage caused by air attacks, the Japanese Government encouraged the media to emphasize

34928-431: The factory to a modification center to be upgraded. The modification centers were overworked, and had limited hangar space, so much of their work had to be done in the open air. When Arnold visited Pratt Army Air Field on 8 March 1944, he found no B-29s ready for combat. Arnold designated Brigadier General Bennett E. Meyers , who was traveling with him, as special project cocoordinator, with responsibility for getting

35164-682: The famous iconic " Why We Fight " series, as an animated map graphic of equal prominence to that of the Army and Navy. The Air Corps at the direction of President Roosevelt began a rapid expansion from the spring of 1939 forward, partly from the Civilian Pilot Training Program created at the end of 1938, with the goal of providing an adequate air force for defense of the Western Hemisphere. An initial "25-group program", announced in April 1939, called for 50,000 men. However, when war broke out in September 1939

35400-508: The fire department were ineffective against incendiary bombs. Civilians had been organized into more than 140,000 neighborhood firefighting associations with a nominal strength of 2.75 million people, but these were also ill-equipped. The basic equipment issued to the firefighting associations was incapable of extinguishing fires started by M69s. Few air raid shelters had been constructed, though most households dug crude foxholes to shelter in near their homes. Firebreaks had been created across

35636-475: The fire. It also caused glass in windows to liquify, and the superheated air and cyclonic winds from the firestorm blew the hot liquified glass into the air, causing it to rain down and melt into people's skin. Families often sought to remain with their local neighborhood associations, but it was easy to become separated in the conditions. Few families managed to stay together throughout the night. Escape frequently proved impossible, as smoke reduced visibility to just

35872-465: The fires expanded, the American bombers spread out to attack unaffected parts of the target area. Power's B-29 circled Tokyo for 90 minutes, with a team of cartographers who were assigned to him mapping the spread of the fires. The raid lasted for approximately two hours and forty minutes. Visibility over Tokyo decreased over the course of the raid due to the extensive smoke over the city. This led some American aircraft to bomb parts of Tokyo well outside

36108-432: The firestorm, and civilians who sheltered in them were burned to death or died from suffocation. As the firestorm spread, civilians fled through the streets, desperate to escape the firestorm. Thousands of the evacuating civilians were killed by fire and by asphyxiation after the firestorm sucked oxygen out of the air. The heat was so intense that it caused people's clothes to burst into flames without actually having touched

36344-411: The first air attack on Tokyo , but inflicted little damage on the city. In June 1944, the USAAF's XX Bomber Command began a campaign against Japan using B-29 Superfortress bombers flying from airfields in China . Tokyo was beyond the range of Superfortresses operating from China, and was not attacked. This changed in October 1944, when the B-29s of the XXI Bomber Command began moving into airfields in

36580-500: The first American bombing raid on Berlin. Colonel Richard H. Carmichael led the 462nd Bombardment Group ; he had formerly commanded the 19th Bombardment Group in the Southwest Pacific Area , and had led the first B-17 raid on Rabaul in February 1943. Colonel Howard E. Engler commanded the 468th Bombardment Group until August 1944, when he was replaced by Colonel Ted S. Faulkner. The 40th Bombardment Group

36816-534: The first B-29 groups be deployed to the Southwest Pacific Area to attack the petroleum refineries in the Netherlands East Indies or to India and China to attack industrial targets in Japan. The timetable for the Central Pacific advance was revised in March 1944: Truk was to be bypassed and the Palau operation was postponed until 15 September, after the capture of the southern Mariana Islands, which

37052-432: The first air organization of the U.S. Army to control its own installations and support personnel. The peak size of the AAF during World War II was over 2.4 million men and women in service and nearly 80,000 aircraft by 1944, and 783 domestic bases in December 1943. By " V-E Day ", the Army Air Forces had 1.25 million men stationed overseas and operated from more than 1,600 airfields worldwide. The Army Air Forces

37288-408: The first bomber crews to arrive over Tokyo; they were able to see clearly for 10 miles (16 km). Conditions on the ground were cold and windy, with the city experiencing gusts of between 45 miles per hour (72 km/h) and 67 miles per hour (108 km/h) blowing from the southeast. The first B-29s over Tokyo were four aircraft tasked with guiding the others in. These Superfortresses arrived over

37524-410: The force array. In the first half of 1942 the Army Air Forces expanded rapidly as the necessity of a much larger air force than planned was immediately realized. Authorization for the total number of combat groups required to fight the war nearly doubled in February to 115. In July it jumped to 224, and a month later to 273. When the U.S. entered the war, however, the number of groups actually trained to

37760-600: The four groups had four squadrons, so the wing had 112 B-29s. Each B-29 had two crews, so the wing had 3,045 officers, 8 warrant officers and 8,099 enlisted men. With the service and maintenance units and aviation engineers to build the airfields, Wolfe would have about 20,000 men under its command. XX Bomber Command Order of Battle XX Bomber Command Wolfe and an advanced echelon of his XX Bomber Command staff arrived in New Delhi on 13 January 1944, where he met with Stratemeyer. On 3 February he met with Stilwell at

37996-485: The four gunners to direct five remote machine gun turrets, each with twin Browning .50 caliber machine guns ; the rear turret also had a 20-mm cannon . It was powered by four 18-cylinder, 2,200-horsepower (1,600 kW) Wright R-3350 Duplex-Cyclone radial engines , each with two turbochargers . The cumulative effect of so many advanced features was more than the usual number of problems and defects associated with

38232-660: The ground forces by March 1942. In the spring of 1941, the success in Europe of air operations conducted under centralized control (as exemplified by the British Royal Air Force and the German Wehrmacht 's military air arm, the Luftwaffe ) made clear that the splintering of authority in the American air forces, characterized as " hydra -headed" by one congressman, had caused a disturbing lack of clear channels of command. Less than five months after

38468-452: The grounds of the Sensō-ji temple in Asakusa died. Others sheltered in solid buildings, such as schools or theatres, and in canals. These were not proof against the firestorm, with smoke inhalation and heat killing large numbers of people in schools. In one instance, over a thousand people were killed after they took refuge in a school's massive swimming pool and were subsequently boiled alive as

38704-411: The grounds that he had wanted to protect Arnold from blame had the attack been a failure. LeMay notified the Twentieth Air Force headquarters of his intended tactics on 8   March, a day he knew Arnold and Norstad would be absent. There is no evidence that LeMay expected that the Twentieth Air Force would object to firebombing civilian areas, but he may have been concerned that it would have judged that

38940-453: The heavy anti-aircraft guns. LeMay was unable to lead the raid in person as he had been prohibited from placing himself in a situation where he could be captured after being briefed on the development of atomic bombs . Instead, the attack was led by the 314th Bombardment Wing's commanding officer, Brigadier General Thomas S. Power . LeMay considered Power to be the best of the wing commanding officers. The new tactics which were to be used in

39176-469: The incendiary bombs had been dropped from too high an altitude, and attacking at lower levels would both improve accuracy and enable the B-29s to carry more bombs. This would also expose them to the Japanese air defenses, but LeMay judged that poor Japanese fire control tactics meant that the additional risk was moderate. As weather conditions over Japan tended to be more favorable at night and the LORAN systems

39412-618: The informally defined Shitamachi district of Tokyo, which was mainly populated by working-class people and artisans. With a population of around 1.1 million, it was one of the most densely populated urban areas in the world. Zone I contained few militarily significant industrial facilities, though there were a large number of small factories which supplied Japan's war industries. The area was highly vulnerable to firebombing, as most buildings were constructed from wood and bamboo and were closely spaced. Due to this vulnerability, it had suffered extensive damage and heavy casualties from fires caused by

39648-519: The invasion of Okinawa. From 11 May until the end of the war the B-29s conducted day precision bombing attacks when weather conditions were favorable, and night firebombing raids against cities at all other times. Further incendiary attacks were conducted against Tokyo, with the final taking place on the night of 25/26 May. By this time, 50.8 percent of the city had been destroyed and more than 4   million people left homeless. Further heavy bomber raids against Tokyo were judged to not be worthwhile, and it

39884-401: The job. Works were not completed until September. The decision in April to deploy the second wing of B-29s to the Marianas meant that only four groups deployed to CBI instead of the original eight, so only the five original airfields were required. Delays in construction at Dudhkundi meant that Charra Airfield had to be used as a temporarily. The B-24 runway there was extended to accommodate

40120-651: The lack of public reaction in the United States to the firebombing of Tokyo, he permitted these operations to continue until the end of the war. The raid was followed by similar attacks against Nagoya on the night of 11/12 March, Osaka in the early hours of 14 March, Kobe on 17/18 March and Nagoya again on 18/19 March. An unsuccessful night precision raid was also conducted against an aircraft engine factory in Nagoya on 23/24 March. The firebombing attacks ended only because XXI Bomber Command's stocks of incendiaries were exhausted. The attacks on Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe during March burned out over 31 square miles (80 km) of

40356-494: The latter's advanced headquarters in Burma to discuss command arrangements. They agreed that the XX Bomber Command should not come under Chennault's command, nor under that of Stratemeyer, who was answerable Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten , the commander of South East Asia Command (SEAC). Stilwell feared that Chennault would use the B-29s to attack Japanese shipping and thereby provoke a strong Japanese reaction that would be beyond

40592-405: The limited options to end the war which were available at the time. For instance, both Arnold and LeMay regarded the 10 March raid and subsequent firebombing operations as being necessary to save American lives by bringing the war to a rapid conclusion. President Franklin D. Roosevelt probably also held this view. While Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was aware of LeMay's tactics and troubled by

40828-425: The loss of 7.6 million man-months of labor. It was also estimated that these attacks would kill over 500,000 people, render about 7.75 million homeless and force almost 3.5 million to be evacuated. The plans for the strategic bombing offensive against Japan developed in 1943 specified that it would transition from a focus on the precision bombing of industrial targets to area bombing from around halfway in

41064-661: The loss of their land and the peasants who worked it were not compensated at all. Construction work was supervised by Lieutenant Colonel Waldo I. Kenerson. Only fourteen U.S. Army engineers were assigned to the project. Some 300,000 impressed laborers and 75,000 contract workers were employed. Contract workers were paid on a piecework basis, and averaged about 25 Chinese yuan per day. This was barely sufficient to buy food, so many had to be supported by their families. There were no bulldozers, power shovels or graders . Some 1,000 ox carts, 15,000 wheelbarrows and 1,500 trucks were used to carry building materials. The topsoil and some of

41300-558: The main mission because they were afraid of being killed. Tokyo's defenders were expecting an attack, but did not detect the American force until it arrived over the city. The air defense units in the Kanto Plain area had been placed on alert, but the night fighter units were instructed not to sortie any aircraft until an incoming raid was detected. While picket boats spotted the attack force, poor radio reception meant that most of their reports were not received. Due to disorganization in

41536-436: The main target was Japanese aircraft and aviation engine factories. These targets were to be attacked by precision bombing. Japanese cities were specified as the secondary target, with area bombing being authorized for use against them. The directive also indicated that firebombing raids were likely to be ordered against cities to test the effectiveness of this tactic. The Twentieth Air Force had an unusual command structure, as it

41772-428: The majority of the casualties were women, children and elderly people. Frank wrote in 1999 that historians generally believe that there were between 90,000 and 100,000 fatalities, but some argue that the number was much higher. For instance, Edwin P. Hoyt stated in 1987 that 200,000 people had been killed and in 2009 Mark Selden wrote that the number of deaths may have been several times the estimate of 100,000 used by

42008-455: The most destructive single air attack in human history. The Japanese air and civil defenses proved largely inadequate; 14 American aircraft and 96 airmen were lost. The attack on Tokyo was an intensification of the air raids on Japan which had begun in June 1944. Prior to this operation, the USAAF had focused on a precision bombing campaign against Japanese industrial facilities. These attacks were generally unsuccessful, which contributed to

42244-550: The name of the commanding general. Among the headquarters directorates were Technical Services, Air Defense, Base Services, Ground-Air Support, Management Control, Military Equipment, Military Requirements , and Procurement & Distribution. A "strong and growing dissatisfaction" with the organization led to an attempt by Lovett in September 1942 to make the system work by bringing the Directorate of Management Control and several traditional offices that had been moved to

42480-402: The new organization. The AAF gained the formal "Air Staff" long opposed by the General Staff, and a single air commander, but still did not have equal status with the Army ground forces, and air units continued to report through two chains of command. The commanding general of AFCC gained control of his stations and court martial authority over his personnel, but under the new field manual FM-5

42716-580: The new tactics were too risky. The Japanese military anticipated that the USAAF would make major night attacks on the Tokyo region. After several small night raids were conducted on the region during December 1944 and January 1945, the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force's 10th Air Division , which was responsible for intercepting attacks on the Kantō region , placed a greater emphasis on training its pilots to operate at night. One of

42952-429: The new tactics, but there were fears that they could result in heavy American casualties. These concerns were shared by some of LeMay's staff. XXI Bomber Command's intelligence officers predicted that 70 percent of the bombers could be destroyed. LeMay consulted Arnold's chief of staff Brigadier General Lauris Norstad about the new tactics, but did not formally seek approval to adopt them. He later justified this action on

43188-410: The official rate of exchange; on the black market an American dollar fetched up to 240 Chinese yuan. Stilwell suspected that half of this sum was in the form of "squeeze" (bribes and commissions), an accepted business practice in China. "One more example", he wrote in his diary, "of the stupid spirit of concession that proves to them that we are suckers." Landowners were inadequately compensated for

43424-473: The oil refineries around Palembang in the Netherlands East Indies . In late 1944, the Japanese offensive Operation Ichi-Go in China threatened the bases. To slow the advance, the XX Bomber Command attacked the Japanese-held city of Hankou with incendiary bombs . The attack left Hankou burning for three days, proving the effectiveness of incendiaries against the predominantly wooden housing stock of

43660-479: The operating staff, including the Air Judge Advocate and Budget Officer, back under the policy staff umbrella. When this adjustment failed to resolve the problems, the system was scrapped and all functions combined into a single restructured air staff. The hierarchical "command" principle, in which a single commander has direct final accountability but delegates authority to staff, was adopted AAF-wide in

43896-485: The operation were not well received by many airmen, who believed that it was safer to bomb from high altitudes and preferred to retain their defensive guns. Leaving behind the unneeded gunners also troubled many of the airmen, as bomber crews typically had a very close relationship. In preparation for the attack, XXI Bomber Command's maintenance staff worked intensively over a 36-hour period to ready as many aircraft as possible. This effort proved successful, and 83 percent of

44132-961: The operational command was designated by the Roman numeral of its parent numbered air force. For instance, the Eighth Air Force listed the VIII Bomber Command and the VIII Fighter Command as subordinate operational commands. Roman numbered commands within numbered air forces also included "support", "base", and other services commands to support the operational units, such as the VIII Air Force Service and VIII Air Force Composite Commands also part of Eighth Air Force during its history. The Tenth and Fourteenth Air Forces did not field subordinate commands during World War II. Fifteenth Air Force organized

44368-493: The precision bombing campaign had failed. It is generally acknowledged that the tactics used against Tokyo and in similar subsequent raids were militarily successful. The attack is commemorated in Japan at two official memorials, several neighborhood memorials, and a privately owned museum. Pre-war USAAF doctrine emphasized the precision bombing of key industrial facilities over area bombing of cities. Early American strategic bombing attacks on Germany used precision tactics, with

44604-400: The proposal the following month which, in the face of Marshall's dissatisfaction with Army GHQ, the War Plans Division accepted. Just before Pearl Harbor, Marshall recalled an Air Corps officer, Brig. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney , from an observer group in England and appointed him to chair a "War Department Reorganization Committee" within the War Plans Division, using Arnold's and Spaatz's plan as

44840-491: The raid died over the following days. After the raid, civilians across Tokyo offered assistance to the refugees. Firemen, police officers and soldiers also tried to rescue survivors trapped under collapsed buildings. Many refugees who had previously lived in slums were accommodated in prosperous parts of the city. Some of these refugees resented the differences in living conditions, prompting riots and looting. Refugee centers were also established in parks and other open areas. Over

45076-399: The raid led the Japanese authorities to become over-confident about their ability to protect cities against incendiary attacks. The next firebombing raid was directed against Kobe on 4   February, and bombs dropped from 69 B-29s started fires which destroyed or damaged 1,039 buildings. On 19 February, the Twentieth Air Force issued a new targeting directive for XXI Bomber Command. While

45312-404: The railways, so a fuel pipeline to the airfields was laid from the port of Calcutta . The four B-29 airbases around Chengdu, along with five airstrips for fighters to defend them, were built by tens of thousands of Chinese laborers with hand tools. The XX Bomber Command deployed to India between February and May 1944. On 5 June, Wolfe launched the first B–29 Superfortress combat mission, against

45548-442: The rejection of Arnold's reorganization proposal, a joint U.S.-British strategic planning agreement ( ABC-1 ) refuted the General Staff's argument that the Air Corps had no wartime mission except to support ground forces. A struggle with the General Staff over control of air defense of the United States had been won by airmen and vested in four command units called "numbered air forces", but the bureaucratic conflict threatened to renew

45784-420: The rest Medium and Light groups ( B-25 Mitchell , B-26 Marauder , and A-20 Havoc ). The balance of the force included 26 Pursuit groups (renamed fighter group in May 1942), 9 Observation (renamed Reconnaissance ) groups, and 6 Transport (renamed Troop Carrier or Combat Cargo ) groups. After the operational deployment of the B-29 Superfortress bomber, Very Heavy Bombardment units were added to

46020-400: The role of the Army Air Forces, Arnold was given a seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff , the planning staff that served as the focal point of American strategic planning during the war, in order that the United States would have an air representative in staff talks with their British counterparts on the Combined Chiefs . In effect the head of the AAF gained equality with Marshall. While this step

46256-413: The same period. On 8 March, LeMay issued orders for a major firebombing attack on Tokyo the next night. The raid was to target a rectangular area in northeastern Tokyo designated Zone I by the USAAF, which measured approximately 4 miles (6.4 km) by 3 miles (4.8 km). This area was divided by the Sumida River , and included most of Asakusa , Honjo and Fukagawa Wards. These wards formed part of

46492-439: The squadrons which were scheduled to arrive over Tokyo first were armed with M47 bombs ; these weapons used napalm and were capable of starting fires which required mechanized firefighting equipment to control. The bombers in the other units were loaded with clusters of M69s. The 73rd and 313th Bomb Wings' Superfortresses were each loaded with 7 short tons (6.4 t) of bombs. As the 314th Bombardment Wing's B-29s would have to fly

46728-423: The strong wind, the large numbers of small fires started by the American incendiaries rapidly merged into major blazes. These formed firestorms which quickly advanced in a northwesterly direction and destroyed or damaged almost all the buildings in their path. The only buildings which survived the fire were constructed of stone. By an hour after the start of the attack most of eastern Tokyo either had been destroyed or

46964-434: The target area at right angles to each other. These bombers were manned by the 73rd and 313th Bombardment Wings' best crews. Their M47 bombs rapidly started fires in an X shape, which was used to direct the attacks for the remainder of the force. Each of XXI Bomber Command's wings and their subordinate groups had been briefed to attack different areas within the X shape to ensure that the raid caused widespread damage. As

47200-521: The target area. The heat from the fires also resulted in the final waves of aircraft experiencing heavy turbulence. Some American airmen also needed to use oxygen masks when the odor of burning flesh entered their aircraft. A total of 279 B-29s attacked Tokyo, dropping 1,665 short tons (1,510 t) of bombs. Another 19 Superfortresses which were unable to reach Tokyo struck targets of opportunity or targets of last resort. These aircraft turned back early due to mechanical problems or pilots deciding to abort

47436-412: The ultimate decision to adopt the new tactics, he acknowledged that his plan combined ideas put forward by many officers. On 7   March, some of the B-29 crews flew training missions in which they practiced using radar to navigate and attack a target from low altitude. The airmen were not told the purpose of this training. The officers who commanded XXI Bomber Command's three flying wings agreed with

47672-413: The war against Germany was won. The idea of basing the Superfortresses in China first surfaced at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. In March, the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Major General Laurence S. Kuter , initiated a detailed study of the possibility of using VLR bombers based in China. No other bases within range of Japan were expected to be in Allied hands in 1944. Support for

47908-420: The war, plus a general air force within the continental United States to support the whole and provide air defense. The latter was formally organized as the Continental Air Forces and activated on 15 December 1944, although it did not formally take jurisdiction of its component air forces until the end of the war in Europe. Half of the numbered air forces were created de novo as the service expanded during

48144-461: The war-time Army Air Forces. The AAF was willing to experiment with its allotment from the unpopular Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAACs) and became an early and determined supporter of full military status for women in the Army ( Women's Army Corps or WACs). WACs serving in the AAF became such an accepted and valuable part of the service they earned the distinction of being commonly (but unofficially) known as "Air WACs". Nearly 40,000 women served in

48380-402: The war. Few attempts were made to target industrial facilities, with the goal of the campaign being to terrorize civilians and cut the Chinese forces off from their sources of supplies. Chongqing , China's provisional capital, was frequently attacked by aircraft using incendiary and high explosive bombs. These raids destroyed most of the city. The American Doolittle Raid on 18 April 1942 was

48616-511: The war. Some grew out of earlier commands as the service expanded in size and hierarchy (for example, the V Air Support Command became the Ninth Air Force in April 1942), and higher echelons such as United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF) in Europe and U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific became necessary to control the whole. Within numbered air forces, operational commands were created to divide administrative control of units by function (eg fighters and bombers). The numbering of

48852-406: The water turned to steam. Many of the people who attempted to shelter in canals were killed by smoke or when the passing firestorm sucked oxygen out of the area. However, these bodies of water provided safety to thousands of others. The fire finally burned itself out during mid-morning on 10 March, and came to a stop when it reached large open areas or the Nakagawa Canal. Thousands of people injured in

49088-404: The wings of World War II, however, were composed of groups with like functions (denoted as bombardment , fighter , reconnaissance , training , antisubmarine , troop carrier , and replacement ). The six support commands organized between March 1941 and April 1942 to support and supply the numbered air forces remained on the same chain of command echelon as the numbered air forces, under

49324-409: Was considerably wider than the 104-foot (32 m) of the B-17, the next largest aircraft in the inventory, and a fully-laden B-29 weighed about 70 short tons (64 t), nearly twice as much as a B-17. The Twentieth Air Force asked for B-29 runways to be 8,500 feet (2,600 m) long and 200 feet (61 m) wide, nearly twice the area of a 6,000 by 150 feet (1,829 by 46 m) B-17 runway. The plan

49560-431: Was a remarkable expansion. Robert A. Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, together with Arnold, presided over an increase greater than for either the ground Army or the Navy, while at the same time dispatching combat air forces to the battlefronts. "The Evolution of the Department of the Air Force" – Air Force Historical Studies Office The German invasion of the Soviet Union , occurring only two days after

49796-483: Was also used on official recruiting posters (see image above) and was important in promoting the idea of an "Air Force" as an independent service. Jimmy Stewart , a Hollywood movie star serving as an AAF pilot, used the terms "Air Corps" and "Air Forces" interchangeably in the narration of the 1942 recruiting short " Winning Your Wings " . The term "Air Force" also appeared prominently in Frank Capra 's 1945 War Department indoctrination film " War Comes to America " , of

50032-408: Was assigned to Second Air Force. The XX Bomber Command was activated in Salina, on 27 November 1943, with Wolfe as its commander, and Harman became the commander of the 58th Bombardment Wing. The group commanders had a wealth of experience. The 444th Bombardment Group was led by Colonel Alva L. Harvey, who had been a test pilot for the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bombers and had participated in

50268-575: Was being affected by fires. The heat in some areas was reported to have reached a temperature of up to 1,800 degrees. Civilians who stayed at their homes or attempted to fight the fire had virtually no chance of survival. Historian Richard B. Frank has written that "the key to survival was to grasp quickly that the situation was hopeless and flee". Soon after the start of the raid news broadcasts began advising civilians to evacuate as quickly as possible, but not all did so immediately. The foxholes which had been dug near most homes offered no protection against

50504-417: Was commanded by Colonel Lewis R. Parker. He was sent to England to obtain combat experience with the Eighth Air Force and was shot down on his second mission over Germany on 6 March 1944. He was replaced by Harman in April 1944, and Saunders succeeded him as commander of the 58th Bombardment Wing. Brigadier General Haywood S. Hansell Jr. , the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff and the Acting Assistant Chief of

50740-399: Was complicated by the long distance from the United States, the poor state of communications within the theater, and the low priority of CBI, especially with regard to shipping. The proviso at Sextant that Matterhorn shipments not materially affect other approved operations in CBI conflicted with the tight timetable. High priority passengers and freight traveled by air. The advance party of

50976-461: Was concurrent with the creation of air forces to defend Hawaii and the Panama Canal . The air districts were converted in March 1941 into numbered air forces with a subordinate organization of 54 groups. The likelihood of U.S. participation in World War II prompted the most radical reorganization of the aviation branch in its history, developing a structure that both unified command of all air elements and gave it total autonomy and equality with

51212-450: Was conducted in daylight, with the bombers flying in formation at high altitudes. It caused extensive damage, with almost 28,000 buildings being destroyed. This was the most destructive raid to have been conducted against Japan, and LeMay and the Twentieth Air Force judged that it demonstrated that large-scale firebombing was an effective tactic. The failure of a precision bombing attack on an aircraft factory in Tokyo on 4   March marked

51448-457: Was created in June 1941 to provide the air arm greater autonomy in which to expand more efficiently, to provide a structure for the additional command echelons required by a vastly increased force, and to end an increasingly divisive administrative battle within the Army over control of aviation doctrine and organization that had been ongoing since the creation of an aviation section within the U.S. Army Signal Corps in 1914. The AAF succeeded both

51684-470: Was designed for. As for the oil industry, the oil refineries in the Dutch East Indies, primarily the ones at Palembang , could be attacked by B-29s based in India, staging through Ceylon. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the Matterhorn plan on 10 April 1944, but cut the force to just one wing of four groups. In recognition of the accelerated schedule for the capture of the Marianas, the second B-29 wing would be sent there instead, or to Australia if bases in

51920-407: Was established on 7 August 1943, and given command status on 1 June 1944. as the AAF Personnel Distribution Command. This organization was ordered discontinued, effective 30 June 1946." The primary combat unit of the Army Air Forces for both administrative and tactical purposes was the group , an organization of three or four flying squadrons and attached or organic ground support elements, which

52156-415: Was formed in June 1943, but the first production B-29 did not arrive until August. In the meantime, crews trained on fifty Martin B-26 Marauders . These were subsequently replaced by B-17s, which were more like the B-29. By November 1943 there was still only one B-29 between twelve crews. A month later they had flown an average of just 18½ hours in the B-29, and only 67 commander-pilots were fully qualified on

52392-452: Was in charge of construction of the air bases; Colonel William C. Kinsolving, a petroleum engineer, had the task of laying two four-inch (100 mm) pipelines to the airfields. They reported to Colonel Thomas Farrell , who headed the CBI Construction Service. Each air base required four months' work by an engineer aviation battalion. To meet the April deadline, the engineer units should have been in place by December, but they were still in

52628-405: Was intended to cause civilian casualties as a means of disrupting production at major industrial facilities. Each of XXI Bomber Command's three wings was allocated a different altitude to bomb from, in bands between 5,000 feet (1,500 m) and 7,000 feet (2,100 m). These altitudes were calculated to be too high for the light Japanese anti-aircraft guns to reach, and below the effective range of

52864-434: Was never officially recognized by the United States Navy , and was bitterly disputed behind the scenes at every opportunity, it nevertheless succeeded as a pragmatic foundation for the future separation of the Air Force. Under the revision of AR 95–5, the Army Air Forces consisted of three major components: Headquarters AAF, Air Force Combat Command, and the Air Corps. Yet the reforms were incomplete, subject to reversal with

53100-401: Was now scheduled to commence on 15 June 1944. The new timetable was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 March. In March 1943, Arnold had asked the Committee of Operations Analysts (COA) to prepare an analysis of strategic targets in Japan whose destruction might affect the course of the war. Most of Japan's war industries lay within the 1,500-mile (2,400 km) range of a B-29 with

53336-576: Was over " the Hump ", as the air ferry route to China over the Himalayas was called. Until the Burma Road could be reopened by the ground forces, all the fuel, ammunition and supplies used by American forces in China had flown over the Hump. It was estimated that 200 C-87 flights would be required to support each VLR bomber group , with 2,000 C-87s in operation by October 1944 and 4,000 by May 1945. Five missions per group per month could be flown, with 168 group-months believed to be sufficient to destroy all targets in Japan within twelve months. The staff of

53572-434: Was personally headed by General Henry H. Arnold , the commanding officer of the USAAF. B-29 raids on Tokyo commenced on 24 November. The first raid targeted an aircraft engine factory on the city's outskirts, and caused little damage. XXI Bomber Command's subsequent raids on Tokyo and other cities mainly used precision bombing tactics and high explosive bombs, and were largely unsuccessful due to adverse weather conditions and

53808-410: Was prone to failure; and the carburetor produced an inefficient fuel mixture distribution. All of these factors contributed to engine overheating, which sometimes resulted in fires owing to an extensive use of magnesium . In spite of 2,000 engineering changes, the engines remained susceptible to overheating. Ostensibly, the B-29 was intended to defend the Western Hemisphere against encroachment by

54044-406: Was removed from XXI Bomber Command's target list. By the end of the war, 75 percent of the sorties conducted by XXI Bomber Command had been part of firebombing operations. United States Army Air Forces The United States Army Air Forces ( USAAF or AAF ) was the major land-based aerial warfare service component of the United States Army and de facto aerial warfare service branch of

54280-400: Was running at full capacity. In fact, the bombers would have to destroy 5,000,000 short tons (4,500,000 t) of capacity to have any impact on production. The JWPC also considered targeting, but favored shipping and the oil industry, which could more easily be attacked from bases in Australia. The staff of the USAAF accepted the importance of targeting shipping, but it was not what the B-29

54516-464: Was small in comparison to European air forces. Lines of authority were difficult, at best, since GHQ Air Force controlled only operations of its combat units while the Air Corps was still responsible for doctrine, acquisition of aircraft, and training. Corps area commanders continued to exercise control over airfields and administration of personnel, and in the overseas departments, operational control of units as well. Between March 1935 and September 1938,

54752-477: Was that under Matterhorn the B-29s would stage through Chengdu in Sichuan province in western China, whereas under Drake they would stage through Guilin in eastern China. Moving the B-29 bases further back from the front lines allowed the ground defense to be dispensed with, and the air defenses scaled back to two fighter groups that would be assigned to Major General Claire Chennault 's China-based Fourteenth Air Force . Supplies would be stockpiled in China by

54988-407: Was the largest of any single air raid of the whole World War II, including the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki , when each raid is considered by itself. The casualties and damage caused by the raid and absenteeism by workers in Tokyo considerably disrupted the Japanese war economy. LeMay and Arnold considered the operation to have been a significant success on the basis of reports made by

55224-404: Was the rough equivalent of a regiment of the Army Ground Forces . The Army Air Forces fielded a total of 318 combat groups at some point during World War II, with an operational force of 243 combat groups in 1945. The Air Service and its successor the Air Corps had established 15 permanent combat groups between 1919 and 1937. With the buildup of the combat force beginning 1 February 1940,

55460-480: Was threatened. Operation Matterhorn 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Operation Matterhorn was a military operation of the United States Army Air Forces in World War II for strategic bombing by Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers based in India, Ceylon, and China. Targets included industrial facilities in Japan, China and Southeast Asia. The B-29s were based in India but staged through bases around Chengdu in China's Sichuan province. Since

55696-515: Was to enlarge and improve five existing runways in the flatlands west of Calcutta to bring them up to B-29 standards. Five airfields were selected on 17 November: Bishnupur, Piardoba , Kharagpur , Kalaikunda and Chakulia . Wolfe's advance party from the XX Bomber Command inspected the fields in December and accepted all but Bishnupur, for which Dudhkundi was substituted. Work was carried out by US Army engineer units with imported materials and local labor. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth E. Madsen

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